Full text of "A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will : which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame"

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A careful and ftridl

ENQUIRY

INTO

The 77todern prevailing Notions

OF THAT

FREEDOM of WILL,

Which is fuppofed to be eflential
T O

Moral Agency^ T^ertue and VicCj
Reward "^xi^ Punijhment^ Praife
.and Blame.

ByJONATHANEDWARDSjA.M.

Pallor of the Church in Stsckbridge,
Rom* ix. 16. // is not cf him that willeth — —

B CIS TO N, N. E.

Printed axid Sold hj S. Kt/Teland, m Qiieen-flreety,

Mdccliv,

THE

PREFACE.

???|gANY

find much Fault with the callinp:

S!2P 'i^Pp profeffing Chriftians, that differ one from
W^^^^^ another in ibme Matters of Opinion, by
ItmiSIM^ ^^^'^nd: Names-, efpecially calling them by
m^i^illMI ^^^- Names of particular Men, who have
didinguifhed themfelves as Maintainers and
Promoters of thofe Opinions : as the calling fome pro-
telling Chriilians Jrminians, from ArminiUs ; others Ari-
ans, trom Arius ; others Socinians, from SocinuSy and the
like. They think it unjufl in it felf -, as it feems to fdp-
pofe and fuggeft, that the Perfons mark'd out by thefe
Names, received thofe Do6trines which they entertain,
out of Regard to, and Reliance on thofe Men after whom
they are named ; as tho' they made them their Rule : in
the fame Manner, as the Followers of Christ are called
Chriftians \ after his Name, whom they regard & depend
upon,^ as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is
an unjud and groundlefs Imputation on thofe that go un-
der the foremention'd Denominations, Thus (fay they)
there is not the lead Ground to fuppofe, that the chief
Divines, who embrace' the Scheme of Dodrine which is
by many called Arminianifm, believe it the more becaufe
Anninius believed it : and that there is no Reafon to
think any other, than that they fincerely and impartially
ftudy the holy Scriptures, and enquire after the Mind
of Chrift, with as much Judgment and Sincerity, as any
ol thole that call them by thcfe Names j that they feek
after Truth, and are not careful whether they think ex-
aaiy ^sArminius^id ; yea, that in fome Things they
adualiy differ from him. This Pradice is alfo elteemed

A 2 actually

The P R E F ^ C E.

adlnally injurious on this Account, that it is fuppofed na-
turally ro lead the Multitude to imagine theDifference be-
tween Perfons thus named & others,to be greater than it is •,
^a, as tho' it were lb great, that they muft be as it were,
another Species of Beings. And they objedl againflic'
as arifing from an uncharitable, narrow,conTradled Spirit ;
which, they fay, qommonly inclines Perfons to confine
all thax is good to themfelves and their own Party, and
to make a wide Diftinction between themfelves and \
others, and ftigmatize thofe that differ from them with '
odious Names. They fay moreover, thac the keeping
up fuch a Diitindlion of Najnes has a diredt Tendency
to uphold Diliance 3c Difaffedion, and keep alive mutual
Hatred among Chriftians, who ought all to be united in \
Friendfhip and Charity, however they can't in allThings j
think alike. i

I confefs, thefe Things are very plaufible. And I will '
not deny, that there are fome unhappy Confcquences of j
this Diftinvflion of Narnes^ and that Men's Infirmities and i
evil Difpofitions oFten make an ill In-iprovement of it. ^
But yet I humbly conceive, thefe Objections are carried <
far beyond Reafon.- The Generality of Mankind are J
difpofed enough, and a great Deal too much, to Uncha- ;
ritablenefs, and to be cenforious and binter towards thefe i
thac differ from them in religious Opinions : which evil \
Temper of Mind will take Occafion to exerc it felf, from •
many Things in themfelves innocent, ufeful & necelfiry. \
hut yet there is no NeceiTuy to fuppofe, that the thus j
didingulfhing Perfons of different Opinions by different j
Names, arifes mainly from an uncharitable Spirit. Ic i
niay arife from the Difpofition there is in Mankind ^
(whom God has dillinguifhed with an Ability and In- §
clination for S})eech) to improve the Benefit of Language, .'
in the proper Ufe and Defign of Nanies, given to I'hings \
which they have often Occafion to fpeak of, or fignify i
their Minds about ; v-'hich is to enable them to exprefs ^
their Ideas with Eafe and Expedition, v^ithout being in- j
cumber'd v/ith an ohfcure and diiiicuk Circumlocution. '
j\nd the thus di(l:inr^uin"iint^ Pcrf-^^ns ofdifi-crenc Opinions !
^ '• " " hi]

i:\ic P R E F A C E.

Ill

in religious Matters, may not imply, nor infer any more
than that there is a Difference, and that the Difference
is fuch as we find we have often Occafion to take Notice
of, and make Mention of. That which we have frequent
Occafion to fpeak of ('whatever it be„ that gives the Oc-
cafion) this wants a Name : and 'tis always a. Defe<5t in
Language, in fuch Cafes, to be obliged to make ufe of a
Defcription, inftead of a Name. Thus we have often
Occafion to fpeak of thofe who are the Defcendants of
rhe ancient Inhabitants of France^ who were Subjeds or
Heads of the Government of that Land, and fpake the
Language peculiar to it ; in Diftindion from the Dc-
fce^ndants of the Inhabitants of Spaifj, V;ho belonged to
that Community, and fpake the Language ot that Coun-
try. And therefore we find the great Need of diftinifb
Names to fignify thcfe different Sorrs of People, and the
great Convenience of thofe dillinguifhing Words, French^
and Spaniards •, by which the Signification of our Minds
is quick and eafy, and our Speech is delivered from the
Burden of a continual Reireration of diffufe Defcrip-
tions, with which if mud otherwife be embarafs'd.

I'hat the Difference of the Opinions of thofe, who in
their general Scheme of Divinity agree with thefe two
noted Men, Calvin^ and Jrmbnus^\s a'l^hing there is often
Occafion ro fpeak of, is what the Pradice of the latter, in
felf confeffes ; who are often, in their Difcourfes and
Writings, taking Notice of the fup^)ofed abfurd and
pernicious Opinions of the former Sort. And therefore
the making Ufe of different Names in this Cafe can't rea-
fonably beobjededagainff,or condemned, as aXhing which
mufi: come from fo bad a Caufe as they alTign. It is
eafy to be accounted for, without fuppofing it to arife
from any other Source, than the Exigence and natural
Tendency of the State of Things ; considering theFaculty
and Difpofition God has given Mankind, to expsefs
Things which they have frequent Occafion to mention,
by certain diftingiiifning Names. It is an Effed that is
fimilar to what we fee arife, in innumerable Cales -which
•are parallel, where cheCaufe is not ai all blame-wonhy.

Neverwhelefs,

iv The PREFACE.

Neveithelefs, at firft I had Thoughts of carefully a-
void.ng the Ufe of the Appellation, JrmMa^, in this
i reatile. But I foon found 1 Ihould be put to greacDiffi-
culty by It ; and that myDifcoiiife would be fo incumber'd
with an otren repeated Circumlocution, inftead of a '
JName. -which would exprefs the Thing intended, as well-:
r!^L l"V^^' ^ altered niy Purpofe. And therefore I '
muftafttheExcufeot fuch as are apt to be offended
wi£h Things of this Nature, that I have fo freely ufed the
i erm JrmmiM in the following Difcourfe. 1 profcfs it
to be without any Defign, to ftigmatize Perfons of any
Sort with a Name of Reproach, pr at all to make theti
appear more odious. If when I had Occafion to fneak '
of tnofc Divines who are commonly called by this nLc,. -
Ihad ..nfteadof fty ling them ^n;;i;;/.«, called :h,m
thee Ma,, as Dr. Whitby does Cahtniftic Divines ; it nrc^
bably would not have been taken any better, ^r tho'c

lfj.7 ^ t'"" "^.TP""' ""' ™°''^ g"'''^ Manners. I
bave,done as I would be done by, in thisMatter. How-
ever the Perm Cahinift is in thefe Days, among moft, a

vef iV ,f "'"■ i^'P™'''' ^''^" the Term °m/«4 ;
^ I r r"L"°i "''^ " ^' ^" «"^''"«'to be called a Cahi.
^¥, for Dirtinaion's Sake : tho' I utterly difclain, a
Dcpenaance on C,hi„, or believing the Dodrines which
I k,K]Decau<e he believed and taught thein ; and can-
not juflly be charged with believing in every Thin<. jull
TiS he taught. ^ o J^^^

But left I fliould really be an Occafion of Injury to
fome Perfons I would here give Notice, that tho' 1 au-
rally fpeak of tnat Doftrine, concerning Free-will a°nd
moral Agency, which I oppofe, as an Jr%ima, Doftrine
^•et 1 would not be underftood. that every Divine o^
Author whom I haveOccafion to mention as maintaini,!^
that Doanne, was properly an .^rmimar,, or one of thai
Sort which IS commonly called by that Name. Some
of them went far beyond the Jnm>ua>is : And I would
by no Cleans charge ^r«;M/^w in general with all tlie
corruprDoitnne, which thefe maintain'd. Thus for In-
stance. V. would be very injurious, it I ihould rank Jr.

%. mtmart

The PRE F A C E. v

minian Divines in general, with fuch Auihors as. Mr.
Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his
Dodrines in Abhorrence •, tho' he agrees, for the mod
Part, v;ich /Irminiam^ in hisi Notion of the Freedom of
the Will. And on the other Hand, tho' I fuppofe this
Notion to be a leading Article in the Aiininian Scheme,
that which, if pUrfued in it's Confequences, will t:ru]y
infer, or naturally lead to all the reft -, yet 1 don't charge
all that h^ve. held this Dodrine, with being Arm fiians.
For whatever may be the Confequences of the Doftrine
really, yet fome that hold this Dodrine, may not own
nor fee thefe Confequences -, and it ^would be unjuft, ia
many Inftances, to charge every Author v/ith believing
and maintaining all the real Confequences of his avowed
Dodrines. And I defire it may be particularly noted,
that tho' I have Occafion in the following Difcourfe,
often to mention theAuthor of the Book cninkdyJpi EJTay
en tbeFreedom of the tVill^ in God & the Creature^z.^ holding
that Notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppofe \ yec
I don't mean to call him an Arminian : however in that
Dodrine he agrees with Jrminians, and departs from the
current and general Opinion of Calvimjls, If the Author
of that Eflay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to,
he doubtlefs was not one that ought to bear that Name.
But however good aDivine he was in many RefpedSjyeC
that-particular Arminian Dodrine which he maintain'd,
is never the better for being held by fuch an One : nor
is there lefs Need of oppofing it on that Account ; but
rather is there the more Need of it j as it v^^ill be likely
to have the more pernicious Influence, for being taught by
a Divine of his Name and Charader ; fuppofing the
Dodrine to be wrong, and in it lelf to be of an ill Ten-
dency.

I have Nothing further to fay by Way of Preface;
but only to befpeak the Reader's Candour, and calm At-
tention to what I have written. The Subjcd is of fuch
Importance, as to demand Attention, and the mod tho-
rough Confideration. Of all Kinds of Knowlege that
we can ever obtain, the Knowledge of God, and the

Knowlege

The PREFACE:

Knowlege of our felves, are the molt importanr. As
Religion is the great Bufinefs, Tor which we are created,
and on which our Happinefs depends -, and as Religion
confids in an Intercourfe between our felves and our
Maker •, and fo has it's Foundation in God's Nacure and
-our's, and in the Relation that God and we iiand in to
each other ; therefore a true Knowledge of both mull
be needful in Order to true Religion. But the Know-
ledge of our felves confilts chiefly in right Apprehen-
fions concerning thofe two chief Faculties ot our Na-
ture, the Under/} anding and fFilL Both are very impor-
tant : yet the Science of the latter mull be confefs'd to
be of greateft Moment •, in as much as all A^ertue and
Religion have their Seat more immediately in the Will,
confiding more efpecially in right Ads and Habits of
this Faculty. And the grand Queftion about the Free-
dom of the Will, is the main Point that belongs to the
Science of the Will, l^herefore I fay, the Impor-
tance of this Subjed greatly demands the Attention ofj
Chriftiafks, and efpecially of Divines. But as to myi
Manner of handling the Subjed, I will be far from pre- S
fiuning to fay, that it is fuch as demands the Attention \
of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to :
own, that in this Matter I depend on the Reader'sC(j«r/<f/5'. i
But Qnly thus far I may have fome Colour for putting in j
a Claim ; that if the Reader bedifpofed to pafs his Cen- j
fere on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently ^j
heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. |
However, this is what 1 Would humbly a/k of myReaders ; \
together with the Prayers of all fincere Lovers of Truths ■
that I may have much of that Spirit which Chrift pro- i
mifed his Difciples, which guides into ail Truth ; and j
that the bleffed and powerful Influences of this Spirii^
would make Truth vidorious in the World. _1

■J« 1 »ii » r j i*— ■ — «l»r » I . I ,1 , : iw r' fci m I

General TABLE
Oi the CO NT E NTS.

PART I.

Wherein are explain'd various Terms and Things belonging to
the Subject of the enfuing Difcourfe.

SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the //-?//, Pag. i,^r.
SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.
Pag. 5.
SECT. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Nc"
cejfity^ Impojfibility^ Inability ^ &c. and of Contingence, Pag. 1 3.
SECT. IV. Of theDirtindionof «^/«r«^/andw2<?r^^/Necei^lty
and Inability. Pag. 20.
SECT. V . Concerning the Notion of Liberty^ and of ?n{jral
Agency, Pago 27.

P A R T II.

Wherein it is confidered, Whether there is, or can be any
fuch Sort of Freecom of Will, as that wherein Arminians
place the EfTence of the Liberty of all moral Agents ; and
whether any fuch Thing ever was^ or can be conceived of.

OECT. I. Shewing the manifeft Incondftence of the Ar7ni^
^ nian Notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in the Will's
[df-determining Power. Pag. 31.

SECT. II. Several fuppofed Ways of evading the foregoing
Reafoning confidered. Pag. 35.

SECT. III. Whether any Event whatfocvci, and VoUttQn
%\ particular, caci come to pals w' hut a Caujc of it's Exiftence.

Jr. Pag. 41.

a ^ Necffj SECl'

r/5g C O N T E N T S.

SECT. IV. Whether Volition can arife without aGaufe,thro'
the A£livity of the Nature of the Soul. Pag. 47.

SECT. V. Shewing that if the Things alTerted in thefc
Evafions fhould be fuppofed to be true, they are altogether
impertinent, and can't help the Caufe of Arminian Liberty ;
and how this being the State of the Cafe, Arminian Writers are
obliged to talk inconfiflently. Pag. 51.

SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things
which are perfecflly indiffererit^ in the View of theMind. Pag. 55.

SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will
conlifting in Indifference. Pag. 63.

SECT. VIII. Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will,
as oppofite to all NeceJJtty, Pag. 73.

SECT. IX. Of the Connexion of the Ads of the mil
with the Didlates of the Underjlanding. Pag. 76,

SECT. X, Volition necefianly connedled with the Influ-
ence of Motives. With particular Obfervation of the great In-
confiftence of Mr. Chubh''s Affertions and Reafonings, about-
the Freedom of the Will. Pag. 84

SECT. XI, The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of^
the Volitions of moral Agents. Paa;. 98.

SECT. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Vo- .
litions of moral Agents, inconjiflent with fuch a Contingence of 1
thole Volitions, as is without all Neceffity. Pag. 117. "^

And infers a Neceffity of Volition, as much as an alfolute \
Decree. Pag. 122, ]

SECT. XIII. Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of moral \
Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, ^
yet they muft be necejfary^ m fuch a Senfe, as to overthrow \
Arminian Liberty. Pao". 131. 1

PART III. j

Wherein is enquired. Whether any fuch Liberty of Will as \
Ar?fiinians hold, be ncccfTary to moral Agency, Vertue and ^
Vice, Praife and Difpraife, ^c. \

CECT. I. God's ?noral Excellency necejfary^ yet veriuous and 1

^^ Praife-worthy. Pag. 13c. \

SECT. IL The A^s of the Will of the human Soul of ^

Jesus Christ mccffarily holy^ yet veriuous^ praife-ivorthy^ rezvar- ]

^'^k\^.^: ^ P^g- 13?- \

SECT. III. The QiS&- ' fuch as are ^iven up cfGsd to Sin^ \

i. • ' 1

Ihe CONTENTS.

and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necejftty and Inahiliff
to be confident with Blame-worthinefs. Pag. 153,

SECT. IV. Command^ and Obligation to Obedience^ con-
Jijient with moral Inability tO obey. Pag. 1 59;

• SECT. 'V. That iSzWn'/y of Defires and Endeavours, which
is fiippofed to excufe in the Non-performance of Things in
themfelves good, particularly confidered. Pag. 170.

' SECT. VI. Liberty of Indifference^ not only not necejfary to
Vertue, but utterly inconfiftent with it : and all, either vertuous,
or vicious Habits and Inclinations^ inconfiftent with Arminian
Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency. Pag. 178.

SECT. VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconfiftent
with all Influence of Motive and Inducement^ in either vertuous
or vicious Adions. Pag. 185.

PART IV.

Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafonings of Arminians^ in
Support and Defence of their Notions of Liberty, moral
Agency, ^^. and againft the oppofiteDodrine, are confidered.

OECT. I. The EJfence of the Vertue and Vice of the Difpo-
^ fitions of the Heart, and A6ts of the Will, lies not in their
Ca^e^ but their Nature, Pag. 192.

. Sect. II. The Falfenejs and Inconfiflence of that metaphy-
fical Notion of ASiion and Agency^ which feems to be generally
entertain'd by the Defenders of the foremention'd Notions of
Liberty, moral Agency, ^c. Pag. 198.

' SECT. III. The Reafons why fome think it contrary to
common Senfe^ to fuppofeThings which are necejjary^ to be worthy
of cither Praife or Blame. Pag. 206.

SECT. IV. It is agreable to common Senfcy and the natural
Notions of Mankind., to fuppofe moral Necefiity to be confident
with Praife and Blame, Reward and Punilhment. Pag. 212.

SECT. V. Concerning thofe0.y.^^wij, That this Scheme of
NecefTity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of
Sin, or the obtaining Vertue and Holinefs, vain and to noPur-.
pofe ; And that it makesMen no more than meer Machines., in
Affairs of Morality and Religion. Pag. 220.

SECT. VI. Concerning that Objefficn againft the Dodrine
which has been maintain'd,That it agrees with the StoicalDoC'
%ine of Fate^ and the Opinion of Mr. Hohbes. Pag. 227,

SECT. VII. Concexning the Neciffity of the diifine Jfill,
.Pa^. 230. SECT.

The CONTENTS.

• SECT. VIII. Some further Ohje5lions againft the moral
Necefjjty of God's Volitions^ confidered. Pag. 239.

SECT. IX. Concerning that Qbjecilon againft the Do6trine
which has been maintain'd. That it makes God the Author of
Sin. ' Pag. 252,

SECT. X. Concerning Sin's fir ft Entrance into the World,

Pag. 268.

SECT. XI. Of a fuppofed Inconfijience of thefe Principles
with God's moral CharaSier. Pag. 270.

SECT. XII. Of a fuppofed Tendency of thefe Principles
to Atheifm^ and Licentioufmfs, Pag. 274.

SECT. XIII. Concerning that ObjeSiion againft the Rea-
foaing by which the Cahini/ii cDo^irinQ is fupported, That it is
metaphyfical and ahjlrufe. Pag. 278,

Tihe CONCLUSION.

X JITHAT Treat?nent this Difcourfe may probably meet with,

' ^ from fome Perfons. Pag. 285.

Confequences concerning feveral Cahini/iic Do6lrines ; fuch as

an univerfal^ decifwe Providence, Pag. 286. \

"^ThQ X.ot2i\ Depravity 2ind Corruption of Man* s Nature. Pag. 287. \
Efficacious Grace. Pag. 288. {

An univerfal and abfolute Decree ; and abfolute, eternal, [

perfonal Ele5lion. Pag. 28c, 1

Particular Redemption. Pag. 290. ;i

Perfeverance of Saints. Pag. 291. '.

Concerning the Treatment which Cahinifiic Writers and i]

Divines have met with. Pag. 292. 'i

The Unhappinefs of the Change lately in many Proteftant I

Countries. Pag. 293. ij

The Boldnefs of fome Writers. Ibid. \]

The cxcdkntfFi/do/n appearing in the holy Scriptures. P.ult;.

PART I.

jp<ii# ^ ^i##f#.f #®##'#f###i^«'-*^""-*'

iilit. r^^fo c^^ fS^ cS% c9Sn cfJfo ^fe ^^j .^^ S^^ Sjt S^h ^fe'$^^; #fe T^ ^k/

PART I.

Wherein are explained and ftated various
Terms and Things belonging to the Sub-
jed of the enfuing Difcourfe,

^r^ *jy* %C^

•VBf •^j^ "VB^*

«VV •W ^JtV* •\A/* "MV* •\A/' WTUt 'W* '\J0^* *^ 'W

Section I.
Concerning the Nature of the Will*

illlim^'^ n^ay polTibly be thought, that there Is na
^v^^^dj^^^'^^i^ great Need of going about to define or delcribs.
Sh%^ T d^<^ the Will \ this Word being generally as v/ell
ll^^ll^ underftood as any other Words we can ule to
^^lllf 1^ explain it : And fo perhaps it would be, had
^^P^S'^^^^ not Philofophers, Metaphyikians and Polemic
Divines brought the Matter into Obfcurity by the Things
they have faid of it. But fmce it is fo, I think it may be of
fome Ufe, and will tend to the greater Clcarnefs in the fol-
lowing Difcourfe, to fay a few Things concerning it.

And therefore I obferve, that the IVill (without ariy meta-
phyfical Refining) is plainly, That by which the Mind chufes any
Thing. The Faculty of the JVill is that Faculty or rower
or Principle of Mind' by which it is capable oi chufing : AnA(ft
of the Will is the fame as an A&. of Chujmg or Choice,

B If

2 The Nature of the Will Part L

If any think 'tis a more perfe<5l Definition of the Will, to
fay, that it is that by which the Soul either chufei or refufes ;
I am content with it : tho' I think that 'tis enough to fay, It's
that by which the Soul chufes : For in every A(5t of Will
"whatfoever, the Mind chufes one Thing rather than another ;
it chufes fomething rather than the Contrary, or rather than
the Want or Non-Exiflence of that Thing. So in every A61
cf Refufal, the Mind chufes the Abfence of the Thing re-
fufed J The Pofitive and the Negative are fet before the Mind
for it's Choice, and it chufes the Negative ; and the Mind's
making it's Choice in that Cafe is properly the A61 of the
Will : The Will's determining between the two is a volun-
tary determining ; but that is the fame Thing as making a
Choice. So that whatever Names we call the A6t of theWill
by, Chufing^ Refufing^ Approving^ Difapprovtng^ Likings Dijliking^
Embracing^ RejeLiing^ Deterfniningy DireSf'tng^ Commanding^ Por^
biddings hidming or being averfe^ a being pkafed or dtfpleas' d with i
all may be reduced to this of Chuftng, For the Soul to adl vo-
hntarily^ is evermore to ac^ eleiiively.

Mr. Loch * fays, " TheWill fignifies Nothing but a Power
** or Ability to prefer or chufe" And in the foregoing Page
fays, *' The Word Preferring feems bed to exprefs the A6t of
Volition ;" But adds,that " it does it not precifely ; For (fays
he) " tho' a Man would prefer Flying to Walking, yet who
*' can fay he ever wills it f" But the Inftance he mentions
don't prove that there is any Thing elfe in Willing^ but meerly
Preferring : For it fhould be confidered what is the next and
immediate Obje6t of the Will, with refpecft to a Man's
Walking, or any other external A6tion ; which is not his be-
ing removed from one Place to another -, on the Earth, or
thro' the Air ; thefe are remoter Objeds of Preference ; but
fuch or fuch an immediate Exertion of himfelf. The Thing
nextly chofen or prefer'd when a Man wills to walk, is not his
being removed to fuch a Place where he would be, but fuch
an Exertion and Motion of his Legs and Feet &c. in order to
it. And his willing fuch an Alteration in his Body in the pre-
fent Moment, is nothing elfe but his chufmg or preferring
fuch an Alteration in his Body at fuch a Moment, or his lik-
ing it better than the Forbearance of it. And God has fo
made and eftablifti'd the human Nature,the Soul being united
to a Body in proper State, that the Soul preferring or chufing
fuch an immediate Exertion or Alteration of the Body, fuch
an Alteration inftantaneoufly follows. There is nothing elfe

^ Human Underftandirg. F.dit. 7. Vol. LP. 1974

Se<a. I. The Nature of th£ Will 3

in the A<5llngs of my Mind, that I am confcious of while I
walk, but only my preferring or chufmg, thro' fucceffive Mo-
ments, that there fhould be fuch Alterations of my external
Senfations and Motions ; together with a concurring habitual
Expectation that it will be fo ; having ever found by Experi-
ence, that on fuch an immediate Preference, fuch Senfations
andMotions do adually inftantaneouny,& conftantly arife. But
it is not fo in the Cafe of Flying : Tho' a Man may be faid
remotely to chufe or prefer 1* lying ; yet he don't chufe or pre-
fer, incline to or defire, under Circumftances in View, any-
immediate Exertion of the Members of his Body in order to
it ; becaufe he has no Expedation that he fliould obtain the
defired End by any fuch Exertion ; and he don't prefer or in-
cline to any bodily Exertion or Effort under this apprehended
Circumftance,of it's being wholly in vain. So that if we care-
fully diftinguifh the proper Objeds of the feveral Ads of the
Will, it will not appear by this, and fuch-like Inftances, that
there is any Difference between Volition and Preference ; or that
a Man's chufmg, liking befl, or being beft pleafed with a
Thing, are not the fame with his willing that Thing ; as they
feem to be according to thofe general and more natural Noti-
ons of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus
an A(5t of the Will is commonly exprefs'd by it'spleaftngaMan
to do thus or thus ; and a Man's doing as he wills^ and doing
"as he pleafesy are the fame Thing in common Speech.

Mr. Locke fays, f " TheWill is perfecSlly diftinguifh'd from
*' Defire ; which in the very fame Action may have a quite
•' contrary Tendency from that which our Wills ht us uporu
*' A Man (fays he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to
*' ufe Perfwafions to another, which, at the fame Time I am
" fpeaking, I may wilh may not prevail on him. In this
" Cafe 'tis plain the Will and Defire run counter." I don't
fuppofe, that JVill and Defire are Words of precifely the fame
Signification; /iF/7/feems to be aWord of a more generalSigni-
fication, extending to Things prefcnt and abfent, Defirs rc-
fpeds fomething abfent. I may prefer my prefent Situation
and Poflure, fuppofe fitting flill, or having my Eyes open,
and fo may will it. But yet I can't think they are fo
entirely diflinct, that they can ever be properly faid to rua
counter. A Man never, in any Inftance, wills any Thing
contrary to his Defires, or defires any Thing contrar)^ to his
Will. The foremention'd Inflance, which Mr. Locke pro-
duces, don't prove that he ever .does. He may, on fomeCon-
^deration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a T'ea-
B 2 deucy

f HaiB. Und, Vo!. L F. 205, 204,,.

4 the Nature oftSeW^. Part I.

dency to perfwade ancFther, and ftill may defire that they may
not perfwade him : But yet his Will and Defire don't run
counter at all : The Thing which he wills, the very fame he
defires ; and he don't will a Thing, and defire the contrary'
in any Particular. In this Inftance, it is not carefully obferv-
ed, what is the Thing will'd, and what is the Thing defired :
If it were, it would be found that Will and Defire don't clalh
in the leaft. T]ie Thing will'd on fome Confideration, is to
utter fueh Words ; and certainly, the fame Confideration fo
influences him, that he don't defire the contrary \ all Things
confidered, he chufes to utter fuch Words, and don't defire
not to utter 'em. And fo as to the Thing which Mr. Locke
fpeaks of as defired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to
perfwade, fhould not be efte<ftual to that End, his Will is
not contrary to this ; he don't will that they fhould be efFed-
ual, but rather wills that they fhould not, as he defires. In
order to prove that the Will and Defire may run counter, it
fhould be fhown that they may be contrary one to the other
in the fame Thing, or v^'ith refpe6l to the very fame Objed of
Will or Defire : But here the Objedls are two ; and in each,
taken by themfelves, the Will and Defire agree. And 'tis no
Wonder that they fhould not agree in different Things, how-
ever little diftinguifhed they are in their Nature. The Will
may not agree with the W^ill, nor Defire agree with Defire, in
different Things. As in this very Inftance which yix,- Locke
mentions, a Perfon may, on fome Confideration, defire to ufe
Perfwalions, and at the fame Time may defire they may
not pn^vail ; But yet no Body will fay, that Defire runs coun-
ter to Defire ; or that this proves that Defire is perfectly a "
diflin6t Thing from Defire.—— The like might be obfervecl of
the other Inftance Mr. Locke produces, of a Man's defiring tci
be eafed of Pain &c.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Defire and
W'lU^ and whether Preference and Volition be precifely the fame
Things or no ; yet, I truft it will be allowed by all, that in
every A6t of Will there is an A61 of Choice ; that In
every Volition there is a *Preference,or a prevailing Inclination
of the Soul, whereby the Soul, at that Inftant, is out of a
State of perfect Indifference, with refped to the direct Object
of the Volition. So that in every Acf , or going forth of the
Will, there is fomePreponderation of the Mind or Inclination,
one Way rather than another ; and the Soul had rather have
or do one Thing than another, or than not to have or do that
Thing ; and that there, where there is -abfolutely no prefer-
ring or chuilng, but a perfed continuing Equilibrium, therein
uo Volition.

Section

Se<a.II. Of the Determination of the Will. 5

Section II.
Concerning the Determination of the WilL

T^ determining the IViU^ if the Phrafe be ufed with any Mean-.
*-^ ing, mull be ivXtx^^t^^caufing that the A£i of theWill or Choice
Jhould be thus, and not otherwife : And the Will is faid to be de-
termined, when, in Conlequence of feme Adion, or Influence,
its Choice is d^fecSted to, and fix'd upon a particular Objecft.
As when we fpeak of the Determination of Motion, we mean
cauiing the Motion of the Body to be fuch a Way, or in fuch
a Diredion, rather than another.

To talk of the Determination of the Will, fuppofes an
EfFed, which muft have a Caufe. If theWill be determined,
there is a Determiner. This mud be fuppofed to be intend-
ed even by them that fay, theWill determmes itfelf. If it be
fo, the Will is both Determiner & determined ; it is a Caufe
that ads and produces Effeds upon it feif, and is the Objed
of its own Influence and Adion.

With refped to that grand Enquiry, IFhat determmes th$
IVill, it would be very tedious and utineceilary at prefent to
enumerate and examine all the various Opinions, which have
been advanced concerning this Matter ; nor is it needful that
I ihould enter into a particular Difquifition of all Points deba-
ted in Difputes on that Quefl:ion, Whether the Will always fol^
lozvs the laji Dilate of the Underjlanding, It is fuflicient to my
prefent Purpofe to fay, — - It is that Motive, zvhich, as it ftands
in the View of the Mind, is thejirongejl, that determims the Will: —
But it may be neceffary that I (hould a little explain my
Meaning in this.

By Motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites
or invites the Mind to Volition, whether that be one Thing
fmgly, or many Things conjundly. Many particular Things
may concur and unite their Strength to induce the Mind ;
•and when it is fo, all together are as it were one complex
Motive. And when I fpeak of the Jirongeft Motive, I have
Refped to the Strength of the whole that operates to induce
to a particular Ad of Volition, whether that be the Strength
of one Thing alone, or of many together.

-^ I What-

6 What determines the Will Part I.

Whatever is a Motive, in this Senfe,muft be fomething that
is extant in the View or Apprehenfton of the Vnderjianding^ or per-
ceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to
will or a(5t any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is
feme Way or other in the Mind's view ; for what is wholly
unperceived, and perfe<5tly out of the Mind's view,can't afFea
the Mind at all. 'Tis moft evident, that nothing is in the
Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwifc
than as it is perceiv'd or tho't of.

And I think it muft alfo be allowed by all, that every Thing
that is properly called a Motive, Excitement €r Inducement
to a perceiving willmg Agent, has fome Sort and Degree of
Tendency y or Advaniuge to move or excite the Will, previous to
the Effect, or to the A6t of the Will excited. This previous
Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Mo-
tive, That Motive which has a lefs Degree of previous Ad-
vantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs
inviting, as it ftands in the View of the Mind, is what I call
a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears moft
inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Un-
derftanding or Apprehenfion, the greateft Degree of previous
Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the
Jirotigejl Motive. And in this Senfe, I fuppofe the Will is al-
ways determined by the ftrongeft Motive.

Things, that exift in the* View of the Mind, have their
Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will,
from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Cir-
cumftances of the T^hing view'd^ the Nature and Circumftances
of the Mind that viewsy and the Degree &Manner of its Fieiu ;
which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration
of. But fo much I think may be determin'd in general,with-
out Room for Controverfy, that whatever is percei|^d or ap-
prehended by an intelligent & voluntary Agent, which has the
Nature and Influence of a Motive to Vplitipn or Choice, is
confider'd or view'd as good ; nor has it any Tendency to in-
vite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree
than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay,
th'dt Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance
they make, to engage the Mind to ele6t them, fome other
Way than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is ab-
furd. And therefore it muft be true, in fome Senfe, that the
^il/ always is as the greate/? apparent Good is. But only, for the
right underftanding of this, two Things muft be well and
di^linctly obferved,

I. It

Se<a. IL What determines the Will 7

I. It muft be obferved in what Senfe lufe the Term Goodi
tiamcly, as of the fame Import with Agreahle. To appear
good to the Mind, as I ufe the Phrafe, is the fame as to appear
agreahle^ or feem pkafing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing ap-
pears inviting and eUgible to the Mind, or tending to engage
il's Ire ination and Choice, confidered 2iS evil or difagreabk i
nor indeed, as 'indifferent^ and neither agreable nor difagrea-
ble. But if it tends to draw the Inchnation, and move the
Will, it muft be under the Notion of that which /tt//i the
Mind. And therefore that muft have the greateft 1 endency
to attrad and engage it, which, as it ftands in the Mind's
View, fuits it beft, and pleafes it moft ; and in that Senfe, is
the greateft apparent Good : to fay otherwife, is little, if any
Thing, fhort of a dire6l and plain Contradidion.
■ ■ The Word Good^ in this Senfe, includes in its Signification,
the Removal or Avoiding of Evil, or of that which is difa-
greab.'e & uneafy. 'Tis agreable and pleafmg, to avoid what
is difagreable and difpleafing, and to have Uneafinefs remo-
ved. So that here is iacluded what Mr. Lpcke fuppofes deter-
mines the Will. For when he fpeaks of Uneaiinefs as de-
termining the Will, he muft be underftood as fuppofing that
the End or Aim which governs in the Volition orA6t of Prefe-
rencCjis the Avoiding or Removal of that Uneafinefs ; and that
is the fame Thing as chufing and feeking what is more eafy
and -agreable.

2. When I fay, the Will i« as the greateft apparent Good
is, or (as I have explain'd it) that Volition has always for its
Objcd: the Thing which appears moft agreable ; it muft be
carefully obferved, to avoid Confufion and needlefs ObjecStion,
that I fpeak of the dire^ and immediaU Obje6l of the A6t of
Volition ; and not fome Objedl that the A6t of Will has not
an immediate, but only an indire6t and remote Refpe<5t to.
Many Ads of Volition have fome remote Relation to an Ob-
je6t, that is different from the Thing moft immediately wiird
and chofen. Thus, when a Drunkard has his Liquor before
him, h he has to chufe whether to drink it,or no ; the proper
and immediate Objeds, about which his prefent Volition is
converfant, and between which his Choice now decides, are
his own Ads, in drinking the Liquor, or letting it alone ; and
this will certainly be done according to what, in the prefent
View of his Mind, taken in the whole of it, is moft agreable
to him. If he chufes or wills to drink it, and not to let it
alone ; then this Adion, as it ftands in the View of
his Mind, with all that belongs to its Appearance there, is
more agreable and pkafing than letting it alone.

B^4. But

8 What determines the WilL Part I.

But the Objecls to which this Aft of Volition may relate
more remotely, and between which his Choice may determine
more indire6tly, are the prefent Pleafure the Man expe6ts by
drinking, and the future Mifery which he judges will be the
Confequence of it : He may judge that this future Mifery,
when it comes, will be more difagreable and unpleafant, than
refraining frorn drinking now would be. Byt thefe two
Things are not the properObjeds that theAdl of Volition fpo-
ken of is nextly converfant about. For the A^ of Will fpo-
ken of is concerning prefent Drinking or Forbearing to drink.
\i he wills to 4nnk, then Drinking is the proper Objedt of the
Act of hisWill J and drinking, on fomeAccount or other, now
appears moft agreable to him, & fuits him beft. If he chufes
to refrain, then Refraining is the immediate Obje6t of his
Will, and is mofi: pleafing to him. If in the Choice he
makes in the Cafe, he prefers a prefent Pleafure to a future
Advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes }
then a leffer prefent Pleafure appears more agreable to hini
than a greater Advantage at a Diftance. If on the contrary a
future Advantage is prefer'd, then that appears moft agreable,
and fuits him beft. And fo ftill the prefent Volition is as
the greateft apparent Good at prefent is,

I have rather chofen to exprefs my felf thus, that the JPlli
always is as the greatcji apparent Good^ or as what appears moft a-
greahk^ is^ than to f.iy that the Will is determined by the greateft
apparent Good, or by what feems moft agreable ; becaufe
an appearing moft agreable or pleafmg to the Mind, and the
Mind's preferring and chufmg, feem hardly to be properly
^nd perfc6tly diftind:. If ftri6t Propriety of Speech be inlifted
on, it may more properly be faid, that tlje voluntary
Miion which is the immediate Confequence and Fruit of
the Alind's Volition or Choice, is 4eter7nined by that which
appears moft agreable, than the Preference or Choice it felf ;
t>ut that the A6t: of Volition it {t\i is always determin'd by
that in or about the Mind's View of the Object, which caufes
it to appear moft agreable. I fay, in or about the Mi?-id's View
of the Obje6t, becaufe what has Influence to render an Objedt
in View agreable, is not only what appears in the Objedl |
view'd» h\i\. ^\{o the Manner oi the View, and the State and '
Circumftances of the Mind that views.— Particularly to enume- '
rate all Things pertaining to theMind'sView of theObjecSts of
Volition, which have Influence in their appearing agreable to
the Mind, would be a Matter of no fmall Difficulty, and !
might require a Treatife by it felf, and is not neceflary to my
prefent Purpofe. I ftiall therefore only mentioa fome Things .,
ijfi general, L Oni'

Seft.II. What determines the Will. . 9

I, One Thing that makes an Obje6t propofed to Choice
agreable, is the apparent Nature and Circumjiayices of the Ohje^^
And there are various Things of this Sort, that have an Hand
in rendring the Obje<5l more or lefs agreable ; as,

I. That which appears in the Objed, which renders it
'lieautiful and pleafant, or deformed and irkfom to the Mind^;
viewing it as it is in it felf

I 2. The apparent Degree of Pleafure or Trouble attending
the Objedt, or the Confequence of it. Such Concomitants and
Confequents being view'd as Circumftances of the Obje6t, are
to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were Parts of it;
as it ftands in the Mind's View, as a propofed Obje6t of
Choice.

3. The apparent State of the Pleafure or Trouble that ap-
pears, with Refpe6t to Dijlance of Time ; being either nearer
or farther off. 'Tis a Thing in it felf agreable to the Mind,
to have Pleafure fpeedily ; and difagreable, to liave it delayed :
So that if there be two equal Degrees of Pleafure fet in the
Mind's View, and all other Things are equal, but only one
is beheld as near, and the other far off ; the nearer will ap-
pear moft agreable, and fo will be chofen. Becaufe, tho' the
Agreablenefs of the Objedls be exa6tly equal, as view'd in
Themfelves, yet not as view'd in their Circumftances ; one
of them having the additional Agreablenefs of the Circum-
ilance of Nearnefs.

II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreablenefs of
an Object of Choice, as it ftands in the Mind's View, is the
Manner of the View, If the Obje6l be fomething which ap-
pears connecfted with future Pleafure, not only will the Degree
of apparent Pleafure have Influence, but alfo the Manner of
the View, efpecially in two Refpecfts.

1 . With refpe6l to the Degree of Judgment^ or Firmnefs
of Affent^ v^ith which the Mind judges the Pleafure to be fu-
ture. Becaufe it is more agreable to have a certain Happinefs,
than an uncertain one ; and a Pleafure view'd as more proba-
ble, all other Things being equal, is more agreable to the
Mind, than that which is view'd as lefs probable.

2. With refpe6l to the Degree of the Idea of the future
Pleafure. With Regard to Things which are the SubjeA of
our Thoughts, either paft, prefent or future, we have much
more of an Idea or Apprehenfion of fomeThings than others ;
that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong.-
Thus, the Ideas we have of fenfible Things by immediate
Senfation, are ufually much more lively than thofe we have
by meer Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when ab-

fent.

lo What determines ty^^ Will. Part I.

fent. My Idea of the Sun, when I look upon it, is more
vivid, than when I-only think of it. Our Idea of the fweet
Rehfh of a dehcious Fruit is ufually ftronger when we tafte it,
than when we only imagine it. And fometimes,the Ideas we
haveof Things byContempIation,are much ftronger & clearer,
than at other Times. Thus, a Man at one Time has a
muchftronger Idea of the Pleafure which is to be enjoyed in
mating fome Sort of Food that he loves,than at another. Now
the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Senfe that Men have
of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influ-
ence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of
two Kinds of future Pleafure, which the Mind confiders of,
and are prefented for Choice, both are fuppofed exa6tly equal
^ the Judgment, and both equally certain, and all other
Things are equal, but only one of them is what the Mind
has a far more lively Senfe of, than of the other ; this has the
greateft Advantage by far to aiFect and attradl: tlie Mind, and
move theV/ill. HTis now more agreable to the Mi»d, to take
the Pleafure it has a ftrong and lively Senfe of, than that
which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former
is attended with the ftrongeft Appetite, and the greateft Unea-
finefs attends the Want of it ; and 'tis agreable to the Mind,
to have Uneafuiefs removed, and it's Appetite gratified. And
if feveral future Enjoyments are prefented together, as Com-
petitors for the Choice of the Mind, fome of them judged to
be greater, and others lefs ; the Mind alfo having a greater
Senfe and more lively Idea of the Good of fome of them, and
of others a lefs ; and fome are viewM as of greater Certainty
or Probability than others ; and thofe Enjoyments that appear
moft agreable in one of thefe Refpeds, appears leaft fo in
others : In this Cafe, all other Things being equal, the A-
greablenefs of a propofed Objedlof Choice will be in a De-
gree fome Way compounded of the Degree of Good fuppofed
by the Judgment, the Degree of apparent Probability or Cer-
tainty of that Good, and the Degree of the View or Senfe, or
Livelinefs of the Idea the Mind has, of that Good ; becaufe
all together concur to conftitute the Degree in which the Ob-
je(5l appears at prefent agreable ; and accordingly Volition
will be determined.

^ I might further obferv^e, the State of the Mind that
views a propofed Objeift of Choice, is another Thing that
contributes to the Agreablenefs or Difagreablenefs of that
Object ; the particular Temper which the Mind has by Na-
ture, or that has been introduced and eftablilhed by Educa-
idon, Example, Cuftom, or fome other Means 3 or theFrame

Sed. li. What determines the WilL 1 1

or State that the Mind is in on a particular Occafion.
That Object which appears agreable to one, does not fo to
another. And the fame Object don't always appear alike agre*
able to the fame Perfon, at different Times. It is moft a-
greable to fome Men, to follow their Reafon ; and to others,
to follow their Appetites : To fome Men, it is more agreable
to deny a vicious Inclination, than to gratify it ; Others it
fuits bcft to gratify the vileft Appetites. 'Tis more difagrea-
bJe to fome Men than others, to counter-a6t a former Refo-
Jution. In thefe Refpe<5ts, and many others which might be
mention'd, different Things will be moft agreable to different
Perfons ; and not only fo, but to the fame Perfons at diffe-
rent Times.

But pofTibly 'tis needlefs and improper, to mention the
Frame and State of the Mind, as a diftin^ Ground of the
Agreablenefs of Objeds from the other two mentioned be-
fore ; 'z;/z. The apparent Nature and Circumftances of the
Objeds view'd, 'and the .Manner of the View : Perhaps if
we ftri6tly confider the Matter, the different Temper and
State of the Mind makes no Alteration as to the Agreable-
nefs of Objects, any other Way, than as it makes the Ob-
jedts themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed,
having apparent Pleafure or Pain attending them ; And as it
occalions the Manner of the View to be different, caufes the
Idea of Beauty or Deformity, Pleafure or Uneafmefs to be
more or lefs lively.

However, I think fo much is certain, that Volition, In no
one Inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the
greateft apparent Good is, in the Manner which has been
explained. The Choice of the Mind never departs from that
which, at that Time, and with Refpedl to the dired: and
immediate Objeds of that Decifion of the Mind, appears
moft agreable and pleafmg, all Things confidered. If the im-
mediate Objedts of the Will are a Man's own A6lions, then
thofe Anions which appear moft agreable to him he wills. If
it be now moft agreable to him, all Things conridered,to walk,
then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of
what at prefent appears to him,moft agreable to fpeak, then he
choofes to fpeak : If it fuits him beft to keep Silence, then
he choofes to keep Silence. There is fcarcely a plainer
and more univerfal Didate of the Senfe and Experience of
Mankind, than that, when Men acSl voluntarily, and do what
they pleafe, then they do what fuits them beft, or what is
Cjoft agrmhk to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe,

1 2 What determines the Will Part I.

or what pleafes them, , but yet don't do what is agreahh to
them, is the fame Thing as to fay, they do what they pleafej
but don't adl their Pleafure ; and that is to fay, that they,
do what they pleafe, and yet don't do. what they pleafe.

It appears from thefe Things, that in fome Senfe, the WtU>
always follows the loft Diclate ef th^ Under/landing. But then the;
Underjianding muftbe taken in a large Senfe, as including the
whole Faculty of Perception or Apprehenfion, and not meerly
what is called Re af on ox Judgment. If by the Dictate of the;
Underftanding is meant what Rcafon declares to be beft or
moft for the Perfon^'s Happinefs, taking in the whole of his
Duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the laft
Di(5late of the Underftanding. Such a Dictate of Reafon is
quite a different Matter from Things appearing now moft
agreahle ; all Things being put together which pertain to
the Mind's prefent Perceptions, Apprehenfions or Ideas, in
any Refpect. Altho' that Didate of Reafon, when it takes
Place, is one Thing that is put into the Scales, and is to be
confidered as a Thing that has Concern in the compound In-
fluence which moves & induces the Will ; and is one Thing
that is to be confidered in eftimating the Degree of that Ap-
pearance of Good which the Will always follows ; either as
having its Influence added to other Things, or fubduded
from them. When it concurs with other Things, then its
Weight is added to them, as put into the fame Scale j but
when it is againft them, it is as a Weight in the oppofite
Scale, where it refifts the Influence of other Things : yet
it's Refiftance is often overcome by their greater Weight,and
fo the Ad of the Will is determined in Oppofition to it.

The Things which I have faid may, I hope, ferve, in fome
Meafure, to illuftrate and confirm the Pofition I laid down
in the Beginning of this Sedion, viz. That the IVill is always
determined by thejlrongeji Motive^ or by that View of the Mind
which has the greateft Degree of previous Tendency to ex-
cite Volition. But whether I have been fo happy as rightly
to explain theThing wherein conlifts the Strength of Motives,
or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the Pofition
it felf 5 which carries much of its own Evidence with it, and
is the Thing of chief Importance to the Purpofe of the en-
fuing Difcourfe : And the Truth of it, I hope, will appear
•with greater Clearnefs, before I have flnifhed what I have to
fay on the Subjed of human Liberty. ^ #

SECT.

Sed. III. The Nature of Neceffity. 1 3

Section III.

Concer?ting the Meaning of the Tenns Ne-
ceffity, Impoffibility^ Inability, &c ; and
^Contingence. . ^ ^^ - -^

THE Words iy^-f^ry, Lnpoffihle he. arc abundantly ufed
in Controverfies about Free-will and moral Agency ;
and therefore the Senfe in which they are ufed, Ihould
be clearly underftood.

Here I might fay, that a Thing is then faid to, be necejjaryy
when it mull be, and cannot be otherwife. . But this would
not properly be a Deiinition of NeceiTit)', or an Explana-
tion of the Word, any more than if I explain'd the Word
nmji^ by there being a Neceffity. The Words mujiy can^
and cannot^ need Explication as m.uch as the Words neceffary^
and unpojfihle -, excepting that the former are Words that
Children commonly ufe, and know fomething of the Mean-
ing; of earlier than the latter.

The Word yieceffary^ as ufed in common Speech, is a rela-
tive Term ; and relates to fome fuppofed Oppofition made
to the Exiftence of the Thing fpoken of, which is overcome,
or proves in vain to, hinder or alter it. That is neceffary, ia
the original and proper Senfe of the Word, which is, or will
be, notwithftanding all fuppofable Oppofition. To fay, that
a Thing is neceffary, is the fame Thing as to fay, that it is
impoITible ihould not be : But the Word impojfible is mani-
feftly a relative Term, and has Reference to fuppofed Power
exerted to bring a Thing to pais, which is infufficient for the
Effea ; As the Word utiable is relative, and has Relation to
Ability or Endeavour which is infufficient ; and as the
Word Irrefifiahle is relative, and has always Reference to
Refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome Force
or Power tending to an Eflfe6t, and is infufficient to withftand
the Power, or hinder the EfFecl. The common Notion oi^
Neceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates
Endeavour or Deiirc,

Here

14 7^^ Nature Part L

Here feveral Things are to be noted.

1. Things arefaid to be neceflary in general^ which are or
will be notwithftanding any fuppofable Oppofition from us or
othersy or from whatever Quarter. But Things are faid to be
neceflaiy to us, which are or will be notwithftanding all Op-
pofition fuppofable in the Cafe from us. The fame may be
obferved of the Word impofftble^ and other fuch like Terms.

2. Thefe Terms necejfary, impojfible, irrefijiihle Sec, do efpeci-
ally belong to the Controverfy about Liberty and moral A-
gency, as ufed in the latter of the two Senfes now mention'd,
viz. as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with Relation to any
fuppofable Oppofition or Endeavour of ours.

3. As the Word Necejftty, in it's vulgar and common Ufe,
is relative, and has always Reference to fome fuppofable in-
fufficient Oppofition ; fo when we fpeak of any Thing as ne-
ceffary to us, it is with Relation to fome fuppofable Oppofition
of our TVills, or fome voluntary Exertion or Effort of ours to
the contrary. For we don't properly make Oppofition to
an Event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofe it.
Things are faid to be what mujl be, or necejfarily are, as to us,
^htn they are, or will be, tho' we defire or endeavour the
contrary, or try to prevent or remove their Exiftence : But
fuch Oppofition of ours always either confifts in, or implies
Oppofition of our Wills.

^Tis manifeft that all fuchlike Words & Phrafes, as vulgarly
ufed, are ufed and accepted in this Manner. A Thing is
faid to be neceffary, when we can't help it, let us do what we
will. So any Thing is faid to be impoffible to us, when we
would do it, or would have it brought to pafs, and endea-
vour it ; or at leaft may be fuppofed to defire and feek it ;
but all our Defires and Endeavours are, or would be vain.
And that is faid to be irrefiflibk, which overcomes all our
Oppofition, Refiftance, and Endeavour to the contrary. And
we are to be faid Unable to do a Thing, when our fuppofable
Defires and Endeavours to do it are infufficient.

We are accuftomed, in the common Ufe of Language, to
apply & underftand thefe Phrafes in this Senfe : We grow up
t^ith fuch a Habit j which by the daily Ufe of thefe Terms,
in fuch a Senfe, from our Childhood, becomes fix'd and
fettled } fo that the Idea of a Relation to a fuppofed W^iil,
Defire and Endeavour of ours, is ftrongly conne<5ted with

thefe

SedJII. r/'Neceflity. 15

thefe Terms, and naturally excited in our Minds, whenever
we hear the Words ufed. Such Ideas, and thefe Words> are
fo united and aflbciated, that they unavoidably go together ;
one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with it, and ne--
ver can be feparated as long as we live. And if we ufe the
Words, as Terms of Art, in another Senfe, yet, unlefs we
are exceeding circumfpe6t and wary, we fhall infenfibly flide
into the vulgar Ufe of them, and fo apply the Words in a very
inconfiftent Manner : this habitual Connexion of Ideas will
deceive & confound us in ourReafonings & DifcourfeSjwhere-
in we pretend to ufe thefe Terms in that Manner, as Terms
of Art.

4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when thefe
Terms neceffary^ impojfible^ irreJi/Uhle^ imahle kc. are ufed in
Cafes wherein no Oppofition, or infufficient Will or Endea-
vour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very Nature of
the fuppofed Cafe it felf excludes and denies any fuch Oppofi-
tion,Will orEndeavour ; thefeTerms are then not ufed in their
proper Signification, but quite befide their Ufe in common
Speech. The Heafon is m.anifeft ; namely, that in fuch
Cafes, we can't ufe the Words with Reference to a fuppofa-
ble Oppofition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any
Man ufes thefe Terms in fuch Cafes, he either ufes them
nonfenfically, or in fome new Senfe, diverfe from their ori-
ginal and proper Meaning. As for Inftance ; If a Man fhould
affirm after this Manner, That it is neceffary for a Man, and
what muft be, that a Man fliould chufe Virtue rather than
Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice 5 and
that it is a Thing impoffible and irrefiftablc, that it fliouid be
otherwife than that he fhould have this Choice, fo long as this
Choice continues ; fuch a Man would ufe thefe Terms mu/^p
irrejijiible Sec. v/ith perfe<5t Infignificence and Nonfenfe, or in
fome new Senfe, diverfe from their common Ufe ; which is
with Reference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable Oppo-
fition, Unwiilingnefs and Refiftance ; whereas, here, the very
Suppofition excludes and denies any fuch Thing ; for the
Cafe fuppofed is that of being willing, and chufmg.

5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe Terms
necejfary^ hnpoffihk &c. are often ufed by Philofophers^ and Me-
taphyficians in a Senfe quite diverfe from their common Ufe
and original Signification : For they apply them to many
Cafes in which no Oppofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus
they ufe them with Refpedl to God's Exiftence before tha
Creation of the World, when there was- no pther Being but

He;

'1 6 The Nature ■ Part L

He : fo with regard to many of the Difpofitlons and A<5ls oif
-the divine Being, fuch as his loving Himfelf, his loving
•Righteoufners, hating Sin &c. So they apply thefe Terms to
many Calcs ot the Inclinations and Adions of created intel-
ligent Beings, Angels and Men \ wherein all Oppofition of
the Will is fliut out and denied, in the very Suppofition of
the Caie. •

MefapJjyfical or Philofophkal NecefTity is nothing different
from their Certainty. I fpeak not now of the Certainty of
Knowledge, but the Certainty that is in Things themfelves,
which is the Foundation of the Certainty of the Knowledge
of them ; or that wherein lies the Ground of the Infallibility
of the Proportion which affirms them.

What is fometimes given as the Definition of Philofophical
NecelTity, namely. That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby
it cajinot be otherwifey fails of being a proper Explanation of it,
on two Accounts : i^fV/?, the Words Ca?2, or Cannot, need
Explanation as much as the Word Necejjity ; and the former
may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the
former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we
fay, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain our felves by fay-
ing, we mean, it muft neceffarily be fo ; as well as explain
Neceirity,by faying,it is that by which aThing cannot but be.
And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mention'd
great Inconvenience : The Words cannot, or unable, are pro-
perly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that
may be exerted,in order to the Thing Ipoken of; to which,as
I have now obferved, the Word Necejjity, as ufed by Philofo-
phers, has no Reference.

Philofophical Neceffity is really Nothing elfe than the full
and fix'd Connexion between the Things iignified "hy the
^ubje(^ ^TPredicate of a Propofi tion» which affirms Something
jo he true. TVlien there" is luch a Connediou,then theThing
affirmed in the Propofition is neceiTary, in a Philofophical
Senfe ; whether any Oppofition, or contrary Effort be fup-
pofed, or fuppofable in the Cafe, or no. When the Subject
and Predicate of the Propofition, which affirms the Exiftence
of any Thing, either SublIance,Quality, A(5t or Circumftance,
have a full and certain Connexion, then the Exiftence ot
Being of that Thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical
Senfe. And in this Senfe I ufe the Word Necejjity, in the fol-
lowing Difcourfe, when I endeavour to prove that Neceffity is
not iiiconjj/ifnt with Liberty,

The

Sea.IJI. of Neceffity. 17

The Subje6t and Predicate of a Pfopofitioa, which affirms
Exiftence of Something, may have a full, iixd, and certain
Connection fever al Ways.

(i.) They may have a full and perfe^ CdnnecStidn m and
sfthemfehjes j becaufe it may imply a Contradiaion, or grofs
Abfurdity, to fuppofe them not conneded. Thus many
Things are neceffary in their owti Nature. So the eternal
Exiftence of Being generally confidered, is necefTary In itfilf:
becaufe it would be in it felf the gfeareft Abfurdity, to deny
the Exiftence of Being in general, or to fay there was abfo-
lute and univerfal Nothing ; and is, as it were the Sum of all
Contradiaions ; as might be ftieWn, if this were a proper
Place for it. So God's Infinity, and other Attributes are
riecefiary. So it is necefiary in its otvn Nature, that two and
two fliould be four ; and it is neceffary, that all fight Linej
drawn from the Center of a . Circle" to the Circumference
ft-.ould be equal. It isneceffaryj fit andfuitable, that Meri,
(hould do to others, as they would 'thlt they iliouid do to
them. So innumerable Metaphyfical and Mathematical
Truths are neceffary in Themfdves j'The Subj eft and Predicate
of the Propofition w hich affirms theiii, are perfqdly conneacd
cfthe?nj elves, ' " ' ' ':

(2.) The Connedion of the Subje(5l and Predicate of ai
Proportion, which affirms the Exiftence of Something, may
be tix'd and made certain, becaufe the Exiftence of that
Thing is already come to pafs ; and either now^ is, or has
been ; and To has as it were made fure of Exiftence. And
therefore, the Propofition which affirms prefent and paft Ex-
iftence of it, may by this Meaiis be mlde certain, and ne-
ceffirily and unalterably true ; the paft Event 'has fix'd and
decided the Matter, as to it's Exiftence ; and has made it
impoflible but that Exiftence (hould be. truly predicated of if.
Thus the Exiftence of whatever is already come to pafs, i|
liow become neceffary ; 'tis become impoffible it fhould bet
othcrwife thaii. true, that fudh a Thing has been*

(3.) The"^^t^^'^a-?(d ffedicate of at Propofition which
affirms Something to be,, may have a real and certain Con-
fieaioh confequeniially ; and fo the Exiftence of the Thing may
be confequentially neceffary ; as it may b^ furely and lirmly;
cdnneded with fomething ehe, that is neceffar}^ in one of
the former Refpcds! As it is either fully and thoroughly
conuedcd with that which is abfdlutely neceffai^ in. its owrt

C ' Nature,

i8 The Nature Part L

Njitufe,'6r with fomething which has already received and
made furc of Exiftence: This Neceffity hes /«, or may be
explained by the Connexion of two or more Propofitions one
with another, lliings which are perfedly conneded with
other Things that are neceilary, are neceflaryThemfelves, by
a NecefTity of Confequence.

And here it may be obferved, that all Things which are
future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be
faid to be neceirary,are neceiTary only in this laft Way. Their
Exiftence is not neceflary in it felf ; for if fo, they always
would have exifted. Nor is their Exiftence become ne-
ceiiarv by being made fure, by being already come to pafs.
Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to
pafs hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a, Conne6Hon
with fomething that is neceffary in it's own Nature, or fome-
thing that already is, or has been ; fa that the one being
fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the
only Way that all Things paft, excepting thofe which were
from Eternity, could be neceffary before they came to pafs^ or
could ccme to pafs neceffarily j and therefore the only Way
in which any Effefl or Event, or any Thing whatfoever that
ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being
neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exift. And therefore
this is the Neceffity which efpecially belongs to Contraverfies
about the Ads of the Will,

It may be of fome Ufe in thefe Controverftes, further to
obferye concerning ?Nefaphy/ical'NcceiT\ty^ that (agreable to the
Diftinftion before obferved of Neceffity, as vulgarly under-
fcood) Things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either
Vi\th 2. general or particular Neceffity. The Exiftence of a
Idling may be faid to be neceftary witli a general Neceftlty,
when all Things whatfoever being conlidered, there is a
f^oundation for Certainty of their Exiftence ; or when ii>
the moft general and univerfal View of Things, the Subjecfl
and Predicate of the Propolition, which affirms its Exift-
ence, would appear with an infallible Conne6lion.

, An Event, or the Exiftence of a Thing, may be faid to be
neceffary with a particular Neceffity, or with Regard to a par-
ticular Perfon, Thing or Time, when Nothing that can be
taken into Confideration, in or about" that Perfon, Thing
or. Time, alters the Cafe at all, as to the Certainty of that
Eyent> or the Exiftence of that Thing j or can be of any
* " AccouiU

ScdJII. c/NeccfTity. 19

Account at all, in determining the Infallibility of the Con-
rkec!:lion of the Subjed and Predicate in the Propofition which
affirms the Exiftence of the Thing ; fo that it is all one, as
to that Perfon, or Thing, at leaft, at that Time, as if the
Exiftence were necefTary with a NeceiTity that is moft urn-
verfal and <^hfolute. Thus there are many Things that H ap-
peal to particular Peribns, which they have no Hand in, and
in ihe Exiftence of which noWiil of theirs has any Concern,
at leaft, at that Time ; which, whether they are ne-
ceflar)^ or not, with Regard to Things in general, yet are ne-
ceflary to them, and with Regard to any Volition of theirs
at that Time ; as they prevent all A(5ls of the Will about:
the Affair. — I fliall have Occafion to apply this Obferva-
tion to particular Infrances in the following Difcourfe.— Whe-
ther the fame Things that are neceflary with 3. particular Ne-
ccfiity, be not alfo necclTary with a ^<?/7^r^/ NeceiTity, may be
a Matter of future Confideration. Let that be as it will, it
alters not the Cafe, as to the Ufe of this Diftinclion of
the Kinds of Neceffity.

Thefe Things may be fufficient for the explaining of the
Terms Necejfary and Kccejftty^ as Terms of Art, and as often
ufed by Metaphyficians, and controverfial Writers inDivinity,
in a Senfe diverfe from, and more extenfive than their origi-
nal Meaning, in common Language, which was before ex-
plain'd.

What has been faid to Ihew the Meaning of the Terms
NeccJJary and Necejfity^ may be fufficient for the Explaining of
the oppofiteTerm.s, hnpoffiblc and Impojjibil'ity. For tliere is no
Difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former
pofitive. Impojjibility is the fame as negative Neceffity^ or a
NecefTity that a Thing fliould not be. And it is ufed as a
Term of Art in a like Diverfity from the original and vulgar
Meaning, with Neceffity.

The fame may be obferved concerning the Words Unahky
and Inability. It has been obferved, that thefeTerms, in their
original and common Ufe, have Relation to Will and En-
deavour, as fuppofable in the Cafe, and as infufncient for
the bringing to pafs the Thing will'd and endeavoured. But
as thefe Terms are often ufed by Philofophers and Divines,
efpecially Writers on Controverfies about Free-Wili, they
are ufed in a quite different, and far more extenfive Senfe i
and are applied to many Cafes wherein no Will or Endea-

C 2 vour

.20 0/" natural and Part !•

voiir for the bringing of the Thing to pafs, is or can be fup-
pofec, but is adualiy denied and excluded in the Nature of
the C^fe.

As the Words necejjary^ impojfihle ^unable Sec. are ufed by pole-
mic Writers, in a Senfe diverfe from their common Significa-
tion, the hke has happen'd to the Term Contingent. Any
7'hing is faid to be contingent, or to come to pafs by Chance,
or Accident, in the original Meaning of fuch Words, when
its Conne6lion with its Caufes or Antecedents, according to
the eftablifti'd Courfe of Things, is not difcerned ; and fo
is what we have no Means of the Forelight of. And efpe-
cially is any Thing faid to be contingent or accidental with
regard to us, when any Thing comes to pafs that we are con-
cerned in, as Occafions or Subjeds, without our Foreknow-
ledge, and befide our Defign and Scope.

But the Word Contingent is abundantly ufed in a very diffe-
rent Senfc ; not for That whofe ConnecStion with the Series of
Things we can't difcern, fo as to forefee the Event ; but for
fomething which has abfolutely no previous Ground or Rea-
fon, with v.hich it's Exillence has any iix'd and certaui Con-
ne<5tion.

Section IV.

Of the DiJlinSlion of natural afid moral
Neceffity, ^W Inability.

THAT NccefTity which has been explained, confifting in
an infallible Connexion of the Things fignified by the
Subjed and Predicate of a Propofition, as intelligent
Beings arc the Subjeds of it, is diftinguilh'd into moral and
natural Necellity.

I fhall not novv' ftand to enquire whether this Diftincflion be
a proper and perfea Diflin6ticn ; but fliall only explain how
thefe two Sorts of Neceffity are underftood, as the Terms are
fometimcs ufed, and as they arc ufed in the following Dif-

tX'Urfe. • ■ •

Th9

Sefl. IV. moral Neceffity. 2t

The Phrafe, moral Necejity^ is ufed varioudy : fometimes 'tis ■
ufed for a Neceffity of moral Obligation. So we fay,a Man is
under Neceffity, when he is under Bonds of Duty and Con--
fcience, which he can't be difcharged from. So the Word
Neceffity is often ufed for great Obligation in Point of Intereft.
Sometimes by moral Neceffity is meant that apparent Con-
nedlion of 1 hings, which is the Ground of ?noral Evidence ;
and fo is diftinguifh'd from abfohite Neceffity^ or that fure Con^
necftion of Things, that is a Foundation for infallible Certainty,
In this Senfe, moral Neceffity fignihes much the fame as that
high Degree of Probability, which is ordinarily fufficicnt to
fatisfy, and be relied upon by Mankind, in their Condud and
Behaviour in the World, as they would confult their own
Safety and Intereft, and treat others properly as Members of
Society. And fometimes by moral Neceffity is meant that
Neceffity of Connexion &Confequence,which arifes from fuch
moral Caufes^ as the Strength of Inclination, or Motives, and
the Connection which there is in many Cafes between thefe,
and fuch certain Volitions and A6tions. And it is in this
Senfe, that I ufe the Phrafe, moral NeceJJlty^ in the following
Difcourfe.

By natural Neceffity,, as applied to Men, I mean fuch Ne-
ceffity as Men are under through the Force of natural Caufcs ;
as diihnguifh'd from what are called moral Caufes, fuch as
Habits and Difpofitions of the Heart, and moral Motives and
Inducements. Thus Men placed in certain Circumftances,
are the Subje6ls of particular Senfations by Neceffity : They
feel Pain when their Bodies are wounded ; they fee the Ob-
je6ls prefented before them in a clear Light, when their Eyes
are open'd : fo they afient to the Truth of certain Propofiti-
ons, as foon as the Terms are underftood ; as that two and
two make four, that black is not white, that two parallelLines
can never crofs one another : fo by a natural Neceffity Men's
Bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to fupport
them.

But here feveral Things may be noted concerning thefe
two Kinds of Neceffity.

I , Moral Neceffity may be as abfolute, as natural Neceffity.
That is, the Effect may be as perfectly connected with its mo-
ral Caufe, as a naturally necelTary Effc6t is with it's natural
Caufe. Whether the Will in every Cafe is neceffarily deter-
mined by the ftrongeil Motive, or whether the Will ever
makes any Refitlance to fuch a Motive, or can ever oppofe
the flrongert prefent Inclination, or not ; if that Matter (hould
be controverted, yet I fappofe none will deny, but that, in

22 Of natural and Part I.

fome Cafes, a previous Bias and Inclination, or the Motive
pfelentcd, may be fo powerful, that the A61 of the Will may
be certainly and indifTolubly conneded therewith. When
Motives or previous Bias are very ftrong, all will allow that
there is fome Difficulty in going againft them. And if they
■were yet ftronger, the Difficulty would be ftill greater. And
therefore, if more were ftill added to their Strength, to a cer-
tain Degree, it would make the Difficulty fo great, that it
would be wholly impoffihle to furmount it ; for this plain Rea-
fon, becaufe whatever Power Men may be fuppofed to have
to furmount Difficulties, yet that Power is not infinite ; and fo

foes not beyond certain Limits. If a Man can furmount ten
)egrees of Difficulty of this Kind, with twenty Degrees of
Strength, becaufe the Degrees of Strength are beyond theDe-
grees of Difficulty ; yet if the Difficulty be increafed to thirty,
or an hundred, or a thoufand Degrees, and his Strength not
alfo increafed, his Strength will be wholly infufficient to fur-
mount the Difficulty. As therefore it muft be allowed, that
there may be fuch a Thing as a fure and perfeSf Conne6tion
between moral Caufes and Effiscfts ; fo this only is what I call
by the Name of msral NeceJJity.

2. V/hen I ufe this Diftindion of moral and yiatural Ne-
ifjfuy^ I would not be underftood to fuppofe, thr^t if any
'Ihing comes to pafs by the former Kind of Neceffity, the
'Nature of Things is not concerned in it, as well as in the
latter. I don't mean to detcrmine,that when a moral Habit or
Motive is fo ftrong, that the A(5l of the Will infallibly follows,
this is not owing to the Nature of Things. But thefe are the
Names that thefe two Kinds of Necellity have ufually been
called by ; and they muft be diftinguiftied by fome Names or
other ; for there is a Diftindion or Diff'erence between them,
that 'is very important in its Confequences. Which Diffe-
rence does not lie fo much in theNature of the ConneSiion^-SiS in
the two Terms connected. The Caufe with which the Effe^
is connecfted, is of a particular Kind ; vix. that which is of a
moral Nature ; either fome previous habitual Difpofition, or
fome Motive exhibited to the Underftanding. And the Effect
is alfo of a particular Kind j being likewife of a moral Nature ;
confifting in fome Inclination or Volition of the Soul, or vo-
luntary Adion.

I fuppofe, that Neceffity which is called natural, in Diftinc-
tion from fnoral Neceffity, is fo called, becaufe 7neer Nature, as
the Word is vulgarly ufed, is concerned, without any Thing

Sed. IV. moral Neceffity. 23

of Choice. The Word Nature is often ufed In Oppofition to
Choice ; not becaufe Nature has indeed never any Hand in our
Choice .; But this probably comes to pafs by Means that
we firft get our Notion of Nature from that difcernable and
obvious Courfe of Events, which we obCerve in many Things
that our Choice has no Concern in ; and efpecially in the
material World ; which, in very many Parts of it, wc eafily
perceive to b€ in a fettled Courfe ; the ftated Order and Man^
ner of Succeflion being very apparent. But where we don't
readily difcern, the Rule and Connexion, (tho* there be a
Connexion, according to an eftablifli'd Law,truly takingPlace)
we fignify the Manner of Event by fome other Name, Eveii
in many Things which are feen in the material and inanimate
World, v/hich don't difcernably and obvioufly come to pafs
according to any fettled Courfe, Men don't call the Maimer
of the Event by theName of Nature .,huthy fuchNames asy/m-
dent^^Chaticefimtingeme kc. So Men make aDiftindion between
Nature and Choice ; as tho' they were compleatly and uni-
verfally diftind. Whereas, I fuppofe none will deny but that
Choice, i?i many Cafes, arifes from Nature, as truly as other
Events. But the Dependance & Connection between A61:s of
Volition or Choice, and their Caufes, according to eftablifhed
Laws, is not fo fenfible and obvious. And we obferve that
Choice is as it were a new Principle of Motion and A<5tion,
different from that eftablilh'd Law k Order of Things which
is moft obvious, that is (een efpecially in corporeal and fenfi-
ble Things ; And alfo that Choice often interpofes, interrupts
and alters the Chain of Events in th«fe external Objects, and
caufes 'em to proceed otherwife than they would do, if let a-r
lone, and left to go on according to the Laws of Motion
among themfelves. Hence it is fpoken of, as if it were a
' Principle of Motion entirely diftind from Nature, and pro-
perly fet in Oppofition to it. Names being commonly given
to Things, according to what is moft obvious, and is fuggefted
by what appears to the Senfes without Refle(5tion & Refearch,

"' 3. It muft be obferved, that in what has been explained, as
fignified by the Name of uMoral NeceJJityy the Word Necejjity is
not ufed according to the original Defign and Meaning of the
Word : For, as was obferved before, fuch Terms necejjhry^ int"
pojjible, irreftjiihle Sic. in common Speech, and their moft pro-
per Senfe, are always relative ; having Reference to fome fup-
pofable voluntary Oppofition or Endeavour, that is infufficient.
But no fuch Oppofition, or contrary Will and Endeavour, is
fuppofable in the Cafe of moral Neceffity ; which is a Cer-
tainty

^4- .0/* natural and Parti

tainty of the Inclination and Will it felf ; which does not
admit of the Suppofition of a Will to oppofe and refift it.
For 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe the fame individual Will to oppof^
it felf, in its prefent Ad ; or the prefent Choice to be oppo-
-fite to,and refifting prefentChoice : as, abfurd as it is to talk of
two contrary Motions, in the fame moving Body, at the fame
Time. And therefgre, the very Cafe fuppofed never admits
of any Trial, whether an oppofmg or refilling Will can over-
come this Neceflity.

What has been faid of natural and moral Neceflity, may
ferve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inal?ir
lity. We are faid to be naturally unable to do a Thing, w4ien
we can't do it if we. will, becaufe what is moft commonly
called Nature don't, allow of it, or becaufe of fome impeding
■Defed or Obstacle that is extrinfic to the Will ; either in
the Faculty of Underftanding'j Conftitution of Body, or ex-
ternal Objeds. Moral Inability confifis not in any of thefe
Things. ; but either in theWant of Inclination ; or theStrength
of a contrary Inclination ; or the want of fufficient Motives in
View, to induce and excite the Act of theWill,orthe Strength
of apparent Motives to the contrary. Or both thefe may be
refolved into one ; and it may be faid in one Word, that mo-
jal Inability coniifis in the Oppofition or Want of Inclination.
For when a Perfon is unable to will or chufe fuch a Thing,
tlirough a Defecft of Motives^ or Prevalence of contrary Mo-
tives, 'tis the fame Thing as his being unable through the
Want of an Inclination, or the Prevalence of a contrary Incli-
nation, in fuch Circumftancep,and under the Influence of fucli
Views. .: .? V .:

- To give fome Infl:ances of this 7nQral Jnabllity, A Woman

of great Honour and Chaflity may have a moral Inability to
proftitute her felf to her Slave. A Child of great Love and
Duty to his Parents, may b^e unable to be willing to kill his
Father, ' A very lafcivious Man, in Cafe of certain Opportu-,
nities and Temptations, and in the Abfence of fuch and fuch
Restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying- his Luft. A
Drunkard, under fuch and fuch Circumftances, may be una-r
ble to forbear taking of ftrong Drink. A very malicious
Man may be unable to exert benevolent A(5ts to an Enemy,o'r
to defire his Profpcnty : Yea, fome may be fo under the Power
of a vile Difpolition, that they may be unable to love thofc
who are mofl: worthy of their Efleem & Afi'cdion. A ftrong
Habit of Virtue and great Degree of Holinefs may caufe a
moral Inability to love VVickednefs in. general, may render a

Ma«

Sed. IV. moral Inability. 25

Man unable to takeComplacence in wicked Pcrfons orThings;
ortochufe a wicked Life j and prefer 'it to a vertuous Lffe.
And on the other Hand, a great Degree of habitual Wicked-
ncfs may lay a Man under an Inability to love and ckoofe Ho-
linefs ; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely
■»holy Being, or to choofe and cleave to him as his chief Good.

- Here it may be of Ufe to obferve this Diftindion of moral
Inabilitvs w'z. of that which is general and habitual., and that
which is particular and occaftonal. By a general and habitual mo-
ral Inability, I mean an Inability in the Heart to all Exercifes
or Acls of Will of that Nature or Kind, through a lix'd and
habitual -Inclination, or an habitual and Itated Defedl,
or Want of a certain Kind of Inclirtation, Thus a very
ill-natur'd Man may be unable to exert fuch Ads of
Benevolence, as another, who is full of £:ood Nature, com-
monly exerts ; and a Man, whofe Heart is habitually void of
Gratitude, may be unable to exert fuch and fuch grateful AcSIs,
through that ftated Defed of a grateful Inclination. Byparti^
cular and occaftonal moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the
Will or Heart to a particular Acl,thro' the Strength or Defecfl:
of prefent Motives, or of Inducem.ents prefented to the View

of the Underftanding, on this Occafion. If it be fo, that the

Will is always determined by the ftrongefl Motive, then ifr
mufl always have an Inability,in this latter Senfe,to a6l other-
wife than it does ; it not being polTible, in any Cafe, that the
Will lhould,at prefent, go againft the Motive which has now,
allThings confidered, the greatell Strength & Advantage to ex-
cite and induce it.— The former of thefe Kinds of moral Ina-
bility, conlilling in that which is ftated habitual and general,
is moft commonly called by the Name of Inability ; becaufe
the Word Inability., in its molt proper and original Significa-
tion, has Refpe6t to fome Jlated Defecf. And this efpecially

obtains the Name oi Inability alio upon another Account :

I before obferved, that the Word Inability in its criminal and
moft common Ufe, is a relative Term 3 and has Refped: to
Will 2nd Endeavour, as fappolabie in the Cafe, and as in-
fufficient to bring to pafs the Thing deiired and endeavoured.
Now there may be more of an Appearance h Sh:5dov/ of thisj
with Refpecl to the Acts which arife from a tixM and flrong
Habit, than others that arife only from tran(icnt Occtilons and
Caufes. Indeed Will and Endeavour againfl, or diverfe from
frejent A6ts of the Will, are in no Cafe fjppofable, vv^hether ,
thofe Afts be occafional or habitual ; for liiat v/ould be to ^
fuppofe the "Will, atpref:at, to be othcrv/ifv^ than, at rref^nt,'

D * ;t

26 (ytooral Inability. PartJ.

it is. But yet there may be Will and Endeavour againfl/«/«r/
A(5ts of the Will, or Volitions that are likely to take Place, as
view'd at a Diftance. 'Tis no Contradidion, to fuppofe that
the A6ts of the Will at one Time, may be againft the Adts
of the Will at another Time ; and there may be Defires and
Endeavours to prevent or excite future Ads of the Will ; But
fuch Defires and Endeavours are, in many Cafes, rendered
infufficient & vain, thro' Fixednefs of Habit : When the Oc-
cafion returns, the Strength of Habit overcomes, and baffles
all fucji Oppofition. In this Refpedl, a Man may be in mife-
rable Slavery and Bondage to a ftrong Habit. But it may be
comparatively eafy to make an Alteration with Refpe6t to fuch
future Ads, as are only occafional and tranfient ; becaufe the
Occafion or tranfient Caufe, if forefeen, may often eafily be
prevented or avoided. On this Account, the moral Inability
that attends fix'd Habits, efpecially obtains the Name of Ina-
hility. And then, as the Will may remotely and indiredly re-
lift it felf, and do it in vain, in the Cafe of ftrong Habits ; fo
Heafon may refift prcfent Acts of the Will, and it's Refiftance
be infufficient ; and this is more commonly the Cafe alfo,
"when the Acts arife from ftrong Habit,

But It mtift be obferved concerned moral Inability, in each
Kind of it, that the Word Inability is ufed in a Senfe very di-
verfe from its original Import. The Word fignifies only a
natural Inability, in the proper Ufe of it ; and is applied to
fuch Cafes only wherein a prefent Will or Inclination to the
Thing, with Refped to which a Perfon is faid to be unable,
is fuppofable. It can't be truly faid, acccrding to the ordi-
nary Ufe of Language, that a mahcious Man, let him be
never fo malicious, can't hold his Hand from ftriking, or that
he is not able to fliew his Neighbour Kindnefs ; or that a
Drunkard, let his Appetite be never fo ftrong, can't keep the
Cup from his Mouth. In the ftndeft Propriety of Speech, a
Man has a Thing in his Power, if he has it in his Choice,
or at his Election : And a Man can't be truly faid to be una*
able to dti.a Thing, when he can do it if he will, 'Tis im-
properly faid, that a Perfon can't perform thofe external Ac-
tions, which are dependent on theAd of the Will, and which
^ould be eafily performed, if the Ad of the Will were pre-
fent. And if X be improperly faid, that he cannot perform
thofe external voluntary Adions, which depend on the Will,
tis in fome RefpcX^ more improperly faid, that he is unable ta
:xert the. Acts of \\q Will themfelves ; becaufe it is more
videmly falfe, with ^^^efpect to thefe, that he caiVt if he will ;

Scd-IV. Of Liberty ^;/(^ moral Agency. 27

Tor to fay fo, is a down-right Contradiction : It is to fay, he
<afit will, if he does will. And in this Cafe, not only is it
true, that it is eafy for a Man to do the Thing if he will
but the very willing is the doing ; when once he has will'd,
the Thing is performed ; and nothing elfe remains to be
■done. Therefore, in thefe Things to afcribe a Non-perfor-
Tti ance to the want of Power or Ability,is not juft ; becaufe the
Thing wanting is not a being ahle^ but a being willing. There
are Faculties of Mind, and Capacity of Nature, and every
Thing elfe, fnfficient, but a Difpofition : Nothing is wantin''-
but a WilL "*

Section V.
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of.
moral Agency,

THE plain and obvious Meaning of the Words Freedom
and Liberty^ in common Speech, is Poiuer, Opportunity^
or Advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleafes. Or in
other Words, his being free from Hindrance or Impediment
in the Way of doing, or conducting in any Refpecl, as he
wills. * And the contrary to Liberty, whatever Name we
call that by, is a Perfon's being hinder'd or unable jto con-
duct as he will, or being necelTitated to do otherwife.

If this which I have mentioned be the Meaning of the
Word Liberty, in the ordinary Ufe of Language ; as I trult
that none that has ever learn'd to talk, and is unprejudiced,
will deny ; then it will follow, that in Propriety of Speech,
neither Liberty, nor it's contrary, can properly be afcribed ta
any Being or Thing, but that which has fuch a- Faculty,
Power or Property, as is called Will. For that which i.«i
pofTeffed of no fuch Thing as JViU, can't have any Power or
Opportunity of doing according to ifs Will, nor be necelhtated
to ad: contrary to its Will, nor be reftrained from acfling agrea-
biy to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary,
as belonging to the very Will it fclf, is not to fpeak good Senfe ;
if we judge of Senfe, and Nonfenfe, by the orighial & proper
Signification of Words. For the Will it felf is not an Agent
that has a Will : The Power of choofing, it felf, has not a

D 2 Power

* I fay not only doing,hut comiuBing ; becaufe a voluntary fc^rbearing
to do, fitting ftilijkeeping Silence &c.are Inftanccs of PerfonsCoWz^^?, a-
bout whichLiberi)' is exercived i tiio' they are nqt (o properly calledirW//^.

2 8 Th Notion «?/* Liberty, Parti.

Power of chuTmg. That which has the Power of
Volition or Choice is the Man or the Soul, and not
the Power of VoHtion it felf. And he that has the Li-
berty of doing accordino; to his Will, is the Agent or Doer
who is poffefTed of the Will ; and not the Will which he is
pofTeffed of. We fay with Propriety, that a Bird let loofe has
Power'& Liberty to fly ; but not that the Bird's Power of
flying ' has a Power ^v Liberty of flying. To be free is the
Property of an Agent, who is pofieflTed of Powers & Facul-
ties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zea-
lous. But thefe Qiialities are the Properties of Men or Per-
fons ; and not the Properties of Properties.

Tliere arc two Things that are contrary to this which is
' calledLiberty in commonSpeech. One is Conjiraint ; the fame
is otherwife called Force^ CoJupulftony & CoaSiion ; which is a
Pel fon's being necelTitated to do a Thing contrary to his Will.
'^Phe other \%~Re[iramt \ which is his being hindred, and not
tiaviiig Power to do according to his Will. But that which
lias no W^ill, can't be the Subject of thefe Things. — I
need fay the lefs on this Head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame
Thing iforth, with fo great Ciearnefs, in his EJ^y on the human
XJnderJland'ing,

But one Thing more I would obferve concerning what is
vulgarly called Liberty ; namely, that Power h Opportunity
for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his
Choice, is all that is meant by it ; w^ithout taking into the
Meaning of the Word, any Thing of the Caufe or Original
of that Choice ; or at all confidering how the Perfon came
to have fuch a Volition ; whether it was caufed by foine ex-
ternal Motive, or internal habitual Bias ; whether it was de-
term in'd by fome internal antecedent Volition, or whether it
happen'd witlu)ut a Caufe ; whether it was necefiarily con-.
nec5Vcd with fomething foregoing, or not conneded. Let the
Perfon come by his Volition or Choice how he will, yet, if
he is able, and there is Nothing in theWay to hinder his pur-
fuing and executing his Will, tlic Man is fully & perfec1:ly
free,, according to the primary and commoa Notion of Free-
dom.

What lias been faid may be fuflicient to fhew what is
meant by Libcrtyy according; to the common Notions of Man-
kind^ arid in the ufual $i primary Acceptation of the Word :
But the Word, as ufed by Arminlans^ Pelagians h others, who
oppofc the Cahinijh^ has an entirely different Signification,—
7'hcfif; fevcral Things belong to their Notion of Liberty.

I. That

'Sed.V. and of moral Agency. 29

f> That it confifts in a Self-detenmning Power in the Will, or
a certain Sovereignty the Will has over it felf, and it's own
A6ls, whereby it determines it's own Volitions ; fo as not to
be dependent in it's Determinations, on any Caufe without
it felf, nor determined by any Thing prior to it's own A6ls.

2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that
the Mind, pre\'ious to the A6t of Volition be, in iquilibriG,

3. Contifigence is another Thing that belongs and is effential
to it ; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that
has been already explained, but as oppofed to all Neceffity,
or any fixed Sz certain Connecflion with fome previous Ground
or Reafon of it's Exiftence. They fuppofe the EfTence of Li-
berty fo much to confift in thefe Things, that unlefs the
Will of Man be free in this Senfe, he has no real Free-
dom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to a<5l ac-
cording to his Will.

A moral Jgent is a Being that Is capable of thofe Adlions
that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be de-
nominated good or evil in a moral Senfe, vertuous or vici-
ous, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a
moral Faculty^ or Senfe of moral Good & Evil, or of fuch a
Thing as Defert or Worthinefs of Praife or Blame, Re-
ward or Punifl-.ment ; and a Capacity which an Agent has
of being influenced in his A6lions by moral Inducements or
Motives, exhibited to the View of Underftanding & Rea-
fon, to engage to a Condu6t agreable to the moral Faculty.

The Sun is very excellent & beneficial in it*s A<51:Ion and
Influence on the Earth, in warming it, and caufmg it to
bring forth it's Fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent : It's
A(5tion, tho' good, is not vertuous or meritorious. Fire
that breaks out in a City, and confumes great Part of it, is
very mifchievous in its Operation ; but is not a moral A-
gent : what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of
any Punifliment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents :
the A6lions of fome of 'em are very profitable & pleafant ;
others are veiy hurtful : yet, feeing they have no moral Fa-
culty, or Senfe of Defert, and don't a6l from Choice guided
by Underftanding, or with a Capacity of reafoning and re-
fleding, but only from Inftincft, and are not capable of be-
ing influenced by moral Inducements, their Actions are not
properly finful or vertuous ; nor are they properly the Sub-
jeds of any fuch moral Treatment for what they do, as mo-
ral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds.

Here

3© 0/ Moral Agency. Part I.

Here it may be noted, that there Is a circumftantial Diffe-
rence between the moral Agency of a Ruler and a Subje^,
I call it drcumftantial^ becaufe it lies only in the Difference
of moral Inducements they are capabk of being influen-
ced by, arifing from the Difference of Circumflances. A
Ruler ailing in that Capacity only, is not capable of being
influenced by a moral Law, and it's Sanations of Threat-
nings and Promifes, Rewards and Punifliments, as the SubjeSf
is ; tho' both may be influenced by a Knowledge of moral
Good and Evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the
Supreme Being, who a6ts only in the Capacity of a Ruler to-
wards his Creatures, and never as a Subje^^ differs in that
Refpedl: from the moral Agency of created intelligent Be-
ings. God's A6iions, and particularly thofe which he ex-
erts as a moral Governour, have moral Qualifications, are
morally good in the higheft Degree. They are moft per-
fectly holy & righteous ; and we muft conceive of Him as
influenced in the higheft Degree, by that which, above all
others, is properly a moral Inducement ; vix, the moral Good
which He fees in fuch and fuch Things : And therefore He
is, in the moft proper Senfe, a moral Agent, the Source of all
moral Ability & Agency, the Fountain and Rule of ail Ver-
t\ie and moral Good ; tho' by Reafon of his being Supreme
over all, 'tis not poffible He ihould be under the Influerx^ of
Law or Command, Promifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Pu-
nifhments, Counfels orWarnings. The effential Qualities of
a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft polfible Perfedlion ;
fuch as Underftanding,to perceive the Difference-between mo-
ral Good & Evil ; a Capacity of difcerning that moral Wor-
thinefs and Demerit, by which fome Things are Praife-wor-
thy, others defcrving of Blame and Puni{hment ; and alfo
a Capacity of Choice, and Choice guided by Underftanding,
and a Power of ading according to his Choice or Pleafure,and
being capable of doing thofe Things which are in the highefi:
Senfe Praife-worthy. And herein does very much conflft that
Image of God wherein he made Man, (which we read of Gen,
I. 26,27. & Chap. IX. 6.) by which God diftinguiflied Man
from the Beafts, viz. in thofe Faculties & Principles of Na-
ture, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very
much confifts the natural Image of God ; as his fpiritual and
moral Image, wherein Man was made at firft, confifted in that
moral Excellency, that he was endowed with.

PART

( %t )

PART 11.

Wherein it is confidered whether there is
or can be any fuch Sort of Freedom of
Will, as that wherein Arminiam place
the Eflence of the Liberty of all moral
Agents ; and whether any fuch Thing
ever was or ca7^ be conceived of.

Section L

Shewing the manifejl Inconjtjience of the
Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will,
confifting in the JVilFs felf-determining
Power.

Aving taken Notice of thofe Things which may be
neceffary to be obferved, concerning the Meaning of
the principal Terms and Phrafes made ufe of in Con-

troverfies concerning human Liberty, and particularly ob-
ferved what Liberty is, according to the common Language,
and general Apprehenfion of Mankind, and what it is as
underftood & maintained by Arminians ; I proceed to confider
the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will^ and the fup-
pofcd NecejQity of it in Order to moral Agency, or in Order
to any One's being capable of Vertue or Viee, aad properly

the

3 2 ^e Inconfifience Part II.

the Subjea of Command or Counfel, Praife or Blame, Pro-
mifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Punifhments ; or whether
that which has been defcribed, as the Thing meant by Li-
berty in common Speech, be not fufficient, and the only Li-
berty, which makes, or can make any one a moral Agent,
and fo properly the Subjedt of thefe Things. In thh Part^ I
ihall confider whether any fuch Thing be poffible or concei-
vable,as that Freedom of Will which Jrminians infift on ; and
Ihall enquire whether any fuch Sort of Liberty be neceffary
to moral Agency ^c. in the next Part.

And Firft of all, I (hall confider the Notion of a Self^
determining Power in the Will : wherein, according to the
Jrminians^ does moft efientially confift the Will's Freedom ;
and fliall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly ab-
furd, and a manifeft Inconliftence, to fuppofe that the Will it
felf determines all the free A£fs of the Will.

Here I fhall not infift on the great Impropriety of fuch
Phrafes, and Ways of fpeaking, as the Wilts determini?ig it
felf ; becaufe Actions are to be afcribed , to Agents, and not
properly to the Powers of Agents j which improper W^ay of
ipeaking leads to many Miftakes, and much Confufion, as
Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Jrminians^
when they fpeak of the Will's determining it felf, do by the
JVill mean the Soul willing, I fhall take it for granted, that
■when they fpeak of the Will, as the Determiner, they mean
the Soul in the Exercife of a Power of Willing^ or acSting volun-
tarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their Meaning, becaufe No-
thing elfe can be meant, without the groffeft and plaineft Ab-
furdity. In all Cafes, when we fpeak of the Powers or Prin-
ciples of Ading, as doing fuch Things, we mean that the A-
fents which have thefe Powers of ading, do them, in the
ixercife of thofe Powers. So when we fay. Valour fights
courageoufly, we mean, the Man who is under the Influ-
ence of Valour fights courageoufly. When we fay. Love
feeks the Objcdt loved, we mean, the Perfon loving feeks that
Objedt. When we fay, the Underftanding difcerns, we mean
the Soul in the Exercife of that Faculty. So when it is faid, .
the Will decides or determines, the Meaning muft be, thae
the Perfon in the Exercife of a Power of Willing & Chufing,
or the Soul acting^ voluntarily, determines.

Therefore

Se(S.I. Of Self-determining Yovjtu 33

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free A6ls,
the Soul determines all the free Ads of the Will in the Ex-
ercife of a Power of Willing and Chuiing ; or^ which is the
fame Thing, it determines them of Choice ; it determines
it's own AxSs by chuiing it's own Ads. If the Will deter-
mines the Will, then Choice orders and determines the
Choice : and Ads of Choice are fubjed to the Decifion,
and follow the Conduct of other Ads of Choice. And
therefore if the Will determines all it's own free Ads, then
every free Ad of Choice is determined by a preceeding Ad
of Choice, chuHng that Ad. And if that preceeding Ad of
the Will or Choice be alfo a free Ad, then by thefe Princi-
ples, in this Ad too, the Will is Self-determined ; that is,
this, in like Manner, is an Ad that the Soul voluntarily chu-
fes ; or which is the fame Thing, it is an Ad determined ftill
by a preceeding Ad of the Will, chufing that. And the like
may again be obferved of the laft mentioned Ad. Which
brings us diredly to a Contradidion : for it fuppofes an Ad of
the Will preceeding the firft Ad in the whole Train, direding
and determining the reft ; or a free Ad of the Will, before
the firft free Ad of the Will. Or elfe we muft come at laft
to anAd of theWill, determining the confequent Ads,wherein
the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free Ad, in
this Notion of Freedom : But if the firft Ad in the Train,de-
termining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all
can be free ; as is manifeft at firft View, but fhall be demon-
ftrated prefently.

If the Will, which we find governs the Members of the
Body, and determines and commands their Motions and
Adions, does alfo govern it felf, and determine it's own Mo-
tions and Ads, it doubtiefs determines them the fame Way,
even by antecedent Volitions. The Will determines which
Way the Hands and Feet fhall move, by an Ad of Volition
or Choice : and there is no other Way of the Will's deter-
mining, direding or commanding any Thing at all. Whatio-
ever the Will commands, it commands by an Ad of the Will.
And if it has it felf under it's Command^ and determines it
felf in it's own Adions, it doubtiefs does it the fame Way that
it determines other Things which are under it's Command.
So that if the Freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it
has it felf and it's own Adions under it's Command and
Diredlon, and it's own Volitions are determined by it fcif,
k will follow, that every free Volition ariles from another an-
tecedent Volition, direding and commanding that ; And it

£ that

34 Of Self-detenni7tingVovjtx. Part IL

that dtreaing Volition be alfo free, in that alfo the Will is de-
termined ; that is to fay, that directing! Volition is deter-
mined by another going before that ; and fo on, 'till we
come to the firft Volition in the whole Series : And if that
firft Volition be free, and the Will f elf- determined in it, then
that is determined by another Volition preceeding that
Which is a Contradiction ; becaufe by the Suppofition, it can
have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the firft in
the Train. But if that firft Volition is not determined by any
preceeding Ad of the Will, then that A6t is not determined
by the Will, and fo is not free, in the Arm'mian Notion of
Freedom, which confifts in the Will's Self-determination.
And if that firft A6t of the Will, which determines and
fixes the fubfequent A6ts, be not free, none of the following

Acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we

fuppofe there are five A6ts in the Train, the fifth and laft de-
termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third
by the fecond, and the fecond by the firft ; If the firft is not
determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them
are truly determined by the Will : that is, that each of them
are as they are,and not otherwife,is not firft owing totheWill,
but to the Determination of the firft in the Series, which is not
dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no
Hand in the Determination of. And this being that which
decides what the reft ftiall be, and determines their Exift-
ence ; therefore the firft Determination of their Exiftence
is not from the Will. The Cafe is juft the fame, if inftead
of a Chain of five A6ts of the Will, we Ihould fuppofe a
Succeffion of Ten, or an Hundred, or ten Thoufand. If
the firft A6t be not free, being determined by fomething out
of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to
it felf, and that the next, and fo on ; They are none of them
free, but all orignally depend on, and are determined by
fome Caufe out of the Will : and fo all Freedom in the Cafe
is excluded, and no Ad of the Will can be free, according
to this Notion of Freedom. If we ftiould fuppofe a long
Chain, of ten Thoufand Links, fo conne6ted, that if the firft
Link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and fp
the whole Chain muft be determined to Motion, and in the
Direction of it's Motion, by the Motion of the firft Link ;
and that is moved by fomething elfe : In this Cafe, tho' all
the Links, but one, are moved by other Parts of the fame
Chain ; yet it appears that the Motion of no One, nor the
Diredlion of it's Motion, is from any Self-moving or Self-
determining Power in the Chain, any more than if every

Link

Seft. II. Some Evafions conjidered. 3 5

Link were immediately moved by fomething that did not be-
long to the Chain. If the Will be not free in the firft Act,

which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next,
which is caufed by that firft A6t : for tho' indeed the Will
caufed it, yet it did not caufe it freely ; becaufe the preceeding
Acft, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the
Will ben't free in the fecond Ad:, fo neither can it be in the
third, which is caufed by that ; becaufe, in like Manner, that
third was determined by an Act of the Will that was not free.
And fo we may go on to the next Adl, and from that to the
next J And how long foever the Succeflion of A6ls is, it is all
one ; if the firft on which the whole Chain depends, and
which determines all the reft, ben't a free Ac5t, the Will is
not free in caufing or determining any one of thofe A6ts ;
becaufe the A(5t by which it determines them all, is not a free
Ad ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining

them, than if it did not caufe them at all. Thus, this Ar^

fninian Notion of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's
Self-Determination^ is repugnant to itfelfjand (huts it felf wholly
out of the World.

Section IL

Several fufpofed Ways ^p/' evading the fore--
r4 K^^^S R^^foningj conjidered.

IF to evade the Force of what has been obferved, it (hould
be faid, that when the Arminiam fpeak of the Will's deter-
niining it's own Ads, they don't mean that the Will de-
termines it's A6ts by any preceeding Ad, or that one Ad of
the Will determines another j but ^only that the Faculty or
Power of Will, or the Soul in the 13 fe of that Power, de-
termines it's own Volitions ; and that it does it without any
Ad going before the Ad determined ; fuch an Evafion would

be full of the moft grofs Abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an Eva-

fion of my own inventing ; and I don't know but I fnould
wrong the Jrminians, in fuppofing that any of them would
make ufe of it. But it being as good a one as I can in-
vent, I would obferve upon it a few Things,

E 2 Firji^

36 Suppofed Evafions Part II.

Firf, If the Faculty or Power of the Will determines aa
A6t of Volition, or the Sonl in the Ufe or Exercije of that
Pcu'cr, determines it, that is the lame Thing as for the Soul
to determine V'^olltion by an Mf of Will. For an Exerdfe of
the Power of "^ill, and an Acl of that Power, are the fame
Thing. Therefore to fay, that the Power of Will, or the
Soul in the Vfc or Exemfe of that Power, determines Voli-
tion, without an y/^ of Will preceeding the Volition deter-
mined, is a Contradi6lion.

Strom^y If a Powder of Will determines the A(5l of theWill,
then a Power of Chufmg determines it. For, as was before
obfcrved, in every AS: of Will, there is Choice, and a Power
of Willing is a Power of Chufmg. But if a Power of Chufmg
determines the Ad of Volition, it determines it by chufmg it.
For 'tis moil abfurd to fay, that a Power of Chufmg deter-
mines one Thing rather than another, without chuling any
Thing. But if a Power of Chufmg determines Volition by
chufine it, then here is the A6t of Volition determined by
an antecedent Choice, chufmg that Volition.

77;/7yA)', To fay, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines it's
owm Volition, but not by any, A6t, is a Contradiction, Be-
caufe for the Soul to dire<^, decide, or determine any Thing,
is to ad ; and this is fuppofed ; for the Soul is here fpoken
of as being a Caufe in this Affair, bringing fomething to
pafs, or doing fomething ; or, which is the lame Thing, ex-
erting It felt in order to an Effe6t, which Efied is the Deter-
mination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of
an Ati of Will. But certamiy, this Exertion or Action is
not the fame with the Effe6t, in order to the Production of
which it IS exerted j but mud be fomething prior to it.

J^ain, The Advocates for this Notion of the Freedom of
the Wj]], ipeak of a certain Sovereignty in the Will, whereby
it has Power to determine it's own Volitions. And there-
jore the Determination of Volition muil itfeif be an Ad of
the Will ; ibr otherwite it can l^e no Exercife of that fuppofed
Power and Sovereignty. ^

J^alti, If the Will determines it felf, then either the Will
is acYive in determining it's Volitions, or it is not. If it be
adive in it, then the Determination is an Adl gf the Will ;
^\\d 10 there is one Ad of the Will determining another.
But if the Will is not a^ii'ie in the Determination, then how
- ^ does

Sea. II. confidered. 37

does it exerdfe any Liberty in it ? Thefe Gentlemen fuppofe
that the Thing wherein the Will exerdfes Liberty, is
in it's determining it's own Ads. But how can this
be if it ben't active in determining ? Certainly the Will,
or the Soul, can't exerdfe any Liberty in that wherein it dont
aa, or wherein it don't exerdfe it felf So that if either Part
of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, confift-
inff in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be
an Aa of the Will in determining all it's own free htXsy
then one free Aa of the Will is determined by another ; and
fo we have the Abfurdity of every free Aa, even the very
fir ft, determined by aforegoing tree Aa. But if there be
no Aa or Exercife of the Will in determining it s own Aas,
then no Liberty is exercifed in determining them. From
whence it follows, that no Liberty confifts in the Will s Power
to determine it's own Aas : Or, which is the fame Thing,
that there is no fuch Thing as Liberty coniifting in a belt-de-
termining Power of the Will.

If it (hould be faid, That altho' it be true, if the Soul de-
termines it's own Volitions, it muft be aaive in fo doing,
and the Determination it felf muft be an Aa ; yet there is
no Need of fuppofing this Aa to be prior to the Volition de-
termined i But the Will or Soul determines the Acl of the
Will in IVilling ; It determines it's own Volition, in the very
Aa of Volition ; It direas and limits the A61 of the Will,
caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, in exerting the Aa,
without any preceeding Aa to exert that. . If any fhould fay
after this Manner,they muft mean one of thefe three Things :
Either, (i.j That the determining Aa, tho' it be before the
Aa determined in the Order of Nature, yet is not before it
in the Order of Time. Or (2) That the determining Aa is
not before the Aa determined, either in the Order of Time
or Nature, nor is truly diftina from it ; But that the Soul^s
determining the Aa of Volition is the fame Thing with it s
exerting the Aa of Volition : The Mind's exerting fuch a
particular Aa, is it's caufing and determining the Aa. Or,
(3.) That Volition has no Caufe, and is no Effea ; but
comes into Exiftence, with fuch a particular Determination,
without any Ground or Reafon of it's Exiftence and Deter-
mination. I ftiall confider thefe diftinaiy.

(i.j If all that is meant, be, that the determining Aa is
not before the Aa determined in Order of Time, it will not
help the Cafe at all, tho' it lliould be allowed. If it be be-

38 Suppo/ecl Evafions PartIL

fore the <5etfermin'd A61 in the Order of Nature, being the
Caufe or Ground of it's Exiftenee, this as much proves it to
Be dil^in(5l from it, and independent on it, as if it were be-
fore in the Order of Time. As the Caufe of the particular
Motioh of a natural Body in a certain Direcftion, may have
fto Diftance as to Time, yet can't be the fame with the Mo-
tion effeded by it, but muft be as diftin6t from it, as any
other Gaufe, that is before it's Effecfl in the Order of Time :
as the Archited is diftindl from the Houfe which he builds,
or the Father diftind from the Son which he begets. And if
the Acfl of the Will determining be diftin<5l from the A61 de-
termined, and before it in the Order of Nature, then we can
go back from one to another, 'till we come to the firil in the
Series, which has no Ad of the Will before it in the Order
of Nature, determining it ; and confequently is an A61 not
determined by the Will, and fo not a free Ad, in this Notion
of Freedom. And this being the Acft which determines all
the Reft, none of them are free Ads. As when there is a
Chain of many Links, the firft of which only is taken hold
of and drawn by Hand ; all the reft may follow and be mov-
ed at the fame Inftant, without any Diftance of Time ; but
yet the Motion of one Link is before that of another in the
Order of Nature ; the laft is moved by the next, and that
by the next, and fo 'till we come to the firft ; which not
being moved by any other, but by fomething diftindt from
the whole Chain, this as much proves that no Part is moved
by any Self-moving Power in the Chain, as if the Motion
of one Link followed that of another in the Order of Time.

(2.) If any ftiould fay, that the determining Ad is not be-
fore the determined Ad, either in the Order of Time, or of
Nature, nor is diftinct from it ; but that the Exertion of the
Ad is the Determination of the Ad ; That for the Soul to
exert a particular Volition, is for it to caufe and determine
that Act of Volition : I would on this obferve, that the
Thing in Queftion feems to be forgotten, or kept out of
Sight, in a Darknefs and Unintelligiblenefs of Speech 5 un-
lefs fuch an Objedor would mean to contradid himfelf. The
very Ad of Volition it felf is doubtlefs a Determination of
Mind ; i. e. it is the Mind's drawing up a Conclufion, or
coming to a Choice between two Things, or more, propofed
to it. But determining among external ObjeSis of Choice, is
not the fame with determining the JSf of Choice it felf,among
various poffible Ads of Choice. The Queftion is, What
infiuences, direds, or determines the Mind or Will to come

Se(3:.II. conjidered. 39

to fuch a Conclufion or Choice as it does ? or whajt is the
Cauie, Ground or Reafon, why it concludes thus, and not
Qtherwife ? Now it muft be anrwered,according to theyirminian
Notion of Freedom, that the Will influences, orders ancl
determines it felf thus to a6t. And if it does, I f^y, it muft
be by fome antecedent A^. To fay, it is caufed, influencec|
and determined by fomething, and yet not determined by any
Thing antecedent, either in Order of Time or Nature, is a
Contradi6tion. For that is what is meant by a Thing's be-
ing prior in the Order of Nature, that it is fome Way the
Caufe or Reafon of the Thing, with Refped to which it is
faid to be prior.

If the particular A(5t or Exertion of Will, which comes
into Exiftence,be anyThing properly determined at all,then ij
has fome Caufe of it's exifting, and of it's exifting in fuch ^
particular determinate Manner, and not another ; fome
Caufe, whofe Influence decides the Matter : which Caufe i$
diftindt from the EfFe6l, and prior to it. But to fay, that the
Will or Mind orders, influences and determines it felf to ex-
ert fuch an A6t as it does, by the very Exertion it felf, is to
make the Exertion both Cauie & EfFed: j or the exerting fuch
an A(5t, to be a Caufe of the Exertion of fuch an A6t. Fo]^
the Queftion is. What is the Caufe and Reafon of the Soul'^
exerting fuch an h&i ? To which the Anfwer is, the Soul ex-
erts fuch an A(5t,and that is the Caufe of it. And fo, by this,
the Exertion muft be prior in the Order of Nature to it felf,
and diftind from it felf.

(3.J If the Meaning be, that the Soul's Exertion of fuch
a particular Adt of Will, is a Thing that comes to pafs of it
felf without any Caufe ; and that there is abfolutely no
Ground or Reafon of the Soul's being determined to exert
fuch a Volition, and make fuch a Choice, rather than ano-
ther ; I fay, if this be the Meaning of Jrmimans^ when they
contend fo earneftly for the Will's determining it's own Acts,
and for Liberty of Will confifting in Self-determming Power ;
they do nothing but confound Themfelves and others with
Words without a Meaning. In the Queftion, fP^hat determines
the JVill f and in their Anfwer, that the Will determines it felf^
and in all the Difpute about it, it feems to be taken for grant-
ed, that fomething determines the W^ill ; and the Controverfy
on this Head is not, whether any Thing at all determmes it,
or whether it's Determination has any Caufe or Foundation
at all ; But where the Foundation of it is, whether in the

WiU

40 Evafions conjidered. Part IL

Will it felf, or fomewhere elfe. But if the Thing intended
be what is above-mention'd, then all comes to this, that No-
thing at all determines the Will ; Volitio i having abiblutely
no Caufe orFoundation of it'sExiflence,either within, or with-
out. There is a great Noife made about Self-determining
Power, as the Source of all free A6ts of the Will : But when
the Matter comes to be explained, the Meaning is, that no
Power at all is the Source of thefe Ads, neither Self-deter-
mining Power, nor any other, but they arife from Nothing ;
no Caufe, no Power, no Influence, being at all concern'd in
the Matter.

However, this very Thing, even that the free Ads of the
Will are Events which come to pafs without a Caufe, is cer-
tainly implied in the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will ; tho'
it be very inconfiftent with many other Things in their
Scheme, and repugnant to fome Things implied in their No-
tion of Liberty. Their Opinion implies, that the particular
Determination of Volition is without any Caufe ; becaufe
they hold the free Ads of the Will to be Contingent Events ;
and Contingence is effential to Freedom in their Notion of it.
But certainly, thofe Things which have a prior Ground and
Reafoa of their particular Exiftence, a Caufe which antece-
dently determines them to be, and determines them to be
juft as they are, don't happen contingently. If fomething
foregoing, by a caufal Influence and Connedion, determines
and fixes precifely their coming to pafs, and the Manner of
it, then it don't remain a contingent Thing whether They
ihali come to pafs or no.

And becaufe it is a Quefl:ion, in many Refpeds, very im-
portant in this Controverfy about the Freedom of Will,
Whether the free A6ls of the Will are Events which come to pafs
without a Caufe ? I (hall be particular in examining this
Point in the two following Sedions.

SlCTJON

Sfea^.ill. No Event without a Caufe. 41

Section III.

Whether any Event whatfoeve?\andV oWtxon
in particular^ can co77ie to pajs without
a Caufe of it's Exijience.

i'r . ■ ■■ , ;

BEfore I enter on any Argument on this Subje^, I would
explain how I would be underftood, when I ufe the
Word Caufe in this Difcourfe : fince, for want of a
better Word, 1 fliall have Occafion to ufe it in a Senfe which
is more extenfive, than that in which it is fometimes ufed*
The Word is often ufed in fo retrained a Senfe as to fignify
only that which has a pofitive Efficiency or Influence to produce
a Thing, or bring it to pafs. But there are many Things
tvhich have no fuch pofitive productive Influence ; which yet
are Caufes in that Refpe6t, that they have truly the Nature
of a Ground or Reafon why fome Things are, rather than
others ; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwife.
Thus the Abfence of the Sun in the Night, is not the Caufe
of the falling of the Dew at that Time, in the fame Manner
as it's Beams are the Caufe of the Afcending of the Vapours
in the Da) -Time ; And it's Withdrawment in the Winter, is
not in the fame Manner the Caufe of the Freezing of the
Waters, as it's Approach in the Spring is the Caufe of their
Thawing. But yet the Withdrawment or Abfence of the
Sun is an Antecedent, with which thefe EfFe(ffs in the Night
and Winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and
is one Thing that belongs to the Ground and Reafon why
they come to pafs at that Time, rather than at other Times ;
, tho' the Abfence of the Sun is Nothing pofitive, nor has
atiy pojGitive Influence.

It may be further obferved, that when I fpeak of ConneSiion
■ef Caufes and Effeds^ I have Refpect to moral Caufes, as well
as thofe that are called natural in Diftindion from 'em.
Moral Caufes may be Caufes in as proper a Senfe, as any
Caufes whatfoever ; may have as real an Influence, and may
as truly be the Ground and Reafon of an Event's coming to
pafs.

Therefore I fometimes ufe theV/ord Caife^ in this Enquiry^
to fignify any AntHidm>i either natural or moral, pofitive or

F negative,

42 No Event without a Caufe. Part IL

negative, on which an Event, either a Thing, or the Manner
and Circumftance of a Thing, fo depends, that it is the
Ground and Reafon, either in Whole, or in Part, why it is,
rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwife j
Or, in other Words, any Antecedent with which a confeqiient
Event is fo connected, that it truly belongs to the Reafoa
why the Proportion which affirms that Event, is true ; whe-
ther it has any pofitive Influence, or not. And in an Agrea-
blenefs to this, I fometimes ufe the Word Effe^^ for the
Confequence of another Thing, which is perhaps rather an
Occafion than a Caufe, moft properly fpeaking.

I am the more careful thus to explain my Meaning, that I
may cut off Occafion, from any that might feek Occafion to
cavil and object againft fome Things which I may fay con*
cerning the 'Dependance of all Things which come to pafs,
on fome Caufe, and their Connection with their Caufe,

Having thus explained what I mean by Cauje^ I afTert, that
Nothing ever comes to pafs without a Caufe. What is Self-
exigent muft be from Eternity, and mull be unchangeable :
But as to all lliings that begin to hc^ they are not belf-ex-
iftent, and therefore muft have fome Foundation of their Ex-
tftence without themfelves. — That whatfoever begins to be,
which before was not,muft have a Caufe why it then begins to
cxift, fccms to be the firfi: Dictate of the common and natural
Senfe which God hath implanted in the Minds of all
Mankind, and the main Foundation of all our Reafonings
about the Exiftence of Things, paft, prefent, or to come.

And this Didate of common Senfe equally refpects Sub-
fiances and Modes, or Things and the Manner and Circum-
flances of Things. Thus, if we fee a Body which has hither-
to been at Reft, ftart out of a State of Reft, and begin
to move, we do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is
fome Caufe or Reafon of this new Mode of Exiftence, as
of the Exiftence of a Body it itM which had hitherto not
exifted. And fo if a Body, which had hitherto moved in a
certain Direction, fhould fuddenly change the Direction of
its Motion ; or if it ftiould put off it's old Figure, and take
a new one ; or change it's Colour : the Beginning of thefe
new Modes is a new Event, and the Mind of Mankind
neceffiarily fuppofes tiiat there \% fome Caufe or Reafon of
them»

Seil.III. No Eve?tt without a Caufe. 43

■ If this grand Principle of common Senfe be taken away, all
Arguing tromEffects to Caufes ceafethjand fo all Knowlege of
any £x;itence, befides what we have by the moft direct and
immediate Intuition. Particularly all our Proof of the Being
of God ceafes : We argue his Being from our own Being,
ana the Being of othtr Things, which we are fenfibie once
were not, but have begun to be ; and from the Being of the
World, with all it*s conftituent Parts, and the Manner ot
their Kxirtcnce 5 all which we fee plainly are not neceffary in
their own Nature, and fo not Self-exiftent, and therefore
muil have a Caufe. But if Things, not in themfelves ne-
celTary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is
vain.

Indeed, I will not afErm, that there is in the Nature of
Th ngs no Foundation for the Knowledge of the Being of
God Without any Evidence of it from his Works. I do fup-
pofe there is a great Abfurdity, in the Nature of Things fun-
p!y confidered, in fuppofing that there fhould be no God,
or in denying Being m general, and fuppofmg an eternal,
abfolute, univerfal Nothing : And therefore that here would
be Foundation of intuitive Evidence that it cannot be, and
that eternal infinite moft perfect Being muft be ; if we had
Strength and Compreheniion of Mind fafficient, to have a
clear Idea of general and univerfal Being, or, which is
the fame Thing, of the infinite, eternal, moft perfed di-
vine Nature and Eftence. But then we fhould not properly
come to the Knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ;
but our Evidence would be intuitive : We Ihould fee it, as
we fee other Things that are necelTary in themfelves, the
Contraries of which are in their own Nature abfurd and con-
tradiilory ; as we fee that twice two is four ; and as we fee
that a Circle has no Angles. If we had as clear an Idea of
univerfal ini'nite Entity, as we have of thefe other Things, I
fuppoie we ihould moft intuitively fee the Abfurdity of fuppo-
fing fuch Being not to be ; fhould immediately fee there
is no Room tor the Queftion, whether it is pofTible that
Being, in the moft general abftraded Notion of it, fliould
not be. But we have not that Strength and Extent of Mind,
to know this certainly in this intuitive independent Man-
ner : But the Way that Mankind come to the Knowledge of
the Being of God, is that which the Apoftle fpeaks of, Rom.
,\. 20. 77?^ ifjvifihle Things of Him, from the Creation of the IVcrld^
are clearly fe en ; being under fiood by the Things that are made ; even
his eternal Power and Godhead, VVe firjl afcend^ and prove a

F 2 Pojleriorip

44 J^o 'Event without a Caufe. Part 11.

Pofteriorly or from Effedls, that there muft be an eternal
Caufe ; and then fecondly^ prove by Argumentation, not In-
tuition, that this Being muft be necefTarily ejciftent ; and
then thirdly^ from the proved NeceiTity of hisExiftencejWe may
defccnd^ and prove ^any of his Perfedlions a Priori,

But if once this grand Principle of common Senfe be given
up, that what is not necejfary in it felf^ mufl have a Caufe ; an(J
•we begin to maintain, that Things may come into Exiftence,
and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of them-
felves, without any Caufe \ all our Means of afcending in
our arguing from the Creature to the Creator, and all our
Evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one Blow. In
this Cafe, we can't prove that there is a God, either from
the Being of the World, and the Creatures in it, or from the
Manner of their Being, their Order, Beauty and Ufe. For
if Things may come intp Exiftence without any Caufe at all,
then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe anfwerable to the
Effed. Our Minds do alike naturally fuppofe and determine
both thefe Things j namely, that what begins to be has a
Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe proportionable and
agreable to the EfFea. The fame Principle which leads us to
determine, that there cannot be any Thing coming to pafs
without a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be
more in the Effea than in the Caufe.

Yea, if once it fhould be allowed, that Things may come
to pals without a Caufe, we Ihould not only have no Proof
of the Being of _ God, but we (hould be without Evidence of
the Exiil:cnce of any Thing whatfoever, but our own imme-
diately prefent Ideas and Confcioufnefs. For we have no
Wa^ to prove any Thing elfe, but by arguing from Effeas
to Caules : from the Ideas now immediately in View, we ar-
gue other Things not immediateiy in View : from Senfations
now excited in us, we infer the Exiftence of Things without
us, as theCaufes of thefe Senfations : And from the :£x-
iftence of thefe Things, we argue other Thiigs, which they
depend on, as Eflfeas on Caufes. We infer the paft Exift-
ence of our Selves, or any Thing elfe, by Memory ; only
as we argue, that the Ideas, which are now in our Minds,
5ire the Confequences of paft Ideas and Senfations. We im-
piediately perceive nothing elfe but the Ideas which are this
Moment extant in our Minds. W^e perceive or know other
Things only hy Meam qf thefe, as neceflarily conneaed with

othersj

Seft.in. No Event without a Caufe. 45

others, and dependent on them. But if Things may b^
without Caufes, all this neceflary Connecftion and Depen-
iience is dilTolved, and fo all Means of our Knowledge is
gone. ' If there be no Abrurdity or Difficulty in fuppofing
one Thing to Hart out of Non-Exiftence, into Being, of ^t
felf without a Caufe ; then there is no Abfurdity or Difficulty
in fuppofing the fame of Millions of Millions. For Nothing,
or no Difficulty multiplied, ftill is Nothing, or no Difficulty :
Nothing multiplied by Nothing don't increafe the Sum.

And indeed, according to the Hypothefis I am opppfin^,
of the A6ts of the Will coming to pafs without a Caufe, it
is the Cafe in Fad, that Millions of Millions of Events are
continually coming into Exiftence Contingently^ without any
Caufe or Reafon v/hy they do fo, all over the World, every
Day and Hour, thro' all Ages. So it is in a conftant Suc-
ceffion, in every moral Agent. This Contingency, this
efficient Nothing, this effectual No-Caufe, is always ready
at Hand, to produce this Sort of EfFeds, as long as the
Agent exifts, and as often as he has Occalion.

If it were fo, that Things only of one Kind, wz. AcSVs of
the Will, feem'd to come to pafs of Themfelves'j but thofe
of this Sort in general came hito Being thus 5 and it were
an Event that was continual, and that happen'd in a Courfe,
wherever were capable Subjeds of fuch Events ; this very
Thing would demonflrate that there was fome Caufe of theni,
which made fuch a Difference between this Event and others,
^nd that they did not really happen contingently. For Con-
tingence is blind, and do^s not pick and choofe for a particu-
lar Sort of Events. Nothing has no Choice. ThisNo-Caufe,
which caufes no Exiftence, can't caufe the Exiftence which
comes to pafs, to be of one particular Sort only, diftmguifli'd
from all others. Thus, that only one Sort of Matter drops
out of the Heavens, even Water, and that this comes fo
often, fo conflantly and plentifully, all over the World, in all
Ages, Ihows that there is fome Caufe or Reafon of the falling
of Water out of the Heavens ; and that fomething beiides
meer Contingence has a Hand in the Matter.

If we fliould fuppofe Non-entity to be about to bring forth ;
and Things were coming into Exiftence, without any Caufe
or Antecedent, on which the Exiftence, or Kind or Manner
of Exiftence depends ; or which could at all determine whe-
ther the Things (hould be 5 Stones, or Stars, or Beafts, or

Angels,

46 Volition arifes not Part 11.

Angels, or human Bodies, or Souls, or only fome new Mo-
tion or Figure in natural Bodies, or fome new Senfations in
Animals, or new Ideas in the human Uoderftanding, or new
Volitions in the Will J or any Thing elfe of all the infinite
Number of Poflibles ; then certainly it would not be expect-
ed, altho' many Millions of Millions of Things are
coming into Exiftence in this Manner, all over the Face of
the Earth, that they fhould all be only of one particular
Kind, and that it fliould be thus in all Ages, and that this
Sort of Exiftences fliould never fail to come to pafs where
there is Room for them, or a Subjecft capable of them, and
that conftantly, whenever there is Occafion for them.

If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the Sort of
Event that renders it poffible for it to come into Exiftence
without a Caufe ; and fhould fay, that the free Acfts of the
Will are Exiftences of an exceeding different Nature from
other Things ; by Reafon of which they may come into Ex-
iftence without any previous Ground or Reafon of it, tho*
other Things cannot ; If they make this Objedion in good
Earneft, it would be an Evidence of their ftrangely forget-
ing themfelves : For they would be giving an Account of
fome Ground of the Exiftence of a Thing, when at the fame
Time they would maintain there is no Ground of it's Exift-
ence. Therefore I would obferve, that the particular Nature
of Exiftence, be it never fo diverfe from others, can lay no
Foundation for that Thing's coming into Exiftence without a
Caufe ; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the
particular Nature of Exiftence to be a Thing prior to the
Exiftence ; and fo a Thing which makes Way for Exift-
ence, with fuch a Circumftance, namely without a Caufe or
Reafon of Exiftence. But that which m any Refpe6t makes
Way for a Thing's coming into Being, or tor any Manner
or Circumftance of iv's firft Exiftence, muft be prior to the
Exiftence. The diftinguiftiM Nature of the EfFea, which
is fomething belonging to the Effe6t, can't have Influence
backward, to ad before it is. The peculiar Nature of that
Thing called Volition, can do Nothing, can have no Influ-
ence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for it's
Influence : for then the Thing has made fure of Exiftence
already, without it's Help.

So that it is indeed as repugnant to Reafon, to fuppofe
that an Adl of the Will ftiouid come into Exiftence without
a Caufe, as to fuppofe the human Soul, or an Angel, or

the

§e6l.IV. withmt a Caufe. 47

the Globe of the Earth, or the whole Univerfe, (hould come
into Exigence without a Caufe. And if once we allow, that
fuch a Sort of Effed as a Volition may come to pafs without
a Caufe, how do we know but that many other Sorts of
Effe<5ls may do fo too ? 'Tis not the particular Kind of
EfFedt that makes the Abfurdity of fuppofmg it has being
without a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all
Things that ever begin to be, viz, that they are not Self-
exiftent, or ncceflary in the Nature of Things.

Section IV. ,

Whether Volition can arife without a Caujhy
through the Activity of the Nature of
the SouL

THE Author of the Efay on the Freedom of the TFilI in
God and the Creatures^ in Anfwer to that ObjecStion
againft his Dodrine of a Self-determining Power in the
Will, (P. 68,69.) ThatNothlng is,or cvmes to fafs^without afuffident
Reafon why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another ^
allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, which are -properly
ond philofophically fp caking pajjive Beings ; but denies that it is
thus in Spirits^ which are Beings of an aSfive Nature^ who have
the Spring of ASiion within thejnfelveSy and can determine them--
felves. By which it is plainly fuppofed, that fuch an Event
as an Ad of the Will, may come to pafs in a Spirit, without
^ fufficicnt Reafon why it comes to pafs, or why it is after
this Manner, rather than another ; by Reafon of the Acti-
vity of the Nature of a Spirit.—— But certainly this Author,
in this Matter, mull be very unwary and inadvertent. For,

I. The Objedion or DifRculty propofed by this Author,
feems to be forgotten in his Anfwer or Solution. The very
Difficulty, as he himfelf propofes it, is this ; How an Event
can come to pafs witiwut a fufpcient Reafcn why it is, or why it
is in this Manner rather than another f Inftead of folving this
Difficulty, or aniwenng this Queflion with Regard to Voli-
tion, as he propofes, he forgets himfelf, and anfwers ano-
ther Queftjon quite divcrfe, and wholly inconfiftent with
this, vis:.. What is a fufficient Reafon why it is, and why it is

48 Volition not without a Caufe Part II.

in this Manner rather than another ? And he afTigns the
Active Being's own Determination as the Caufe, and a
Caufe fufficient for the EfFe6t ; and leaves all the Difficulty
ilrirefolved, and the Queftion unanfwered, which yet returns,
^ven, How the Soul's own Determination, which he fpeaks
of, came to exift, and to be what it was without a Caufe ?
The Adivity of the Soul may enable it to be the Caufe of
Efffedts' ; but it doA't at all enable or help it to be the Sub-
je<5t of Effedts which have no Caufe ; which is the Thing
this Author fuppof^s concerning A6ls of the Will. Activity
of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Effeds,
and determine the Manner of their Exiftence, within it felf,
without a Caufe, than out of it felf, in fome other Being.
But if an adive Being (hould, through it's Adivity, produce
and determine an Effedl in fome external Objecl, how abfurd
would it be to fay, that theEffedt was produced without a Caufe !

2. The Queftion is not fo much. How a Spirit endowed

with Adivity comes to acSt, as why it exerts fuch an A61, \

and not another ; or why it ads with fuch a particular De- ;;

termination ? If Adivity of Nature be theCaufe why a Spirit ''

(the Soul of Man for Inltance) ads, and don't lie ftill ; yet j

that alone is not the Caufe why it's Adion is thus and thus (

limited, directed and determined. Adlive Nature is a general \
Thing ; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to Adion,

generally taken ; which may be a Caufe why the Soul ,j

ads as Occafion or Reafon is given ; but this alone ■■.

can't be a fufficient Caufe why the Soul exerts fuch '

a particular Ad, at fuch a Time, rather than others. '

In order to this, there muft be fomething befides a general \

Tendency to Adion ; there muft alfo be a particular Ten- ]

dency to that individual Adion. If it ftiould be afked, I

why the Soul of Man ufes it's Adivity in fuch a Manner as 1

it does ; and it ftiould be anfwered, that the Soul ufes it's ■;

Adivity thus, rather than otherwife, becaufe it has Adivity ; \

would fuch an Anfwer fatisfy a rational Man ? Would it ]

not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one I 'i

3. An adive Being can bring no Effeds to pafs by his '
Adivity, but what are confequent upon his ading : He pro- I
duces Nothing by his Adivity, any other Way than by the \
Exercife of his Adivity, and fo Nothing but the Fruits of i
it's Exercife : He brings Nothing to pafs by a dormant I
Adivity. But the Exercife of his Adivity is Adion ; and fo '
his Adion, or Exercife of his Adivity, roufi; be prior to the ,

Sedl-IV. thro the SouTs Adlivity. 49

EfFe(5ts of his Acclivity. If an a6live Being produces an
EfFe6l in another Beings about which IiiSJ*' Activity is convcr-
fant, the EfFe6l being the Fruit of his Ailivity, his A6ti-
vity muft be firft exercifed or exerted, and the Effect of it
muft follow. So it murt: be, with equal Reafon, if the
a6live Being is his own Objev5t, and his Acflivity is conver-
fant about Himfelf, to produce and determine fome Eifedl
in himfelf ; ftill the Exercife of his AvStivity muft go before
the Effect, which he brings to pafs and determines by it.
And therefore his A6tivity can't be the Caufe of the Deter-
mination of the firft A6lion, or Exerciie of Adivity it feJf,
whence the Effeds of A6livity arife \ for that would imply
aContradi6tion ; It would be to fay,the firft Exercife of Adivity
is before the firft Exercife of A6tivity, and is the Caufe of it.

4. That the Soul, tho' an a6live Subftance, can't dherjify
it's own Ads, but by firft a6ting ; or be a determinmg
Caufe of different Ads, or any different Effeds, fometimes
of one Kind, and fometmies of another, any other Way
than in Confequence 6f it's own diverfe Ads, is manifeft by
this ; That if fo, then the faine Caufe, the fame caufal
Power, Force or Influence, ivkhout Variation in any Refpe£fy
would produce different Effeds at different Time's. For the
fame Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and the fame
adive Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i, e. before in
the Order of Naturej would be the Caufe of different
Effeds, "uiz, different Volitions at diff'erent Times. But the
Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and it's adive Nature
before it is exerted, are the fame without Variation. For 'tis
fome Ad that makes the firft Variation in the Caufe, as to any
caufal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it be fo, that
the Soul has no different Caufality, or diverfe caufal Force
or Influence, in producing thefe diverfe Effeds , then 'tis
evident, that the Soul has no Influence, no Hand in the
d'iverfity of the Effed ; and that the Difference of the Effed
can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul ; or which is the
fame Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diverfity of the

Effed ; which is contrary to the Supp9fition. 'Tis true,

the Subftance of the Soul before it ads, and before there is
any Difference in that Refped, may be in a different State
and Circumftances : But thofe whom I oppofe, v/ill not:
allov/ the diff"erent Circumftances of the Soul to be the de-
termining Caufes of the i\ds of the Vv^'ill • as being con-
trary to tiieir Notion of Self-detenninatiou and Self-motiou,

50 Volition not without a Caufe &c. Part IL

5. Let us fuppofe, as thefe Divines do, that there are no
Aas of the Soul, ftriaiy fpeaking, but free Volitions ;
Then it will follow, that the Soul is an a^ive Being in
Nothing further than it is a voluntary or ele6tive Being ;
and whepever it produces EfFeds aaively, it produces Effeds
voluntarily and eledively. But to produce Effeds thus, is
the fame Thing as to produce Effects in Confequence of^ and
according to it's own Choice. And if fo, then furely the
Soul don't by it's Adtivity produce all it's own Ads of Will
or Choice themfeives : For this, by the Suppofition, is to
produce all it's free A6ls of Choice voluntarily and eledive-
ly, or in Confequence of it's own free Ads of Choice, which
brings the Matter diredly to the fore-mentioned Contra-
diction, of a free A6t of Choice before the tirft free Ad of

Choice. According to thefe Gentlemen's own Notion of

Adion, if there arifes in the Mind a Volition without a free
Ad of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it,
the Mind is not the adive voluntary Caufe of that Voli-
tion ; becaufe it don't arife from, nor is regulated by Choice
or Defign» And therefore it can't be, that the Mind fliould
be the adive, voluntary, determining Caufe of the lirft and

leadmg Volition that relates to the Affair. The Mind's

htv!\% 2i dcfigning Q-^wit^ only enables it to produce Effeds in
Confequence of it's Defign ; it will not enable jit to be the
defigning Caufe of all it's own Defigns. The Mind's being
an ele^live Caufe, will only enable it to produce Effeds in
Confequence of it's Ele£iions^ and according to them ; but
can't enable it to be the eledive Caufe of all it's own Elec-
tions ; becaufe that fuppofes an Eiedion before the firft E-
ledion. So tli£ Mind's being an .ja^ive Caufe enables it to
produce Effeds in Confequence of it's own ASfs^ but can't
enable it to be the determining Caufe of all it's own Ads ;
for that is ftill in the fame Manner a Contradidion ; as it
fuppoles a determining Act converfant about the firft Act,
and prior to it, having a caufal Influence on it's Exiftence,
and Manner of Exiftence.

I can conceive of Nothing elfe that can be meant by the
Soul's having Power to caufe and determine it's own Voli-
tions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of
Adion, but this j that God has given Power to the Soul,
fometimes at leaft, to excite Volitions at it's Pleafure, or
according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes,- in all
fuch Caics, a Choice preceeding all Volitions which are

thus

Sedt. V. Thefe Evaftons imdertinent. 5 1

thus caufed, even the very firft of them. Which runs into
the fore-mentioned great Abfurdity.

Therefore the Activity of the Nature of the Soul affords
no Rehef from the Difficulties which the Notion of a Self-
determining Power in the Will is attended with, nor will it
help, in the leaii, it's Abfurdities and Inconfiftences.

I .

Section V,

Shewing^ that if the Things ajferted in thefc
-Eva/tons JJjould be fuppofed to be true ^

they are altogether imperti7unty and can t
\ help the Caufe ^Arminian Liberty ; And

how f this being the State of the Cafe )

Arminian Writers are obliged to talk in-

confjiently.

WHAT was lad obferved in the preceeding Se(5Vion
may {hew, not only that the adive Nature of the
Soul can't be a Reafon why any AcSt of the Will is,
or why it is in this Manner, rather than another ; but alio
that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions
are contingent Events, in that Senfe, that their Being and
Manner of Being is not fix'd or determined by any Caufe,
or any Thing antecedent -, it would not at all ferve the Pur-
pofe of Armimans^ to eftablifh the Freedom of the Will, ac-
cording to their Notion of it's Freedom, as confilting in the
Will's Determination ofit'i felf; which fuppofes every free
Aa of the Will to be determined by fome Ad of the W^ill
going before to determine it ; in as much as for the Will to
determine a Thing, is the fame as for the Soul to determine
a Thing by Willing ; and there is no ^Vay that the Will can
determine an A<51 of the Will, than by xc77/;;z^ that A6t of
the Will, or, which is the fame Thing, chufing it. So that
here muft be two Ads of the Will in the Cafe, one goin^
before another, one converfant about the other, and the lat-
ter the Objedt of the former, and chofen by the former.

G % If

52 Thefe EvaJ^om impertinent. Pattll.

If the Will don't c^ufe and determine the Act by Choice,
it don't caufe or determine it at all ; for that which is hot.
determined by Choice, is not determined voluntarily or'
nx-iIUngly : And to fay, that the Will determines fomething.
>^/hich the Soul don't determine willingly, is as much as to
fiy, that fomething is done by the Will, which the Soul
don't do with it's Will.

So that if Armiman Liberty of Will, confifting in the
Will's determining it's own Ads, be maintained, the old
Abfurdity and Contradiction muft be maintained, that every
free A61 of Will is caufed and determined by a foregoing free
Aa of Will. Which don't confift with the free Aa's anfing
'yvithout any Caufe, and being fo contingent, as not be fix'd
by any Thing fore-going. So that this Evafion muft be given
i/p, as not at ail relieving, and as that which, inftead of fup-
porting this Sort of Liberty, diredly deflroys it.

And if it {hould be fuppofed, that the Soul determines it's
own Acfts of Will fome other Way, than by a foregoing
A6t of Will ; ftill it will not help the Caufe of their Liberty
of Will. \{ it determines them by an Act of the Under-
flanding, or fome other Power, then the IVtll don't deter-
mine it J elf ', and fo the S:lf-deter?nming Power of the Will is
given up. And what Liberty is there exercifed, according to
their own Opinion of Liberty, by the Soul's being deter-
mined by fomething befides ifs own Choice P The Acts pf
the WilJ, it is true, may be directed, and effe(5laally deter-
mined and lix'd ; but it is not done by the Soul's own Will
and Pleafiire : There is no Exercife at all of Choice or Will
in producing the Effect ; And if If^i/l and Choice are not
exercifed in it, how is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in it ?

So th at \ct Jnnimans turn which Way they pleafe with their
Notion of Liberty, confuting in the Will's determining it's
own ASsy their Kotion deftroys it felf. If they hold every
free Act of Will to be determined by the Soul's own free
Choice, or foregqing free A6t of Will 5 foregoing^ either in
the Order of Time, or Nature ; It implies that grofs Contra-
diction, that the tirft free A<Si belonging to the Affair, is de-
termined by a free A(5t which is before it. Or if they fay
thot the free Acts of the Will are determined by fome other
>^<:? of the Soul, and not an ACt of Will or Choice, Tl is
aifodefcroys their Notion of Liberty, confining in the A6ts
of the Wiil being determined by the fVill it felf \ Or
. • ■ if

^ci:.V. Arminians talk inconfiftently. 53

if they hold that the A6ls of the Will are determined by
Nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contin-

fent in that Senfe, that they are determined and fixed by no
'aufe at all ; this alfo deftroys their Notion of Liberty, con-
fifting in the Will's determining it's own Ads.

This being the true State of the Jr?nwia7i Notion of Li-
berty, it hence coines to pafs, that the Writers that defend
it are forced into grofs Liconfidences, in what they fay upon
this Subje61:. To inftance in Dr. JVhitby ; he in hisDifcourfe
on the Freedom of the Will, * oppofes the Opinion of the
Cahinifis^ who place Man's Liberty only in a Poiuer of doing
what He w'lll^ as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr.
Hohbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame Notion
of Liberty, as the Didate of the Senfe and coinmon Reafon of
Mankind^ and a Rule laid down by the Light of Nature ; viz. That
Liberty is a Power of aofing from our Selves^ or DOING WHAT
WE IflLL. t This is indeed, as he fays, a Thing agreable
to the ^enfe and comrnon R:afcn of Mank'.nd ; 'and therefore 'tis
not To much to be v^7ondered at, that he unawares acknow-
ledges it agaiaft himielf : For if Liberty don't confift in this,
what ejfe can be deviled that it fliould confift in ? If it be
faid, as Dr. Whitby elfewhere iniifts, That it don't only con-
fiil in Liberty of doing zvhat we will^ but alfo a Liberty of
Willing without Neceflity ; dill the Queftien returns. What
does that Liberty of willing without Necefuty coniift in, but
in a Fovver of willing as we pleafe^ without being impeded by
a contrary Neceillty ? or in other Words, A Liberty for the
Soul in it's wiliing to acft according to it's own Choice P Yea,
this very Thing the fame Author feems to allow, and fup-
pcfi again and again, in the Ufe he makes of Sayings of the
Fathers, whom he quotes as his Vouchers. Thus he cites
thefe Words of Origen, which he produces as a Teftimony
on his Side ; j| The Soul aSfs By HER OJl^ CHOICE, and
it is free for her to incline to zvhat ever Part SHE WILL. ,And
thofe Words of fujiin Martyr ; % ^'^^ Do^rine of the ChrijVians
is this. That Nothing is dons or ftijfered according to Fate, but that
eim-y Man doth Good or Evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN
FREE CHOICE. And from Eufebius, thefe Words ; 4- If
Fate be ejlablifh'd, Philofophy and Piety are overthrown. — Ail
thefe Things depending upon the NeceJJity introduced by the Stars^

and

* In his Book on the five Points, 2d Edit. P. 350, 35i,3>--
+ Ibid. p. 325, 326. jl Ibid, P. 342. % Ibid. P.3 6o. \Itid.
^' 363-

54 Arminians talk inconfiftently. Part II.

md not upon Meditation and Exertife PROCEEDING FROM
OUR Om^ FREE CHOICE. And again, the Words- of
Macaritis^ || God^ to preferve the Liberty of Mali's TVill^ Juffered
their Bodies to die^ that it might he IN THEIR CHOICE to turn
to Good or Evil. — They who are aSied by the Holy Spirit^ are
not held under any Nccejjity^ hut have Liberty to turn themfelves^
^md DO WHAT THEY WILL in this Life.

Thus, the Do<5lor in EfFe6l comes into that very No-
tion of Liberty, which the Calvinijis have ; which he at
the fame Time condemns, as agreeing with the Opinion of
Wx. HohbeSy namely, the Soul's Aciing by it's oivn Choice, Aden's
doing Good or Evil according to their own free Choice^ Their being
in that Exertife which proceeds from their own free Choice, Having
it in their Choice to turn to Good or Evil, and doing what they zvilL
So that if Men exercife this Liberty in the Acts of the Will
themfelves, it muft be in exerting A6ts of Will as they will,
or according to their own free Choice ; or exerting Acts of Will
that proceed frcin their Choice. And if it be fo, then let every
one judge whether this don't fuppofe a free Choice going be-
fore the free kdi of Will, or whether an Acl: of Choice don't
go before that A6t of the Will which proceeds from it. And
if it be thus with all free Ads of the Will, then let eveiy
one judge, vv'hether it won't follow^ that there is a free
Choice or Will going before the firft free A61 of the Will
exerted in the Cafe. And then let every one judge, whetlier
this be not a Contradicftion. And finally, let every one
uidge whether in the Scheme of thefe Writers tliere be any
rolfibility of avoiding thefe Abfurdities.

If Liberty confifts, as Dr. Whiiby hinifelf fays, in a Man's
doing what He will ; and a Man exercifes this Liberty, not
only in external A(5lions, but in the Ads of the Will 'them-
felves ; then fo far as Liberty is exercifed in the latter, it
confifts in willing what he wills : And if any fay fo, one of
thefe two Things muft be meant, either i. That a Man has
Power to Will, as he docs will ; becaufe w^hat he wills, he
wills ; and therefore has Power to will what he has Power
to will. If this be their Meaning, then all this mighty Con-
troverfy about Freedom of the Will and Self-determining
Power, comes wholly to Nothing ; all that is contended
for being no more than this, That the Mind of Man does
>ijvhat it does, and is the Subjed of w^hat it is the Subjed of,

X Ibid. 369, 370. .

^QiN\. Of chujing in Things indifferent, 55

©r that what is, is ; wherein None has any Controverfy v/ith
them. Or, 2. The Meaning muft be, that a Man has
Power to will as he J)leafes or chufcs to will : That is, he
has Power by one A61 of Choice, to chufe another ; by an
antecedent Ad of Will to chufe a confequent A(5t ; and
therein to execute his own Choice. And if this be their
Meaning, it is Nothing but Shuffling with thofe they difputc
with, and baffling their own Reafon. For ftill the Queftion
returns, wherein lies Man's Liberty in that antecedent Adi
of Will which chofe the confequent A61. The Anfwer ac-
cording to the fame Principles muft be, that his Liberty in
this alio lies in his willing as he would, or as he chofe, or
agreable to another A(5t of Choice preceeding that. And fo
the Queftion returns in infinitu?n^ and the like Anfwer muft be
made in infinitum : In order to fupport their Opinion, there
muft be no Beginning, but free Ads of Will muft have

• been chofen by foregoing free Ads of Will, in the Soul of
every Man, without Beginning ; and fo before he had a

' Being, from all Eternity.

Section VI.

Concerning theWilPs determining inT'hings
which are perfeBly indifferent, in the
V , J^iew of the Mind.

A Great Argument for Self-determining Power, is the
fuppofed Experience we univerfally have of an Ability
to determine our Wills, in Cafes wherein no prevail-
ing Motive is prefented : The Will (as is fuppofed) has
It's Choice to make between two or more Things, that are
perfedly equal in the View of the Mind ; and the Will is
apparently altogether indifferent ; and yet we find no Diffi-
culty in coming to a Choice ; the Will can inftantly deter-
mine it felf to one, by a fovereign Power which it has over
it felf, without being moved by any preponderating Induce-
ment.

Thus

56 Of chujing in Things mdi&xQnt. PartIL

Thus the forementioned Author of an Effay on the Freedom
cfthe Will &c. P. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes, ^' That there are
*' many Inftances, wherein the Wiil is determined neither
" by prefcnt Uneafinefs, nor by the greatefi: apparent Good,
'' nor by the laft Didate of the Underfiand ng, nor by
'' any Thing elfe, but meerly by it feif, as a Sovereign Self-
*' determining. Power of the Soui ; and that the Soul does
" not will this or that A(5tion, in fome Cafes, by any other
^' Influence, but becaufe it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn
*' my Face to the South, or the North ; I can point with my

'' Finger -upward, or downward. And thus, in fome Ca-

*' fes, the Will determines it felf in a very fovereign Man-
>* ner, becaufe it will, without a Reafon borrowed from the
*' Underftanding : and hereby it diicovers. it's own perfe6t
*' Power of Choice, riling from within it felf, and free from
'' all Influence or Reftraint of any Kmd." And in Pages 66,
70, ^73, 74. This Author very exprcfly fuppofes the Will
in many Cafes to be determined by no Motive at all^ and aSls
altogether without Motive, or Ground oj Preference, — Here I
would obferve,

I. The very Suppofltion which is here made, dire^lly con-
tradicSts and overthrows it felf. For the Thing fuppofed,
wherein this grand Argument confifl:s,is. That among feveral
Things the Will a6hial]y chufes one before another, at the
fame Time that it is perfectly indiflferent ; which is the very
fame Thing as to fay, the Mind has a Preference, at the
fame Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't
be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a
Choice, or 'till it has a Preference ; or, which is the fame
Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not
indifferent. For certainly this Author did not fuppofe he
had a Controverfy with any Perfon in fuppofing this. And
then it is Nothing to his Purpofe, that the Mind which
chufes, was indifferent once ; unlefs it chufes, remaining in-
different ; for otherv^^ife, it don't chufe at all in that Cafe of
Indifference, concerning which is all the Qiief^ion. Befides,
it appears in Fa6f, that the Thing which this Author fup-
pofes, is not that the Will chufes one Thing before ano-
ther, concerniiig which it is indifferent before it chufes ; but
alfo is indifferent when it chufes \ and that it's being otherwife
than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Confequence of
'it's Choice ; that the chofen Thing's appearing preferable
and more agrcable than anotherj arifes from it's Choice
His Words are fP. 30.J *' Where the Ob-

Sed.VI. Ofchujing inThings indifferent. 57

*« je(5ts which are propofed, appear equally fit or good, the
" Will is left without a Guide or Diredor ; and therefore
" mull make it's own Choice, by it's own Determination ; it
" being properly a Self-determining Power. And in fuch
*< Cafes theWill does as it were make a Good to it felf by it's
*'~ own Choice, /. e. creates it's own Pleafure or Delight
** in this Self-chofen Good. Even as a Man by feizing
*' upon a Spot of unoccupied Land, in an uninhabited
*' Country, makes it his own Poffeffion and Property, and
*l as fuch rejoyces in it. Where Things were indifferent
" before, the Will finds Nothing to make them more agrea-
** ble, confidered meerly in themfelves ; but the Pleafure it
« feels ARISING FROM IT'S OWN CHOICE, and it's
" Perfeverance therein. We love many Things which we
« have chofen, AND PURELY BECAUSE W^E CHOSE
« THEM."

This is as much as to fay, that we firft begin to prefer many
Things, now ceafmg any longer to be indifferent with
Refpe6l to them, purely becaufe we have prefer'd and chofen

them before. Thefe Things muil needs be fpoken incon-

fiderately by this Author. Choice or Preference can't be
before it felf, in the fame Inftance, either in the Order of
Time or Nature : It can't be the Foundation of it {^iiy or
the Fruit or Confequence of it felf. The veryAdl of chufing
one Thing rather than another^ is preferring that Thing, and
that is fetting a higher Value on that Thing. But that the
'Mind fets an higher Value on oneThing than another,is not,
in the firil Place, the Fruit of it's fetting a higher Value on
that Thing.

This Author fays, P. 36. " The Will may be perfectly In-
f** different, and yet the Will may determine it felf to chufe
*' one or the other." And again in the fame Page, " I am
*' entirely indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may de-
*' termine it felf to chufe." And again, ''Which I fhall chufe
*' muft be determined by the meer A6t of my Will." If
the Choice is determined by a meer A€t of V/ili, then
the Choice is determined by a meer A(fl of Choice. And
concerning this Matter, vi%. that the Ad of the Will it felf
is determined by an A6t of Choice, this Writer is exprefs, in
P.72. Speaking of the Cafe, where there is no fuperiour Fit-
nefs in Objedls prefented, he has thefe Words : " There it
« muft aa by it's own CHOICE, and determine it k\i as
it PLEASES." Where it is fuppofed that the very Deter-

II jmnation^

38 Of the Will's determinhig Part II.

mination^ which is the Ground and Spring of the WilFs Ad,
\% Tin KQi oi Choice 2iW^ Plea jure ^ wherein one A(5t ,is more
agreable, and the Mmd better pleafed in it than another ;
and this Preference^ and fuperiour Pleafednefs is the Ground of "
all it does in the Cafe. And if fo, the Mind is not indiffe-
rent when it determines it k\^, but had rather do one Thing
than another, had rather determine it felf one Way than
another. And therefore the Will don't ad at ail in In-
difference ; not fo much as in th^ firft Step it takes, or the "
firft Rife and Beginning of it's ading. If it be poffible foi*
the Underftanding to a6l in Indifference, yet to be fure the
Will never does ; becaufe the Will's beginning to ad is the
very fame Thing as it's beginning to chufe or pr fer. And
if in the very iirlt Ad of the Will, the Mind prefers fome-
thing, then the Idea of that Thing prefer'd, does at that
Time preponderate, or prevail in the Mind ; or, which is
the fame Thing, the Idea of it has a prevailing Influence on
the Will. So that this wholly deftroys the Thing fuppofed,
'vix. That the Mind can by a fovereign Power chufe one of
two or more Things, which in the View of the Mind are,
in every Reiped, pcrfedly equal, one of which does not at
all preponderate, nor has any prevailing Influence on the
Mind above another.

So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Abi-
lity of the Will to chufe one of two, or more Things,
concerning which it is perfedly indifferent, does at the fame
Time, in Effed, deny the Thing he fuppofes, and allows
«nd aflerts the Point he endeavours to overtlirow ; even that
the Will, in chufing, is fubjed to no prevailing Influence
of the Idea, or View of the Thing chofen. And indeed it
is im;:)offibl& to offer this Argument without overthrowing it ;
the Thing fuppofod in it being inconfiftent with it felf,
and that which denies it felf. To fuppofe the Will to ad
at all in a State of perfcd Indifference, either to determine
it felf, or to do any 'I^hing elfej is to affert that the Mind
chufe s without chufing. To fay that when it is indifferent,
it can do as it pleafes, is to fay that it can follow it's Plea-
fure, when it has no Pleafure to follow. And therefore if
there be any Difficulty in the Inftances of two Cakes, or two
Eggs kc. which are exactly alike, one as good as another ;
concerning which this Author iuppofes the Mind in Fad has
a Choice^ and fo in Puffed fuppofes that it has a Preference ;
it as much concern'd Himfeif to folve the Difliculty, as it
"does thofe whom he oppofes. For if thefe Inftances prove

Sed.VI. in Things indifferent. 59

any Thing to his Purpofe, they prove that a Man chufes
without Choice. And yet this is not to his Purpoie ; be-
caufe if this is what he allerts, his own Words are as much
^gainft him, and do as much contradidl him, as the"* Words
of thofe he difputes againft can do.

2. There is no great Difiicuhy in (liewing, in fuch Inftan-
ces as are ailedged, not only that it mhfi needs he fo^ that tlie
Mind muft be influenced m it's Choice, by fomething that has
a preponderating Influence upon it, but aUb how it is Jo.
A little Attention to our own Experieace, and a diftincft
Confideration of the Ads of our own Minds in fuch Cafes,
will be fuflicient to clear up the Matter.

Thus, fuppoling T have a Chefs-board before me ; and
becaufe I am required by a Superiour, or defired by a Friend,
■or to make fome Experiment concerning my own Ability and
Jyiberty, or on fome other Coniideration, I am determined
-to touch fome one of the Spots or Squares on the 2oard with
,my Finger ; not being limited or directed in the firit Propo-
fal, or my own firfl: Purpofe, which is general, to any one
Jn particular ; and there being nothing in the Squares in
themfelves confidered, that recommends any one of all the
fixty four, more than another : In this Cafe, my Mind de-
termines to give it felf up to what is vulgarly called Accident^ f
;by determining to touch that Square which happens to be
^mofl: in View, which my Eye is efpecially upon at that Mo-
.ment, or which happens to be then moll in my Mind, or
.which I fliali be directed to by fome other fuch-like Accident.
:Here are feveral Steps of the Mind's proceeding (tho' all
jmay be done as it were in a Moment) the firji Step is it's
.^^;z<?r<?/ Determination that it will touch one 6f the Squares.
'The next Step is another general Determination to give it felf
'up to Accident, in fome certain Way ; as to touch that
•which fhall be mofl in the Eye or Mind at that Time, or to
fome other fuch-like Accident. The third and laif Step ^is a
.^rtr//W<?r Determination to touch a certain individual Spot,
even that Square, which, by that Sort of Aocident the Mind

H 2 has

I have elfewhere obferved what that is which is vulgarly called
Accident; That it is Nothing akin to the Arm'mian metaphyseal
Notion of Contingenccy fomething not conneded wuh anyThirg
foregoing ; Bat that it is fomething that comes to pafs in the
Courle of Things, in fome Affair that Men arc loncerned in,
unforqfeen, and not owing t<j their Defign.

6o Of the WilTs determining Part II.

has pitched upon, has adually offered it felf bevond others.
Now 'tis apparent that in none of thefe feveral Steps does
the Mind proceed in abfolute Indifference, but in each of
them is influenced by a preponderating Inducement. So it is
in the/r/? Siep ; The Mind's general Determination to touch
one of the fixty four Spots : The Mind is not abfolutely in-
different whether it does fo or no : It is induced to it, for
the Sake of making fome Experiment, or by the Defire of a
Friend, or fome other Motive that prevails. So it is in the
fccond Step, The Mind's determining to give it felf up to
Accident, by touching that which fhall be moft in the Eye,
or the Idea of which (hall be moil prevalent in the Mind &c.
The Mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds
by this Rule or no \ but chufes it, becaufe it appears at
tiut Time a convenient and requifite Expedient in order
to fulhl the general Purpofe aforefaid. And fo it is in the
third and laft Step, It's detennining to touch that indivi-
dual Spot which actually does prevail in the Mind's View.
The Mind is not indifferent concerning this ; but is influ-
enced by a prevailing Inducement and Reafon ; which is,
that this is a Proi'ecution of the preceeding Determination,
which appeared requifite, and was hx'd before in the fecond
Siep.

Accident will ever ferve a Man, without hindring him a
Mmiciii, in fuch a Cafe. It will always be fo among a
Nii:;bcr of Objects in View, one will prevail in the Eye,
or n Idea beyond others. When we have our Eyes open in
the clear Sun -fnme, many Gbjeds flrike the Eye at once,
and innumf r.^ble Images may be at once painted in it by the
Kays of Light ; but the Attention of the Mind is not
equal to feveral of them at once ; or if it be, it don't conti-
nue fo for any Time. And fo it is with Refped to the
Ideas Of the Mind in general : Several Ideas are not in
equal Strcn^^th in the Mind's View and Notice at once ; or
at icafl,Gon-t remain fo for any fenfible Continuance. There !
is nothing in the World more conftantly varying, than the \
Ideas of the Mind : They don't remain precifely in the
fame Str.te" for the leaft perceivable Space of Time : as is ^
evident by this. That all perceivable Time is judged and
perceived by the Mind only by the Succeffion or the fuc- J
ceffive Changes of it's own Ideas. Therefore while the J
Views or Perceptions of the Mind remain precifely in the 1
fame State, there is no perceivable Space or Length of Time, j
tecaufe" no fenfible Succeffion at all.

Sed.VI. in Things indifferent. 6i

As the A<5ls of the Will, in each Step of the fore-men-
tioned Proceedure, don't come to pafs without a particular
Caufe, every Ad is owing to a prevailing Inducement ; fo
the Accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in
the unfearchable Courfe of Things, to which the Mind
yields it felf, and by which it is guided, is not any Thing
that comes to pafs without a Caufe ; and the Mind in de-
termining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething
that has no Cauie ; any more than if it determined to be
guided by a Lot, or the calling of a Die. For tho' the Die's
falling in fuch a Manner be accidental to him that cafts it,
yet none will fuppofe that there is no Caufe why it falls as
it does. The involuntary Changes in the Succeffion of our
Ideas, tho' the Caufe may not be obferved, have as much
a Caufe, as the changeable Motions of the Motes that float
in the Air , or the continual, infinitely various, fucceflive
Changes of the Unevenneiles on the Surtacc of the Water.

There are two Things efpecially, which are probably th?
Occafions of Confuiion in the Minds of them who infift up-
on it, that the Will ads in a proper Indifference, and with-
out being moved by any Inducement, in it's Determinations
in fuch Cafes as have been mentioned.

I. They feem to miftake the Point in Queflion, or at leaft
not to keep it diflincSlly in View. The Queflion they difputc
about, is. Whether the Mind be indifferent about the Obje£fs
prefented, one of which is to be taken, touch'd, pointed to
&c. as two Eggs, two Cakes, which appear equally good.
Whereas the Queftion to be confidered, is, Whether the
Perfon be indifferent with Refpedl to his own J^iom ; whe-
ther he don't, on fome Confideration or other, prefer one
Act with Refpedl to thefe Obje6ts before another. The
Mind in it's Determination and Choice, in thefe Cafes, is
not moll immediately and diredlly converfant about the
ObjeSls prefented \ but the A£is to he done concerning thefe Ob-
jeds. The Objects may appear equal, and the Mind may
never properly make any Choice between them : But the
next A6t of the Will being about the external Adlions to
be performed. Taking, Touching &c. thefe may not ap-
pear equal, and one A6lion may properly be chofen before
another. In each Step of the Mind's Progrefs, the Deter-
mination is not about the Obje^ls, unlefs mdiredly and im-
properly, but about the Anions, which it chufes for other
Reafons than any Preference of the Objeds, and for Rea-
fons not taken at all from the Objeds.

There

62 Of chtifmg in Things indifferent. Part II.

Therp is no NoceiTity of fuppofing, that the Mind does
ever at all properly chii[e one of the Objefts before ano-
ther J either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the
Man chufes to /^?>^^ or /^z^^/' one rather than another; but
not becaufe it chufes the Thing taken^ cv touch' dy but from
foreign Confiderations. The Cafe may be fo, that of two
Things offered, a Man may, for certain Reafons, chufe
and prefer the taking of that which he undervcdues^ and
chufe to negle6t to take that which his Mind prefers, Ii>
fuch a Cafe, chufmg the Thing taken, and chufing to take,
are diverfe : and fo they are in a Cafe where the Things
prefented are equal in the Mind's Eileem, and neither of
them preferred. All that Fad and Experience makes evi-
dent, is, that the Mind chufes one Adion rather than ano-
ther. And therefore the Arguments which they bring, in
order to be to their Purpofe, ought to be to prove that the
Mind chufes the A6lion in perfedt Indifference, with Refpecl
to that Action \ and not to prove that the Mind chufes the
A6tion in perfed Indifference with Refpe6t to the 0hje5f 5
which is very poffible, and yet the Will not ad at all with-
out prevalent Inducement, and proper Preponderation.

2. Another Reafon of Confufion and Diihcuity in this
Matter, feems to be, not diflinguilhing between a general
Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to what is to
be done in a more diilant and general View of it, and a par-
ticular Indifference, or an Indifference with Refped to the
next immediate Ad, view'd with it's particular and prefent
Circumftances. A Man may be perfectly indiffer-ent with
Refped to his own Aciions^ in the former Refped ; and yet
not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing Inftance of touch-
ing one of the Squares of a Chefs-board ; when 'tis firfl.
propofed that I fhould touch one of them, I may be per-
fedly indifferent which I touch ; becaufe as yet I view
the Matter remotely and generally, being but in the firfl
Step of the Mind's Progrefs in the Affair. But yet, when,
I am adually come to the lafl Step, and the very next Thing
to be determined is, which is to be touch'd, having already
determined that I will touch that which happens to be.
mofl: in my Eye or Mind, and my Mind .being now fix'd on \
a particular one, the Ad of touching that, confidered thus ^
immediately, and in thefe particular prefent Circumflances^
is not what my Mind is abfolutely indifferent about.

Section

Sedl.VII. Of Liberty ^t/" Indifference. 63"

Section VII.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will
confft'ing in Indifference.

X Tt 7 HAT has been faid in the foregoing Section, has a
\/ 1/ Tendency in feme Meafure to evince theAbfurdity
» ^ of the Opinion bf fuch as place Liberty in Indiffe-
rence, .or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without
all antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free
from any prepoffeffing Inclination to one Side or the other ;
that the Determination of the Will to either Side may be
entirely from it felf, and that it may be owing only to it's
own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over it felf,
that it goes this Way rather than that. ||

But in as much as this has been of fuch long ftanding, and
,has been fo generally received, and fo much infilled on by
Pelagians^ Semi-Pelagians^ Jefuits^ Socin'ianSy Jrminians^ and
others, it may delerve a more full Confideration* And
therefore I ihall now proceed to a more particular and tho-
rough Enquiry into thjs Notion.

But

I Dr. Whithy, and fome other Arminiam^ make a Diftinftion of dif-
ferent Kinds of Freedom ; one of God, and perfeft Spirits above;
another of Perfons in a State of Trial. The former Dr. Whlthy
allows to confill with Necefliiy ; the latter he holds to be without
Neceffity : And this latter he fuppofes to be requifite to our being
the Subje^ls of Praife or Difpraife, Rewards or Punifhments, Pre-
cepts and Prohibitions, Promifes and Threats, Exhortations and
Dehortations, and a Covenant-Treaty. And to this Freedom he
fuppofes Indifference to be requifite. In Kis Difcourfe on the iivc
Points, P. 299, 300, he fays ; *' It is a Freedom (fpeaking of a Free-
** dom not only from Co-a61ion,but from NeceiTity) requifite,as we
" conceive, to render us capable of Trial or Probation, and to
" render our Anions worthy of Praife or Difpraife, and our Per-
" fons of Rewards or Punifhments." And in the next Page,fpeak-
5ng of the fame Matter, He fays, " Excellent to this Purpofe,
•* are the Words of Mr. l^horndike : We fay noty that Indifference is
*' requifite to a' I Freedom y but to the Freedom of Man alone in this
** State of Trwvail and Froficience : theGround of <which isGod's Ten'
*' der of a Treaty, and Conditions of Pe.jce and Reconcilement to fallen
" Man, together ^vith thofe Precepts and ProhibifionSj thofe Promifes
'* and Threat Sf thofe 'Exhortations 6* Dihrtatiom, it is er/orced'witiJ* .

64 0/ Liberty conftjiing Part II.

Now left fomc fhould fuppofe that I don't underftand thofe
that place Liberty in Indifference, or (hould charge me with
mifreprefenting their Opinion, I would fignify, that I am
fenfible, there are fome, who when they talk of the Liberty
of the Will as confifting in Indifference, exprefs themfelves
as tho' they would not be underftood of the Indifference of
the Inclination or Tendency of the Will, but of, I know
not what. Indifference of the Soul's Power of Willing ; or
that the Will, with Refpe^ to it's Power or Ability to chufe,
is indifferent, can go either Way indifferently, either to the
right Hand or left, either a6t or forbear to a6t, one as well
as the other. Tho' this feems to be a Refining only of
fome particular Writers, and newly invented, and which
will by no Means confift with the Manner of Expreffion ufed
by the Defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general.
And I wi(h fuch Refiners would thoroughly confider,whether
they diftinclly know their own Meaning, when they make a
Diltindlicn between Indifference of the Soul as to it's Power
or Ahiuty of Willing or Chufing, and the Soul's Indiffe-
rence as to the Preference or Choice it felf ; and whether
they don't deceive themfelves in imagining that they have
any diftin6f Meaning at all. The Indifference of the Soul
as to it's Ability or Power to Will, muft be the fame Thing
as the Indifference of the State of the Power or Faculty of
the Will, or the Indifference of the State which the Soul
it felf, which has that Power or Faculty, hitherto remains
in, as to the Exercife of that Power, in the Choice it (hall
by and by make.

But not to infift any longer on the Abftrufenefs and

Inexplicabienefs of this Diftindion ; let what will be fup- j

pofed concerning the Meaning of them that make Ufe of it, i

thus much muft at leaft be intended by Anniniam^ when j

they talk of ladiffersnce as effential to Liberty of Will, . if '

they intend any Thing, in any Refpedt to their Purpofe, i

^/z. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the Will not |

determined already ; but free from actual Poffeffion, and j

vacant of Predetermination, fo far, that there may be j

Room for tlie Exercife of the ^ elf -determining Power of the i

Will ; and that the Will's Freedom confifts in, or depends 1

upon this Vacancy and Opportunity that is left for the Will i

it felf to be the Determiner of the A<ft that i;> to be the free i

A<51. ]

And 3

Seft.VL in IndiiFerence. 65

And here I would obferve in Xhtfrji Place, that to make
out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference mull be per-*
fe£l and abfolute ; there muft be a perfect Freedom from all
antecedent Prepondcration or Inclination. Becaufe if the
Will be already inchned, before it exerts it's own fovereign
Power on it felf, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing
to it felf : If when two Oppofites are propofed to the Soul
for it's Choice, the Propofal don't find the Soul wholly in a
State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Li-^

berty for meer Self-determination. The leaft Degree of

antecedent Bias muft be inconfiftent with their Notion of
Liberty. For fo long as prior Inclination poffeffes the Will,
and is not removed, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly
impoffible that the Will ffould a6l otherwife than agreably
to ft. Surely the Will can't a6t or chufe contrary to a re-
maining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To fuppofs
otherwife, would be the fame Thing as to fuppofe, that the
Will is inclined contrary to it's prefent prevailing inclination^
or contrary to what it is inclmed to. That which the Will
chufes and prefers, that, all Things confidered, it prepon-
derates and inchnes to. It is equally impoffible for the
Vv^iil to chufe contrary to it's own remaining and prefent
preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's
own prefent Preference^ or chufe contrary to it's own prefent
Choice. The Will therefore, fo long as it is under the
Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at
Liberty for a new free x^ct, or any Act that (hall now be
an A61 of Self-determination. The A<5t which is a Self-
determin'd free A6t, muft be an A61 v/hich the Will de-
termines in the Poffeffion and Uib of fuch a Liberty, as con-
fifts in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were
there, would make it impoffible that the Will, at that
Time, Ihould be othervvife than that Way to which it
tends.

If any one fhould fay, there Is no Need "that the In-
difference ftiould be perfect ; but altho' a former Inclina-
tion and Preference ftill remains, yet, if it ben't very ftron^
and violent, poffibly the Strength of the Will may oppofc
and overcome it :

This is grofty abfur'd ; for the Strength of the WilU let
it be never (o great, does not at all enable it to ad one Way,
and not the contrary Way, both at the fame Time. It.
gives it no fuch Sovereignty and Commaad, aS' to eaufe it

66 OfUhcxiyofWill Part II.

felf to prefer and not to prefer at the fame Time, or to
chufe contrary to it's own prefent Choice.

Therefore, if there be the lead Degree of antecedent Pre-
ponderation of the Will, it mufl be perfedly abolilhed,
before the Will can be at Liberty to determine it k\i the
contrary Way. And if the Will determines it 4clf the
fame Way, it was not a free Determination^ becaufe the
Will is not wholly at Liberty in fo doing : It's Deter-
mination is not altogether /r^w it felf but ,it was partly de-
termined before, in it's prior Inclination : And all the Free-
dom the Will exercifes in the Cafe, is in an Increafe of In-
clination, which it gives it felf, over and above what it had
by foregoing Bias ; fp much is from it felf, and fo much
is from perfed Indifference. For tho' the Will had a pre-
vious Tendency that Way, yet as to that additional Degree
of Inclination, it had no Tendency. Therefore the previ-
ous Tendency is of no Confideration, with Refpe<5l to the
A61: wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame
Thing which was faid at firft, that as to the A6f of the Will,
wherein the Will is free, there muft be perfect Indifferencey
or EquiUhriu7n.

To illudrate this ; If w^e fhould fuppofe a fovereign Self-
moving Power in a natural Body : But that the Body is in
Motion already, by an antecedent Bias ; for Inilance, Gra-
vitation towards the Center of the Earth ; and has one De-
gree of Motion already, by Vertue of that previous Ten-
dency ; but by it's feif-moving Power it adds one Degree
more to it's Motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly to-
wards the Center of the Earth than it would do by it's Gra-
vity only : It is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-mov-
jng Power in this Cafe, is the additional Degree of Motion ;
and that the other Degree of Motion which it had from
Gravity, is of no Coniideratien in the Cafe, don't help the
Effe^ft ot the free felf-moving Power in the leaft ; the EiTecl
is juH: the fame, as if the Body had received from it itli
one Degree of Motion from a State of perfe6t Reft. So if
we Ihouid fuppofe a felf-moving Power given to the Scale of
a Balance, which has a Weight of one Degree beyond the
oppofite Scale ; and Vv'e afcribe to it an Ability to add to it
it\i another Degree of Force the fame Way, by it's felf-
moving Power ; This is juft the fame Thing as to afvribe
to it a Power to give it felf one Degree of Preponderation
Irom a pcrfed Equilibrium ^ and fo much Power as the
*' Scale

Sed.VII. conjtjling in IndifFerence. 67

Scale has to give it felf an Over-balance from a perfed E-
quipoife, fo much felf-movlng felf-preponderatina; Power it
has, and no more. So that it's free Power this Way is al-
ways to be meafured from perfe6t Equilibrium.

I need fay no m.ore to prove, that, if Indifference be
effen lal to Liberty, it mull: be perfe6l Indifference ; and
that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is defti-
tute of that Freedom by which it is it's own M after, and in
a Capacity of being it's ov/n Determiner, without being at
all pafiive, or fubjed to the Power and Sway of fomething
elfe, in it's Motions and Determinations.

Having obferved thefe Things, let us now tr^^ whether
this Notion of the Liberty of Will conliiling in Indiffe-
rence and Equilibrium, and the Will's Self-determination
in fuch a State, be not abfurd and inconfiftent.

And here I would lay down this as an Axiom of undoubt-
ed Truth ; That every free Ad is do7ie i:i a State of Freedom^ and
not only after fuch a State. If an A6t of the Will be an A6t
wherein the Soul is free, it mull be exerted in a State of
Freedom^ and in the Fime of Freedom. It Vs^ill not fuflice, that
the Acl immediately follows a State of Liberty ; but Li-
berty muft yet contmue, and co-exift with the Acl: ; the Soul
remaining in Poifeffion of Liberty. Becaufe that is the No-
tion of a free Act of the Soul, even an A6t wherein the Soul
ufes or exercfes Liberty. But if the Soul is not, in the very
I'ime of the A61:, in the Foffeffion of Liberty, it can't at
that Time be in the Vfc of it.

Now the Quedion is, whether ever the Soul of Man puts
forih any Act of Will, while it yet remains in a State of Li-
berty, in that Notion of a State of Liberty, vi%. as implying
a State of Indifference ; or whether the Soul ever exerts an
Act of Choice or Preference, while at that very Time
the Will is in a perfe6t Equilibrium, not inclining one Way
more than another. The very putting of the Queftion is
fufficient to ftiew the Abfurdity of the affirmative Anfwer :
For how ridiculous would it be for any Body to infift, that
the Soul chufe? one Thing before another, when at the
very fame Inftant it is perfectly indifferent with Refpect to
each. ! This is the fame Thing as to fay^ the Soul prefers
one Thing to another, at the very fame I'ime that it has no

Preference. Choice and Preference can no more be in a

I 2 S^'^^^

65 Of Liberty of Will Part 11. \

State of Indifference, than Motion can be in a State of Red,
or than the Preponderation cf the Scale of a Balance can be j
in a State of Equilibriunn, Motion may be the next Moment |
afterRell ; but can't co-exift with it,in a7iy,^vtn the %^Part of '
it. So Choice may be immediately after aState of Inditference, |
but has no Co-exiftence with it : Even the very Beginning of •
it is not in a State of Indifference. And therefore if this be
Liberty, no Acl of the Will, in any Degree, is ever per-
formed in a State of Liberty, or in the Time of Liberty. .
Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing together, and
being effential one to another, that they are contrary one to
another, and one excludes and deftroy? the other, as much
as Motion and Reft, Light and Darknefs, or Life h Death.
$0 that tlie Will ads not at all, does not fo much a^ begin
to ad in the Time of fuch Liberty : Freedom is perfectly
fit an End, and has ceafed to be, at the lirft Moment of
Adion ; and therefore Liberty can't reach the Action, to I
affecl, or qualify it, or give it a Denomination, or any Part of |
i|:, any more than if it had ceafed to be twenty Years before |
the Adion began. The Moment that Liberty ceafes to be, |
it ceafes to be a Qualihcation of any Thing. If Light and ^
Darknefs fucceed one another inftantaneouily. Light qualifies ;
Nothing after it is gone out, to make any^ thing lightfome :
or bright, any more- gt the firft Moment of perfect Darknefs, J
than Months or Years after. Life denominates Nothing |
vital at the lirft Moment of perfect Death. So Freedom, if it ^|
confifts in, or implies Indifference, can denominate Nothing '\
free, at the firft Moment of Preference or Preponderation. i
Therefore 'tis manifeft, that no Liberty which the Soul is pof- ;
feffed of, or ever ufes, in any of it's Acts of Volition, con- -
fifts in Indifference ; and that the Opinion of fuch as lup- '
pofe, that Indifference belongs to the very Effence of Liberty,
is to the higheft Degree abfurd and contradictory.

If any one ftiould imagine, that this Manner of arguing
ing is Nothing but Trick and Delufion ; and 'to evade the
Reafoning, fliould fay, that the Thing wherein the Will ex-
ercifes it's Liberty, is not in the Act of Choice or Prepon-
deraticn it felf, but in determining it felf t9 a certain Choice
or Preference ; That the Act of the Will wherein it is free,
iand ufes it's own Sovereignty, conlifts in it's caufing or de^
ter mining the Change ox Tranjnion from a State of Indifference
to a ccriain Preference, or determining to give a certain^
Turn to the Balance, which has hitherto been even ; ancH
t'lat this Ad the Will exerts in a State of Liberty, or while '^
the Will yet remains in Equilibrium, and perfect Mafter o'

Scd.VII. conjifltng in Indifference. 69

it felf : I fay, if any One chufes to exprefs his Notion

of Liberty after this, or fome fuch Mjfnner, let us fee if he
can make out his Matters any better than before.

What is afferted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in
perfect Equilibrium, without Preference, determines to change
it felf from that State, and excite in it felf a certain Choice
or Preference. Now let us fee whether this don't come
to the fame Abfurdity we had before. If it be fo, that
4he Will, while it yet remains perfedly Indifferent, deter-
mines to put it felf out of that State, and give it felf a cer-
tain Preponderation ; Then I would enquire, whether the
Soul don't determine this of Choice ; or whether the Will's
coming to a Determination to do fo, be not the fame Thing
as the Soul's coming to a Choice to do fo. If the Soul don't
determine this of Choice, or in the Exercife of Choice,
then it don't determine it voluntarily. And if the Soul don't
determine it voluntarily, or of it's own Will^ then in what
Senfe does it's Will determine it ? And if the Will don't
determine it, then hovs^ is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in
the Determination ? What Sort of Liberty is exercifed
by the Soul in thofe Determinations, wherein there is
no exercife of Choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein
the Will is not concerned ?— - But if it be allowed, that this
Determination is an Act of Choice, and it be infilled on, that
the Soul, while it yet remains in a State of perfect Indiffe-
rence, chufes to put it felf out of that State, and to turn it
felf oneWay ; then the Soul is already come to a Choice,and
chufes that Way. And fo we have the very fame Abfurdity
which we had before. Here is the Soul in a State of Choice,
and in a State of Equilibrium, both at the fame Time : the
Soul already chufing one Way, while it remains in a State
of perfe6t Indifference, and has no Choice of one Way
more than the other.—- And indeed this Manner of talking,
tho' it may a little hide the Abfurdity, in the Obfcurity of
Exprelhon, is more nonfenfical, and increafes the Inconfift-
cnce. To fay, the free A61 of the Will, or the A6t which
the Will exerts in a State of Freedom and Indifference, does
not imply Preference in it, but is what the Will does in
Order to caufing or producing a Preference, is as much as to
fay, the Soul chufes (for to Will and to Chufe are the fame
1^^ Thing) without Choice, and prefers without Preference, in
border to caufe or produce the Beginning of a Preference, or
the firfl: Choice. And that is, that the firft Choice is ex-
pened without Choice, in order to produce it i^\L

70 OflAh^xty'slyinginaPower Part II.

If any, to evade thefe Things, fhould own, that a State of
Liberty, and a State di Indifference are not the fame, and
that the former may be without the latter ; But fliould fay,
that Indifference is fcill ejfential to the Freedom of an Act of
Will, in fome Sort, namely, as 'tis neceffary to go imme-
diately before it ; It being efiential to the Freedom of an A6t
of Will that it fhould directly and nnmediately 'arife out of
a State of Indifference : ftill this Vvrili not help the Caufe of
JrmimanUihtviy^ or make it confiftent with it felf. For if
the AS. fpnngs immediately out of a State of Indifference,
then it do's not arife from antecedent Choice or Preference. But
if the A6t arifes directly out of a State of Indifi^rence, with-
out any intervening Choice to chufe and determine it, then
the Act not being determined by Choice, is not determined
ty the Will ; the Mind exercife^ no free Choice in the
Affair, and free Choice and free Will have no Hand in the
Determination of the Act. Which is entirely inconfiilent
with their Notion of the Freedom of Volition.

If any fnould fuppofe, that thefe Difficulties and Abfurdi-
ties may be avoidec^, by faying, that the Liberty of the Mind
confifts in a Power X.o fufpend the A6t of the Will, and fo to
keep it in a State of Indifference^ 'till there has been Oppor-
tunity for Confideration ; and fo Ihall fay, that however
Indifference is not effential to Liberty in fuch a Manner, that
the Mind mufr make it's Choice in a State of Indifference,
which is. an Inconfiftency, or that the A6t of Will mull
fpring immediately out of Indifference ; yet Indifference may
be effential to the Liberty of Acts of the Will in thisRefpect \
viz. That Liberty confifts in a Power of the Mind to for-
bear or fufpend the A6t of Volition, and keep the Mind in
a State of Indifference for the prefent, 'till there has been
Opportunity for proper Deliberation : I fay, if any one
imagines that this helps the Matter, it is a great Miftake : It
reconciles no Inconfiftency, and reiieves no Difficulty

which the Affair is attended with. For here the following

Things muil be obferved,

I. That \\\\s fufpcnding of Volition, if there be properly any
fuch Thing, is it lelf an AS. px Volition. If the A/Iind de-
termines to fufpend it's A<ft, it determines it voluntarily ; it
chufes, on fome Confideration, to fufpend it. And this
Choice or Determination, is an Act of the Will : And in-
deed it is fuppofed to be fo in the very Hypothefis ; for 'tis
fuppofed, that the Liberty of the Will confifls in it's Power

Sed.VlI. to fufpend Volition. 7 1

to do thus, and that it's doing it is the very Thing wherein
the TVill exercifes it's Liberty. But how can the Will exercife
Liberty in it, if it ben't an A(5l of the Will ? The Liberty
of the Will is not exercifed in any Thing but what the Will
does.

2. This determining to fufpend a6ting is not only an A61
of^the Will, but 'tis fuppoled to be the only free Act of
the Will ; becaufe it is laid, that this is the Thing wherein the
Liberty of the TVill confi/h.—^ ow if this be fo, then this is
all the Ad of Will that we have to confider in this Contro-
verfy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our Enquiries,
wherein the Liberty of Man confifts. And now the fore-
mentioned Difficulties remain : the former Qiieftion returns
upon us ; z'iz. Wherein confifts the Freedom of the Will in
thofe ASis wherein it is free ? And if this Adt of determining
a Sufpenfion be the only A(5t in which the Will is free, then
wherein confifts the Will's Freedom with Refpe6l to this A6t
of Sufpenfion ? And how is Indifference eflential to this A61 ?
The Anfwer muft be, according to what is fuppofed in the
Evalion under Confideration, That the Liberty of the Will
in this Kdi of Suipenfton, conftfts in a Power to fufpend even
this A61:, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deli-
beration. But this will be to plunge dirediy into the grofleft:
Nonienfe : for 'tis the A6t of Sufpenfion it felf that we are
fpeaking of ; and there is no Room for a Space of Delibe-
ration and Sufpenfion, in order to determine whether we
will fufpend or no. For that fuppofes, that even Sufpenfion
it felf may be deier'd : V/hich is abfurd ; for the very de- '
ferring the Determination of Sufpenfton, to confider whe-
ther we will fufpend or no, will be actually fufpending. For
during the Space of Sufpenfion, to confider whether to fuf-
pend, the Ad is ipfofa^o fufpended. There is no Medium
between fufpending to ad, and immediately ading ; and
therefore no Poffibility of avoiding either the one or the other
one Moment ; and fo no Room for Deliberation before we
do either of them.

And befides, this is attended with ridiculous Abfurdity
another Way : For now it is come to that, that Liberty con-
I lifts wholly in the Mind's having Power to fufpend it's Deter-
I mination whether to fufpend or no ; that there may be
I Time for Confideration, whether it be beft to fufpend. And
if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under
u Confideration ; We have to enquire uov/, how Liberty with

72 Of fufp^nding F'oluion. Part II. \

Refpe(5l to this A6t of fufpending a Determination of Suf- ']

penfion, confifts in Indifr'ercnce, or how Indifference is |^

cfiential to it. The Anfwer, according to the Hypothtfis we ^

are upon, mud be, that it confifts in a Power oi fufpending ■}

even this laft mentioned A6t, to have Time to confider whe- ^

ther to fufpend that. And then the fame Difficulties and IfS

Enquiries return over again with Refpe6l to that ; and fo on .c

forever. Which, if it would ihew any Thing, would fhew ^

only that there is no fuch Thing as a free A(5f. It drives the i

Exercife of Freedom back in hifiniium 3 and that is to drive j

it out of the World. |

And befides all this, there is a Delufion, and a latent grofs . 'i
Contradidion in the Affair another Way ; in as much as in 1
explaining how, or in what Refpedt the Will is free with I
Pvcgard to a particular A6f of Volition, 'tis faid, that it's
Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend that ASiy j
"which places Liberty not in that Act of Volition which the ' \
Enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent h.$i, \
Which contradicts the Thmg fuppofed in both the Queftion \
and Anfwer. The Quefi:ion is, wherein confifts the Mind's i
Liberty in any -particular A^ of Volition ? And the Anfwer, in |
pretending to fliew wherein lies the Mind's Libert) in that I
ASi^ in Effe6t fays, it don't lie in that Ad at all, but in ano- -<
ther, vi%, a Volition to fufpend that A£i. And therefore the ,ii
Anfwer is both contradidor)', and altogether impertinent and 3
befide the Purpofe. For it don't fhew wherein the Liberty {
of the Will confifts in the A6t in Qiieftion ; Inft:ead of that, J
it fuppofes it don't confift in that Act at all, but in another t
diftin6t from it, even a Volition to fufpend that A6t, and take >]
Time to condder of it. And no Account is pretended to be; )i
given wherein the Mind is free with Refpedi to that A6t, \
wherein this Anfwer fuppofes the Liberty ef the Mind in- 1
deed confifts, w'z. the Ad of Sufpenfion, or of determining, ^
the Sufpenfion. /

On the whole, 'tis exceeding manifefl:, that the Liberty of i
the Mind docs not confjft in Indifference, and that Indiffe- ^
rence is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to »1
it, as the Arjninians fuppofe ; that Opinion being full of No- C
thing but Abfurdity and Seif-Contradidion. t

S E C T 1^1

5e(3:.VlIL Of Liberty without ^CQt{^ity . 73

Section VIIL

Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will^
as oppofite to all Neceffity.

ilS a Thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians^ In this
Controverfy, as a Thing moft important and effen-
tial in human Liberty, that Volitions, or the A<:^ts of
the Will, are contingent Events ; underftanding Contingence as
oppofite, not only to Conilraint, but to all Neceffity. There-
fore I would particularly confider this Matter. And

1. I would enquire, w^hether there is, or can be any fuch
Thing, as a Volition which is contingent in fuch a Senfc,
as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of Con-
ftraint or Co-adion, but alfo without a Necejfity of Confequence^
or an infallible Conne6tion with any Thing foregoing.

2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the Caufe
of Liberty.

L I would coniider whether Volition is a Thing that ever
does, or can come to pafs, in this Manner, contingently.

And here it muft be remembred, that it has been already
(hewn, that Nothing can ever come to pafs without a Caufe,
or Reafon why it exiils in this Manner rather than another 5
and the Evidence of this has been particularly applied to
the A(5ts of the Will. Now if this be fo, it wuU demon-
ftrably follow, that the Atfls of the Will are never contingent,
or without Neceffity, in the Senfe fpoken of j in as much as
thofe Things which have a Caufe, or Reafon of their Exift-
ence, muft be connected with their Caufe. This appears by
the following Confiderations.

I. For an Event to have a Caufe and Ground of it's Ex-
iftence, and yet not to be conneded with it's Caufe, is art
Inconfiftence. For if the Event ben't connected With the
Caufe, it is not dependent on t'e Caufe ; it's Exift-
ence is a« it were ioofe from it's Influence, and may at-
tend it, or may not ; it being a meer Contingence, whe-
ther it follows or attends the Influence of the Caufe,
Qr not : And that is the fame Thing as not to be depen-

K dent

74 0/ thefuppofed Liberty Part II.

dent on it. And to fay, the Event is not dependent on it's
Caufe, is abfurd : 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, it is not it's
Caufe, nor the Event the Effe6t of it : For Dependence on
the Influence of a Caufe, is the very Notion of an Eftea. If
there be no fuch Relation between one Thinj^ and another,
confiding in the Connecftion and Dependence of one Thing
on the Influence of another, thea it is certain there is no
fuch Relation between them as is fignified by the Terms
Caufe and Effed. So far as an Event is dependent on a Caufe,
2nd conne6ted with it, fo much Caufahty is there in the Cafe,
and no more. The Caufe does, or brings to pafs no more in
any Event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the Con-
necftion and Dependence is not total, but partial, and that the
EfFe(5l, tho' it has fome Connection and Dependence, yet is
not entirely dependent on it ; That is the fame Thing as to
fay, that not all that is in theEvent is an EfFe6t of that Caufe,
but that only Part of it arifes from thence, and Part fome
other Way.

2. If there are fome Events which are not necefl^arily con-
nected with their Caufes, then it will follow, that there are
fome Things which come to pafs without any Caufe, contra-
ry to the Suppofition. For if there be any Event which was
not necefl^arily conneded with the Influence of the Caufe un-
der fuchCircumftances,then it was contingent whether it would
attend or follow thelnfluence of theCaufe,orno ; It might have
followed, and it might not, when the Caufe was the fame,
it's Influence the fame, and under the fame Circumftances.
And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow ? There,
is no Caufe or Reafon of this. Therefore here is fome-
thing without any Caufe or Reafon why it is, viz. the follow-
ing of the Effe<5l on the Influence of the Caufe, with which
it was not necefliurily conneded. If there be a necefl^ary
ConnecSiion of the Effed on any Thing antecedent, then we
may fuppofe that fom^times the Event will follow the Caufe,
and fomctimes not, when the Caufe is the fame, and in
every RefpeCl: in tlie fame State h Circumftances. And what
can be tiie Caufe and Reafon of this flrange Phenomenon,
even this Diveriity, that in one Inftance, the ElTecl ftiould
follow, in another not ? 'Tis evident by the Suppofition,
that this is wholly without any Caufe or Ground. Hare is.
fometiiing in the prefent Manner of the Exiflence of Things,
and State of the World, that is abfolutely without a Caufe.
Which is contrary to the Suppofition, and contrary to what
has beea before demonfcrated.

P To

Seil.VIIL without all Neceffity. 75

3. To fuppofe there are fome Events which have a
Caufe and Ground of their Exiftence, that yet are not ne-
cefTarily connected with their Caufe, is to fuppofe that they
have a Caufe which #not their Caufe. Thus ; If the EiFeA
be not necellarily connected with the Caufe, with it's Influ-
ence, and influential Circumftances ; then, as I obferved
before, 'tis a Thing poflible and fuppofable, that the Caufe
may fometimes exert the fame Influence, under the fame
Circumrtances, and yet the Eff;:6l not follow. And if this
aduaily happens in any Inftance, this Inflance is a Proof, in
Fad, that the Influence of the Caufe is not fuflicient to pro-
duce the Effe6l. For if it had been fuilicient, it would have
done it. And yet, by the Suppofition, in another Inflance,
the fame Caufe, with perfecStly the fame Influence, and
when all Circumflances which have any Influence, are the
fame, it Wc^i /J//^w<?J with the Eftecl. By which it is mani-
fell, that the Effe6t in this lafl: Inftance was not owing to
the Influence of the Caufe, but mufl: come to pafs fome
other Way. For it was proved before, that the Influence
of the Caufe was not fufficient to produce the Effe^l. And
it it was not fufficient to produce it, then the Produdion
of it could not be ov/ing to that Influence, but mud be
owing to fomcthing elfe, or owing to Nothing. And if the

^pffedt be not owing to the Influence of the Caufe, then it
is not the Caufe. Which brings us to the Contradidion,
of a Caufe, and no Caufe, that which is the Ground and
Reafon of the Exiflence of a Thing, and at the fame Time
is not the Ground and Reafon of it's Exiftence, nor is

1 fuiEcient to be fo.

If the Pvlatter be not already fo plain as to render any
further Reafoning upon it impertinent, I would fay, that
I that which feems to be the Caufe in the fuppofed Cafe, can
j be no Caufe ; it's Power and Influence having, on a full
Trial, proved infuflicient to produce fuch an Effect : and it
it be not fufiicient to produce it, then it don't produce it.
To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is Power to do that which
there is not Power to do. If there be in a Caufe fufficient
Power exerted, and in Circumftances fufficient to produce an
Effed, and fo the EfFecl: be adually produced at one Time ;
Thefe Things all concurring, will produce the Efl^ed at ail
Times. Andfo we may turn it the other Way ; That which
proves not fufficient at one Time, cannot be fufficient at
another, with precifely the fame influential Circumftances.
And therefore if the EfFed follows, it is not owing to that

K 2 Cauie ;

76 Of the Connexion of the Will Part II.

Caufe ; imlefs the different Time be a Circumftance which
has Influence : But that is contrary to the Suppofition ; for
'tis fuppofed that all Circumftances that have Influence, are
the fame. And befides, this would l^to fuppofe the Time
to be the Caufe ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of
the other Thing's being the Caufe. But if meerly Diverfity
of Time has no Influence, then 'tis evident that it is as
much of an Abfurdity to fay, the Caufe was fufficient to
produce the Effed at one TiAie, and not at another ; as to
fay, that it is fufiicient to produce the Effe6t at a certain
Time, and yet not fuflicient to produce the fame EffecT: at
that fame Time.

On the whole, it is clearly manifefl, that every Effe6t has
a neceflary Connexion with it's Caufe, or with that wliich
is the true Ground and Reafon of it's Exifl;ence. And
therefore if there be no Event without a Caufe, as was
proved before, then no Event whatfoever is contingent in
the Manner that Arminians fuppofe the free Ads of the Will
to be contingent.

Section IX.

Of theQonn^&xow of the ASts of the Will
with the DiBates of the Undcrftanding.

IT is manifeft, that the Ads of the Will are none of i

them contingent in fuch a Senfe as to be without all ■•

Necelfity, or fo as not to be neceflary with a Ne- i

(reflity of Confequence and Connection ; becaufe every Ad '

of the Will is fome Way conneded with the Underfl:anding, j
^nd is as the greateft apparent Good is,in the Manner which
has already been explained ; namely, that the Soul always ^
wills or chufes that which, in the prefent View of the Mmd,
confiderecj in the whole of that View, and all that belongs :

to it, appears mofl: agreable. Becaufe, as was obferved be- 'I

fore. Nothing is more evident than that, when Men ad vo- i<

hintarily, ^nd do what they pleafe, then they do what -ap- v

pears racft agreable to thejji ^ and to fay otherwife, would ;

be' f]

Sed. IX. with the Underftanding. 77

be as much as to affirm, that Men don't chufe what ap-
pears to fuit them beft, or what feems moft pleafmg to
them ; or that they don't chufe what they prefer. Which
brings the Matter to a Contradi6tion.

As 'tis very evident in it felf, that the A<5ls of the Will
have fome Connection with the Dilates or Views of the
Underftanding, fo this is allowed by fome of the chief of
the Arminian Writers : Particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr.

Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull^ tho' a great Enemy to the

Do6tnnc of NecefTity, allows the fame Thing. In his
Chriftian Phihjophy (P. 196.) He with much Approbation
cites another Philofopher, as of the fame Mind, in thefc
Words ; " No Man (fays an excellent Philofopher) fets
" himfelf about any Thing, but upon fome View or other,
" which ferves him for a Reafon for what he does ; and
" whatfoever Faculties he employs, the Underftanding, with
" fuch Light as it has, well or ill informed, conftantly
'' leads ; and by that Light, true or falfe, all her operati"\fe
" Powers are dire6ted. The Will it felf, how abfolute and
" incontroulable foever it may be thought, never fails in
'* it's Obedience to the Didates of the Underftanding.
" Temples have their facred Images ; and we fee what In-
" fiuence they have always had over a great Part of Man-
" kind ; Bui in Truth, the Ideas and Images in Men's
" Minds are the invilible Powers that conftantly govern
** them ; and to thefe they all pay univerfally a ready Sub-
« million."

But whether this be in a juft Confiftence with Themfelves,
and their own Notions of Liberty, I defire may now be im-
partially confidered.

Dr. Whitby plainly fuppofes, that the A6ls and Determina-
tions of the Will always follow the Uriderftanding's Appre-
henfion or View of the greateft Good to be obtain'd, or Evil
to be avoided ; or in other Words, that the Determinations
of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two Things
in the Underftanding : i. The Degree of Good to be obtained,
and Evil to be avoided, propofed to the Underftanding,
and apprehended, viewed, and taken Notice of by it.
2. The Degree of the Underftanding s VieWy Notice or Appre-
hcnfion of that Good or Evil ; which is increafed by Atten-
• tion and Confideration. That this is an Opinion he is ex-
ceeding peremptory in ( as he is in every Opinion which he
maintains in his Gontroverfy wuh the Calvinijis) with Dif-

dain.

78 Of the Connteion of the Will Part II.

dain of the contrary Opinion, as abfurd and felf-contra-
di^tor)', will appear by the following Words cf his, in his
Difcourfe on the five Points.*

" Now, 'tis certain, that what naturally makes the Un-
" derftanding to perceive, is Evidence propofed, and appre-
«^ hended, confidered or adverted to : for Nothing elfe can
"• be requifite to make us come to the Knowledge of the

" Truth. Again, what makes the Will chufe, is fome-

" thing approved by the Underftanding ; and confequently
" appearing to the Soul as Good. And whatfoever it re-
" fufeth, is fomething reprefented by the Underftanding,
" and fo appearing to the Will, as Evil. Whence all that
" God requires of us is, and can be only this ; to refufe the
" Evil, and chufe the Good. Wherefore, to fay that Evi-
«■' dence propofed, apprehended and confidered, is not fuffi-
" cient to make the Underftanding approve ; or that the
*' greateft Good propofed, the greateft Evil threatned, \^'hen
" equally believ'd and refleded on, is not fufficient to en-
" gage the Will to chufe the Good and refufe the Evil, is
" in Efred to fay, that which alone doth move the Will to chufe
'« or to refufe^ is not fufficient to engage it fo to do ; which
<•' being ccntradiaory to it felf, muft of NecefTity be falfe.
*' Be it then fo, that we naturally' have an Averfation to
" the Truths propofed to us in the Gofpel ; that only can
" make us indifpofed to attend to them, but cannot hinder
" our Convidion, when we do apprehend them, and attend

" to them. Be it, that there is in us alfo a Renitency to

*< the Good we are to chufe ; that only can indifpofe us to
*' believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefeft Good. Be
" it, that we are prone to the Evil that we fliould decline ;
«' that only can render it the more difficult for us to be-
" lieye it is the worft of Evils. But yet, what we do really
*' believe to he our chiefiji Good^ willjiill 'be chofen ; and what we
" apprehend to he the zvorjl of Evils ^ will, zvhilfl we do continue
" under that Ccnvi£lion, be refufed by la. It therefore can be
" only requifite, in order to thefe Ends, that the good Spi-
" rit fhould fo illuminate our Underftandings, that we at-
" tendmg to, and confidering what lies before us, fhould
•' apprehend, and be convinced of our Duty ; and that the
*' Bleffings of the Gofpel (hould be fo propounded to us, as
" that we may difcern them to be our chiefeft Good ; and
" the Miferies it threatcneth, fo as we qwy be convinced
" they are the worft of Evils s that we may chufe the one,
" and refufe the other." Here

* Edit. 2d P. 211, 212, 213.

Seft.IX. "With the Underftanding. 79

Here let it be obferved, how plainly and peremptorily it is
afferted, that the greatejl Good propofed, and the great>iji Evil
threatned^ when equally believed and rcfie5led on, is fufficient tj
engage the Will to chufe the Good, and refiife the Evil, and is that
alone which doth move the Will to chufe or to refufe ; and that it is.
contradiSfory to it felf, to fuppofe otherwife ; and therefore nmft of
NeceJJity he falfe ; and then ivhat ive do really believe to be our chief-
ejl Good willjTill he chofen, and what we apprehend to he the worfl
9 f Evils, will, whilj} we continue under that Conviclion, be refufed
by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the Purpofe,
fully to fignify and declare, that the Determinations of the
Will muft evermore /ollow the Illumination, Convi6lion and
Notice of the Underftanding, with Regard to the greateft
Good and Evil propofed, reckoning both the Degree of
Good and Evil underftood, and the Degree of Underftand-
ing, Notice and Conviction of that propofed Good and Evil ;
and that it is thus neceffarily, and can be otherwife in no In-
ftance : becauie it is afferted, that it implies a Contradidion,
to fuppofe it ever to be otherwife.

I am fenfible,the Do6lor's Aim in thefe Aftertions is againlr
the CalviniJIs ; to ftiew, in Oppofition to them, that there is
no Need of any phyfical Operation of the Spirit of God on
the Will, to change and determine that to a good Choice,
but that God's Operation and Afliftance is only moral,
fuggefting Ideas to the Underftanding ; which he fuppofes to
|r be enough, if thofe Ideas are attended to, infallibly to ob-
tain the End. But whatever his Defign was. Nothing can
more dire6tly and fully prove, that every Determination of
the Will, in chufing and refufing, is neceffary ; directly con-
trary to his own Notion of the Liberty of the Will. For if
tlie Determination of the Will, evermore, in this Manner,
follows the Light, Convidion and View of the Underftand-
ing, concerning the greateft Good and Evil, and this be that
alone which moves the Will, and it be a ContradicSlion to
fuppofe otherwife ; then it is neceffarily fo, the Will neceffarily
follows this Light or View of the Underftanding, not only
in fome of it's Ads, but in every A6t of chufing and refu-
fing. So that the Will don't determine it felf in any one of
it's own A6ls ; but all it's A6ls, every A61 of Choice and Re-
fufal, depends on, and is neceffarily conneded with fome an-
tecedent Caufe ; which Caufe is not the Will it felf, nor any
A6t of it's own, nor any Thing pertaining to that Faculty,
but fomething belonging to another Faculty, whofe Ads go
before the Will, in all it's Ads, and govern and determine
them every one.

Here,

So Of the Connexion of the Will Part II,

Here, if it (hould be replied, that altho' it be true, that
according to the Dodor, the final Determination of the Will
always depends upon, and is infallibly conneded with the
Ijnderftanding's Convi(5lion, and Notice of the greateft
Good ; yet the Ads of the Will are not neceffary ; becaufe
that Convidion and Notice of the Underftanding is firft de-
pendent on a preceeding A61 of the Will, in determining to
attend to, and take Notice of the Evidence exhibited ; by
which Means the Mind obtains that Degree of Convi6tioa
which is fufficient and tffedual to determine the confequent
and ultimate Choice of the Will ; and that the Will with
Regard to that preceeding A6t, whereby it determines whe-
ther to attend or no, is not neceffary ; and that in this, the
Liberty of the Will confifis, that when God holds forth
fufficient objedive Light, the Will is at Liberty whether to^
command the Attention of the Mind to it.

Nothing can be more weak and inconfiderate than fuch a
Reply as this. For that preceeding Ad of the Will, in de-y
termining to attend and confider, ftill is an A£i of the Will,
(it is fo to be fure, if the Liberty of the Will confifts in it, as
is fuppofed) and if it be an Ad of the Will, it is an Ad
of Choice or Refufal. And therefore, if what the Dodor
afferts be true, it is determined by fome antecedent Light iri
the Underftanding concerning the greateft apparent Good or
Evil. For he afferts, it is that Light which alone doth ?tiove the
Will to chufe or refufe. And therefore the Will muft be moved
by that in chufing to attend to the objedive Light offered, in
order to another confequent Ad of Choice : fo that this Ad
is no lefs neceffary than the other. And if we fuppofe ano-
ther Ad of the Will, ftill preceeding both thefe mentioned, to
determine both,ftill that alfo muft be an Ad of the Will,& an
Ad of Choice ; and fo muft,by the famePrinciples,be infallibly
determin'd by fome certain Degree of Light intheUnderftanding
concerning the greateft Good. And let us fuppofe as many
Ads of the Will, one preceeding another, as we pleafe, yet
they are every one of them neceffarily determined by a cer-
tain Degree of Light in the Underftanding, concerning the^
greateft and moft eligible Good in that Cafe ; and fo, not
one of them free according to Dr. Whith/s Notion of Free-
dom. And if it be faid, the Reafon why Men don't attend
to Light held forth, is becaufe of ill Habits contracted by
evil Ads committed before, whereby their Minds are in-
difpofed to attend to, and confider of the Truth held forth

j Sed.IX. with the Underftandlng. 8i

to them by God, the Difficulty is not at all r.voided : fiili
: the Queftion returns, What determined the - Will in thofe
^ preceeding evil A6ts ? It mufl, by Dr. IVhitbys Principles,
ftill be the View of the Underftandlng concerning the
greateft Good and Evil. If this View of the Underllanding
be that alone which doth move the Will to chufc or refufe^ as the
i Do6lor aflerts, then every Acl of Choice or Refit fal^ from a
i Man's tirft Exiftence, is moved and determined by thisView j
and this View of the Underftandlng exciting and governing
the Ad, muft be before the A6t : And therefore the Will is
neceftarily determined, in every one of it'sAcls, from a Man's
firftExiftence,by a Caufe befide theWill, & a Caufethat don't
proceed from,or depend on any A6t of the Will at all. Which
at once utterly abohfties the Dodor's whole Scheme of Li-
berty of Will ; and he, at one Stroke, has cut the Sinews
of all his Arguments from the Goodnefs, Righteoufnefs,
Faithfulnefs and Sincerity of God, in his Commands, Pro-
mifes, Threatnings, Calls, Invitations, Expoftulations ;
\ which he makes Ufe of, under the Heads of Reprobation,
Eledion, Univerfal Redemption, fufficient and effedual
Grace, and the Freedom of the Will of Man ; and has
enervated aad made vain all thofe Exclamations againft:
the Dodrine of the Calvinijls^ as charging God with mani-
feft Unrighteoufnefs, Unfaithfulnefs, Hypocrify, Fallaci-
oufnefs, and Cruelt}' ; which he has over, and over, and over
again, numberlefs Times in his Book.

Dr. Samuel Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and
Attributes of God, f to evade the Argument to- prove the
NeceiTity of Volition, from it's necelTary Connexion with the
laft Di6tate of the Underftandlng, fuppofes the latter not
to be diverfe from the Act of the Will it feif. But if it be
fo, it will not alter the Cafe as to the Evidence of the Ne-
ceffity of the Ad: of the Will. If the Didate of the Under-
ftandlng be the very fame with the Determination of the
Will or Choice, as Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this Determi-
nation is no Fruit or Effe6i of Choice : And if fo, no Liberty
of Choice has any Hand in it : As to ^Volition or Choice, it
is neceftary ; That is. Choice can't prevent it. If the iaft
Dictate of the Underftandlng be the fame with the Deter-
mination of Volition it felf, then the Exiftence of that De-
termination muft be neceffary as to Volition ; in as much
as Volition can have no Opportunity to determine whether
it ihall exift or no, it having Exiftence already before VoJi-

L tioa

^ Mt. 6. P. 93.

82 Of the Conn&daon of the TFill Part II.

tion has Opportunity to determine any Thing. It is it felf
the very Rile and Exiftence of Volition. But a Thing, af-
ter it exilfs, has no Opportunity to determine as to it's own
Exiftence -, it is too late for that.

If Liberty confifts in that which Armmiam fuppofe, wz.
in the Will's determining it's own A6ts, having free Oppor-
tunity, and being without all NecefTity ; This is the lame
as to fay, that Liberty confifts in the Soul's having Power
and Opportunity to have what Determmations of the Will
it pleales or chufes. And if the Determinations of the Will,
and the laft Di6tates of the Underftanding be the fame
Thing, then Liberty confifts in the Mind's having Power to
have what Di6tates of the Underflanding it pleafes, having
Opportunity to chufe it's own Dictates of Underflanding.
But this is abfurd j for it is to make the Determination of
Choice prior to the Di6late of Underftanding, and the
Ground of it ; which can't confifl with the Di&ate of Un-
derftanding's being the Determination of Choice it felf.

Here is no Way to do in this Cafe, but only to recur to
the old Abfurdity, of one Determination before another,
and the Caufe of it ; and another before that, determining
that ; and fo on in infinitum. If the laft Dictate of the Un-
derftanding be the Determination of the Will it felf, and the
Soul be free with Regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian
Notion of Freedom ; then the Soul, before that Di6tate of
it's Underftanding exifts, voluntarily and according "to it's
own Choice determines, in every Cafe, what that Didate
of the Underftanding ftiall be ; otherwife that Di6late, as to
the Will, is neceiTary \ and the Ads determined by it, muft
ahb be neceflary. So that here is a Determination of the
Mind prior to that Dictate of the Underftanding, an A(5l of
Choice going before it, chufing and determining what that
Di6tate of the Underftanding (hall be : and this preceeding
Aa of Choice, being a free Aa of Will, muft alio be the
fame with another laft Didtate of the Underftanding : And
if the Mind alfo be free in that Di6tate of Underftanding, that
muft be determined ftill by another ^ and fo on forever.

Befides, if the Dictate of the Underftanding, and De-
termination of the Will be the fame, this confounds the Un-
derftanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether
they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute ; but only
would obferve, that if it be io^ and the Arminian Notion of

Liberty

Sed.IX. with the Underftanding. 83

Liberty confifts in a Self-determining Power in the Under-
ftanding, free of all Neceflity ; being independent, unde-
termined by any Thing prior to it's own Acfts and Determi-
nations ; and the more the Underftanding is thus indepen-
dent, and fovereign over it's own Determinations, the more
free. By this therefore the Freedom of the Sou', as a moral
Agent, muft confift in the Independence of the Underftand-
ing on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any
Thing whatfoever that ftands forth to the View of the Mind,
prior to the Underftanding's Determination. And what a
Sort of Liberty is this ! conlifting in an Ability, Freedom
and Eafmefs of judging, either according to Evidence, or a-
gainft it ; having a fovereign Command over it felf at all
Times, to judge, either agreably or difagreably to what is
plainly exhibited to it's own View. Certainly, 'tis no Li-
berty that renders Perfons the proper Subjeds of perfwafive
Reafoning, Arguments, Expoftulatlons, and fuch i.ke moral
Means and Inducements. The Ufe of which with A4ankind,
is a main Argument of the Armimans^ to defend their Notion
of Liberty without all NecelTity. For according to this,
the more free Men are, the lefs they are under the Govern-
ment of fuch Means, lefs fubjedt to the Power of Evidence
and Reafon, and more independent on their Influence, in
their Determinations.

And whether the Underftanding and Will are the fame or
no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe, yet in order to maintain
^he Arminian Notion of Liberty without Necelfity, the free
Will is not determined by the Ln'-'erftandin^^-, nor neceftarily
connected w th the Underftanding ; and the further from
iuch Connection, the greater the Freedom. And when
the Liberty is full and compleat, the Determinations of the
Will have no Connexion at all with the Dictates of the
Underftanding. And if fo, in vain are all Applications to
the Underftanding, in order to induce to any free vertuous
Ad ; and fo in vain are all Inftrudions, Counfels, Invitati-
ons, Expoftulations, and all Arguments & Perfwafives what-
soever : For thefe are but Applications to the Underftanding,
and a clear and lively Exhibition of the Objects of Choice
to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the" Will muft be
ifelf-d^termined, and independent on the Underftanding, to
what Purpofe are Things thus reprefented to the Underftand-
ing, in order to determine the Choice ?

Section

84 ABs of the Will PartIL

Section X.

Volitio7t neceffarily conneEiedwith the Influ--
ence <?/ Motives ; %mth particular Ohfer--
nations on the great Inconfifience of Mr.
Chubb's Afertions andReafonings^ about
the Freedc7n of the WilL

THAT every Act of the Will has fome Caufe, and con-
fequently (by what has been already proved) has a
neceiTary Connexion with it's Caufe, and fo is ne-
Ccflary by a Neccffity of Conne61:ion and Confequence, is
evident by ihis, That every Ad of the Will whatfoever, is •
excited by fome Motive : Which is manifeft, becaufe, if the
Will or Mind, in willing and chufing after ^he Manner that
it does, is Excited fo to do by no Motive or Inducement,
then it has no End which it prcpofes to it felf, or purfues
in fo doing ; it aims at Nothing, and feeks Nothing, And
if it feeks Nothing, then it don't go after any Thing, or ex-
ert any Inclination or Preference towards any Thing.
Which brings the Matter to a Contradjclion ; Becaufe for
the Mind to will.fomething, and for it to go after fomething
by an A61 of Preference and Inclination, are the fameThing,

But if every Acft of the Will Is excited by a Motive, then
that Motive is the Caufe of the A61 of the Will. If the Ads
of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the

Caufes of their being excited ; or, which is the fame 'i

Thing, the Caufe of their being put forth into A6t and Ex- '\

iftenc^. And if fo, the Exiftence of the A<5ls of the Will is i

properly the Effect of their Motives. Motives do Nothing ;j

as Motives cr Inducements, but by their Influence ;' and fo 3

much as is done by their Influence, is the EfFe6t of them, j

For that is the Notion of an Efled, fomething that is bro*t i

to pafs«by the Influence of another Thing. \

A
And if Volitions are properly the EfFe^s of their Motives, :^
then they are neceffarily conneded with theirMotives. Every i
Effect and Event being, as was proved before, neceflarily \
connected with that which is the proper Ground and Reafon i(
of it's Exiflencc. Thus it is tnanifeft^ that Volition is ne- \

ceflary, i

Sed.X. conneEled with Mo\\vt^. 85

ceflary, and is not from any Self-determining Power in the
Will : The Volition which is caufed by previous Motive and
Inducement, is not caufed by the Will exercifmg a fovereign
Power over it felf, to determine, caufe and excite Volitions
in it felf. This is not confiftent with the Will's ading in a
State of Indifference and Equilibrium, to determine it felf to
a Preference ; for the Way in wl^ich Motives operate, is by
biafTmg the Will, and giving it a certain Inclination or Pre-.
ponderation one Way.

Here it may be proper to obferve,'that Mr. Chubby in his
Colle6lion of Tra6ts on various Subjects, has advanced a
Scheme of Liberty, which is greatly divided againft it felf,
and thoroughly fubverfive of it felf ; and that many Ways.

I. He is abundant in afTerting, that the Will, in all it's
A(5fs, is influenced by Motive and Excitement ; and that
this is the previous Ground and Reafon of all it's Acts, and
that it is never otherwife in any Inftance. He fays, ('P.262.^
No JSlion can take Place without fome Motive to excite it. And
in P. 26 3. Volition cannot take Place without fome PREVIOUS Rea-
fon or Motive to induce it. And in P. 3 10. A£lion would not take
Place zuithout fome Reafon or Motive to induce it ; it being abjurd to
fuppofe.^that the aSiive Faculty would be exerted without JomePREVI-
OUS Reajon to difpofe the Mind to Adion. So alfo P. 257. And
he fpeaks of theleThings as VN^hat we may be abfolutely certain
■ of, and which are the Foundation, the only Foundation we
have of a Certainty of the moral Perfe6tions of God. P. 252,
253» 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264.

And yet at the fame Time, by his Scheme, the Influence
of Motives upon us to excite to Action, and to be actually a
Ground of Volition,isf^w/^^2/^«^ on the Volition or Choice of the
Mind. For he very greatly infifts upon it,that in all freeA6tions,
before theMind is the Subje<5t of thofe Volitions whichMotives
excite, it chufes to be fo. It chufes whether it will comply
with the Motive, which prefents it felf in View, or not ; and
when various Motives are prefented, it chufes which it will
yield to, and which it will rejed. So P. 256. Every Man has
Power to a5i., or to refrain from a£iing agreably with^ or contrary
to., any Motive that prefents. P. 257. Every Man is at Liberty it
ff^, or refrain from a£iing agreably with^ or contrary to., what each

§f thefe Motives^ conftderedfingly^ would excite him to. Man has

^Power^ and is as much at Liberty to rejeSf the Motive that does
^revaily as he has Power ^ and is at Liberty to reje^ thofe Motives

ibsS

86 Inconjtfience of Mr. C\mh\ys Part II.

that do not. And foP.310, 311. hi order to conji'itute amoral
Jgent^ it is neceffary^ that he Jhould have Power to aSi^ or to re-
frain from a^ingy upon fuch moral Motives as he pleafes. And to
the like Purpole in many other Places. According to thefe
Things, the Will ads lirft, and chuies or refufes to com-
ply with the Motive that is prefented, before it falls under
it's prevailing Influence : And 'tis iirfl determined by the
Mind's Pleafure or Choice, what Motives it will be induced
bvj before it is induced by them.

Nowjhow can thefe Things hang together ? How can the
Mind firfl: ad, and by it's Ad of Volition and Choice determine
what Motives (hall be the Ground and Reafon of it's Volition
and Choice f For this fuppofes, the Choice is already made,
before the Motive has it's EfFed ; and that the Volition is al-
ready exerted, before the Motive prevails, fo as adually to be
the Ground of the Volition ; and makes the prevailing of the
Motive, the Confequence of the Volition, which yet it is the
Ground of. If the Mind has already chofen to comply with
a Motive, and to yield to it's Excitement, it doa't need to
yield to it after this : for. the Thing is effeded already, that
the Motive would excite to, and the Will is before-hand
with the Excitement ; and the Excitement comes in too late,
and is needlefs and in vain afterwards. If the Mind has
already chofen to yield to a Motive which invites to a Tiling,
that implies and in Fad is a chufing the Thing invited to ;
and the very Ad of Choice is before the Influence of the
Motive which induces, and is the Ground of the Choice ;
the Son is before-hand with the Father that begets him :
The Choice is fuppofed to be the Ground of that Influence
of the Motive, which very Influence is fuppofed to be the
Ground of the Choice. And fo Vice verfa. The Choice is
fuppofed to be the Confequence of the Influence of ^-the Mo-
tive, which Influence of the Motive is the Confequence of
that very Choice.

And befidesjif the Will ads firfl: towards the Motive before
k falls under it's Influence, and the prevailing of the Motive
■upon it to induce it to ad and chufe, be the Fruit and Con-
fequence of it's Ad and Choice, then how is the Motive a
PREVIOUS Ground and Reafon 0} the AB and Choice^ fo that
in the Nature of the Things^ Volition cannot take Place without fc?ne
PREVIOUS Reafon and Motive to induce it , and that this Ad
is confequent upon, and follows the Motive ? WhichThings
Mr. Ch'uhb often aflerts, as of certain and undoubted Truth.

SccSl.X. Scheme of Liberty^ &€• 87

So that the very fame Motive is both previous and confequent^
both before and after, both the Ground and Fruit of tkc
very fame Thing !

II. Agreable to the fore-mention'd inconfiftent Notion of
the Will's tirll acting towards the Motive, chufmg whether
it will comply with it, in order to it's becoming a Ground of
the Will's acting, before any A6t of Volition can talc^
Place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and Excitements
to the Action of the Will, the pajftve Ground or Reafon of that
Adion. Which is a remarkable Phrafe ; than which I pre-
fume there is none more unintelligible, and void of diftincS:
and confident Meaning, in all the Writings of Duns^ Scotus,
or Thomas Jquinas. When he reprefents the Motive to
Adion or Volition as paflive, he muil mean— pafTive in that
Affair, or paflive with Refpe6l to that A6tion which he
fpeaks of; otherwife it is Nothing to his Purpofe, or relating
to the Delign of his Argument ; He mull mean (if that
can be called a Meaning) that the Motive to Volition is firil
acfted upon or towards by the Volition, chufing to yield to it,
making it a Ground of A6lion, or determining to fetch it's
Influence from thence ; and fo to make it a previous
Ground of it's own Excitation and Exiftence. Which is
the fame Abfurdity, as if one fliould fay, that the Soul of
Man, or any other Thing fliould, previous to it's exifting,
chufe what Caufe it would come into Exiftence by, and
fhould ad upon it's Caufe, to fetch Influence from thence,
to bring it into Being ; and fo it's Caufe fliould be a paflive
Ground of it's Exiftence !

Mr. Chubb does very plainly fuppofe Motive or Excitement
to be the Ground of the Being of Volition. He fpeaks of it as
the Ground or Reafon of the EXERTION of an A61 of
the Will, P. 391, & 392. and exprefly fays, that Volition
cannot TAKE PLaCE without fome previous Ground or Mq-
live to induce it^ P. 363. And he fpeaks of the Acft as FROM
the Motive^ and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the Motive^
P. 352. and from the Influence that the Motive has on the
Man, for the PRODUCTION of an ASiion, P. 317. Certain-
ly, there is no Need of multiplying Words about this ;
'Tis eafily judged, whether Motive can be the Ground of
Volition's being exerted and taking Place, fo that the
very Produdion of it is from the Influence of the Motive,
and yet the Motive, before it becomes the Ground of the
Volition, is palfive, or a6ted upon by the Volition. But

this

88 Inconftjience of Mr. CtmWs Part II.

this I will fay. That a Man who infifts fo much on Clear-
nefs of Meaning in others, and is fo much in blaming
their Confufion and Inconfiftence, ought, if he was able, to
have explained his Meaning in this Phrafe of p^j^^f GV^z/W
ef ASiioTiy fo as to (hew it not to be confufed and incon-
iiftent.

If any fhould fuppofe, that Mr. Chubby when he fpeaks of
Motive as a pajfive Ground of J^fion^ don't mean palTive
with Regard to that Volition which it is the Ground of, but
fome other antecedent Volition (tho' his Purpofe and Ar-
gument, and whole Difcourfe, will by no Means allow of
fuch a Suppoiition) yet it would not help the Matter in the
leaft. For, (i.) If we fuppofe there to be an A6t of Volition
or Choice, by which the Soul chufes to yield to the Invi-
tation of a Motive to another Volition, by which the Soul
chufes fomething elfe ; both thefe fuppofed Volitions are in
Effect the very fame. A Volition, or chufmg to yield to
the Force of a Motive inviting to chufe fomething, comes to
juft the fame Thing as chufing the Thing which the Mo-
tive invites to, as I obferved before. So that here can be no
Room to help the Matter, by a Diftin6tion of two Volitions.
(2.) If the Motive be pallive with Reiped, not to the fame
Volition that the Motive excites to, but one truly diftindt
and prior 5 yet, by Mr. Chubb., that prior Volition can't
take Place, without a Motive or Excitement, as a previous
Ground of it's Exiftence. For he infifts, that // is ahfurd to
fuppofe any Volition fl?ould take Place without fome previous
Motive to induce it. So that at laft it comes to juft the fame
Abfurdity : for if every Volition muft have a previous Mo-
tive, then the very /ry? in the whole Series muft be excited
by a previous Motive ; and yet the Motive to that firft Vo-
lition is paffive ; but can't be paflive with Regard to ano-
ther antecedent Volition, becaufe, by the Suppofition, it is
the very firft : Therefore if it be paflive with Refpecft to
any Volition, it muft be fo with Regard to that very Vo^
lition that it is the Ground of, and that is excited by it.

III. Tho' Mr. Chubb aflerts, as above, that every Volition
has fome Motive, and that, in the Nature of the Thing., n$
Volition can take Place without fome Motive to induce it \ yet he
aflerts, that Volition does not always follow the ftrorg:ft Mo-
tive ; or in other Words, is not governed by any laperiour
Strength of the Motive that is follov^^ed, beyond Motives to
the contrary, previous to the Volition it feif. His own

Words,

Scd.X. Scheme of Liberty y Uc. 89

Words,?. 258, are as follows : " Tho' with regard to phyfi-
*' cal Caufes, that which is ftrongeft always prevails,
<• yet it is otherwife with regard to moral Caufes. Of
" thefe, fometimes the ftronger, fometimes the weaker,
*' prevails. And the Ground of this Difference is evident,
*' namely, that what we call moral Caufes, flriclly fpeak-
'' ing, are no Caufes at all, but barely paffive Reafons 0^
*' or Excitements to the A<5fion, or to the refraining from
*' a(5ting : which Excitements we have Power, or are at
« Liberty to comply with or reje6t, as I have fhewed above."
And fo throughout the Paragraph, he, in a variety of
Phrafes, infifls, that the Will is not always determined by the
ftrongeft Motive, unlefs by ftrongeft we prepofteroully meaa
adually prevailing in the Event ; which is not in the Mo-
tive, but in the Will 5 but that the Will is not always de-
termined by the Motive which is ftrongeft, by any Strength
previous to the Volition it felf. And he elfewhere does a-
bundantly affert, that the Will is determined by no fuperiouf
Strength or Advantage that Motives have, from any Conftitu-
tion or State of Things, or any Circumftances whatfoever,
previous to the adual Determination of the Will. And in-
deed his whole Difcourfe on human Liberty implies it, his
whole Scheme is founded upon it.

But thefe Things cannot ftand together. There is

fuch a Thing as a Diverfity of Strength in Motives to Choice,
previous to the Choice it felf. Mr. Chuhb himfelf fuppofes^
that they do previoiifly invite^ h^duce^ eix'ite and difpofe the Mind
to ASfion. This implies, that they have fomething in them-
felves that is inviting, fome Tendency to induce and difpofe
to Volition, previous to Volition it itlL And if they have
in themfelves this Nature and Tendency, doubtlefs they have
it in certain limited Degrees, which are capable of Diver-
fity ; and fome ha\'^ it in greater Degrees, others in lefs ;
and they that have moft of this Tendency, conlidered with
all their Nature and Circumftances, previous to Volition,
they are the ftrongeft Motives ^ and thofe that have leaft, are
the weakeft Adotives.

Now if Volition fometimes don't follow the Motive v/hich
is ftrongeft, or has moft previous Tendency or Advantage, ail
Things confidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the
"Weakeft, or that which as it ftands previoufty in the Mind'»
View, has leaft Tendency to induce it ; herein the Will ap-
parently a6ts wholly without Motive, without any previous
keafon to difpofe the Mind to it, contrary to what the fani:;

M AutU.oif

90 Inconjipnce of Mr. Chuhh\ Part II..

Author fuppofes The Aa wherein the Will muft proceed
Whout previous Motive to induce it, is the Act ■ of prefer-
ring the weakert Motive. For how abfurd is it to fayf The
Mind fees previous Reafon in the Motive, to pre/er that
-Mot ve before the other ; and at the fame Time to fuppofe, -
that there is Nothing m the Motive, in it's Nature, State, or
any Circumftances of it whatfoever, as k (lands in the pre-
vious View of the Mind, tliat gives it any Preference : but
on the contrary the other Motive that ftands in Comprtition
with It, in all thefe Refpeas, has moft belonging to it, tha"
IS inviting and moving, and has moft of a Tendency to
Choice and Preference ? This is certainly as much as o
Z'aa'VpT'""' G'-o^nd and Reafon in the Motive for
the Aa of 1-reterence, and yet no previous Reafon for it. Bv
theSuppofition astoall that is m the two rival Motives
which tenas to Preference, previous to the Aa of Preference,
It IS not m tnat which is prefer'd, but wholly ,n the other •
becaufe appearing fupenour Strength, and all appearing Pre-

Aa of 1 reference is from ^rmWx Ground, and Reafin in the
Motive which IS preferred. But are thefe Thines confiftent ?
Can there be previous Ground in a Thing for an Event
that takes Place, and yet no previous Tendency in it to that
Event? If one Thing folio .vs another, without any previ-
ous 7 endency to it s following, then I fhould think" it very-
piain, that it lollows it without any Manner of previous Rea-
fon why It fhould follow.

Yea, in this Cafe, Mr. Chulb fuppofes, that the Event
follows an Antecedent or a previous Thin;., as the Ground'
oi it s txiftence, not only that has no Tendmcy to it, but a
cmtrary Tendency 1 he Event is the Preference which the
Mind gives to that Motive which is weaker, as it ftands in
the previous View of the Mind ; the immediate Antecedent
IS the View the Mind has of the two rival Motives con-
junaiy ; m which previous View of the Mind, all the Pre-
terablenefs or prev.ous Tendency to Preferenoe, is fuppofed
to be on the other Side or in the contrary Motive ; and alt
the Lnworthmef^ of Preference, and fo previous Tendency
to Comparative Neglecl, R.yeaion or Undervaluing, is on

It- i'^%'^'"'^f P"'*^"'''^ '■ ^"'ly<^t '"*is Viev? of the
Mind js fuppofed to be the previom Ground or Reafon of this •
Aa or Prererence, exciting itf and diffofmg the Mnd to it.
\'vhich, I leave the Reader to judge, whether it be abfurd-
or not. It It be not, then it is not abfurd to fay, that the \

Sed.X. Scheme of Libefy^ ^c. 91

i)revioiis Tendency of an Antecedent to a Confequent, is the
Ground and Reafon why that Confequent docs not follow ;
^nd the Wart of a previous Tendency to m Event, yea, a
Tendency to the Contrary^ is the true Ground and Reafon
^hy that Event does follow.

An Aa of Choice or Preference is a comparative ^ Aa,
jwherein the Mind ads with R.eference to two or moreThings
that are compared,- and fiand in Competition in the Mind's
View. If the Mind, in this comparative A6t, prefers that
which appears inferiour in the Comparifon, then the Mind
herein ads abfolutely without Motive, or Inducement, or
any Temptation whatfcever. Then, if a hungry Man has
the Offer of two Sorts of Food, both which he finds an Ap-
petite to, but has a ftronger Appetite to one than the other ;
and there be no Circumftances or Excittm.ents whatfoever in
the Cafe to induce him to tske either one or the other, but
meerly his Appetite : If in the Choice he makes between
them, he chufes that which he has leaft Appetite to, and
refuies that to which he has the ilrongeft Appetite, this is
a Choice made abfolutely without previous Motive, Excite-
ment, Reafon or Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly
without ali Appetite to either : Becaufe his Volition in
this Cafe is a comparative A6f, attending and following a
comparative \ iew of the Food which he chufes, viewing it
as related to, and compared with the other Sort of Food, in
which View his Preference has abfolutely no previous
Ground, yea, is againft all previous Ground and Motive.
And if there be any Principle in Man from v/hence an Act
of Choice may arife after this Manner, from the fame
Principle Volition may arife wholly without Motive on ei-
ther Side. If the Mind in it's Volition can go beyond Mo-
tive, then it can go without Motive : for when it is be-
yond the Motive, it is out of the Reach of the Motive,
, out of the Limits of it's Influence, and fo without Motive.
If Volition goes beyond the Strength and Tendency of Mor
tive, and efpecially if it goes againit it's Tendency, this
dciiionftrates the Independence of Volition or Motive.
And if fo, no Reafon can be given for what Mr. ChiM
fo often afferts, even that in the Nature of Things Volition
, cannot take Place without a Motive to induce it.

If the mod High fliould endow a Balance with Agency

or A6tivity of Nature, in fuch a Manner, that when une-

quaiWeights are put into the Scales, it's Agency could enable

' . M 2 .1^

92 Inconjijlence of Mr. Chubb's Part 11.

it to caufe that Scale to defcend which has the lead "Weight,
and fo to raife the greater Weight ; this would clearly de-
jnonftrate, that the Motion of the Balance do's not depend
on Weights in the Scales, at lead as much, as if the Ba-
lance fhould move it felf, when there is no Weight in ei-
ther Scale. And the Acftivity of the Balance which is
Sufficient to move it felf againft the greater Weight, muft
certainly be more tlian fufficient to move it when there is
no Weight at all.

Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Will can't ftir at all without
fome Motive ; and alfo fuppofes, that if there be a Motive
to one Thing, and none to the Contrary, Volition will in-
fallibly follov/ that Motive. This is vertually to fuppofe an
entire Dependence of the Will on Motives : If it were not
wholly dependent on them, it could furely help it felf a httle
•without them, or help it felf a little againft a Motive, with-
out help from the Strength and Weight of a contrary Mo-
tive. And yet his fuppofing that the Will, when it has be-
fore it various d|>porite Motives, can ufe them as it pleafes,
and chufe it's own Influence from them, and negledl the
ftrongefl:, and follow the weakeft, fuppofes it to be wholly
independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. Chubvs Suppofition, that Vo-
lition muft be without any previous Ground in any Motive,
thus : If it be as he fuppofes, that the Will is not deter-
mined by any previous fuperiour Strength of the Motive,
but determines and chufes it's cwn Motive, then, when the
rival Motives are exactly equal in Strength and Tendency to
induce, in all Refpedfs, it may follow either ; and may in
fuch a Cafe, fom.etimes follow one, fometimes the other.
And if fo, this Diverfity which appears between the A6l«
of the Will, is piaiply without previous Ground in either
of the Motives ; for all that is previoully in the Motives, is
fuppofed precifely and perfe6f ly the fame, without any Di-
verfity whatfoever. Now perfed Identity, as to all that is
previous in the Antecedent, can't be the Ground and Rea-
fon of Diverfity in the Confequent. Perfect Identity in the
pround can't bp a Reafon why it is not followed with the
fame Confequence. And therefore the Source of this Diver-
fity of Confequen<;e muft be fought for eifewhere.

And laftly, it may be obferved, that however Mr. Chubb
^oes much infift that no Volition can tgke Fiace without

fome

Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty y 8cc. 93

fome Motive to induce it, which previoufly difpofes the
Mind to it ; yet, as he alfo iniifts that the Mind without
Reference to any previous fuperiour Strength of Motives,
picks and chufes for it's Motive to follow ; He himfelf here*
in plainly fuppofes, that with Regard to the Mind's Prefe-
rence of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive
that difpofes the Will, but the Will difpofes it felf to fol-
low the Motive.

IV. Mr. Chubb fuppofes NecelTity to be utterly inconfill-
cnt with Jgtncy ; and that to fuppofe a Being to be an Agent
in that which is neceiTary, is a plain Contradiction. P. 311.
And throughout his Difcourfes on the Subjed of Liberty, he
fuppofes, that NecelTity cannot confift with Agency or Free-
dom ; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make Liberty and
NepelTity, A6tion and Paffion, the fame Thing. And fo he
feems to fuppofe, that there is no A6tion ftriclly fpeaking,
but Volition ; and that as to the Effects of Volition in
Body or Mind, m themfelves confidered, being neceiTary,
they are faid to be free, only as they are the Etfe6ts of an
A61 that is not neceiTary.

And yet, according to him. Volition it felf is the Eff^
if Volition ; yea, every A(5t of free Volition : and therefore
every Adl of free Volition muft, by what has now been ob •
ferved from Him, be neceflary. That every A(5t of free
Volition is it felf the Effect of Volition, is abundantly fup-
pofed by Him. In P. 341, he fays, " If a Man is fuch a
*' Creature as I have above proved him to be, that is, if he
" has in him a Power or Liberty of doing either Good or
" Evil, and either of thefe is the Subject of his own free
" Choice, fo that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED,

. *^ have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here He fup-
pofes, all that is Good or Evil in Man is the EfFecft of his
Choice ; and fo that his good or evil Choice it felf is the
Effect of his Pleafure or Choice, in thefe Words, He might
if he had PLEASED^ have CHOSEN the contrary. So in P.356.
" Tho' it be highly reafonable, that a Man fhould always
" chufe the greater Good, —yet he may, if he PLEASE,
" CHUSE oltherviife." Which is the fame Thing as if he
had faid, He may^ if he chufes^ chufe otherwife. And then he
goes on, "— that is, he may, if he pieafes^ chufe what is
good for himfelf &c." And again in the fame Page, " The
^ Will is not confined by the Underftanding to any parti-

., " cular Sort of Ggod, whether greater or lefs -, but is at

" Liberty

94 Inconftjlence of Mr. Chubb's Part IL

** Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it pleafes."—!^ there
be any Meaning in thele laft Words," the Meaning mull be
this', that the Will is at Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it
chujes to chufe ; fuppofing the A61 of Choice it felf deter-
mined by an antecedent Choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb
fpeaks of, is not only a Man's having Power to move his
Body agreably to an antecedent Ad of Choice, but to ufe
or exert the Faculties of his Soul. Thus, in P. 379.fpeaking
of the Faculties of his Mind, he fays, " Man has Power,and
*' is at Liberty to neglect thefe Faculties, to ufe them aright,
*' or to abufe them, as he pkafesy And that he fuppofes an
Adi of Choice^ or Exercife of Pleafure, properly dijflincl
fromy and antecedent to thofe Ads thus chofen, directing,
commanding and producing thii chofen Ads, and even the
Ads of Choice themfelves, is very plain in P. 283. " He
" can command his JSfions ; and herein confifts his Liberty ;
" He can give or deny himfelf that Pleafure as he plcafesS*
And P. 377. " It the Adions of Men — are not the Pror-
*' dzice of a free Choice^ or Eledion, but fpring from a Neceffity

" of Nature, he cannot in Reafon be the Objed of Re-

" ward or Punifhment on their Apcount. Whereas, if
*' Adion in Man, whether Good or Evil, is the Produce of
*' Will or f-ee Choice ; fo that a Man in either Cafe, had it
«' in his Power, and was at Liberty to have CFIOSEN the
" contrary, he is the proper Objed of Reward or Punifli-
*' ment, according: as he CHUSES to behave Himfelf."
Here in thefe laft Words, be fpeaks of Liberty ofCHUSING,
according as he CHUSES, So that the Behaviour which he
fpeaks of as fubjed to his Choice, is his chuftng it iQ\{^ as
"well as his external Condud confequent upon it. And
therefore 'tis evident, he means not only external AdionSjbut
the Ads of Choice themfelves, when he fpeaks of all f-ee
Jaions^ as the PRODUCE of free Choice, And this is abun-
dantly evident in what he fays in P. 372^ & 373.

Now thefe Things imply a twofold great Abfurdity and
Inconfiftence.

I. To fuppofe, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every
free Ad of Choice is commanded by^ and is the Produce of
free Choice^ is to fuppofe the firft free Ad of Choice belong-
ing to the Cafe, yea, the firft free Ad of Choice that
ever Man exerted, tohtthe Produce of an antecedent Ad
of Choice. But I hope I need not labourat all to convince
my Readers, that 'tis an Abfurdity to fay, the very firji Ad
is the Produce of another Ad that went befon it.

2. If

I Sed.X. Scheme of Liberty ^ &c. 95

i 2. If it were both pofTible and real, as Mr. Chicbh infifts,

T ^ that every free A<51 of Choice were the Produce or the EfFe(5t

of ' a free A(5t of Choice ; yet even then, according to

his Principles, no one A61 of Choice would be free, but every

one neceriary ; becaufe, every Ad of Choice being the Effect

of a foregoing Ad, every Ad would be necelTarily con-

'j neded with that foregoing Caufe. For Mr. Chubb himfelf

I fays? P- 3^9- " When the Self-moving Power is exerted, it

" becomes the neceilary Caufe of it's Effeds." — So that his

\ Notion of a free Ad, that is rewardable or punifhable, is a

y Heap of Contradictions. It is a free Act, and yet, by his

I own Notion of Freedom, is neceflary ; and therefore by him

|j it is a Contradidion, to fuppofe it to be free. According to

jit him, every free Ad i$^he Produce of a free Act ; fo that

there mull be an infinite Number of free Ads in Succeffion,

without any Beginning, in an Agent that has a Beginning.

And therefore here is an infinite Number of free Ads,

every one of them free ; and yet not any one of them free,

i but every Ad in the whole infinite Chain a neceflary EfFed.

I'! All the Ads are rewardable or punifliable, and yet the Agent

I cannot, in Reafon^be the Objed of Reward or Punilhment,on

I Account of any one of thefe Adions. He is adivc in them

all, and paffive in none ; yet adive in none, but pafTive in

t| all, b'r.

M; V. Mr. Chubb does moft flrenuoufly deny, that Motives
are Caufes of the Ads of the Will ; or that the moving
Principle in Man is moved^ or caufed to be exerted by Motives..
His Words P. 388 & 389. are, " If the moving Principle in
« Man is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERTED,
'' by Ibmething external to Man, zvh'ich all Motives are^ then,
" it would not be a Self-moving Principle, feeing it would be
" moved by a Principle external to it felf. And to fay, that a
" Self-moving Principle is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE
" EXERTED, by a Caufe external to it felf, is abfurd and
*' a Contradidion &c."— And in the next Page, 'tis particu-
larly and largely infifted, that Motives are Caufes in no Cafe,
that they are meerly pajfftve in the ProduSlion of Aciion^ arid havd
no Caitjality in the ProduSiion of it, — no Caufality, to be the Caufe
$fthe Exertion of the Will.

Now I defire it may be confidered, how this can pollibly
confifis with what he fays in other Places. Let it be noted
here,

I.Mr.

96 Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb's Part II.

1. Mr. Chuhh abundantly fpeaks of Motives as Ex-
mtements of the J^'s of the Will ; and fays, that Motives d»
excite Volition, and induce it, and that they are necelTary to
this End ; that in the Reafo?i and Nature of Things, Folition can-
not take Place without Motives to excite it. But nov/ if Motives
excite theWill, they move it ; and yet he fays, 'tis abiurd to fay,
the Will is moved by Motives. And again (if Language is
of any Significancy at all) If Motives excite Vohtion, then
they are the Cauje of it's being excited ; and to caufe Voh-
tion to be excited, is to cauie it to be j>ut forth or exerted^ -
Yea, Mr. Chubb fays himfelf, P. 317. Motive is neceffary
to the Exertion of the adive Faculty. To excite, is pofitively
to do fomething ; and certainly that which does fomtthing, is
the Caufe of the Thing done by it. To create, is to caufe to
be created ; to make, is to caufe to be made ; to kill, is to
caufe to be killed ; to quicken, is to caufe to be quickened ;
and to excite, is to caufe to be excited. To excite, is to be a
Caufe, in the moft proper Senfe, not meerly a negative
Occafion, but a Ground of Exiftence by pofitive Influence.
The Notion of exciting, is exerting Influence to caufe the
Effe6t to arife or corne forth into Exifl:ence.

2. Mr. Chubb himfelf, P. 317, fpeaks of Motives as the
Ground and Reafon of Adion BY INFLUENCE, and BY
PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant
by a Caufe, but fomething that is the Ground and Reafon of
a Thing by it's Influence, an Influence that is prevalent and
.fo efFedual ?

3. This Author not only fpeaks of Motives as the Ground
and Reafon of A6tion, by prevailing Influence ; but exprefly
oUhQir Influence as prevailing FOR THE PRODUCTION
of an A6tion, in the fame P. 317 : which makes the Incon-
fiflency fliill more palpable and notorious. The Produ^iow
of an Eifect is certainly the Caufmg of an EfFedf ; and pro-
du^ive Influence is cnufal Influence, if any Thing is ; And
that which has this Influence prevalently, fo as thereby to
become the Ground of another Thing, is a Caufe of that
Thing, if there be any fuch Thing as a Caufe. This In-
fluence, Mr, Chubb fays, Motives have to produce an Action ;
and yet he fays, 'tis abfurd i.nd a Contradidion, to fay they
are Caufes.

4. In the fame Page, He once and again fpeaks of Mo-
tives as difpofmg the Agent to Adtion, by their 'influence. His

Words

,jSed.X. Scheme of Liberty^ he. 97

Words are thefe : " As Motive, which takes Place in ther
*' Underftandmg, and is the Produ6l of IntelHgence, is
« NECESSARY to Adion, that is, to the EXERTION of
*« the adive Faculty, becaufe that Faculty would not be ex-
<« erted without Ibme PREVIOUS REASON to DISPOSE
*' the Mind to A6tion ; fo from hence it plainly appears,
*' that when a Man is faid to be difpojed to one A6lion ra-
<' ther than another, this properly fignifies the PREVAIL-
« ING INFLUENCE that one Motive has upon a Man
« FOR THE PRODUCTION of an Aaion, or for the
*' being at Reft, before all other Motives, for the Prodw^ion
** of the contrary. For as Motive is the Ground and Rea-
*« fon of any Adion, fo the Motive that prevails, DISPOSES
*' the Agent to the Performance of that Adion."

Now, if Motives difpofe the Mind to Adion, then they
caufe the Mind to be ctfpofed ; and to caufe the Mind to be
difpofed, is to caufe it to be willing ; and to caufe it to be
willing, is to caufe it to will ; and that is the fame Thing
as to be the Caufe of an A61 of the Will. And yet this
fame Mr. Chubb holds it to be abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be
a Caufe of the Ad of the Will.

And if we compare thefe Things together, we have here
again a whole Heap of Inconfiftences. Motives are the previous
Ground and Rcafon of the A(5ts of the Will ; yea, the necejfary
Ground & Reafon of their Exertion, tvithout which they zuiil 'not
be exerted, and cannot in the Nature of Things take Place ; and
they do excite thefe A6ts of the Will, and do this by a pre^
vailing Influence ; yea, an Influence which prevails for the Pro-'
duSiion of the A5t of the Will, and for the difpoftng of the Mind
to it : And yet 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe Motive to be a Caufe of an
A6t of the Will, or that a Principle of Will is moved or
caufed to be exerted by it, or that it has any Caufality in the Pro-
du£tion of it, or any Caufality to be the Caufe of the Exertion of
the Will

A due Confideration of thefe Things which Mr. Chubb has
advanced, the ftrange Inconfiftences which the Notion of Li-
berty confifting in the Will's Power of Self-determination
void of all Ncceffity, united with that Dictate of common
Senfe, that there can be no Volition without a Motive, drove
him into,may be fufficient to convince us,that it is utterly im-
poffible ever to make that Notion of Liberty confiftent with
the Influence of Motives in Volition. And as it is iU a man-

N t^-^T

98 GOD certamly foreknows Part II •

ner felf-evldent, that there can be no A6t of Will, Choice
or Preference of the Mind, without fome Motive or Induce-
ment, fomething in the Mind's View, which it aims at,
feeks, inclines to, and goes after ; fo 'tis moll manifeft,
there is no fuch Liberty in the Univerfe as Arrninlatis inlift
on ; nor any fuch Thing poliibie, or conceivable.

Section XL

77je Evidence of GOD' s certain Foreknow-
ledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

THAT the A(5ls of the Wills of moral Agents are not
contingent Events, in that Senfe, as to be without all
Necellity, appears by God's certain Foreknowledge of
fuch Events.

In handhng this Argument,! would in the/?;/? Place prove,
that God has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary A(5ts
of moral Agents ; and fecondly^ Ihew the Confequence, or
how it follows from hence, that the Volitions of moral A-
gents are not contingent, fo as to be without NecelTity of
Connedtion and Confequence.

First, I am to prove, that God has an abfolute and cer*
tain Foreknowledge of the free Acftions of moral Agents.

One would think, it fhould be wholly needlefs to enter on
fuch anArgument with any that profefs themfelves Chriilians :
But fo it is ; God's certain Foreknowledge of the free A6ts
of moral Agents, is denied by fome that pretend to believe
the Scriptures to be the Word of God ; and efpecially of
late. I therefore Ihall confider the Evidence of fuch a Pre-
fcience in the moit High, as fully as the defigned Limits of
this EiTay will admit of ; [fuppo mg my felf herein to have
lo do with fuch as own the Truta of the Bible.

Arg. I. Myfi'/? Argument fliall be taken from God's
Prediclicn of fuch Events Here I would in the firft Place
iay down thefe tv/o Things as Axioms.

(I.) If

kii

Se5:.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 99

(i.) If God don't foreknow. He can't foretell fuch Events ;
that is, He can't peremptorily and certainly foretell thtm.
If God has no more than an uncertain Guefs concernixng
Events of this Kind, then He can declare no more than an
uncertain Guefs. Politively to foretell, is to profefs to fore-
know, or to declare pofitive Foreknowlege.

(2.) If God don't certainly foreknow the future Volitions
of moral Agents, then neither can He certainly foreknow
thofe Events which are confequent and dependent on thefe
Volitions. The Exiiience of the one depending on the
Exii^ence of the other, the Knowledge of tlie Exiilence of
the one depends on the Knowledge of the Exigence of the
other i and the one can't be more certain than the other.

Therefore, how many, how great, and how extenfive fo-
cver the Confcquences of the Volitions of moral Agents
may be ; tho' they Ihould extend to an Alterat'on of the State
of Things through the Univerfe, and ih.cJ.d be continued
in a Series of fucceffive Events to all Eternity, and fliould
in the Progrefs of Things branch forth into an infinite Num-
ber of Series, each of tnem going on in an endlefs Line or
Chain of Events ; God muft be as ignorant of all thefe Con-
fcquences, as He is of the Volition w^hence they firft take
their Rife : All thefe Events, and the whole State of Things
depending on them, how important, extenfive and vaft fo-^
ever, mult be hid from him.

Thefe Pofitions being fuch as I fuppofe none will deny, I
now proceed to obfer\^e the following Things.

I. Men's moral Condu6l and Qualities, their Vertues
■ and Vices, their Wickednefs and good Pra6tice, Things re-
wardable and punifhable, have often been foretold by God. —
Pharaoh's moral Conduct, in refufing to obr.y G: ci s Com-
mand, in letting his People go, was foretold. God fays to
Mofesy Exod. iii. 19. / am fur e^ that the King ^ Egypt zvill not
let you go. Here God profelTes not only to guefs at, but to
know Pharaoh's future Difobedience. In Chap. vii. 4. God
fays, But Pharaoh JJjall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay
mine Hand upon Egypt, &c. And Chap. ix. 30. Mofcs fays to
Pharaoh, As for thee^ and thy Servant Sy I KNOW that ye zviil
not fear the Lord. See alfo Chap. xi. 9. — The moral Con-
duct of Joftahy by Name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf iri
Oppofition to Idolatr)', in particular Awts oi his, was ffiretold

N 2 above

I CO GOD certainly foreknows Part II.

above three Hundred Years before he was born, and the

Prophecy feal'd by a Miracle, and renewed and confirm- ■\

ed by the Words of a fecond Prophet, as what furely would i

not fail, I K^ngs xiii. i,— -6, 32. This Prophecy was alfo 1

in EfFe6t a Predidion of the moral Condud of the People, 1

in upholding their Schifmatical and Idolatrous Worfhip 'till i

that Time, and the Idolatry of thofe Priefts of the high !

Places, which it is foretold Jofiah fhould offer upon that ti

Altar oi Bethel.— Micaiah foretold the foclifh and fmful Con- J

<lu6f of Jhab^ in refufing to hearken to the Word of the &

Lord by him, and chufing rather to hearken to the falfe %

Prophets, in going to Raymth-Gilwd to his Ruin, i Kings xxi. }!

20,-— 22.— The moral Condud of Hazael was foretold, in i

that Cruelty he (hculd be guilty of ; on which Hazael fays, ^ |
IP^hat., is thy Servant a Dog^ that he fnould do this Thing! The*}

Prophet fpeaks of the Event as what he knew, and not what t

he conjeclured. 2 Kings viii. 12. I know the Evil thou wilt do \

f4nto the Children of Ifrael : Thou wilt dafo their Children^ and rip \

tip their Women with Child. The moral Condud of Cyrus is !

foretold, long before he had a Being, in his Mercy to God's «

People, and Regard to the tiue God, in turning the Capti- -

vity of the Jews^ and promoting the building of the Tem- \

pie. Ifai. xJiv.28. ^ Ixv. 13. Compare 2 C/?r^«. xxxvi. 22,23. *

and Ezrai. i,--^.. — _ How many Inftances of the moral \

Condu6l of the Kings of the Norths' South., particular Inftances ' i

oi the Wicked Behaviour of the Kings of Syria and Egypt., are \

foretold in the xith Chap, o^ Daniel ? Their Corruption, ii

Violence, Robbery, Treachery, and Lies. And particularly, ,

how much is foretold of the horrid Wickednefs of Antiochusy ,

jEpiphajies., called there a vile Perjhi^ inftead of Epiphanes, or '

Illuftrious. In that Chapter, and alfo in Chap. viii. ver.9,— » ^

14,23, to the End, are foretold his Flattery, Deceit and Lies, j

his having his Heart fet to do Mifchief., and fet againjl the holp '

Covenant^ his dejiroying and treading lender Foot the holy People , ,

\n a marvellous Manner, his having Indignation again)} the holy i

Covenant^ fetting his Heart agalnft it, and confpiring againji ity \

his polluting the San£fuary of Strength., treading it under Footy \

taking away the daily Sacrifice., and placing the Abomination that \

maketh deflate ; his great Pride, magnifying Jmnfelf againji Gody \

and uttering marvellous Blafphemies againji Him., 'till God in j

Indignation jhould dejiroy hi?nl Withal the moral Condu6l of 'j

the Jews., on Occai'ion of his Perfecution, is predided. 'Tis i

foretold, that he fmdd corrupt many by Flatteries., Chap. xi. j

t2,— 34. But that others fhould behave with a glorious i

/Ojiftancy and Fortitude, in Oppofitlon to him, ver. 32^,^ ;

A"1j

Sed.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents, i o i

And that fome good Men (hould fall, and repent, ver. 35.
Chriil foretold Peter's Sin, in denying his Lord, with it's Cir-
cumftances, in a peremptory Manner. And fo, that great
Sin of Judas^ in betraying his Mafter, and it's dreadful and
eternal Puniihment in Hell, was foretold in the like pofitive
Manner. Matth. xxvi. 21, — 25. and parallel Places in the
other Evangelifts.

. 2. Many Events have been foretold by God, which were
confequent and dependent on the moral Conduct of parti-
cular Perfons, and were accomplifhed, either by their ver-
tuous or viciousAdions.— Thusjthe Children of Ifrael's going
down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham^
Gen. XV. which v>^as brought about by the WickedneCs of
Jofeph's Brethren in felling him, and the Wickednefs of Jo-
Jeph's Miflrefs, and his own fignal Vertue in reiifting her
Temptation. The Accomplifhment of the Thing preiigur'd
in Jofeph\ Dream, depended on the fame moral Condu6t^

fothmris Parable and Prophecy, y/^^^^i ix. €5, 20. was

accompiifhed by the wicked Condud of Ahimekch^ and the
Men of Sheche7n. The Prophecies againft the Houfe of El'iy

1 Sam. Chap. ii. & iii. were accompiifhed by the Wickednefs
of Doeg the Edomite^ in accufmg the Priefts ; and the great
Impiety, and extreme Cruelty of Saul in deftroying the
Priefts atA^^!^. i Sa?n.xKU.- — Natha7i''s Prophecy 2ig2im{i David,

2 Sam. xii. 11,12. was fulhl'd by the horrible Wickednefs of
Jbfalom^ in rebelling againft his P'ather, feeking his Life,
and lying with his Concubines in the Sight of the Sun. , The
Prophecy againft iS.?/^;7z^«, i Kings xi. 11,— 13. was fulfil'd
by JerQboa7ns Rebellion and Ufurpation, which are fpoken
of as his Wickednefs, 2 C/;r(?w.xiii.5,6. compare ver.18. The
Prophecy againft Jeroboam's Family, i Kings xiv. was fulfil'd

' by the Confpiracy, Treafon, and cruel Murders of Baajha,,
2 Kings XV. 27, &c. The Predications of the Prophet Jehu
againft the Houfe of Baa/ha^ i Kings xvi. at the Beginning,
were fulfil'd by the Treafon and Parricide of Zimri^ i Kings
xvi. 9, 13, 20.

3. How often has God foretold the future moral Condudl
of Nations and Peoples, of Numbers, Bodies, and Suc-
ceffions of Men ; with God's judicial Proceedings, and
many other Events confequent and dependent on their
Vertues and Vices ; which could not be foreknown, if
the Volitions of Men, wherein they a6ted as moral Jgefits^
had not been forefeen I The future Cruelty of the Egyptians

102 GOD certainly foreknows Part II.

in opprefTing Ifrael^ and God's judging and punching them
for it, was foretold long before it came to pafs. Gen, xv.
13, 14. The Continuance of the Iniquity of the Amorites^
and the Increafe of it until it Jhould be fully and they ripe,
for Deftrudion, was foretold above four Hundred Years be^
fore-hand, Gen. xv. 16. J^, vii. 6, 7. The Prophecies of
the Deftru(5lion of Jerufalem^ and the Land of Judah^ were
abfolute ; 2 Kingi xx. 17,-19. Chap, xxii. 15, to the End.
It was foretold in Hezekiah's Time, and was abundantly in-
fifted on in the Book of the Prophet Ifaiah^ who wTote No-
thing after Hezekiah's Days. It was foretold in Jofiah' sTimCy
in the Beginnir^ of a great Reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And
it is manifeft by innumerable Things in the Predidions of
the Prophets, relating to this Event, it's Time, it's Cir-
cumftances, it's Continuance and End ; the Rtturn from
the Captivity, the Reftoration of the Temple, City & Land,
and many Circumftances, and Confequences of That ; I fay,
thefe fliew plainly, that the Prophecies of this great Event
were abfolute. And yet this Event was connected with, and
dependent on two Things in Men's moral Conduct : firft, the
injurious Rapine and Violence of the King of Babylon and
his People, as the efficient Caufe ; which God often fpe^ks
of as what he highly refented, and would feverely punifli ;
and 2dly, The final Obftinacy of the Jews, That great E-
vent is often fpoken of as fufpended on this. Jer. iv. i.& v. i,
vii. I5— 7. xi. I,— 6. xvii. 24, to the End. xxv. 1,-7,
xxvi. I,— 8. 13. & xxxviii. 17,18. Therefore this Deftruc-
tion and Captivity could not be foreknown, unlefs fuch a
moral Conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been fore-
known. And then it was foretold, that the People Jhould be
finally ohflinate^ to the Deftruction and utter Defolation of

the City and Land. Ifai^ vi. 9, 11. Jer, i, 18, 19. vii. 27,

— 29. Ezek. in, 7. & xxiv. 13, 14.

The final Obftinacy of thofe Jews who were left in the
Land of Ifrael^ and who afterwards went down into Egypt^^ in
their Idolatry and Rejection of the true God, was foretold by
God, and the Prediaion confirmed with an Oath. Jer, xliv.
26,27. And God tells the People, Ifai, xlviii.3.4, — 8. that he
had predided thofe Things which Ihould be confequent on
their Treachery and Obftinacy, becaufe he knew they would
be obftinate ; and that he had declared thefe Things before-
hand, for their Convi^^ion of his being the only trueGod, Gft.

The

Sed*XI. the Volitions 6f moral Agents, ic^

The Deftru6lion of Babylon^ with many of the Circumftan*
ces of it, was fore-told, as the Judgment of God for the ex-
ceeding Pride and Haughtinefs of the Heads of that Monar-
chy, Nebuchadnezzar, and his Succeflbrs, and their wickedly
dellroying other Nations, and particularly for their exalting
themfelves againft the true God and his People, before any
of thefe Monarchs had a Being ; Ifai. Chap, xiii, xiv, xlvii :
Compare Habbak. ii. 5, to the End, and Jer. Chap, I. and ii.
That Babylon's Deftrudion was to be a Reco?npencey according to
the Works of their own Hands, appears by "Jer, xxv. 14.-— The
Immorality which the People of Babylon, and particularly her
Princes and great Men, were guilty of, that very Night that
the City was deftroyed, their Revelling and Drunkennefs at
Beljhaz-zar's Idolatrous Feaft, was foretold, Jer, Ii. 39, 57.

The Return of the Jews from tlie Babyhnijh Captivity is
often very particularly foretold, with many Circumftances,
and the Promifes of it are very peremptory ; Jer, xxxi. 35,
— 40. and xxxii. 6, — 15, 41,-44. and xxxiii. 24,-26.
And the very Time of their Return was prefixed ; Jer, xxv.
II, 12. andxxix. 10,11. 2 Lhron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6. and
Dan, ix. 2. And yet the Prophecies reprefent their Return
as confequent on their Repentance. And their Repentance it
felf is very exprefly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12,
13,14. xxxi.8,9,18,— 31. xxxiii. 8. 1.4,5. ^2;^>^.vi.8,9,io.vii.
16. xiv. 22, 23. and xx. 43, 44.

It was foretold under the old Teftament, that the Meffiah
(hould fufFer greatly through the Malice and Cruelty of Men j
as is largely and fully fet forth, Pfal. xxii. applied to Chrift
in the New Teftament, Matt, xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34.
Joh. xix. 24. Heb. ii. iiz. And likewife in Pfal. Ixix. which,

I it is alfo evident by the New Teftament, is fpoken of Chrift ;
John XV. 25. vii. 5, &c. and li. 17. Rofn. xv. 3. Matt, xxvii.

i 34, 48. Mark XV. 23. John xix. 29. The fame Thing is alfo
foretold, Ifai. liii. & 1. 6. & Mic. v. i. This Cruelty of
Men was their Sin, and what they a6ted as moral Agents. It
was foretold, that there ftiould be an Union of Heathen and
Jezvijh Rulers againft Chrift, Pfal. ii. i, 2. compar'd with
J^s iv. 25, 28. It was foretold, that the Jews ftiould ge-

;Snerally rejed and defpife the Mefliah, Ifai. xlix. 5, 6, 7. and

• Jiii. 1—3. Pfalm, xxii. 6, 7. and Ixix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it.
■was foretold, that the Body of that Nation ftiould be reje<5led
in the Mefliah's Days, from .being God's People, for their
Obftinacy in Sin ; Ifai, xlix. 4 — 7. and viii. 14, I5> i6. com-

pare4

I ©4 GOD certainly iorthiiow^ PartIL J

pared with Rom.x.ig. and//^/.lxv. at the beginning, compared {)

with Rom. x. 20, 21. . I: was foretold, that Chrift fhould be j'

rejedted by the chief Priefts and Rubers among thtjeivs, Pfalm \
cxviii. 22. compared with Matth. xxi. 42. Atls iv. 11. i Fet»

ii. 4, 7. ,!

Chrift himfelf foretold his being delivered into the Hands ' ia{

of the Elders, chief Priefts and Scribes, and his being cruel- j

J) treated by them, and condemned to Death ; and that he d

by them fhould be delivered to the Gentiles \ and that He fhould jj)

be Wi7fi<?^, and fcourged^ 2Lnd crucified^ [Matt.xvi, 21. & xx. ♦:

17,—- 19. Luke IX. 22. John viii. 28.) and that the Peo- |

pie fliould be concerned in and contenting to his DeathjfLw^^ ^

XX. 13,-18.) efpecially the Inhabitants of yerujalcm \ Luke |

xiii. 33,- —35. He foretold, that the Difciples fhould ail be i

offended becaufe of Knn that Nigiit that he was betrayed, \

and fhould forfake Him ; Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32. %

He foretold that He fhould be rejeded of that Genera- I

tion, even the Body of the People, and that they fhould |

continue obilinate,to their Ruin j Matt. xii. 45. xxi. 33,— 42. .

and xxii. i, 7. Luke xiii. 16, 21,24. ^'^^^^ 25. xix. 14, 27,

41, — 44. XX. 13,- — 18. and xxih, 345—39-

As it was foretold in both old Teflament and new, that
the Jews fliould rejed: the MefFiah, fo it was foretold that the
Gentiles fliould receive Him, and fo be admitted to the

Privileges of God's People j in Places too many to be now \

particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Tefta- %

ment,that the Jews fhould envy the Gentiles on thisAccount; |

Deut. xxxii. 21. compared with Rom. x. 19. Chrifl Himfelf r

often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true ,

Religion, and become his Followers and People ; Matth.mii, i,;

10,11,12. x;d. 41,— 43. and xxii, 8,-— 10. Lukex\Yi.i%. xiv, |"

16,-24. and XX. i5. John x. 16. He alfo foretold the Jewi \

Envy of the Gentiles on this Occafion j Matt. xx. 12, — 16. |

Luke XV. 26,to the End. He foretold, that they fhould conti- '1

nue in this Oppofition and Envy, and fnouid manifeft it in 1

cruel Perfecutions of his Followers, to their utter De- I

flrudion ; Mctt. xxi. 33,-42. xxii. 6. and xxiii. 34, 39. \

Luke xi. 49, --5 1. The Jews Obftinacy is alio foretold, A^s %

xxii. 18. Chnfl often toretold the great Perfecutions his I

Followers fhould meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles ; *

Matt. X. 165—18,21, 22, 34,-36. and xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. ^

Luke X. 3. xii. II, 49)— 53. and xxi. 12,16,17. John xv. 18,. I

—21. and xvi. 1,-4. 20,-22,33. ^^ foretold the Mar- I

tyrdoi» h

Seft.XI. the Volitims of moral Agents. 105

tyrdom of particular Perfons ; Matt. xx. 23. Job. xiii. 36^
and xxi. 18, 19,22. He foretold the great Succefs of the
Gofpel in the City of Samaria^ as near approaching j which
afterwards was fulfilled by the Preaching of Philips Toh. iv,
35,-38. He foretold the Rifing of many Deceivers, after
his Departure, Alatt. xxiv. 4, 5, 11. and the Apoftacy of
many of his profefs'd Followers j Matth. xxiv* 10,— -i 2,

The Perfecutions, which the Apoftle Paul was to meet with
in the World, were foretold ; ASis ix.i6.— -xx-23. ^ xxi. 11.
I'he Apoftle fays to the Chriftian Ephefians, ASis xx. 29,30. /
know^ that after my Departure Jhall grievous TVolves enter in anwng
you^ 7iot [paring the Flock : Alfo of your own f elves Jhall Men artfe^
fpeaking perverfe Things^ to draw away Dtfciples after them^
The Apoftle fays, He knew this ; but he did not know it, if
God did not know the future Actions of moral Agents.

4. Unlefs God foreknows the future A<5ls of moral Agents^
all the Prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great
Antichrijlian Apoftacy ; the Rife, Reign, wicked Qualities
and Deeds of the Man of Sin, and his Inftruments and Ad-
herents ; the Extent and long Continuance of his Domi-
nion, his Influence on the Minds of Princes and others,
to corrupt them, and draw them away to Idolatry, and other
foul Vices ; his great and cruel Perfecutions ; the Behaviour
of th& Saints under thefe great Temptations, &c. &c. I fay,
unlefs the Volitions of moral Agents are forefeen, all thefe
Prophecies are uttered without knowing the Things foretold,

. The Predi6tions relating to this great Apoftacy are all of a
moral Nature, relating to Men's Vertues and Vices,and their
Exercifes, Fruits and Confequences, and Events dependino*
on them ; and are very particular ; and moft of them often
repeated, with many precife CharaaeriftickSjDefcriptionSjand
Limitations of Qualities, Condu6i:,. Influence, EfFeds, Ex-
tent, Duration, Periods, Circumftances, final Iflue, &c.
which it would be very long to mention particularly. And
to fuppofe, all thefe are predided by God without any cer-
tain Know^ledge of the future moral Behaviour of free Ar-
gents, would be to the utmoft: Degree abfurd,

5. Unlefs God foreknows the future A<5ls of Men's Wills,
and their Behaviour as moral Agents, all thofe great Things
which are foretold in both Old Teftament and New con-
•erning the Eredion, Eftabliftiment, and univerfal Extent

O •f

io5 GOD certainly foreknows Part II, f

of the Kingdom of the Msjfiah^ ■ were predicted and pro- |
mifed while God was in Ignorance whether any of thefe
7^hings would come to pafs or no, and did but guefs at
them. For that Kingdom is not of this World, it don't
confill in Things external, but is within Men, and confifts ■
in the Dominion of Vertue in their Hearts, in Righteouf-
nefs, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Gholl ; and in thefe
Things made manifeft in Pra6lice, to the Praife and Glory
of God. The MefTiah came to jave Men from their Sim^ and
deliver them from their fpiritual Ene7mes ; that they ?mght
ferve Hi?n in Righteoufnefs and HoUnefs before Him : He gave
Himfelf for us, that he might redeem us from a/hlniqtiity, and pu-
rify unto Hunfelf a peculiar People^ zealous of good Works. And
therefore his Succefs confifts in gaining Men's Hearts to
Vertue, in their being made God's willing People in the Day
of his Power. His Conqueft of his Enemies confifts in his
vi6lory over Men's Corruptions and Vices. And fuch
Succefs, fuch Victory, and fuch a Reign and Dominion is
often exprefty foretold : That his Kingdom foall fill the
Earth ; that all People, Nations and Languages 'fl)ould ferve and
obey Him ; and fo, that all Nations Jlwuld go up to the Momi- ,
iain of the Houfe of the Lord, that He might teach them his - ■^
JVays, and that they ?mght walk in his Paths : And that all Men '^
fhould he drawn to Chri/i, and the Earth be full of the Know- \
ledge of the Lord (by which, in the St)de of Scripture, is ^
iTieant true Vertue and Religion) as the JVaters cover the Seas ; ;
that God's Law Jhoidd be put into Men^s inward Parts, and ivrit- ij
ten in their Hearts \ and that God's People Jhould be all Righ^ , \.,
teoiis, &c. &c. 'i

A very great Part of the Prophecies of the Old Tefta- ■[

ment is taken up in fuch Predictions as thefe. And here 5

I would obleiTe, that the Prophecies of the univerfal Preva- ..^
lence of the Kingdom of the Meftiah, and true Religion of 't^
Jefus Chrift, are delivered in the moft peremptory Mann'er, ' ^
and confirmed by the Oath of God. Ifai. xlv. 22,to theEnd, ^1
Look to me, and he ye faved, all the Ends of the Earth j for 1 am ' m
God, and there is none elfe. 1 have SWORN by my Self, the ^
JVord is gone out of 7ny Mouth in Righteoufnefs, and fljall not re- ^
turn, that unto Me every Knee Jhall bow ; and every Tongue Jhatl ^
fwear, SURELY, Jhall one fay, in the Lord have I Righte- ^ ♦]
oufmfs and Strength :- even to Him fljall Men come &c. But here ):
this peremptory Declaration, and great Oath of the moft ^
High, are delivered with fuch mighty Solemnity, to Things y
which God did not know, if He did not certainly forefee the J
Volitions of moral Agents, ^'1

And||

' Sed.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 107

And all the Prediaions of Chrift and his Apoftles, to the
like Purpofe, muft be without Knowledge : As thofe of our
Saviour comparing the Kingdom of God to a Grain of
Muftard-Seed, growing exceeding great, from a fmali Begin-
ning ; and to Leaven, hid in three Meafures of Meal, 'till
the whole was ieaven'd, &c.— And the Prophecies in the E-
piftles concerning the Reftoration of the Nation of the Jev^s
to the true Church of God, and the bringing in the Fulnefs
of the Gentiles ; and the Prophecies in all the Revelation con-
cerning the glorious Change in the moral State of the World
of Mankind, attending the Dedru^tion of Antichrift, the
Kingdoms of the World becoming the Kingdoms of our Lord and
of his Chrijl ; and it's being granted to the Cimrch to be arrayed
in that fine Linncn, white and clean ^ which is the Righteoufnejs of
Saints J Sec.

CoroL I. Hence that great Promife and Oath of God to
Abraha??u Ifaac and Jacobs io much celebrated in Scripture,

. both in the Old Teftament andNev/, namely, TJmt in their
Seed all the Nations a7id Families of the Earth fooidd be blcffed^
mull be made on Uncertainties, if God don't certainly fore-
know the Vohtions of moral Agents. For the Fulfilment
of this Promife cpnfiils in that Succefs of Chrift in theWork
of Redemption, and that Setting up of his fpiritual Kingdom
over the Nations of the World, which has been fpoken of.
Men are blejfedin Chriji no otherwife than as they are bro't

^to acknowledge Flim, trull in Him, love and ferve Him,
as is reprefented and predi^led in Pfal. Ixxii. ii. All Kings

'Jhallfall down bfore Him ; all Nations pall ferve Him. With
ver. 17. Men fnall be bleffed in Him \ all Nations foail call him
BleJJed. This 0?X\\ to J^^coh znd Jbraham \s fulhiled in fub-
duing Men's Iniquities ; as is implied in that of the Pro-
phet Aiicah, Chap. vii. 19,20.

CoroL 2. Hence alfo it appears, That fird: Gofpel-Pro'^^/if^
that ever was made to Mankind, that great Predic5tion of
the Salvation of the Meffiah, and his Vii5lory over Sat(7ti^
made to our firft Parents, Gen. iii. 15. if there be no certain
Prefcience of the Volitions of m.oral Agents, mull have no
better Foundation than Conjecture. For ChriiVs Viclory
over Satan confifts in Men's being faved from Sin, and in
the Vidory of Vertue and Kolincrs, over that Vice and
Wickednefs, which Satan by his Temptation I'as Intioduced,
and wherein his Kino;dom confiits.

02 6: If

ic8 GOD certainly foreknows Part II*

6. If it be fo, that God has not a Prefcience of the future
A^^ions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the Prophecies
of Scripture in general .are without Fore-knowledge. For
Scripture-Prophecies, almoft all of them, if not univerfally
without any Exception, are either Predictions of the Adings
and Behaviours of moral Agents, or of Events depending
on them, or fome Way comiecfted with them ; judicial Dif-
penfations. Judgments on Men for their Wickednefs, or Re-
wards of Vertue and Righteoufnefs, remarkable Manifefta-
tions of Favour to the Righteous, or Manifeftations of fo-
vereign Mercy to Sinners, forgiving their Iniquities, and
magnifying the Riches of divine Grace ; or Difpenfations of
Providence, in fome Refpe6t or other, relating to the Condu6t
of the Subjetfts of God's moral Government, wifely adapt-
ed thereto ; either providing for what fhould be in a future
State of Things, through the Volitions and voluntary Acti-
ons of moral Agents, or confequent upon them, and regu-
lated and ordered according to them. So that all Events
that are foretold, are either moral Events, or other Events
which are conuedled with, and accommodated to moral
JE vents r

That the Predi(5tions of Scripture in general muft be with-r
out Knowledge, if God don't forefee the Volitions of Men,
will further appear, if it be confidered, that almoft ail E-
vents belonging to the future State of the World of Man-
kind, the Changes and Revolutions which come to pafs iij^
Empires, Kingdoms, and Nations, and all Societies, depend
innumerable Ways on the A6ts of Men's Wills ; yea, on an
innumerable Multitude of Millions of Millions of Volitions
of Mankind, Such is the State and Courfe of Things in
the World of Mankind, that one fmgle Event, which ap-
pears in it felf exceeding inconfiderabie, may in the Pro-
grefs and Series of Things, occafion a SuccelTion of the
greateft and moft important and extenfive Events ; caufing
the State of Mankind to be vaftly different from what it
would otherwife have been, for all fucceeding Generations.

For Inftance, the coming into Exiftence of thofe particu-
lar Men, who have been the great Conquerors of the World,
"which under God have had the main Hand in all the con-
fequent State pf the World, in all after-Ages ; fuch as
Nebuchadnezzar^ Cyrus ^ Alexander ^ Pompey, Julius Cefar^ &c.
undoubtedly depended on many Millions of Acts of the
Will, which followed, and were occafion'd one by ano-
ther, ■

'Se<9:. XL the Volitions of moral Agents. 109

ther, in their Parents. And perhaps moft of thefe Volitions
depended on Milhons of Volitions of Hundreds and Thou-
fands of others, their Contemporaries of the fame Genera-
tion j and moft of thefe on Millions of Millions of Voliti-
ons of others in preceedmg Generations.—- As we go back,
ftill the Number of Volitions, which were fome Way the
Occafion of the Event, multiply as the Branches of a River,
'till they come at laft, as it were, to an infinite Number.
This Will not feem ftrange, to any one who well confiders the
Matter ; if we recollect what Philoibphers tell us of the in-
numerable Multitudes of thofe Things which are as it were
the Principia^ or Stamina VHee^ concerned in Generation ;
the Animakula in Semine majculo^ and the Ova in the Womb
of the Female ; the Impregnation, or animating of one of
thefe in Diftindion from all the reft, muft depend on Things
infinitely minute, relating to the Time and Circumftances of
the Adf of the Parents, the State of their Bodies, i^c,
which muft depend on innumerable foregoing Circum-
fiances and Occurrences ; which muft depend, infi-
nite Ways, on foregoing A6ls of their Wills ; which are
occafioned by innumerable Things that happen in the
Courfe of their Lives, in which their own, and their Neigh-
bour's Behaviour, muft have a Hand, an infinite Number
of Ways. And as the Volitions of others muft be fo many
Ways concerned in the Conception and Birth of fuch Men ;
fo, no lefs, in their Prefervation, and Circumftances of Life,
their particular Determinations and A6tions, on which the
great Revolutions they were the Occafions of, depended. As
for Inftance, When the Confpirators in Ferfia^ againft
the Aiagi^ were confulting about a Succeflion to the Empire,
it came into the Mind of one of them, to propofe, that he
whofe Horfe neighed firft, when they came together the
next Morning, fhould be King. Now fuch a Thing's com-
ing into his Mind, might depend on innumerable Incidents,
wherein the Volitions of Mankind had been concerned.
But in Confequence of this Accident, Darius^ the Son of
Hifafpes^ was King. And if this had not been, probably
his Succeflbr would not have been the fame, and all the
Circumftances of the Ferfian Empire might have been far
otherwife. And then perhaps Alexander might never have
conquered that Empire. And then probably the Circum-
ftances of the World in all fucceeding Ages, might have
been vaftly otherwife. I might further inftance in many
•ther Occurrences j fuch as thofe on which depended Alex-

^ndcr's

1 1 o GOD certainly foreknows Part 11.

€mder\ Prefervatlon, in the many critical Jundlures of his
Life, wherein a fmall Trifle would have turned the Scale
againft him -, and the Prefervation and Succefs of the Ro^

man People, in the Infancy of their Kingdom and Common- {

Wealth,and afterwards ; which all the fucceeding Changes ia iJ

their State, and the mighty Revolutions that afterwards' ]

came to pafs in the habitable World, depended upon. But \

thefe Hints may be fufficient for every difcerning confide- \

rate Perfon, to convince him, that the whole State of the |

World of Mankind, in all Ages, and the very Being of every J

Perfon who has ever lived in it, in every Age, fmce the "\

Times of the ancient Prophets, has depended on more i

Volitions, or Ads of the Wills of Men, than there are \

Sands on the Sea-flioar. I

And therefore, unlefs God does mofl: exactly and perfedl- \
ly forefee the future Acts of Men's Wills, all the Pre-,. 1
didions which he ever uttered concerning David^ Hezekiahy ^

^ojiah^ Nehuchadnezxary Cyrus ^ Alexander ; concerning' the four \
lonarchies, and the Revolutions in them ; and concerning ij
all the Wars, Commotions, Vidories, Profperities and Cala-
mities, of any of the Kingdoms, Nations, or Communities
of the World, have all been without Knowledge.

So that, according to this Notion of God's not forefeeing
the Volitions and free Ac5lions of Men, God could forefee
Nothing pertaining to the State of the World of Mankind \\
in future Ages ; not fo much as the Being of one Perfon |
that fhould live in it ; and could foreknow no Events, but I
only fuch as He would bring to pafs Himfelf by the extra- t
ordinary Interpofition of his immediate Power ; or Things, i^
which fhould come to pafs in the natural material World, J
by the Laws of Motion, and Courfe of Nature, wherein i)|
that is independent on the A6lions or Works of Mankind : :|
That is, as he might, like a very able Mathematician and 1^
Aftronomer, with great Exadnefs calculate the Revolutions 1(
of the heavenly Bodies, and the greater Wheels of the |
Machine of the external Creation. i;

And if we clofely confider the Matter, there will appear- : if
Reafon to convince us, that he could not with any abfo- q
lute Certainty forefee even thefe. As to the FirJ}^ namely I
Things done by the immediate and extraordinary Interpo- |
fition of God's Power, thefe can't be forefeen, unlefs it can 1
be forefeen when there fhall be Qccafion for fuch extraordi- ^

nary

Sed.XI. the Voltttons of moral Agents, in

nary Interpofition. And that can't be forefeen, unlefs
the State of the moral World can be forefeen. For
whenever God thus interpofes, it is with Regard to the State
of the moral World,requiring fuch Divine Interpofition. Thus
God could not certainly fore fee the univerfal Deluge, the
Calling of Abraham^ the Deftru^lion of ^odom and Gomorrah^
the Plagues on Egypt^ and IfraeH Redemption out of it, the
expelling the feve^n Nations of Canaan^ and the bringing
Ifracl into that Land ; for thefe all are reprefented as con-
ne6led with Things belonging to the State of the moral
World. Nor can God foreknow the moft proper and con-
venient Time of the Day of Judgment, and general Con-
flagration \ for that chiefly depends on the Courfe & State
of Things in the moral World.

Nor, Secondly^ can w^e on this Suppofition reafonably think,
that God can certainly forefee v/hat Things fliall come to
pafs, in the Courfe of Things, in the natural and material
World, even thofe which in an ordinary State of Things
might be calculated by a good Aftronomer. For the moral
World is the End of the natural World ; and the Courfe
of Things in the former, is undoubtedly fubordinate to God's
Defigns with Refped to the latter. Therefore he has ktn
Caufe,from Regard to the State of Things in the moral World,
extraordinarily to interpofe, to interrupt and lay an Arrell: on
the Courfe of Things in the natural World ; and even in
the greaterWheelsof it's Motion ; even fo as to flop the Sun in
it's Courfe. And unlefs he can forefee the Volitions of Men,
and fo know fomething of the future State of the moral
World, He can't know but that he may ftill have as great
Occafion to interpofe in this Manner, as ever He had : nor
can He forefee how, or when, He fliall have Occafion
\ thus to interpofe.

Corol. I . It appears from the Things w^hich have been ob-
Iferved, that unlefs God forefees the Volitions of moral A-

gents, that cannot be true which is obferved by the Apoftle
\ja7nes^ Act. xv. 1 8. Known unto God are all his frorks from the

Beginning of the World.

Corol. 2. It appears from what has been obferved,that unlefs
jGod foreknows theVolitions of moral Agents, all the Prophe-
cies of Scripture have no better Foundation than meer Con-
jecture ; and That., in moft Inftahces, a Conje6lure which
muft have the utmoft Uncertainty j depending on an innu-
merable

112 GOD certainly foreknows Part II. |

merable, and as it were infinite. Multitude of Volitions, j

which are all, even to God,uncertain Events : However,thefe '

Prophecies are delivered as abfolute Predidtions, and very ;

many of them in the moft pofitive Manner, with Affeverati- i

®ns J and fome of them with the molt folemn Oaths. \

CoroL 3. It alfo follows from what has been obferved, ^ ,■
that if this Notion of God's Ignorance of future Volitions I
be true, in vain did Chrift fay (after uttering many great I
and important Predidions, concerning God's moral King- j
dom,and Things depending on Men's moral Adions) Matth, |
xxiv. 35. Heaven and Earth Jhall pafs aivay j but my JVords Jhdl - J
v.ot pafs away, i

CoroL 4. From the fame Notion of God's Ignorance, it j
would foiloWjthat in vain has God himfelf often ipoken of the
Predictions of his Word, as Evidences of his Foreknowlege ;
and fo as Evidences of that which is his Prerogative as GOD,
and his peculiar Glory, greatly diftinguifhing Him from all
other Beings ; as in Ifai, xli. 22—26. xliii. 9,10. xliv. 8.
xlv. 21. xlvi. 10. & xlviii. 14.

I
Argum. II. If God don't foreknow the Volitions of mo-;|

ral Agents, then he did not foreknow the Fall of Man, nor
of Angels, and fo could not foreknow the great Things
which are mifequent on thefe Events ; fuch as his fending;
his Son into the World to die for Sinners, and all Things
pertaining to the great Work of . Redemption 3 all the
Things which were done for four Thoufand Years before
Chrift came, to prepare the Way for it ; and the Incarnation,
Life, Death, Refurre6lion and Afcenfion of Chrift 5 and the
fetting Him at the Head of the Univerfe, as King of Hea-
ven and Earth, Angels and Men ; and the fetting up his <
Church and Kingdom in this World, and appointing Him ;;
the Judge of the World ; and all that Satan fliould do in
the World in Oppofition to the Kingdom of Chrift : And
the great Tranfadioas of the Day of Judgment, that Men
and Devils fliall be the Subje6ls of, and Angels concerned
in J they are all what God was ignorant of before the Fall.,
And if fo, the following Scriptures, and others like them,
muft be without any Meaning, or contrary to Truth. Eph.
i. 4. Jc cor ding as he hath chofen us in Him before the Foundation of
the World, i Pet. i. 20. IVho verily was fore-ordained before the
Foundation of the World. 2 Tim. i. g. Wloo hath faved us^ and
called us with an holy CaUin'g , not according fQ our Works ^ hut

according

Seft. XI . the ToUtions of moral Agents. 113

\accordmg to his own Purpofe^ and Grace^ which was given us in
Chrijl Jefus before theWorld began. So, Eph. iii. 1 1 . (fpeaking of
the Wildom of God in the Work of Redemption) according
to the eternal Furpofe zvhich he purpofed in Ch7iji Jefus. Tit. 1.2.
In hope of eternal Life^ which Gody that ■ cannot lie, pro?mfed before
the World began. Rom. viii. 29. IVhom he did foreknozv^them he

' alfo did ptedcjVinate.^ &c. i Pet. i. 1, EleSly acco?'ding to the Fore-
knowledge of God the Father.

If God did not foreknow the Fall of Man, nor the Re-
demption by Jefus Chrift, nor the Volitions of Man fmcc
I the Fall ; then He did not foreknow the Saints in any Senfe ;
•\ neither as particular Perfons, nor as Societies or Nations ;
i either by Election, or meer Forefight of their Vertue or good
I Works ; or any Forefight of any Thing about them relating
; to their Salvation ; or any Benefit they have by Chrift, or
] any Manner of Concern of their's with a Redeemer.

V Arg. III. On the Suppofition of God's Ignorance of the
-future Volitions of free Agents, it will follow, that God
tnuft in many Cafes truly repent what He has done, fo as
properly to wifti He had done otherwife : by Reafon that
the Event of Things, in thofe Affairs which are moft impor-
tant, vi%. the Affairs of his moral Kingdom, being uncer-
tain and contingent, often happens quite otherwife than he
was aware beforehand. And there would be Reafon to un-
derftand That, in the moft literal Senfe, in Gen. vi. 6. It
repented the Lord^ihat he had made Man on the Earth^and it grieved
%im at his Heart. And that, i Sam. xv. ir. contrary to
that. Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not the Son of Man, that he ^
-flmuld repent. And, I Sam. xv. 15, 29. Alfo the Sti'ength of
Ifrael will not lie, nor repent : for he is not a Man that he Jhould
repent. Yea, from this Notion it would follow, that God
is liable to repent and be grieved at his Heart, in "a literal
Senfe, continually ; and is always expofed to an infinite
Number of real Difappointments, in his governing the
World ; and to manifold, conftant, great Perplexity and
Vexation : But this is not very coniiftent with his Title of
Gcd over all, bleffed for evermore ; \vhich reprefents Him as
poffelTed of perfe6l, conftant and uninterrupted Tranquillity
-and Felicity, as God over the Univerfe, and in his Manage-
•ment of the Affairs of the World, as fupreme and univer-
Xal Ruler. See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor^ xi, 31. i Ti?}i.\'\. 15.

P Arg*

,j 14 GOD certainly foreknows Part IL

Arc. IV. It will alfo follow from this Notion, that as
God is liable to be continually repenting what He has done ;
fo He muft be expofed to be conftantly changing his Mind and
lntcntions,as to his future Condudt ; altering his Meafures,re-
iinquiihing his old Defigns, and forming new Schemes & Pro-
jedions. For his Purpofes, even as to the main Parts of his
Scheme, namely, fuch as belong to the State of his moral
Kingdom, muft be always liable to be broken, thro' want
of Forefight ; and He muft be continually putting his Syftem
to rights, as it gets out of Order, through the Contin-
gence of the Adions of moral Agents : He muft be a Being,
who, inftead of being abfolutely immutable, muft necefTa-
rily be the Subjed of infinitely the moft numerous Ads of
Repentance, and Changes of Intention, of any Being what-
foever ; for this plain Reafon, that his vaftly extenfive
Charge comprehends an infinitely greater Number of thofe
Things which are to Him contingent and uncertain. In
fuch a Situation, He muft have little elfe to do, but to mend
broken Links as well as he can, and be re6tifying his dif-^
jointed Frame and difordered Movements, in the beft^ Man-
ner the Cafe will aUow. The fupream Lord of all Things
muft needs be under great and miferable Difadvantages, in
governing the World which He has made, and has the Care
of, through his being utterly unable to find out Things
of chief Importance, which hereafter ftiall befal his Syftem ;
which if He did but know. He might make fegfonable Pro-
vifion for. In many Cafes, there may be very great Neceflity
that He ftiouid make Provifion, in the Manner of his order-
ing and difpofing Things, for fome great Events which
are to happen, of vaft and extenfive Influence, and endlefs
Confequence to the Univerfe ; which He may fe.e after-
wards, when it is too late, and may wifti in vain that He
had known beforehand, that He might have ordered his
Affairs accordingly. And it is in the Power of Man, on
thefe Principles, by his Devices,. Purpofes and Adions,
thus to difappoint God, break his Meafures, make Him con-
tinually to change his Mind, fubjedt Him to Vexation, and
bring Him into Confufion.

But how do thefe Things confift with Reafon, or with the
Word of God ? Which reprefents, that all God's JVorkSy
all that He has ever to do, the whole Scheme and Series
of his Operations, are from the Beginn'mg perfectly in hiS
View ; and declares, that whatever Devices and Defigns are
, in the Hearts of Men^ the Counfel cf the Lord is that which
/hail Jlandy and the Thouo^hts of hii Heart to ail Generations,

Prov.

Sedt.XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. 115

Prov. xix, 21. Pfal. xxxiii. lO, ll. And that which the Lord
of Ho/is hath purpofed^ none J})all difannul^ Ifai. xiv. 27. And
that he cannot be fruftrated in one Defign or Thought^ Job xlii.2.
And that what God doth^ it Jhall he forever^ that Nothing can be put
to it, or taken fro?n it, Eccl. iii. 14. The Stabihty and Per-
petuity of God's Counfels are expreily fpoken of as con-
nected with the Foreknowledge of God, Lai. xlvi. 10. De-
claring the End from the Beginning, and from ancient Ti'mes the
Things that are not yet done 3 faying. My Counfel flmll ftand^
and I will do all my Pleafure. — And how are thefe Things
confluent with what the Scripture fays of God's Immu-
tabjhty, which reprefents Him as without Variahlencfs, or
(hadow of Turning', and fpeaks of Him moil particularly as
unchangeable with Regard to his Purpoles. Mai. iii. 6. lam
the Lord ; / change not ; therefore ye Sons of Jacob are not
confumed. Exod. iii. 14. / AM THAT I AM, Job xxiii.
13, 14. He is in one Mind \ and who can turn Him ? And what
his Soul defireth, even that he doth : fir he performeth the Thing
that is appointed for me.

Arc. V. If this Notion of God's Ignorance of tJie future
Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly confidered in it's
Confequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God^after
he had made the World, was liable to be wholly frujirated
^^/V £«^ in the Creation of it ; and fo has been in like
Manner liable to be fruftrated of his End in all the great
Works He hath wrought. 'Tis manifeft, the moral World
is the End of the natural : The reft of the Creation is
but an Houfe which God hath built, with Furniture, for mo-
ral Agents : And the good or bad State of the moral World
depends on the Improvement they make of their natural
• Agency, and fo depends on their Volitions. And there-
fore, if thefe can't be forefeen by God, becaufe they
^re contingent, and fubjedt to no Kind of NecelTity, then
the A.ffairs'of the moral World are liable to go wrong, to any
aflignable Degree ; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on
this Scheme, it may v/ell be fuppofed to be literally faid,
when Mankind, by the Abufe of their moral Agency,
became very corrupt before the Flood, that the Lord repented
that he had made Man on the Earth, and it grieved Hi?n
at his Heart ; fo, when He made the , Univerie, He
rdid not know but that he might be fo difappointed in it,
that it might grieve Him at his Heart that he had made it.
It a<5tually proved, that all Mankind became fmful, and a
very great Part of the Angels apoftatifed ; And liow could

P 2 Goi

Ii6 C^r/^/;^ Foreknowledge Part 11. i

God know before-hand, that all of them would not ? And ,
how could God know but that all Mankind, notwith-
Aanding Means ufed to reclaim them, being ftill left to the
Freedom of their own Will, would continue in their Apofta-
cy, and grow worfe and worfe, as they of the Old World
before the Flood did ?

According to the Scheme I am endeavouring to confute,
neither the Fall of Men nor Angels, could be forefeen, and
God mufl be greatly difappointed in thefe Events ; and fo
the grand Scheme and Contrivance for our Redemption,
and deftroyjng the Works of the Devil, by the Mefliah, and
all the great Things God has done in the Profecution of
thefe Defigns, muft be only the Fruits of his own Difap-
pointment, Snd Contrivances of his to mend and patch up,
as well as he could, his Syftem, which originally was all
very good, and perfedlly beautiful ; but was mar'd, broken^
and confounded by the free Will of Angels and Men.
And ftill he muft be liable to be totally difappointed
^ fecond Time : He could not know, that He Ihould
have his defired Succefs, in the Incarnation, Life,
Death, Refurredion and Exaltation of his only begot-
ten Son, and other great Works accomplifhed to reftore the
St-ate of Things : He could not know after all, whether
there would adually be any tolerable Meafure of Reftora-
tion ; for this depended on the free Will of Man. There
has been a general great Apoftacy of almoft all the Chriftian
World, to that which was worfe than Heathenifm ; which
continued for many Ages. And how could God, without
forefeeing Men's Volitions, know whether ever Chriftendom
would return from this Apoftacy ? And which way could He
tell before-hand how foon it would begin ? TheApoftle fays,
jt began to work in his Time ; and how could it be known
how far it would proceed in that Age ? Yea, how could
it be known that the Gofpel, whigh was not effedual for
the Reformation of the Jews^ would ever be eftedlual for
the turning of the Heathen Nations from their Heathen
Apoilacy, which they had been confirmed in for fo many Ages?

'Tis reprefcnted often in Scripture, that God who made
the World for* Himfelf, and created it for his Pleafure,
would infallibly obtain his End in the Creation, and in all
his Works \ that as all Things, are of Him, io they would
all be to Him ; and that in the final IfTue of Things, it
would appear that He is thefrjfy and tk hfi. Rev. xxi. 6,

And

Se£t. XII. infers fome Neceffity • 117

And he faid unta me^ It is done. I am Alpha and Omega ^ theBeginning
and the End^ the firjl and the lafi. But thefe Things are not
confiftent with God's being fo liable to be disappointed in
all his Works, nor indeed with his failing of his End in
any Thing that He has undertaken, or done.

Section XII.

GO Us certain Foreknowledge of the future
Volitions of moral Agent s^ inconfijlent
withfuch a Contingence ofthofe Volitions^
as is without all Neceffity.

HAVING proved, that GOD has a certain and in-
fallible Prefcience of the Ads of the Will of moral
Agents, I come now, in the : Second Place, to" (heW
the Confequence , to fhew how it follows from hence, that
thefe Events are necejfary^ with a NecefTity of Connedtign
or Confequence.

The chief Armlnian Divines, fo far as I have had Oppor-
tunity to obferve, deny this Confequence ; and affirm, that
if fuch Foreknowledge be allowed, 'tis no Evidence of any
Neceffity of the Event foreknown. Now I defire, that this
Matter may be particularly and thoroughly enquired into.
I cannot but think, that on particular and full Conlideration,
it may be perfecStly determined, whether it be indeed fo,
or not.

* In order to a proper Confideration of this Mattfer, I
would obferve the following Things.

I. 'Tis very evident, with regard to a Thing whofe Ex-
"iftence is infallibly and indiffolubly conneded with fome-
thing which already hath, or has had Exiftence, The Ex-
iftence of that Thing is necefTary. Here may be noted,

^ I. I

li8 €Vr/^/>2 Foreknowledge PartIL I

1. I obferved before, in explaining the Nature of Neceflity, ^
that in Things which are paft, their paft Exiftence is now \
necelTary : having already made fure. of Exiftence, 'tis too \
late for any PolTibility of Alteration in that Refpedl : 'Tis ;
now impomble, that it Ihould be otherwife than true, that i
that Thing has exifted. ,:

2. If there be any fuch Thing as a divine Foreknowledge ;
of the Volitions of free Agents, that Foreknowledge, by the
Suppofition, is a Thing which already has, and long ago
had Exiftence ; and fo, now it's Exiftence is neceffary ; it

is now utterly impoffible to be otherwife, than that this Fore •
knowledge fhould be, or ftiould have been.

3. 'Tis alfo very manifeft, that thofe Things which are
indiftblubly conne<5led with other Things that are neceftary,
are Themfelves neceftary. As that Propofition whofe Truth
is neceftarily connedcd with another Propofition, which is
neceflarily true, is itfelf neceftarily true. To fay other-
wife, would be a Contradiction ; it would be in Effe6l to
fay, that the CoJine(5tion was indiftbluble, and yet was not
fo, but might be broken. If That, whofe Exiftence is in-
diflblubly conneded with fomething whofe Exiftence is now
neceftary, is it felf not neceftar)^, then it may pojjjbly mi exifl,
notwithftanding that indiftbluble Connexion of it's Exift-
ence.— Whether the Abfurdity ben't glaring, let the Rea-
der judge.

4. 'Tis no lefs evident, that if there be a full, certain
and infallible Foreknowledge of the future Exiftence of the
Volitions of moral Agents, then there is a certain infallible
and indiftbluble Conneaion between thofe Events and that
Foreknowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceeding Ob-
fervations, thofe Events are neceftary Events ; being infal-
libly and indiffolubly conneded with that whofe Exiftence
already is, and fo is now neceftary, and can't but have been.

To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible,and yet ■
the Connexion of the Event with that Foreknowledge is
not indiftbluble, but diffoluble and fallible, is very abfurd.
To affirm it, would be the fame Thing as to affirm, that
there is no neceftary Conne(5tion between a Propofition's-
being infallibly known to be true, and it's being true in*-
deed. So that it is perfedly demonftrable, that if there be
any infallible Knowledge of future Volitions, the Event is

mcejlary j

Sedt.XII. infers /ome Ncccnity. 119

necejary •/ or, in other Words, that it is impojjthle but the
Event Ihould come to pafs. For if it ben't impoflible
but that it may be otherwife, then it is not impoflible but
that the Propofition which affirms it's future coming to
pafs, may not now be true. But how abfurd is that, on the
Suppofition that there is now an intalUble Knowledge ( i. c.
Knowledge which it is impoflible ihould fail) that it is true.
There is this Abfurdity in it, that it is not impoflible but
that there now ihould be no Truth in that Propofition,
which is now infalUbly known to be true.

II. That no future Event can be certainly foreknown,
whofe Exifl:ence is contingent, and without all NeceiTity,
may be proved thus ; 'Tis impoflible for a Thing to be
certainly known to any Intellecfl without Evidence. To
fuppofe otherwife, implies a Contradi6lion : Becaufe for a
Thing to be certainly known to any Underftanding, is for
it to be evident to that Underftanding : And for a Thing
to be evident to any Underftanding, is the fame Thing, as
for that Underftanding to fee Evidence of it : But no Un-
derftanding, created or increated, can fee Evidence where
there is none : For that is the fame Thing,as to fee that to
be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any Truth
which is abfolutely without Evidence, that Truth is abfo-
lutely unknowable, infomuch that it implies a Contradidtion
to fuppofe that it is known.

But if there be any future Event, whofe Exiftence is
contingent, without all Neceflity, the future Exiftence of
that Event is abfolutely without Evidence, li there be any
Evidence of it, it muft be one of thefe two Sorts, either
Self- Evidence^ or Proof ; for there can be no other Sort of
Evidence but one of thefe two ; an evident Thing muft be
fither evident r« ;V y^^, or evident in fomething elfe \ that is,
evident by Connexion with fomething elfe. But a future
Thing, whofe Exiftence is without all NeceiTity, can have
neither of thefe Sorts of Evidence. It can't be Self-evident :
For if it be, it may be now known by what is now to
be feen in the Thing it felf ; either it's prefent Exiftence,
or the NeceiTity of it's Nature : But both thefe are con-
trary to the Suppofition. It is fuppofed, both that the
Thing has no prefent Exiftence to be feen ; and alfo
that it is not of fuch a Nature as to be neceiTa-
rily exiftent for the future : So that it's future Ex-
iftence is not Self-evident. And fecondly^ neither is there
V any

I20 CenaJn Fovdknowhdgt Part IL j

any Prdof, or Evidetice in any Thing elfe, or Evidence of !

Connexion with fomething tMt that is evident \ For this j

alfo is contrary to the Suppolition. 'Tis fuppofed, that J

there is now Nothing exiftent, with which the future Ex- |

iftence of the contingent Event is conne(5ted. For fuch a j

Connexion defiroys its Contingence^ and fuppofes Neceflity. i

Thus 'tis dernonftratedjthat there is in the Natvwe of Things |

abfoltitely n6 Evidence at all of the future Exiftence of ;

that Event, v>fhich is contingent, without all Neceflity (if |

any fuch Event there be) neither Self-Evidence nor Proof, j

And therefore the Thing in Reality is not evident ; and 1

fo can't be fefcn to be evident^ or, which is the fame \
Thing, can't be known.

Let us confider this in an Example. Suppofe that fivfe
Thoufand feven Hundred and fixty Years ago, there w^ag j
Sio other Being but the divine Being ; and then this 3
World, or fome particular Body or Spirit, all at once S
flarts out of Nothing into Being, and takes on it felf a \
particular Nature and Form ; all in abfolute Conti?igence, \
without any Concern of God, or any other Caufe, in the I
Matter ; without any Manner of Ground or Reafon of |
it's Exiftence ; or any Dependence upon, or Connection j
at all with any Thing foregoing i I fay, that if this be ^
fuppofed, there was no Evidence of that Event before- x
hand. There was no Evidence of it to be feen in the fi
Thing it felf ; for the Thing it felf, as yet, was not. And \
there w^as no Evidence of it to be feen in any Thing elfe ; ;
for Evidence in fomething elfe, is Connexion with fomethingr |
elfe : But fuch Connexion is contrary to the Suppofition. I
There was no Evidence before, that this Thing would hap- -i
pen-, for by the Suppofition, there was no Reafon why zV'i
fhoidd happen, rather than fomething elfe, or rather than ii
Nothing. And if fo, then all Things before were exactly .1
equal, and the 'fame, with Refpe6t to that and other pofli- 'il
ble Things ; there was no Preponderation, no fuperiour
Weight or Value 5 and therefore Nothing that could be i
of any Weight or Value to determine- any Underftanding. |
The Thing was abfolutely without Evidence, and abfo- 1
lutely unknowable. An Increafe of Underftanding, or of I
the Capacity of Difcerning, has no Tendency, and mak6s %
no Advance, to a difcerning any Signs or Evidences of it, 1
let it be increafed never fo much ; yea, if it be increafed jI
infinitely. The Increafe of the Strength of Sight may have i
a Tendency to enable to difcera the Evidence which is|

farP

Sed. XIL i7ifers fom^ Neceflity. 121

far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in Clouds
and Darknefs ; but it has no Tendency to enable to difcerri
Evidence where there is none; If the Sight be infinitely
ftrong, and the Capacity of Difcerning infinitely great, it
will enable to fee all that there is, and to. fee it perfe(5lly,
and with Eafe ; yet it has no Tendency at all to enable a
Being to difcern that Evidence which is not ; But on the
contrary, it has a Tendency to enable to difcern with great
Certainty that there is none.

III. To fuppofe the future Volitions of moral Agents not
to be necelTary Events ; or, which is the fame Thing, Events
which it is not impoflible but that they may not com« to
pafs ; and yet to fuppofe that God certainly foreknows
them, and .knows all Things ; is to fuppofe God's Know-
f ledge to be inconfiftent with it felf. For to fay, that God
certainly, and without all Conjedure, knows that a Thing
will infallibly be, which at the fame Time he knows to be
fo contingent^ that it may polTibly not be, is to fuppofe his
Knowledge inconfiftent with it felf 5 or that one Thing
that he knows is utterly inconfiftent with another Thing
that he knows. 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, He now
knows a Propofition to be of certain infallible Truths
which he knows to be of contingent uncertain Truth,,, If
a future Volition is fo without all Neceflity, 'that there is no-
thing hinders but that it may not be, then the Propofitioni
which afferts it's future Exiftence, is fo uncertain, that there
is Nothing hinders but that the Truth of it may entirely
fail. And if God knows all Things, He knows this Pro-
pofition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconfiftent
v/ith his knowing that it is infallibly true 5 and fo incon-*
fiftent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the
Thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges
it to be contingent, if he views Things as they are. If the
Event be not neceftary, then it is poffible it may never be :
And if it be pofllble it may never be, God knows it may
poifibly never be ; and that is to knov/ that the Propofition
which affirms it's Exiftence, may poflibly not be true ; and
that is to know that the Truth of it is uncertain ; which
furely^ is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a certain
Truth. If Volitions are in Themfelves contingent Events,
without all Neceffity, then 'tis no Argument of Perfection
of Knowledge in any Being to determine peremptoril)r
that they will be ; but on the contrary, an Argument of
Jgnorance and Miftake : Becaufe it would argue, that

Q^ he

12 2 Foreknowledge infersNeceJftty^zxX, 11,

he fuppofes that Propofition to be ccT-tain, which in it's
own Nature, and ail Things conf.dered, is uncertain and
contingent. To fay in fuch a Cafe, that God may hav«
Ways of knowing contingent Events which we can't con-
ceive of, • is ridi;:ulous ; as much fo, as to fay, that God;
may know Contradictions to be true, for ought we know,,
or that he may know a Thing to be certain, and at thei
fame Time know it not to be certain, tho' we can't con-
ceive how ; becaufe he has Ways of knowing, which we^
can't comprehend.

Coroh I. From what has been obferved it is evident, that
tlie abfolute Decrees of God are no more inconfiftent with
human Liberty, on Account of any Neceffity of the Event
which follows from fuch Decrees, than the abfolute
Foreknozvledge of God. Becaufe the ConnecSlion between
the Event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and
indlflbluble, as between the Event and an abfolute Decree.
That is, 'tis no more impollible that the Event and Decree
fhould not agree together, than that the Event and abfolute
Knowledge fhould difagree. The Conne6lion between thcl
Event &Foreknowledge is abfolutelyperfe6l,by theSuppofition:]
becaufe it it is fuppofed, that the Certainty and Infallibility
of the Knowledge is abfolutely perfed. And it being fo,
the Certainty can't be increafed ; and therefore the Con-
ne<5tion between the Knowledge and Thing known, can't be
mcreafed ; fo that if a Decree be added to the Foreknow-
ledge, it don't at ail increafe the Connection, or make it
more infallible and indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the
Certainty of Knowledge might be increafed by the Ad-'
dition of a Decree ; which is contrary to the Suppofition,
v/hich is, that the Knovv^ledge is abfolutely perfed, or per-
fect to the higheft polTible Degree.

There is as much of an ImpoflibiHty but that the Things (1
which are infallibly foreknown, ihould be, or (which is the i
fame Thin'<) as great a NecelTity of their future Exiftence, .^
as if the Event were already written down, and was known,',
and read by all Mankind, thro' all preceeding Ages, and j
there were the mod indiffoluble and perfeA Conne<5tion i
poffible, between the Writing, and the Thing vmtten.i
In fuch a Cafe, it would be as impoflible the Event ihould i
fail of Exigence, as if it had exifted already ; and a ;;
Decree cau't make aa Event furer or more neceffary than ^
this.

And.i
i

Seca.XII. as much as a Decree. 123

And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknowledge, as
it has been proved there is, then Neceffity of Conneaion
land Confequence, is not at all inconfiftent with any Li-
berty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And
from hence it may be infer'd, that abfolute Decrees of
God, which don't at all increafe the Neceffity, are not at all
•inconfiftent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any
Ifuch Account, as that they make the Event decreed neceffary,
•fand render it utterly impoffible but that it (hould come to
pafs. Therefore if abfolute Decrees are inconfiftent with
Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a Statas
of Probation, or any Liberty v.^hatfoever that he enjoys, it
is not on Account of any Neceffity which abfolute De-
crees infer.

Dr. Wh'ithy fuppofes, there is a great Difference between
God's Foreknowledge, and his Decrees, with Regard to
Neceffity of future Events. In his Difcourfe on the five
Points, P. 474, 5ct. He lays, '^ God's Prefcience has no

'' Influence at all on our Adions. Should God (fays be)

*' by immediate Revelation, give me the Knowledge of the
" Event of any Man's State ^or Actions, would my Know-
" ledge of them have any Infmence upon his Acflifins ?
*' Surely none at all.- — Our Knowledge doth not affecl
" the Things w^e know, to make them more certain, or
" more future, than they would be without it. Now Fore-
" knowledge in God is Knowledge. As therefore Know-
*' ledge has no Influence on Things that are, fo neither has
*' Foreknowledge on Things that ihall be. And confe-
*' quently, the Foreknowledge of any Action that would be
" otherwife free, cannot alter or diminlfti that Freedom.
*' Whereas God's Decree of Ele6lion is powerful & adive,
*' and comprehends the Preparation and Exhibition of fuch

*' Means, as ftiall unfruft.rably produce the End. Hence

" God's Prefcience renders no Actions neceflary." And to
this Purpofe, P. 473. he cites Origen^ where he fays, GocVs
Prefcience is not the Cauje of Thhigs future^ hut their being fu-
ture is the Caufe of God's Prefcience that they will be : And
Le B/anCy where he fays. This is the truejf RefoJutiGn of this
Difficulty y that Prefcience is not the Caufe that Things are future \
hut their being future is the Caufe they are forcfeen. In like
Manner Dr. Clark^ in his Demonftration of the Being and^
Attributes of God, P. 95, — 99. And the Author of
the Freedom of IVilU in God and the Creature^ fpeaking to the
like Purpofe with Dr. IVhitby^ reprefents Foreknowledge as

Q 2 having

124 Foreknowledge infer sNeceJftty Part 11. j

having no mor^ hifluence on Things known^ to make them mcejjar^^ \
than Jfter-Knouikedge^f or to that Purpqfe. .

To all which I would fay ; That what is faid about
Knowledge, it's not having Influence on the Thing knowii-
to make it necefiary, is Nothing to the Purpofe, nor does
It in the leaft ^fFecfl the foregoing Reafoning. Whether
^refcience be the Thing that ?nakes the Event neceflary or no,
It alters not the Cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prov^
the Neceflity of the Event foreknown, and yet not be the
Thing which caufes the Neceflity. If the Foreknowledge be
abfolute, this proves the Event known to be neceflary, or
proves that 'tis impoffible but that the Event fliould be,
by fome Means or other, either by a Decree, or fome
other Way, if there be any other Way : Becaufe, as was faid
before, 'tis abfurd to fay, that a Proportion is known to
t)e certainly and infallibly true, which yet may poflibly prove
not true.

The whole of thp feqming Force of this Evafion lies in
this ; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge don't
caufe an Event to be neceflary, as a Decree does ; therefor^
it don\ prove it to be neceflary, as a Decree does. But there
is n» Force in this arguing : For it is built wholly on this
Suppofltion, that Nothing can prove^ ox he an Evidence of a
Thing's being neceflary, but that which has a coufal In-
fluence to make it fo. But this can never be 'maintained.
li certain Foreknowledge of the future exifl:ing of an E-
yent, be not the Thing which firft makes it impoflij^le that
it fhould fail of Ej^illence ; yet it may, and certainly does
demonjh-ate^ that it is impoflible it fliould fail of it, how-
ever ^'that Impollibility comes. If Foreknowledge .be not
the Caufe, but the Effe6t of this Impofllbility, it may prove
that there is fuch an Impoflibility, as much as if it were the
Caufe. It is as fl:rong arguing from the Effec5l to the
Caufe, as from the Caufe to the Eff'edt. 'Tis enough, that "j
an Exiftence which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whe-
ther that I;npoflibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is J
prior to it. 'Tis as evident, as 'tis pofllble any Thing fliould/j
be, that it is impoffible a Thing which is infallibly:;
known to be true, fliould prove not to be true ; therefore^
there is a Nccejjiiy that it fliould be otherwife ; whether the ,'
Knowledge be the C^ufe of this Neceflity, or the NeceffityS
the Caufe of the Knowledge.

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or^
After-Knowledge, or concomitant Knov/ledge, proves the

Thing

Sed.XII. as much as a Decree. 125

vThing known now to be necefTary, by fome Means or other ;
or proves that it is impoffible it fliould now be other-
wife than true. — I freejy allow, that Foreknowledge don't
prove a Thing to be necefTary any more than After-Know-
ledge : But then After-knowledge which is certain & infalli-
ble, proves that 'tis now become impoffible but that the
Propofition known (hould be true. Certain After- Knowledge
proves that it is now, in the Time of the Knowledge, by
fome Means or other, become im-pofllble but that the Propo-
fition which predicates paft Exiflence on the Event, fiiould
be true. And fo does certain Foreknowledge prove, that
now, in the Time of the Knowledge, it is by fome Means
or other, become impoffible but that the Propofition which
predicates future Exiftence on the Event, fhould be true.
The Neceffity of thie Truth of the Propofitions, confiding
in the prefent Impoffibility of the Non-exiflence of the Event
affirmed, in both Cafes, is the immediate Ground of the
certainty of the Knowledge ; there can be no Certainty of
Knowledge without it.

There mufl be a Certainty in Things themfelves, before
they are certainly known, or (which is the fame Thing j
known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is no-
thing elfe but knowing or difcerning the Certainty there is
in the Things themfelves which are known. Therefore
there mufl be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Cer-
tainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of be-
ing known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Ne-
celfity of the Truth known, or it's being impoffible but that
it fhould be true ; or, in other Words, the firm and infalli-
ble Connexion between the Subjed and Predicate of the
Propofition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of
Knowledge confifts in the View of the Firmnefs of that
Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the fu-
ture Exiflence of any Event, is his Vfcw of the firm and in-
difToluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the
iPropofition that afHrn;s it's future Exiflence. The Subject is

. ^hat poffible Event ; the Predicate is it's future exifling :
But if future Exiflence be firmly and indifTolubly connected
with that Event, then the future Exiflence of that Event

. is necefTary. If God certainly knows the future Exiflence
of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may poffibiy
never be, then He fees a firm Connection between a Sub-
ject and Predicate that are not firmly connected ; which is

. a Contradiction,

]

J 26 FoTcknowhdgcmfersNeceJ^fj, Pai-tll,

I allow what Dr. Whlthy fays to be true. That meer ^

Knowledge don^t affe5i the Thing knowriy to make it more certain i

mr more future. But yet, I fay, it fuppofes and proves the |

Thing to be already^ both future, and certain ; i. e. necefla- 1

rily future. Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes Futurity ; and I

2 certain Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes certain Futurity, an- j

tecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other \

certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of j

Knowledge, than a prior Impoflibility but that the Thing j

Ihould prove true ; or (which is the fame Thing^ the I

Neceffity of the Event. I

I would obferve one Thing further concerning this Mat- |J

ter, and it is this; That if it be as thofe foremention'd |

Writers fuppofe, that God's Foreknowledge is not the |

Caufe, but the EfFe6t of the Exiftence of the Event fore- I

known ; this is fo far from (hewing that this Foreknowledge 'i

don't infer the Neceffity of the Exiftence of that Event, that .j

It rather fhews the contrary the more plainly. Becaufe it t

Ihews the Exiftence of the Event to be fo fettled U firm, that ;':

it is as if it had already been ; in as much as in Effect it 'i

adtualiy exifts already ; it's future Exiftence has already *i

had a<5hial Influence and Efficiency, and has produced an Effect, \

viz. Prefcience : The Effedt exifts already ; and as the j^

EfFe(5l fuppofes the Caufe, is connc6ted with the ^aufe, and - !

depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future E- .(

vent, which is the Caufe, had exifted already. The Effedt '^

is firm as poffible, it having already the Pofteffion of Ex- j

iftence, and has made fure of it. But the Effed can't be \

more firm and ftable than it's Caufe, Ground and Reafon. I

The Building can't be firmer than the Foundation. r

To illuftrate this Matter, let us fuppofe the Appearances }

and Images of Things in a Glafs ; for Inftance, a refledling "\

Telefcope to be the* real Effects of heavenly Bodies (at J

a Diftance, and out of SightJ which they referable : |J

If it be fo, then, as thefe Images in the Telefcope have A

had a paft a6tual Exiftence, and it is become utterly \

impoffible now that it fhould be otherwife than that ^

they have exifted ; fo they being the true Effe<5ls of the 3

heavenly Bodies they referable, this proves the exifting of ?

thofe heavenly Bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and I

neceffary, as the exifting of thefe Eff*e(5ls ; the one being ^

connected with, and wholly depending on the other. '

Now let us fuppofe future Exiitences fome Way or other >;<

Scd.XII. as much as a Decree. 127

to have Influence back, to produce Efre<5ls before-hand,
and caufe exadl and perfefl Images of themfelves in a Glafs,
a Thoufand Years before they exift, yea, in all preceed-
ing. Ages ; But yet that thefe Images are real Effe6ls of
thefe future Exiftences, perfectly dependent on, and con-
necSted with their Caufe ; thefe Effects and Images, having
already had adual Exiftence, rendring that Matter of their
Exifting perfedly firm and ftable, and utterly impoffiblc
to be otherwife ; this proves in like Manner as in the
other Inftance, that the Exiftence of the Things which
are their Caufes, is alfo equally fure, firm and neceffary ;
and that it is alike impoffible but that they fhould be, as
if they had been already, as their Effeds have. And if
inftead of Images in a Glafs, we fuppofe the antecedent
EfFedts to be perfedl Ideas of them in the divine Mind,
which have exifted there from all Eternity, which are as
properly EfFe6ls, as truly and properly conne<5led with their
Caufe, the Cafe is not altered.

Another Thing which has been faid by fome Armlmans^
to take ofiT the Force of what is urged from God's Pre-
fcience, againft the Contingence of the Volitions of moral
Agents, is to this Purpofe ; " That when we talk .of
*' Foreknowledge in God, there is no ftri6i: Propriety in
" our fo Speaking ; and that altho' it be true, that there is
" in God the moft perfed Knowledge of all Events from
*' Eternity to Eternity, yet there is no fuch Thing as
" before and after in God, but He fees all Things by
" one perfed unchangeable View, without any SuccelTion."
To this I anfwer,

1. It has been already fhewn, that all certain Knowledge
proves the Necefllty of the Truth known ; whether it be

before^ after^ or at the fame Time, Tho' it be true, that

there is no Succeffion in God's Knowledge, and the Manner
of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much
we know concerning it, that there is no Event, pad,
prefent, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of ; He
never is, never was, and never will be without *infallible
Knowledge of it ; He always fees the Exiftence of it 'to
be certain and infallible. And as he always kts Things

ft as they are in Truth ; hence there never is in Reality
. ; ^) Thing contingent in fuch a Senfe, as that pofTibly it
may happen never to exift. If, ftridly fpeaking, there is no
Foreknowledge in God, 'tis becaufe thofe Things which

are

128 CVr/^/» Foreknowledge Part II. I

are future to us, are as prefent to God, as if they already ;

had Exiftence : and that is as much as to fay, that future j

Events are always in God's View as evident, clear, fure i

and neceflary, as if they already were. If there never is 3

a Time wherein the Exigence of the Event is not prefent I

with God, then there never is a Time wherein it is not j

as much impoffible for it to fail of Exiftence, as if it's \

Exiftence were prefent, and were already come to pafs. ]

God's viewing Things fo perfedlly and unchangeably as u

that there is no Succeflion in his Ideas or Judgment, don't • \

hinder but that there is properly now, in the Mind of God, \

a certain and perfe<5l Knowledge of the moral Actions of '

Men, which to us are an Hundred Years hence : yea the 1

Obje6lion fuppoles this ; and therefore it certainly don't 1

hinder but that, by the foregoing Arguments, it is now ;

impoffible thefe moral A<5lions fliould not come to pafs. \

We know, that God knows the future voluntar}' Anions j
of Men in fuch a Senfe before-hand, as that he is able par- *
ticularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them,- :;
or caufe them to be written down in a Book, as He often 1
has done j and that therefore the neceffary Connedlion |
which there is between God's Knowledge and the Event*)
known, does as much prove the Event to be neceffary \
before-hand, as if the divine Knowledge were in the fame ^
Senfe before the Event, as the Prediction or Writing is. i
If the Knowledge be infallible, then the Expreffion of it in i
the written Prediction is infallible 5 that is, there is an i
infallible Connedion between that written Predidion and i
the Event. And if fo, then it is impoffible it iliould i
ever be otherwife, than that that Prediction and the Event i
IhouW agree : And this is the fame Thing as to fay, ^
'tis impoffible but that the Event fhould come to pafs : |
and this is the fame as to fay, that it's commg to pafs i

is neceffary. So that it is manifeft, that there being no ' >

proper Succeffion in God's Mind, makes no Alteration "4
as to the Neceffit)^ of the Exiftence of the Events which |
God knows. Yea, <

2, This is io far from weakening the Proof, which has
been given of the Impoffibility of the not coming to pafs i
of future Events known, as that it eftablifties that whereia 'li
the Strength of the foregoing Arguments confifts, and. «
fhQVt's the Clearnefs of the Evidence. For, J

(I.) The I

Sedl.XII. infers fome NecdTity. 129

I (ij The very Reafon why God's Knowledge is with-

i out SuccelTlon, is, becaufe it is ablblutely perfecl, to the

I higheft pofTible Degree of Clearnefs and Certainty : all

i Things, whether paft, prefent or to come, being view'd

I with equal Evidence and Fulnefs ; future Things being

\ htn with as much Clearnefs, as if they were prefent ;

the View is always in abfolute Perfedion ; and abfolute

! conftant Perfedion admits of no Alteration, and fo no

I SuccefTion ; the adual Exiftence of the Thing known, don't

at all increafe, or add to the Clearnefs or Certainty of

lithe Thing known : God calls the Things that are not, as

tho' they were ; they are all one to Him as if they

[had already exifled. But herein coniifts the Strength of

the Demonftration before given, of the ImpoiTibility of the

I not exifting of thofe Things whofe Exiftence God knows ;

('That it is as impolTible they fhould fail of Exiftence, as if

itheyexifted already. This Objedion, inftead of weakening

jthis Argument, fets it in the cleareft and ftrongeft Light ;

for it fuppofes it to be fo indeed, that the Exiftence of

future Events is in God's View fo much as if it already

had been, that when they come actually to exift, it makes

not the leaft Alteration or Variation in his View or

Knowledge of them.

(2.) The Objedlon is founded on the Immutability oi Go6!^
Knowledge : For 'tis the Immutability of Knowledge makes
his Knowledge to be without SucceiTion. But this moft
diredly and plainly demonftrates the Thing I infift on,
^vz.that 'tis utterly impoffible the known Events fhould
fail of Exiftence. For if that were pollible, then it would
be poliible for there to be a Change in God's Knowledge
and View of Things. For If the knov/n Event ftiouid
fail of Exiftence, and not come into Being, as God expefted,
then God would fee it, and fo would change his Mind^
and fee his former Miftake ; and thus there would be
Change and SuccefTion in his Knowledge. But as God is
immutable, and fo it is utterly and infinitely impoffible
that his View fhould be changed ; fo 'tis, for ,the fame'
Reafon, juft fo impoffible that the fore-known Event fhould
not exift : And that is to be impoffible in the higheit
iDegree : and therefore the contrary is neceflary. Nothing
[is more impoffible than that the immutable God fhould
[be changed, by the SuccefTion of Time ; ^who compre-
Ikends aU Things, from Eternity to Eternityj in one, moft:

R. perfect

130 Forcknowlege/jrw^j NeceJJtty. Part II,

perfed, and unalterable View ; fo that his whole eternal
Duration is Vitoe interminabilis^ tota^fimul^ & perfe£ia Pojpjfto, .

On the whole, I need not fear to fa}S that there is no
Geometrical Theorem or Propolition whatfoever, more capa-.
ble of ftri(5t Demonftration, than that God's certain Pre-
fcience of the Volitions of moral Agents is inconfiftent with
fuch a Contingence of thefe Events, as is without all
Neceflity ; and fo is inconfiftent with the Arminian Notion
of Liberty.

Cord. 2. Hence the Dodrine of the Calvinifis^ concerning
the abfoliite Decrees of God, does not at all infer any
more Fatality in Things, than will demonftrably follow froii\
the Doclrine of moft Arminian Divines, who acknowledge
God's Omnifcience, and univerlal Prefcience. Therefore
all ObjecStions they make againft the Doclrine of the Calvijiijlsy
as implying Hobbes's Do6lrine of Neceflity, or the Stoicd.
Dodrine of Fate, lie no more againft the Dodlrine of
Cahinijis, than their own Do6lrine : And therefore it ^on't
become thofe Divines, to raife luch an Out-cry againft the
Cakinijis, on this Account.

CoroL 3. Hence^ all arguing from Neceflity, againft the
Do6tnne of the Inability of unregenerate Men to perform
the Conditions of Salvation, and the Commands of God;
requiring fpiritual Duties, and againft the Calviniftic Dodrine
of efficacious Grace ; I fay, all Arguings of Arminiam
(fuch of 'em as own God's Omnifcience) againft thefe
Things, on this Ground, that thefe Doarines, tho' they
don't fuppofe Men to be under any Conftraint orCoadion,
yet fuppofe 'em under NecefiTity, with Refpeft to their moral
Aclions,and thofe Things which are required of 'em in Order
to their Acceptance with God j and their arguing againft
t^ie Neceflity of Men's Volitions, taken from the Reafo-
iiablenefs of God's Commands, Promifes, and Threatnings,,
and the Sincerity of his Counfels and Invitations ; and all
Objedions againft any Doctrines of the Cahiynjh as being
inconfiftent with human Liberty, becaufe they infer NecelFity ;
I fay, all thefe Arguments and Objections muft fall to
the Ground, and be juftly efteem'd vain and frivolous,
as coming from them -, being maintain'd in an Inconflftence
with themfelves, and in like Manner levelled againft their own
Doahne, as againft the Doctrine of the Qalvmifls,

Section

Section XIIL

Whether weftippofe the Folitions of moral
Agents to be conneEied with any Xhing
antecede7tty or not ^ yet they mujl be ne-
ceffary in fuch a Senfe as to overthrow
Arminian Liberty.

EVERY Aa of the Will has a Caufe, or it has not.
If it has a Caufe, then, according to what has
already been demonftrated, it is not contingent, but
neceflary \ the EfFe<5t: being neceffarily dependent and con-
fequent on it's Caufe ; and that, let the Caufe be what
it will. If the Caufe is the Will itfelf, by antecedv^nt
A6ts •chufmg and determining ; ftill the determined and
canfed Ad muft be a neceflary Effea. The Aa that
is the determined Effea of tl\e foregoing Aa which is it's
Caufe, can't prevent the Efficiency of it's Caufe ; but mull
be wholly fubjea to it's Determination and Command,
as much as the Motions of the Hands and Feet : The
confequent commanded Aas of the Will are as paflive
and as neceffary, with Refpea to the .antecedent determining
Aas, as the Parts of the Body are to the Vohtions
"Which determine and command them. And therefore, if
all the free Aas of the Will are thus, if they are all
-determined Effeas, determined by the Will it felf, that
is, determined by antecedent Choice, then they are all
• neceflary ; they are all fubjec^ to, and decifively fixed by
the foregoing Aa, which is their Caufe : Yea, even the
determining Aa it felf ; for that muft be determined and
fixed by another Aa, preceding that, if it be a free and
voluntary Aa ; and fo muft be neceflary. So that by this
all the free Ads of the Will are neceflfary, and can't be
free unlefs they are neceflary : Becaufe they can't be free,
according to the Arminian Notion of Freedom, unlefs they
are determined by the Will ; which is to be determined
by antecedent Choice ; which being their Caufe, proves
■ 'em nebeflTary, And yet they fay, NeceflTity is utterly incon-

R 2 iiftent

132 Both NeceJJlty &^ Conttngence Part II. ]

fiflent with Liberty. So that, by their Scheme, the A6ls \

oi the Will can't be free unlefs they 2X^ neceflary, and ;
yet cannot be free if they be ^ssm- neceflary !

But if the other Part of the Dilemma be taken, and j

it be affirm'd that the free A6ts of the Will have no 1

Caufe, and are connected with nothing whatfoever that \

go^s before them and determines them, in order to maintain \ ;

their proper and abfolute Contingence, and this fliould b« I

allowed to be poffible ; ftill it will not ferve their Turn. I

For if the VoUtion comes to pafs by perfect Contingence, ]
and without any Caufe at all, then it is certain, no A(5t

of the Will, no prior Ad of the Soul was the Caufe, no" I

Determination or Choice of the Soul, had any Hand in \

it. The Will, or the Soul, was indeed the Subject of what \

happened to it accidentally, but was not the Caufe. The i

Will is not active in caufmg or determining, but purely ;■

the palTive Subject ^ at leaft according to their Notion of \

A6lion and Paflion. In this Cafe, Contingence does as 1

much prevent the Determination of the Will, as a proper '

Caufe ; and as to the Wil], it was neceflary, and could be .|

po otherwife. For to fuppofe that it could have^ been i

©therwife, if the Will or Soul had pleafed, is to fuppofe \

that the Ad is dependent Qn fome pnor A6t of Choice or \\

Pleafure ; contrary to what now is fuppofed : Jt is to fup- 1

pofe that it might have been otherwife^ if it's Caufe had \

made it or ordered it otherwife. Eut this dpn't agree to \

it's having no Caufe or Orderer at all. That muft be -'

neceflary as to the Soul, which is dependent on no free ij

A6t of the Soul ; But that which is without a Caufe, is de- >

pendent on no free A6t of the Soul : bccaufe, by the Sup- •

pofition, it is dependent on Nothing, and is conneded with 1

Nothing. In fuch a Cafe, the Soul is neceflarily fubjeded" J

to what Accident: brings to pafs, from Time to Time, as .

much as the Earth, that is inadive, is neceflarily fub- j

jected to what falls upon it. But this don't confift with !

the Armnicin Notion of Liberty, which is the Will's Power '

of determming it fclf in it's own Ads, and being wholly j

adive in it, without Pafllvenefs, and without being fubjed '\

to Neccirity.--— Thus, Contingence belongs to the Armini^n '

Notion of Liberty, and yet is inconfiftent with it. \

I would here obferve, that the Author of the EJfay on \

the Freedc?n of Will^ in God and the Creature^ Page 76, 77. \

^iivs as follows;, " The Word Chance always means forrie- j

' ' '*' thins: '

Seft.XIII. inco?tJiJI^ wi^^hxmm. Liberty . 133

*' thing done without Defign. Chance and Defign ftand
" in dire6t Oppofition to each other : and Chance can
*« never be properly applied to the Ads of the ^yiil,
« which is the Spring of all Defign, and which defigns
*« to chufe whatfoever it doth chufe, whether there be any
<*= fuperiour Fitnefs in the Thing which it chufes, or no -,
** and it defigns to determine it felf to one Thing, where
. *' two Things perfedlly equal are propofed, meerly becaufe it
*' will." But herein appears a very great Inadvertence in this
Author. For if the IVill be the Spring of all Defign^ as he
fays, then certainly it is not always the EffeSl of Defign -,
and the A61s of the Will themfelves muft fometimes come
to pafs when they don't fprmg from Defign \ and confe-
quently come to pafs by Chance, according to his own
Definition of Chance. And if the Will defigns to chiije what-
foever it does chufe y 2.n6. defigns to determine it felf as he fays,
then it defigns to determine all its Defigns. Which
carries us back from one Defign to a foregoing Defign
determining that, and to another determining that ; and
fo on in infinitum. The very firft Defign muft be the
J£fFe6l of foregoing Defign, or elfe it muft be by Chance,
in his Notion of it.

Here another Alternative may be propofed, relating to
the Conne(5\ion of the Acts of the Will with fomething
foregoing that is their Caufe, not much unlike to the other ;
which is this : Either human Liberty is fuch that it may
iwell ftand with Volitions being neceffarily connected with
the Views of the Underftanding, and fo is confiftent with
Necelfity ; or it is inconfiftent with, and contrary to fuch
a Connection and Neceflity. The former is diredly fub-
<verfive of the Arininian Notion of Liberty, confifting in Free-
dom from all Neceflity. And if the latter be chofen, and it
be faid, that Liberty is inconfiftent with any fuch neceflary
Connection 'of Volition with foregoing Views of the Under-
ftanding, it confifting in Freedom from any fuch NecelTity
of the Will as that would imply ; then the Liberty of
the Soul confifts (in Part at leaft) in the Freedom from
Reftraint, Limitation and Government, in it's a6tings, by the
Underftanding, and in Liberty and Liabienefs to aCl contrary
to the Underftanding's Views and Dictates : and confe-
quently the more the Soul has of this Difengagednefs, in
it's acting, the more Liberty. Now let it be confidered
what this brings the noble Principle of human Liberty to,
particularly when it is poflefiTed and enjoyed in it's Perfection,

1
134 P^rmim^iri Liberty inc^^^ Part II. \

viz. a full and perfe(5l Freedom and Liablenefs to a6^ t'
altogether at Random, without the leaft Conne6tion with, t
Of Reftraint or Government by, any Di6late of Reafon, \
or any Thing whatfoever apprehended, confidered or viewed ^
by the Underftanding ; as being inconfiftent with the full i!
and perfect Sovereignty of the Will over it's own Deter-
minations. The Notion Mankind have conceived of j

Liberty, is fome Dignity or Privilege, fomething worth j
claiming. But what Dignity or Privilege is there, in being
given up to fuch a wild Contingence as this, to be per-»
fe<5lly and conftantly liable to a6t unintelligently and un-
reafonably, and as much without the Guidance of Un-
handing, as if we had none, or were as deftitute of
Perception as the Smoak that is driven by the Wind !

*w* "^o^ **J0/* %o^ *w "^y ^^ %v* %iv* v^ "w* ^4^ ^{v* *vft^ ^c/* w* 'w <^

PARxi

w^^^s^sss^s^ssi^d^^s^^^'s^^^s^^m I

( '35 )

PART III.

Wherein is enquired^ whether any fuch
Liberty of Will as Arminians hold^ be
neceffary to Moral Agency, Vertue
and Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, ^c.

S E-C T I o N I.

god's moral Excellency neceffary^ yet
vertuous and praife-worthy.

*• Tf AVING confidered the firji Thing that was propofed
^ I '■ 1 to be enquired into, relating to that Freedom of Wili
'*- -■• which Arminians maintain j namely, Whether any
fuch Thing does, ever did, or ever can exift, or be con-
ceived of ; I come now to the fecond Thing propofed to be
the Subjed of Enquiry, 'viz. Whether any fuch Kind of
Liberty be requifite to moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Praife
and Blame, Reward and Puniihment, i^c.

I fhall begin with fome Confideration of the Vertue and
Agency of the Supream moral Agent, and Fountain of all
Agency and Vertue.

Dr. IVhithy^ in his Difcourfe on the five Points, P. 14. fays,
*' If all human Actions are neceffary. Virtue and Vice mud
*^ be empty Names \ wc being capable of Nothing that is

*^ blame-

136 God' smor^lExctWency necejfarj^ Pa.IlI

'' blame-worthy, or deferveth Praife ; For who can blame
'^ a Perfon for doing only what he could not help, or judge
*^' that he deferveth Praife only for what he could not avoid ?'*
To the like Purpofe he fpeaks in Places innumerable ; efpe-
cially in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will ; conftantly
maintaining, that a Freedcm tiot only from Coa^ion^ but Necejfity^
is abfolutely requifite, in order to Adions being either wor-
thy of Blame, or deferving of Praife. And to this agrees, as
is well known, the current Dodrine of Arminlan Writers ;
who in general hold, that there is no Vertue or Vice, Reward
or Punifhment, nothing to be commended or blamed, with-
out this Freedom. And yet Dr. //^/^/%, P. 300, allows, that
God is without this Freedom ; And Arminians^ fo far as I
have had Opportunity to obferve, generally acknowledge,
that Gojd is necelTarily holy, and his Will neceflarily deter- '
mined to that which is good.

So that, putting thefe Things together, the infinitely holy
God, who always ufed to be efteemed by God's People, not
only vertuous, but a Being in whom is all pofTible Vertue,
and every Vertue in the moft abfolute Purity and Perfedion,
and in infinitely greater Brightnefs and Amiablenefs than in
any Creature ; the moft perfed: Pattern of Vertue, and the I
Fountain from whom all others Vertue is but as Beams from i
the Sun ; and who has been fuppofed to be, on the Ac- '}■
count of his Vertue and Holinefs, infi.nitely more worthy jj
to be efteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, \
extoli'd and praifed, than any Creature ; and He who is \
thus every where reprefented in Scripture ; I fay, this Being,
according to this Notion of Dr. IPlokhy^ and other Ar7nhnans^
has no Vertue at all j Vertue, when afcribed to Him, is but
ah empty Name ; and he is deferving of no Commendation or
Praife ; becaufe he is under Neceflity, He can*t avoid being
holy and good as he is ; therefore no Thanks to him for it.
It feems, the Holinefs, Juftice, Faithfulnefs, &c. of the moft
High, muft not be accounted to be of the Nature of that
which is vertuous and praife -worthy. They will not deny,
that thefe Things in God are good ; But then we muft un-
derftand them, that they are no more veftuous, or of the
Nature of any Thing commendable, than the Good that is
in sny other Being that is not a moral Agent ; as the Bright^
nefs of the Sun, and the Fertility of the Earth are good, but
not vertuous, becaufe thefe Properties are neceflary to thel<5
Bodies, and not the Fruit of Self- determining. PoiYer.

Ther9

Seft.I. j'^/ Vertuous &^ Praife-worthy. 137

There needs no other Confutation of this Notion of God's
not being vertuoiis or praife -worthy, to Chriftians ac-
[quainted with the Bible, but only ftating and particularly
reprefenting of it. To bring Texts of Scripture, wherein
God is reprefented as in every Refpedt, in the higheft
Manner vertuous, and fupreamly praife-worthy, would be
endlefs, and is altogether needlefs to fuch as have beea
brought up under the Light of the Gofpel.

. It were to be wifhedj that Dr. IVhitby, and other Divines
I of the fame Sort, had explain'd themfelves, when they havci
afferted that That which is neceflary, is not deferuing of
Praife ; at the fame Time that they have own'd God's Per-
fedlion to be necefTary, and fo in EiFe6t repi'efented God as
not deferving Praife* Certainly, if their Words have any
Meaning at all, by Praife^ they muft mean the Exercife of
jT^imony of fome Sort of Efteem, Refpe<5t, or honourable
jRdgard. And will they then fay> that Men are worthy of
I that Efteem, Refpe6l, and Honour for their Vertue, fmali
land imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of^ for his
[infinite Righteoufnefs, Holinefs, and Goodnefs ? If fo, it
I muft be becaufe of fome Sort of peculiar Excellency in the
jvi^rtuous Man, which is his Prerogative, wherein he really
has the Preference ; fome Dignity, that is entirely diftin-
iguifti'd from any Excellency, Amiablenefs or Honourablenefs
in God ; not in Imperfe6tion and Dependance, but in
Pre-eminence ; which therefore he don't receive from God,
inor is God the Fountain or Pattern of it ; nor can God, in
that Refpe6t, ftand in Competition with him, as the Obje<£t of
Honour and Regard ; but Man may claim a peculiar Efteem,
Commendation and Glory, that God can have no Pretenfion^
!to. Yea, God has no Right, by vertue of his necelTary Ho-
linefs, to intermeddle with that grateful Refpe(5l and Praife,
idue to the vertuous Man, who chufes Vertue, in the Exercife
of a Freedom ad utruinque ; any more than a precious Stone,
which can't avoid being hard and beautiful.

And if it be fo, let it be explained what that peculiar
I Refped is, that is due to the vertuous Man^ which differs
I in Nature and Kind, in fome Way of Pre-eminence, from
\ all that is due to God. What is the Name or I>efcription
I of that peculiar Affedlion ? Is it Efteem, Love, Admiration^,
Honour, Praife, or Gratitude ? The Scripture every where
: reprefents God as the higheft Objea of all thefe : there we
j read of the $quI' s imgnfying the Lord^ of hv'wg Hhn mth all the
i . ■ " S Hearty

138 Concerning GOXy^ Vertue. Part III.

Hearty with all the Soul^wlth all theMind^ ^ with all the Strength ;
admiring him, and his righteous A^s^ or greatly regarding them,
as marvellous ^ wonderful ; honouring^ glorifying^ exalting^ extolling^
blefpng^ thanking^ and praifing Him ; giving unto Him all the Glory
of the Good which is done or received, rather than unto
Men ; that no Flejh Jhould glory in his Prefence j but that He
fl-iould be regarded as the Being to whom all Glory is due.
What then is that Refpea ? What Pairion,AfFeaion, or Ex-
ercife is it, that Arminians call Praife^ diverfe from all thefe
Things, which Men are worthy of for their Vertue, and
which God is not worthy of, in any Degree ? ';t

If that Neceflity which attends God's moral Perfedions
and Actions, be as inconfiftent with a Being worthy of
Praife, as a Necefllty of CoacStion ; as is plainly implied in
or inferred from Dr. Ulnthys Difcourfe ; then why fhould.
we thank God for his Goodnefs, any more than if He were
forced to be good, or any more than we ftiould thank one
of our Fellow-Creatures who did us Good, not freely, and
of good Will, or from any Kindnefs of Heart, but from meer
Compulfion, or extrinfecal Neceflity ? Arminians fuppofe,
that God is neceflarily a good and gracious Being : for this
they make the Ground of fome of their main Arguments
againft many Dodrines maintain'd by Calvinijls : They fay,
thefe are certainly falfe, and it is i?npaffible they fhould be true,:
becaufe they are not confident wqth the Goodnefs of God.l
This fuppofes, that it is impoffible but that God fhould be
good : for if it be fpofuble that He fhould be otherwife,
then that ImpofTibihty of the Truth of thefe Dodrines ceafes,
according to their own Argument.

That Vertue in God is not, in the moft ;^roper Senfe^tft
rewardcible^ is not for Want of Merit in his moral Perfedi- J
ons and Actions, fufncient to deferve Rewards from hisli
Creatures ; but becaufe He is infinitely above all Capacity ;)ii
of receiving any Reward or Benefit from the Creature : HeH
is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we can'tn
be profitable unto Him. But flill he is worthy of our fupreamj4
Benevolence for his Vertue ; and would be worthy of ontk
Beneficence, which is the Fruit and ExprefTion of Benevo-^^
lence, if our Goodnefs could extend to Him. If God de- 1|
fervcs to be thanked and praifed for his Goodnefs, He wouldrt'
for the fame Reafon, deferve that we fhould alfo requite his|i
Kindnefs, if that were poffible. TVhat Jhall I render to thtV
Lord for all his Benefits f is the natural Language of Thank-|

fulnefs

Seft.II. Chn{\' s Oh^dicncG mcejfarj. 139

fulnefs : and (o far as in us lies, it is our Duty to recompenfc
God's Goodnefs, and render again according to Benefits received.
And that we might have Opportunity for fo natural an Ex-
preflion of our Gratitude to God, as Beneficence, notwith-
ftanding his being infinitely above our Reach j He has ap-
pointed others tobe his Receivers, and to ftand in his Stead,
as the Objeas of our Beneficence ; fuch are efpecially our
indigent Brethren.

Section II.

Ths AEis of the Will of the human Soul of
Jesus Christ neceflarily holy,jj^^/ ^r^/^
vertuGus^ praife-worthyy rewardable^ 6cc.

ir Have already confidered how Dr. Whithy infifis upon it,
I that a Freedom, not only from Coadion, but Necefiity,
# is requifde to either Vertue or Vice^ Praife or Dijpraife^ Reward
or Funijlmient. He alfo infifis on the fame Freedom as abfo-
h^tely requifite to a Perfon's being the Subject of a Lav;^ ot
Precepts or Prohibitions \ in the Book before mentioned (P. 301,
!^3i4, 328, 339, 940, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373,410.; And of
' Pro7ni/es znd Threatnings (P. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 34G,
363.) And as requifite to a State of Trial, (P. 297, &c.)

Now therefore, with an Eye to thefe Things, I would en-
quire into the moral Condud and Pra<5lice of our Lord Jei'us
Chrift, which he exhibited in his human Nature here, in
his State of Humiliation, And Firj}^ I would (hew, that his
■ hoJy Behaviour was necejfary ; or that it was impcfftble it
! (liculd be otherwife, than that He iliould behave himfelf
holily, and that he fliould be perfectly holy in each indivi-
dualAdt of his Life. And Secondly^ t\\2it his holy Behaviour'
was properly of the Nature of Vertue^ and was zvorthy of
Praife ; and that He was the Subject of Lawy Pi'ecepis o>-
Commands^ Projnifes and Rewards \ and that he was in a State
of Trial
i- S 2 I. It

140 TieJS?so/t&eWi[\o(Chna, P.III. J

I. It was impojftbk^ that the A(5ls of the Will of the human
Soul of Chrift Ihould, in any Inftance, Degree or Circum- 1
fiance, be otherwife than holy, and agreable to God's Na-
ture and Will. The following Things make this evident,

I. God had promifed fo effedually to preferve and uphold j
Him by his Spirit, under all his Temptations, that he ihould 1 |
not fail of reaching the End for which He came into the \
World ; —which he would have fail'd of, had he fallen intg A
Sin. We have fuch a Promife, Ifai. xlii. 1,2,3,4. Behold my ^\
Servant^ wham I uphold ; mine EleSi^ in whom my Soul dellghteth ,\ \
I have put my Spirit uponHim : He Jhall bring forth Judgment to the
Gentiles : He Jhall not cry^nor lift up^nor caufe hisVoice to be heard in

the Street. He Jhall bring forth Judgment unto Truth. He Jhall

not fail ^ nor be difcouragedy till he have fet Judgment in the Earth ;
end the Ifles Jhall wait for his Lqiv. This Promife of Chrift's
having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and
lifting up his Voice &c. relates to the Time of ChrilVs Ap-
pearance on Earth ; as is manifeft from the Nature of the
Promife, and alfo the Application of it in the New Tefta-
ment, Matth. 12, 18. And the Words imply a Promife of
his being fo upheld by God's Spirit, that he (hpuld be pre-
ferved from Sin ; particularly from Pride and Vain-glory,
and from being overcome by any of the Temptations he
ihould be under to affe6t the Glory of this World ; the Pomp )
of an earthly Prince, or the Applaufe and Praife of Men : and I
that he Ihould be fo upheld, that he fhould by no Means 1
fail of obtaining the End of his coming into the World, of (
bringing forth Judgment unto Victory, and eftalplilhing his
Kingdom of Grace in the Earth.— And in the following
Verfes, this Promife is conf rmed, with the greateft imagina-
ble Solemnity. Thus faith the LORD^ HE that created the
Heavens^ andjlretched them out ; Tie that fpread forth the Earthy
arid that which ccmeth out of it ; He that giveth Breath unto the ■■.
People upon it^ and Spirit to them that tualk therein : I the Lord ^
have called Thee in Righteoufnefs^ and will hold thine Hand ; and •
will keep Thee^ and give Thee for a Covenant of the People, for a .
Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind Eyes, to briyig out the Pri' ■
f oners from the Prijon, and thein that Jit in Darknefs out of the }
'Prijm-Eloufe. 1 am JEHOVAH, that is my Name, kc.

Very parallel with thefe Promifes is that, Tfai. xlix. 7, 8,9.
which alio has an apparent Refpect to the Time of Chrift's
Humiliation on Earth. Thus faith the Lord, the Redeemer of
liraelj and his hdy Oncy to Him whom Man defpifeth^ to Hirti

Se<9:.II. neceflarily ^^/^'. X41

whom the Nation akhorreth^ to a Servant of Riders j Kings fljalt
fie and arifi^ F rimes alfo jfimll luorjhip ; becaifi of the Lord 'that is
i faithful, and the holy One of Ifrael, and He jhall choofe Thee.
! Thus faith the Lord^ In an acceptable Time have I heard Thee ; in
I a Day of Salvation have I helped Thee ; and I will preferve
\ Thee, and give thee for a Covenant of the Peopky to ejlablijh
fhe Earthy &c.

And in Ifai. I. 5 9. w^ have the Meffiah expre fling

his Aflurance, that God would help Him, by fo opening
his Ear, or inclining his Heart to<Tod's Commandments,
that He (hould not be rebellious, but (hould perfevere^
I and not apoftatife, or turn his Back : That through God's
Help, He ftiouM be immovable, in a Way of Obedience^
\inder the great Trials of Reproach and Suffering he (hould
meet with ; fetting his Face like a Flint : So that He knev/
He (hould not be aihamed, or fruilrated in his Defign ;
and finally (hould be approved and juftiiied, as having done
his Work faithfully. ' The Lord hath opened mine Ear ; fo that
J was not rebellious y neither turned away rny Back : I gave my
Back to the Smiters, and my Cheeks to them that plucked off the
Hair ; / hid not my Face from Shame and Spitting. For the
Lord God will help' me ; therefore jhall I not be confounded : there-
fore have I fet my Face as a Flint, and 1 know that I Jhall
not be a foamed. He is near that juflifeth me ; who will contend
with me f Let us fland together. Who is mine Adverfary ?
Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me :
who is He that fcall condemn ?ne ? Lo, they Jhall all wax old
as a Garment y the Moth Jhall eat them up,

2. The fame Thing is evident from all the Promifes

which God made to the Melfiah, of his future Glory,

Kingdom, and Succefs, in his Office and Charader of a

j Mediator : which Glory could not have been obtained, if

his Holinefs had fail'd, and he had been guilty of Sin.

God's abfolute Promife of any Things makes the Things

promifed mceffaryy and their failing to take Place abfolutely

t impojfible : and in like Manner it makes thofe Things ne-

I cefTary, on which the Thing promifed depends, and without

which it can't take Effe6l. Therefore it appears, that it

I was utterly impoilible that Chrill's Holinefs (hould fall,

i from fuch abfolute Promifes as thofe, Pfal. ex. 4. The Lord

j hath fworny and will not repent. Thou ar't a Priejl forever, after the

\ Order of Melchizedek. And from every other Promife in

I that Pialm, contaiAe^ in each Verfe of it. And Pfal. ii. 6^ 7.

142 Tl^e ABs oJtheW^ of Chrift, P.III. i

1 will declare the Decree r The Lord hath faid unto 7ne^ Thou \
mi my Son^ this Day have I begotten Thee : JJk of Me, and / '
'wUl give Thee the Heathen for thine Inheritance, &c. Pfal. xlv.
3, 4> &c. Gird thy Sivord on thy Thigh, O mojl Mighty, with thy \
Glory and thy Majejly ; and in thy Majejiy ride profperonjly. And 1
fo every Thing that is faid from thence to the End .of
the Pfalm. And thofe Promifes, Ifai, lii. 13, 14, 15. & Hii. !
10, II, 12. And all thofe Promifes which God makes to the 1
Mefliah, of Succefs, Dominion and Glory in the Charader of
Redeemer, in Ifai. Chap. xhx.

3. It was often promifed to the Church of God of old, . ,
for their Comfort, that God would give them a righteous^
finlefs Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5,6. Behold, the Days come, faith the
Lord, that I tvill raife up unto David a righteous Branch ; and a
King Jloall reign and profper, andfiall execute ^Judgment and Jujlict
in tlye Earth, In his Days jliall Judah he faved, aJid Ifraei Jhall
dwell fafely. And this is the Narne whereby He Jhall be called. The h
Lord ourRighteoifnefs, So,Jer.xxxiii.— / will c^ufe the Branch of \\
Righteoufnefs to grow i^p unto David ; a^id He Jhall execute fudg- y
ment and Righteoufnejs in the Land. Ifai. ix, 6, 7. For unto us
a Child is born ; JJpon the Throne of David and of his King-
dom, to order it, and to eftablijh it with f:! dement andfuJliceT,
from h^nceforth^ even fcre^ier : The Zeal of the Lord of Ho/Is will
do this. Chap. xi. at the Beginning. There JJ^all come forth a ^
Rod out of the Stem of Jeffe, and a Branch Jhall grow out of his "
Roots -y and the Spirit of the Lord Jhall reft upon Him,~-T- The
Spirit of Knowledge, and of the Fear of the Lord : — IVith Righ-
teoifnej's Jhall He judge the Poor, and reprove with Equity ;-—- 1
Righteoufnefs pall be the Girdle of his Loins, ajid Faithfuhiefs.
the Girdle of his Reins. Chap. lii. 13. My Servant Jliall deal
prudently. Chap. iiii. 9. Becaufe He had done no Fiolcnce, neither h
was Grille found in his Mouth. If it be impoffible, that thefe li
Promifes fhould fail, and it be eafier for Heaven and Earth to pi
pafs aw^ay, than for one Jot or Tittle -of thefe Promifes of |d
God to pafs away, then it was impoflible that Chrift fhould
commit any Sin. Chrift himfelf fignified, that it was im-
poflible but that the Things which were fpoken concerning

Him fliould be fulfilled. Luk. xxiv. 44. That all Things mufi

be fulfilled, which were written in the Law of Mofes, and in
the Prophets, and in the Pjalnis concerning Me. Mat. xxvi. 53, 54.
Bui how then Jhall the Scripture be fulfJlcd, that thus it muji be ?
Mark xiv. 49. But the Scriptures muji be fulfilled. And fo the

Apoftle, ht\. i. 163 17, This Scripture mufi nmls have been

fulfillecL

4- A^i

Sed.II. neceflai-ily holy. 14.3

4. All the Promifes which were made to the Church of
old, of the Meffiah as' a future Saviour, from that made
to our firft Parents in Paradife, to that which was delivered
by the Prophet Malachl^ {hew it to be impoffible that Chrift
fhould not have perfevered in perfecSt Holinefs. The antient
Predictions given to God's Church, of the Meffiah as a
Saviour, were of the Nature of Promifes ; as is evident by
the Predictions themfelves, and the Manner of delivering
them. But they are exprefly, and very often called Prbmifcs
in the New-Teftament ; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Ads
I xiii. 32, 33. Rom, i. i, 2, 3. & Chap. xv. 8. Heh. vi. i-^^ &c«
Thefe Promifes were often made with great Solemnity, and
confirmed with an Oath ; as in Gen. xxii. 16. 17. By my f elf
have I Jworriy faith the Lord^ that in hleffing^ I will hlefs thee^ and
in multiplying^ I will multiply thy Seed, ai the Stars of Heaven, mid
as the Sand which is upon the Sea-Shore :— — And in thy Seed JhaU
i all the Nations of the Earth be hleffed. Compare Luke i. 72,73,
land Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The Apoftle in Heh. vi. 17, 18.
fpeaking of this Promife to Abraham, fays^ IVherein God wil-
! ling more abundantly to foew to the Heirs of Promife the Imniuta-'
bility of his Couifel, confirmed it by an Oath ; that by tW9
IMMUTABLE Things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE fir
God to lie, he might have Jlrong Conflation, — In which
Words, the Neceffity of the Accompiilbment, or (which is
the fame Thing) the Impojfihility of the contrary, is fully de-
clared. So God confirmed the Promife of the great Salva-
I tion of the MelTiah, made to David, by an Oath ; Pfal.Ixxxix*
j 3? 4' I have made a Covenant with my Chofen, I have fwom
I Unto David my Servant ; Thy Seed will I ejiablijh for ever, a7id
\ build up thylhrone to all' Generations. There is Nothing that
is fo abundantly fet forth jin Scripture, as fure and irrefra-
! gable, as this Promife and Oath to David, See PfaLlxxxix^
34> 355 36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Ifai. Iv. 3. ASf, ii. 29, 30,
J ,and xiii. 34. The Scripture exprefly fpeaks of it as utterly
1 impojjible th^t this Promife and Oath to David, concerning
\ the everlafting Dominion of the Meffiah of his Seed, fhould
I fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c. In thofe Days, and at that Time, I

f will caufe the Branch of Righteoujhefs to gj'oiu up unto David.

For thus faith the Lord, David fiall never want a Man to fit

upon the Throne of the Houfe o/Ifrael. ver. 20, 21. If you

can break my Covenant of the Day, and my Covenant of the Nighty
and that thert f/mdd not he Day and Niglt in their Seafon ; then
may alfo my Covenant be broken with David my Servant, that He
JJjoul'l not have a Sen to reign upon his Throne, So in ver. 25^

26. Thus abundant is the Scripture in reprefenting how

i?npolftbU

144- 1ley4£isoftheWi\\o^C\in9iy P.III.

impojfible it was, that the Promifes made of Old concerning
the great Salvation and Kingdom of the MefTiah ftiould
fail : Which implies, that it was impoffible that this Meffiah,
the fecond Jdam^ the promifed Seed of Ahrahamf and o{ David^
ffcould fall from his Integrity, as the firft Jdam did.

5. All the Promifes that were made to the Church of God
under the Old Teftament, of the great Enlargement of the
Church, and Advancement of her Glory, in the Days of
the Gofpel, after the Coming of the Meffiah ; the Increafe-
of her Light, Liberty, Holinefs, Joy, Triumph over her
Enemi2s,c5V. of which fo great a Part of the Old Tefta-
ment ccnfifts ; which are repeated fo often, are fo varioufly
exhibited, fo frequently introduced with great Pomp and So-
lemnity, and are fo abundantly fealed with typical and fym-
bolical P^eprefcntations j I fay, all thefe Promites imply,
that the Meffiah (hould perfed the Work of Redemption j
and this implies, that he fhould perfevere in the Work
"which the Father had appointed Him, being in all Things
conformed to his Will. Thefe Promifes were often confirm-
ed by an Oath. (See Ifat. liv. 9. with the Context; Chap.
Ixii. 18.) And it is reprefented as utterly impoffible that
thefe Promifes (hould fail. {Ifai. xlix. 15. with the Con-
text, Chap. liv. 10. with the Context ; Chap. li. 4, — 8. Chap.
xl. 8. with the Context.) And therefore it was impojfible, that
the Meffiah (liould fail, or commit Sin.

6. It was impGjJlhky that the Meffiah fhould fail of perfe-
vering in Integrity and Holinefs, as the firft Adam did,
becaiife this would have been inconfiftent with the Pro-
mifes which God made to the bleffed Virgin, his Mother,
and to her Hufband ; implying, that He Jhould Jave his People
from their Sins^ that God would give Him the Throne of his Fa-
ther David, that He jhould reign over the Houfe of Jacob for^
ever \ and that of Ins Kingdom there fmdd he no End. Thefe
Promifes were fure, and it was impoff.ble they fliould fail.
And therefore the Virgin Mary., in trufting fully to them,
adted reafonably, having an immovable Foundation of her
Faith ; as Elifaheth obferves, ver. 45. And hlejjed is fhe that
heiieveth ; for there J]:>all be a Performance of ihofe Things which
were told her from the Lord.

7. That it fliould have been poffible that Chrift (hould
fin, and fo fail in the Work of our Redemption, does not
confilt with the eternal Piurpofe and Decree of God,' reveal'd

Sed.II. neceffarily holy. 145

i in the Scriptures, that He would provide Salvation for fallen
I Man in and by Jefus Chrift, and that Salvation fhould be
i offered to Sinners through the Preaching of the Gofpel.
Such an abfolute Decree as this Armlniam don't deny.
Thus much at lead fout of all Controverfy) is implied in fuch
, Scriptures, as i Cor. ii. 7. £/,f. i. 4, 5. and Ch. iii. 9, 10, 11.
I Fet. i. 19, 20. Such an abfolute Decree as this, Armlniam
allow to be fignified in thefe Texts. And the Armlnmn
Ele6tion of Nations and Societies, and general Ele6tion
of the Chriftian Church, and conditional Ele6tiGn of parti-
cular Perfons, imply this. God could not decree before the
Foundation of the World, to fave all that fhould believe
in, and obey Chrift, unlefs he had abfolutely decreed that
Salvation fhould be provided, and effedually wrought out
by Chrift. And fmce (as the Armlniam themfelves ftrenu-
oufly maintain) a Decree of God infers Necejftty ; hence
it became necejfary that Chrift ftiould perfevere, and actually
work out Salvation for us, and that He fhould not fail by
the Commiffion of Sin.

■ 8. That it fnould have been pofTible for Chrift's Ho-
linefs to fail, is not confiftent with what God pro-
mifed to his Son before all Ages. For, that Salvation
fhould be offered to Men thro* Chrift, and beftowed on
all his faithful Followers, is what is at leaft implied in

1; that certain and infallible Promife fpoken of by the Apoftle,
Tit. i. 2. In hope of eternal Life ; which God^ that cannot Ile^

f promlfed before the TVorld be'ga?i. This don't feem to be con-

I troveitei by Armlniam. *

9, That it ftiould be pofTible for Chrift to fail of doing
his Father's Will, is inconftftent with the Promife made

t to the Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the
Father from the Beginning, before he took the human
Nature : as may be feen in Pfal. xl. 6,7, 8. (compar'd with

'the Apoftle's Interpretation, Heb, x. 5,-9. ) Sacrifice and
Offering thou did ft not defer e : mine Ears hajl thou opened., (or
tored ;) Burnt-Offering a7id Sln-Offerlng Thou hafe not required.,
Then f aid /, X^, I come : In the Volume of the Book It Is written
•f me^ I delight to do thy IFill., O my God., and thy Law Is with-
in my Heart. Where is a manifeft Allufion to the Cove-
nant which the willing Servant, who ioved his Mafter's Ser-
vice, made with his Mafter, to be his Servant for ever, on

T UiQ

* See Dr. ffhl/hy on the five Points, P. 48, 49, ;c^

14-6 TheASisoftheWi\\oiC\in9i, Partlll.

the Day wherein he had his Ear bored ; which Covenant
was probably inferted in the publick. Records, called the

Volume of the Book^ by the Judges, who were called to take -I

Cognizance of the Tranfadtion i Exod, xxi. If the Logosy \

who. was with the Father, before the World, and who made ':

the World, thus engaged in Covenant to do the Will of the :'

Father in the human Nature, and the Promife, was as it were 4
recorded, that it might be made fure, doubtlefs it was im-,^v

pofftble that it (hould fail j and fo it was impojftble that Chrift ^

fhould fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human u

Nature. ^

ro. If it was poflible for Chrift to have failed of doing
the Will of his Father, and fo to have failed of effedually
working out Red(?inption for Sinners, then \^\t Salvation of
all the Saints, who were faved from the Beginning of the
World, to the Death of Chrift, was not built on a firm
Foundation. The Mefliah, and the Redemption which He
was to work out by^ his Obedience unto Death, was the.
Foundation of the Salvation of all the Pofterity of fallen
Man, that ever were faved. Therefore, if when the Old-
Teftament Saints had the Pardon of their Sins, and the Fa-
vour of God promifed them, and Salvation beftawed upon
them, ftiil it was poflible that the Mefliah, when he came,
might commit Sin, then all this was on a Foundation that
was not firm and ftable, but liable to fail j fomething which
it was poflible might never be. God did as it Vv'ere truft
to what his Son had engaged and promifed to do in future .
Time ; and depended fo much upon it, that He proceeded
actually to fave Men on the Account of it, as tho' it had been
already done. But this Truft and Dependance of God, on
the Suppofltion of Chrift's being liable to fail of doing his
Will, was leaning on a Staff that was weak, and might-
pollibly break. The Saints of old trufted on the Promifes"
of a future Redemption to be wrought out and compieated
by the Melfiah, and built their Comfort upon it : Abraham
^aw Chrift's Day and rejoyccd j and he and the other Pa-
triarchs died in the Faith of the Promife of it. ( Hcb.x\.ii^,)
But on this Suppofltion, their Faith and their* Comfort, and
their Salvation, was built on a moveable fallible P'oundation ;
Chrift was not to them a tried Stone, a fure Foundation ; as.
in 7/?//. xxviii. i6. Da-vid cniixoXy refted on the Covenant of
God with him, concerning the future glorious Dominion aiVd
Salvationof theiVIefflah,of his Seed ; fays, it was all hisSahationy
and all his D£ fin ; and comfort;; himfclf that this Covenant was

Seca.II. neceffarily ic?^. 147

an everlafting Covenant^ ordered in all Things and fure^ 2 Sam.
xxiii. 5. But if Chrift's Vertue might fail, he was miftaken :.
his great Comfort was not built fo fure, as he thought it
was, being founded entirely on the Determinations of the
Free-Wiil of Chrift's human Soul ; which was fubje6l to no
NeceiFity, and might be determined either one Way or the
other. Alfo the Dependance of thofe who looked for Re-
demption in Jerufalcm^ and waited for the Confolation of
Ifrael^ [Luh ii. 25. & 38.) and the Confidence of the Difci-
pies of Jefus, who forfook all and followed Him, that they
might enjoy the Benefits of his future Kingdom, was built
on a fandy Foundation.

.11. The Man Chrift Jefus, before he had finifhed his
Courfe of Obedience, and while in the midil of Tempta-
tions and Trials, was abundant in pofitively predicting his
own future Glory in his Kingdom, and the Enlargement of
his Church, the Salvation of the Gentiles through Him &c.
and in Promifes of Bleffings he would beftow on his true
Difciples in his future Kirip;dom ; on which Promifes he re-
quired the full Dependence of his Difciples. (Jjh. xiv.).
But tlie Difciples would have had no Ground for fuch De-
pendance, if Chrift had been liable to fail in his Work :
And Chrift Himfelf would have been guilty of Prefumption,
in fo abounding in peremptory Promifes of great Things,
which depended on a nieer Contingence ; nji-z. the Determi-
nations of his free Will, confifting in a Freedom ad iitrnm-
^ue^ to either Sin or Holinefs,. ftanding in Indifference, and
incident, in Thoufands of future Inilances, to go either one
I Way or the other.

Thus it is evident, that it was impofflble that the Ac5\s cf
the Will of the human Soul of Chrift Ihould be otherwife
than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, u\
ibther Words, they were neceflarily fo conformed.

I have been the longer in the Proof of this Matter, it being
a Tiling denied by feme of the greateft Arminhuis^ hy EpJfcopius
in particular ; and becaufe I look upon It as a Point ck-ariyand
abfolutely determining the Controverfy between Caivi?ii/h and
Jrjnimans^ concerning the Nccefftty of fuch a Freedom ot
Will as is infifted on by the latter, in order to moral Agen-
cy, Vertue, Command or Prohibition, Promife or Thi ear-
ning, Reward or Punilhment, Praife or Difpraife, Ment or
Demerit. I now therefore proceed,

T 2 • ][, To

148 Christ's Righteoufnefs

II. To confider whether Christ, in his holy Behaviour
on Earth, was not thus a moral Agent ^ fubje<St to Commandi^
Proynifes^ &c.

Dr. JVhitby very often fpeaks of what he calls a Freedom
0d utriimllbet^ without NecefTity, as requifite to Law and Com-
mands ; and fpeaks of Neceflity as entirely inconfiftent with
JnjunSfions and Prohibitions, But yet we read of Chrift's being
the Subjedl of the Commands of his Father, Joh, x, 18,
and XV. 10. And Chrift tells us, that every Thing that He
faid^ or did^ was in Compliance with Com?nandments he had re-
ceived of the Father ; Joh. xii, 49, 50. h xiv. 31. And we I
often read of Chrift's Obedience to his Father's Commands,
Rom. V. 19. Fhil ii, 18. Heh. v. 8.

The foremention'd Writer reprefents Promifes offered as
Motives to Perfons to do their Duty, or a being moved and in-
duced by Prc?nifes^ as utterly inconfiftent with a State wherein
perfons have not a Liberty ad utrumlibet^ but are neceftarily
determined to one. (See particularly, P. 298. & 31 1.) But
the Thing which this Writer afferts, is demonftrably falfe,
if the Chriftian Religion be true. If there be any Truth in
Chriftianity or the holy Scriptures, the Man Chrift Jefus
had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfruftrably deter-
mined to Good, and that alone ; but yet he had Promifes
of glorious Rewards made to Him, on Condition of his per-
fevering in, and perfe(5>ing the Work which God had ap-
pointed Him ; Ifai, hii. 10, 11, 12. Pfal. ii. & ex. Ifai^
xlix. 7, 8, 9.— In Luke xxii. 28, 29. Chrift fays to his Dif-
ciples, Te are They which have continued with me in my Tempta^
tions y and I appoint unto you a Kingdom^ as my Father hath ap-*
poirited unto ?ne. The Word moft properly fignifies to ap-
point by Covenant,orPromife. The plainMeaning of Chrift's
V/ords is this : " As you have partook of my Temptations
^^ andTrials,and have been ftedfaft, & have overcome ; I pro-
^' mife to make youPartakers of my Rewardjand to give you a
"^^ Kingdom ; as the Father has promifed me a Kingdom
*< for continuing ftedfaft, and overcoming in thofe Trials/*
And the Words are well explained by thofe in Rev. iii. 21^
To hi?n. that overomicth^ will I grant to fit with me in my Throne\
^ven as I alfo overcame^ and am jet down with my Father in his
Throne, And Chrift had not only Promifes of glorious Suc-
ct:is and Rewards made to his Obedience and Sufferings,
tut the Scriptures plainly reprefent Fiim as ufing thefe Pro-
luilcs ioi' Motives and Inducements to obey and fuffer ; and

particulajcly

Sed.II. Pratfe-worthy^rewardable^t^c. 149

particularly that Promife of a Kingdom which the Father
had appointed Him,or fitting with theFather on his Throne ;
as in Heb. xii. i,2- Let us lay afide every Weighty and the Sin
which doth eafly befet us^ and let us run with Patience the Race
that is Jet before uSy looking unto Jefus^ the Author and Finijher
of our Faith ; who for the Joy that was fet before Him^ endured
the Crofs^ defpifing the Shame, and is fet down on the right Hand
1 of the Throne of God.

And how ftrange would it be to hear any Chriftian aflert,
that the holy and excellent Temper and Behaviour of Je-
fus Chrifl, and that Obedience which he performed under
fuch great Trials, was not vertuous or P7-aife-worthy ; becaufe
his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either Holinefs or Sin,
but was unalterably determin'd to one ; that upon this Ac-
count, there is no Vertue at all, in all Chrift's Humility,
Meeknefs, Patience, Charity, Forgivenefs of Enemies, Con-
tempt of the World, Heavenly-mindednefs, Submiffion to
the Will of God, perfed Obedience to his Commands,
(tho' He was obedient unto Death, even the Death of the
Crofs) his great Compaifion to the AfHicSted, his unparai-
lel'd Love to Mankind, his Faithful nefs to God and Man,
under fuch great Trials •, his praying for his Enemies, even
when nailing Him to the Crofs ; That Vertue^ when applied
to thefe Things, is but an empty Name ; That there was no
Merit in any of thefe Things ; that is, that Chrift was wor^
I thy of Nothing at all on the Account of them, worthy of no
I Reward, no Praife, no Honour or Refpe6t from God or
Man ; Becaufe his Will was not indifferent, and free either
to thefe Things, or the Contrary ; but under fuch a ftrong
Inclination or Bias to the Things that were excellent, as
made it impojfihle that he fliould chufe the contrary ; That
upon this Account (to ufe Dr. Whitby s Language) // would
he fenfibly umeafonable that the human Nature fhould be re-
warded for any of thefe Things.

According to this Doctrine, That Creature who is evi-
dently fet forth in Scripture as the Firji-born of every Crea^
ture, as having iyi all Things the Pre-eminence, and as the high-
eft of all Creatures in Vertue, Honour, and Worthinefs of
Efteem, Praife and Glory, on the Account of his Vertue, is
lefs worthy of Reward or Praife, than the very leaft of Saints ;
yea, no more worthy than a Clock or meer Machine, that is
purely palfr/e, and moved by natural Neceflity.

1 50 Christ's Rightcoufncfs Part III. l!

If we judge by fcriptural Reprefentatlpns of Things, wc j
have Reafon to fuppofc, that Chrift took on him our Na- ^
ture, and dwelt witji us in this World, in a fuffering t
State, not only to fatisfy for our Sins ; but that He, being i
in. our Nature and Circumilances, and under our Trials, ' <
might be our moft fit and proper Example, Leader and ' u
Captain, in the Exercife of glorious and vidorious Ver-' p
tue, and might be a vifible Inftancc of the glorious End ;,c
and Reward of it -, That we might fee in Him the ui
Beauty, Amiablenefs, and true Honour and Glory, and |j
exceeding Benefit of that Virtue, which it is proper for us |
human Beings to pra6life ; and might thereby learn, and la
be animated, to feck the like Glory and Honour, and to [i

obtain the like glorious Reward. See Heb. ii. 9, 14, m

•with V. 8,9. and xii, i, 2, 5. Joh. xv. 10. Rom.xin. 17. j|
2 Tim, ii. II. 12. I Pet. ii. 19,20. & iv. 13. But if there \l
was Nothing of any Vertue or Merit, or Worthinefs of any :j
Reward, Glory, Praife or Commendation at all, in all that !>;
He did, becaufe it was all necefiary, and He could not ^1
help it ; then how is here any Thing fo proper to animate i
and incite us, free Creatures, by patient Continuance in it
well-doing, to feck for Honour, Glory, and Vertue ? ^

God fpcaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed with ;i
the Righteoufnefs of this Servant of his. Ifai. xlii. 21. Thg ■•i
Lord is well pleafed foj- his Righteoufnefs fake. The Sacrifices of ]\
old are fpoken of as a fweet Savour to God, but the Obe- [3
dience of Chriil: as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. fi

xl. 6, 7. Sacrifice and Offering Thou iiidjl not defire : Aline |.j

Ear haji Thou opened [as thy Servant performing willing
Obedience j] Burnt -Off'ering and Sin-Offering hnji thou not re-
quired : Then f aid /, Lo^ I co?ne [as a Sei-vant that chearfully
anfwers the Calls of his Mafter :] I delight to do thy Will,, O
my God, and thy Law is ivithin mine Heart, Matth. xvii. 5. p
This is my lelo'ved Son, in whom I am well-pleafed.' And' >
Chrift tells us exprefly, that the Father loves Him for tl
that wonderful Inftance of his Obedience, his voluntarily |'
yielding himfelf to Death, in Compliance with the P'ather's P
Command. Joh. x. 17, 18. Therefore doth my Father love me^ i

lecaufe I lay down my Life : No Man taketh it from me ; J

hut 1 lay it down of my felf This Command7nent received I of

iny Father,

And if there was no Merit in Chrift's Obedience unto
Death, if u was not worthy of Piaife, and of the moft

glorious

Sc(3:.II. Praife-worthy^rewardaMe^^c.^ i 5I'

glorious Rewards, the heavenly Hods were exceedingly
miftaken, by the Account that is given of them, in Rev. v.
%,— 12.— The four Beafls and the four and twenty Elders fell,
dozun before the Lamb^ . having every one of them Harps^ mid

golden Fials full of Odours ; Jnd they Jiing a new Song^ fay-

ing, . Thou art JFORTHT to take the Btok^ and to open the

Seals thereof ', for Thou waji Jlain^ And I beheld, and 1

heard ike Voice of many Jngels round about the Throne^ and the ■
Beafls^ and the Riders, and the Number of the?n was ten Ihoufand-
Times ten Thoufand, and Thoufands of Tlmfands, faying with a loud
Voice, WORTHY is the Lamb that was Jlain, to receive Power^,
and Riches, and IVifdom, . and Strength, and Honour, and Glory^
md Blejfmg,

, Chrifl fpeaks of the eternal Life which He was to re*
ceive, as the Reward of his Obedience to the Father's Com-i
mandments. Joh. xii. 49, 50. / have not fpoken of my f elf ; but
the Father which fent me. He gave me a Conwiandmcnt what _ /
foould fay, and what I Jhould fpeak : And I know that his Com-
manchnent is Life everlafling : IVJ^atfoever I fpeak therefore, even
as the Father Jaid unto me, fo 1 fpeaL---God promifes to di-
vide Flim a Portion with the great Sec. for his being his
righteous Servant, for his glorious Vertue under fuch great
Trials & Sufferings. Ifai. liii. 11,12.^ He Jhall fee of the Travel
of his Soul and be fatisfied : By his Knowledge jhall my righteous'
\ Servant juflify many -, for he Jhall bear their Iniquities, Therefore
will I divide him a Portion tvith the Great, and he flmll divide the
Spoil -with the Strong, becaufe He hath poured out his Soul unto

Death. The Scriptures reprefent God as rewarding Him

far above all his other Servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. He took on
Him the Form of a Servant, and was made in the Likenefs of
Men : arid being found in Fajhion ai a Man, He humbled himfelf,
: and became obedient unU^ Death, even the. Death of the Crofs :
Wherefore GOD alfo hath highly .exalted Him, and given Him a
Name above every Name.—'jPM. xiv. 7. Thou lovefl Righieoifnejs,
and hatefl JVickednefs ; Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed Thee
With the Oil of Gladnefs above thy Fellows,

There is no Room to pretend, that the glorious Benefits
beilowed in Confequence of Chrift's Obedience, are not pro-
perly of the Nature of a Rev/ard. What is a Reward, in
the moil proper Senfe, but a Benefit bellowed in Confe-
quence of lomething ^morally exceiient in Quality or Beha-
^'iour, in Teftimony of weii-pieafednefs in that moral Ex-
:cjjency> and Rcfpe<5l and Favour on that Account ? If

152 Christ's Righteoufnefsj^c*. Partlll,

We confider the Nature of a Reward moft ftn(5lly, and make
the utmoft of it, and add to the Things contained in this
Defcription, proper Merit or Worthinefs, and the Beftow-
ment of the Benefit in Confequence of a Promife ; ftill it
will be found, there is Nothing belonging to it, but that
the Scripture is moft exprefs as to it's belonging to the
Glory beftowed on Chrift, after his Sufferings ; as appears
from what has been already obferved : There was a glo-
rious Benefit beflowed in Confequence of fomething mo-
rally excellent, being called Righteoufnefs and Obedience ;
There was great Favour, Love and Well-pleafednefs, for
this Righteoufnefs and Obedience, in the Beftower ; There
was proper Merit, or Worthinefs of the Benefit, in the O-
bedience ; It was beftowed in Fulfilment of Promifes,made
to that Obedience ; and was beftowed therefor, or becaufi
he had performed that Obedience.

I may add to all thefe Things, that Jefus Chrifl,
while here in the Flefh, was manifellly in a State of Trial.
The laft Adam^ as Chnfl is called, i Cor, xv. 45. Rom.v. 14.
taking on Hun the human Nature, and fo the Form of
a Servant, and being under the Law, to fland and a6t for

us, was put into a State of Trial, as the firit Adam was.

Dr. Whitby mentions thefe three Things as Evidences of
Perfons being in a State of Trial (on the live Points, P. 298,
299.) namely. Their Afflidions being fpoken of as their
Triafs or Temptations, their being the Subjeds of Promifes,
and their being expofed to Satan's Temptations. But Chrift
was apparently the Subjed of each of thefe. Concerning
Promifes made to Him, I have fpoken already. The
Difficulties and AffiiBionz He met v^ith in the Courfe of his
Obedience, are called his Temptations or l^riaU^ Luke xxii. 28.
Ye are they which have continued with me in my Temptations, or
Trials. Heb. ii. 18. For in that he Himfelf hath fuffered, being
tempted [or tried] He is able to fuccour them that are tempted*
And Chap. iv. 15. We have not an High-Prieji, which cannot bt
touched with the Feeling of our Infirmities ; but was in all Points
tempted, like as we are^ yet without Sin. And as to his being
tempted by Satan, it is what none will difpute.

S E c T J Oif

( ^53 )

Section III.
The Cafe offuch as are given up of God to
Sin, and (t/' fallen Man in general^ proves
moral Necejfity and Inability to be con-*
fijient with Blame-worthinefs.

R. fFhiiby aflerts Freedom, not only from Coac^ion,
but Neceffity, to be eflential to any Thing deferving
the Name of Sin, and to an Adion's being cuipa^
hie: in thefe Words (Difcourfe on five Points, Edit. 3.P.348.)
*' If they be thus neceflitated, then neither their Sins of O^
*' mifTion or Commiffion could deferve that Name ; it be-
*' ing efTential to the Nature of Sin, according to St. AufitrC^
*' Definition, that it be an Action, a quo liberum efl ahfi'mere^
*' Three Things feem plainly neceffary to make an Adion
•' or Omiffion culpable ; i. That it be in our Power to
** perform or forbear it : For, as OrigeUy and all the Fa*
*' thers fay, no Man is blame-worthy for not doing what
" He could not do." — And clfewhere the Doctor infills, that
*' when any do Evil of Neceffity, what they do is no Vice^
" that they are guilty of no Fault, || are worthy of no
" Blame, Difpraife, % or Diftionour, \ but are unblamea-
" ble. *

If thefe Things are true, in Dr. lVJMy\ Senfe of Neceffity,
they will prove all fuch to be blamelefs, who are given up of
God to Sin, in what they commit after they are thus given
up. That there is fuch a Thing as Men's being judici-
ally given up to Sin, is certain, if the Scripture rightly in-
forms us ; fuch a Thing being often there fpoken of : as m
Pfal. Ixxxi. 12. So I gave them up to their oivn Hearts Lujly
. and they ivalked in their ownCounfeh. A61. vii. 42. TJyenGod twned^
and gave them up ta worjhip toe Hoji of Heaven, Rom. i. 24,
Wherefore, God alfo gave them up to UncleannefSy through the
Lu/ls of their own Hearts, to dijhonour their own Bodies between
Themfelves, Ver. 26. For this Cauje God gave them up to vile Af*
feSiions. Ver. 28. And even as they did not like to retain God in
their Knowledge, God gave them over to a reprubati Mind, t9 do
thofe Things that are not convenient,

V Tis

5 Difc. oh £vePoins. P. 347. 360, 361. 377. % 303^ 325. 329.
and many other Places, f 371. * 304. 361,

154 Of the Inability-^ Sin offuch PartllL

'Tis needlefs to iland particularly to inquire, what God's
giving Men up to their own Heart* s Liifls fignities : . It is fuffi-
cient to obferve, that hereby is certainly meant God's fo or-
dering or difpjpfing Things, in fome Refpedt or other, either
by doing or forbearing to do, as that the Confequence (hould
be Men's continuing in their Sins. So much as Men >are
given up to^ fo much is the Confequence of their being
given up ; whether that be lei5 or more. If God don't 6rder
Things fo, by Adtion or Permiffion, that Sin will be the
Confequence, then the Event proves that they are not given
up to that Confequence. If Good be the Confequence, in-
Head of Evil, then God's Mercy is to be acknowledged in
that Good ; which Mercy muft be contrary to God^s
Judgment in giving up to Evil. If the Event muft prove
that they are given up to Evil as the Confequence, then the
Perfons who are the Subjects of this Judgment, muft be the
Subjeds of fuch an Event, and fo the Event is neceifary.

If not only CoaS^lon^ but all NeceJJity^ will prove Men
blamelefs, then Judas was blamelefs, after Chrift had given
kim ov^er, and had already declared his certain Damnation,
and that he Ihould verily betray Him. He was guilty of no
Siu in betraying his Mafter, on this Suppofition ; tho his fo
doing is fpoicen of by Chrift as the moft aggravated Sin,
more heinous than the Sin of Filate in crucifying Him.
And the Jews in Egypt ^ in Jereimah's Time, were guilty of
no Sin, in their not worfhipping the true God, after God
had Sworn by his great Name^ that his Name Jl^ould he no more
named in the Alouth of any Man <?/" Judah, in all the Land of
Egypt. Jer. xliv. 26.

Dr. Whithy (Difc. on five Points. P. 302, 303) denies, that
Men, in this World, are ever fo given up by God to Sin, that
their Vv^ills fnould be necelTarily determined to Evil ; tho' He
Gv/ns, tnat hereby it may. become exceeding difficult for Men to
do Good, having a ftrong Bent, and powerful Inclination to
what is Evii.— But \i we ftiould allow the Cafe to be juft as
he reprefcnts, the Judgment of giving up to Sin will no better
agree with his Notions of that Liberty, which is effential
to Praife or Blame, than if we fhould fuppofe it to render the
avoiding of Sin i?npcjjible. For if an ImpoJJibility of avoiding
Sin wholly excufes a Man 5 then, for the fame Reafon, it's
being difficult to avoid it excufes Him in Part ; and this

iu.^ in Proportion to the Degree of DijBiculty. If the

'. Influence

Seft. Hi. as are given up to Sin. 155

j Influence of- W(7r^/Impoffibility or Inability be the fame, tcj
; fexcufe Perfons in not doing, or not avoiding any Thing,
, as that oi natural Inabihty, (which is fuppofed) then undoubt-
I edly, in like Manner, moral Difficulty has the fame Influence
I to tXQuit W\\h natural Difficulty. But all allow, that natural
j Impoflibility wholly excufes,; and alfo that natural Difficulty
j excufes in rart, and makes the A6t,or Omiflion lefs blame-
able, in Proportion to the Difliculty. AW natui-al Difficult j^^
according to the plaineft Didtates of the Light of Nature,
excufes in fome Degree, fo that the Negle6l is- not fo blame-
j able, as if there had been no Brfliculty in the Gafe : - and fo
the greater the Difliculty is, ftill the more excufable, in Pro-
i f)ortion to the Increafe of the Difficulty. And as naiural Im-.
polfibility wholly excufes and excludes all Blame,, fo the nearec
the Difliculty approaches to Impolhbility, ftill 'th'e nearer a
Perfon is to Blamelefnefs, in Proportion to that •Approach.
And if the Cafe of moral Impoffibility or Necellity, be jufl: the
fame with natural Necellity orCo-adtion, as to Influence to'
excufe a Negitd, then alio, for the fame Reafon, the Cafe of
natural Difliculty don't difi^er in Iniluence,to excviie a'Negle(5f,
from moral Difficulty, arifing from a ftrong Bias or Bent to
I'^vil, fuch as Dr. IFhnly owns in the Cafe of thofe that are
given up to their own Hearts Lulls. So that the Fault of
luch Peribns muft be leffen'd^ in Proportion to the Diffi-
culty, and Approach to Impoflibility. If ten Degrees of
moral Difficulty make the Adion quite impoffible, and fo
wiiolly excufe, then if there be nine Degrees of Difficulty,
the Peribn is in great Part excufed, and is nine Degrees in
ten, lefs blame-worthy, than if there had been no Difficulty
at ell ; and he has but one Degree of Blame-worlhinefs.
The Reafon is plain, on Arminian Principles ; vvz. becaufe as
Difficulty, by antecedent Bent and Bias on the Will, is in-
creafed, Liberty of Indiff'erence, and Self-determination in
theWill, is diminifhed : fo much Hindrance and Impediment
is there, in the Way of the Will's ading freely, by meer
Self-determination. And if ten Degrees of fuch Hindrance
take away all fuch Liberty, then nine Degrees take away
! nine Parts in ten, and leave but one Degree of Liberty.
, . And therefore there is but one Degree of Blameablenefs,
j ceteris paribus^ in the Negle61: \ the Man being no further
' blameable in what He does, or negle6fs, than he has Liberty
' in that Aflfair : For Blame or Praife (fay they) arifes wholly
i from a good Ufe or Abufe of Liberty.

y 2 From

IS6 Of the Inability^ Sin Part III.

From all which it follows, that a ftrong Bent and Bias one
Way, and Difficulty of going the contrar)^, never caufes a
Ferfon to be at all more expofed to Sin, or any Thing blame-
zh\t: Becaufe as the Difficulty is increafed, lb much the lefs
is required and expedted. Tho' in one Refped, Expofednefs
to Sin or Fault is increafed, viz. by an Increafe of Expofed-
nefs to the evij Action or Omiffion ; yet it is dimimfhed in
another Refpe<5t, to ballance it ; namely, as the Sinfulnefs
or Blameablenefs of the A6lion or Omillion is diminilhed in
the fame Proportion. So that, on the whole, the Affair, as
to Expofednefs to Guilt or Blame, is left jufl as it was.

To illuftratc this, let us fuppofe a Scale of a Balance to be
intelligent, and a free Agent, and indued with a ielf-moving
Power, by Virtue of which it could a6t and produce Efie(5ts
to a certain Degree ; ex, gr. to move it felf up or down with
a Force equal to a Weight of ten Pounds ; and that it might
therefore be required of it, in ordinary Circumftances, to
move it felf down with that Force ; for which it has Power
and full Liberty, and therefore would be -blame-worthy \( it
fail'd of it. But then let us fuppofe a Weight of ten Pounds
to be put in the oppolite Scale, which in Force entirely cpun*
ter-balances it's felf-moving Power, and fo renders it impolii^
blefor it to move down at all ; and therefore wholly. excufes it^
from any fuch Motion. But if we fyppofe there to be only
pine Pounds in the oppofite Scale, this renders it's MptiOn
not impoffible, but yet more difficult ; fo that it can now
only move down with the Force of one Pqund : But how-
ever, this is all that is required of it vjnder thefe Circum-
flances ; it is wholly excufed from nine Parts of its Motion :
And if the Scale, under thefe Circumftances, neglc6ts to
inove, and remains at Refl, all that it will be blamed for, v.-ili
be it's Negle6t of that one tenth Part of it's Motion ; which
it had as much Liberty and Advantage for, as in ufual Cir^*
cumftances, it has for the greater Motion, which in fuch a
Cafe would be reqLjired. So th^t this new Difficulty, don't
^t ^11 increafe its Expofednefs to any Thing blame-worthy.

And thus the very Suppofition of Difficulty in the ^Way
of a Man's Duty^ or Proclivity to Sin, thro' a being given
Vp to Hardnefs of Heart, or indeed by any other Means
■yvhatfoever, is an Inconfiftence, according to Dr. lVhHhy%
Notions of Liberty,Vertue and Vice, Blame and Praife. The
avoiding Sin and Blame, and the doing what is vertuous
i^nd Jj^'faife-werthy, muft be jdways equally eafy.

Dr.

Sc£l.lII. of fallen Man. 157

Dr. W}nihy\ Notions of Liberty, Obligation, Vertue, Sin,
&c. lead Him into another great Inconfiftence. He abun-
dantly infifts, that Neceffity is inconliftent with fne Nature of
Sin or Fault. He fays in the foremention'd Treatife, P. 14.
Who can blame a Ferfon for doing what he could not help ? and P. 1 5.
// being fenftbly unjujl^ to punijh any Man for doing that which it
was ne^er in his Poiver to avoid. And in P. 341. to confirm
his Opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, faying, Why doth
God command^ if Man hath Jiot Free-will and Fower to obey ? And
again in the fame and the next Page, IVho will not cry out^
that it is Folly to command hm^ that hath 7iot Liberty to do what is
commanded ; and thai it is unjuf to condeinn Him^ that has it not in
his Fower to do what is required? And in P. 373. He cites
another faying, A Law is given to Him that can turn to both
Parts ; i. e. cbfy or tranfgrefs it : Bitt no Law caii he againjl Him.
\vho is hound by Natuj-^.

And yet the fame Dr. PFhithy ailcrts, that fallen Man is not
able to perform perfe6l Obedience. In P. 165. He has thefe
Words, ^' The Nature of Jdam had Power to continue in-
.*' nocent, and without Sin ; whereas it is certain, our Nature
*' never had fo." But if we han't Power to continue innocent
and without Sin, then Sin is confiftent with Neceffity, and we
may be fmful in that which we have not Power to avoid ;
and thofe Things can't be true, which He aflerts elfewhere,
nan^ly, " That if we be necelTitated, neither Sins of Omiflion
" nor Commiffion, would deferve that Name. (P. 348.) If
we have it not in our Power to be innocent, then we have
it not in our Power to be blamelefs : and if fo, we are un-
der a Necelhty of being blame-worthy. And how does this
confift with what he fo often alferts, that Necellity is in-'
confiftent with Blame or Praife ? If we have it not in our
Power to perform perfe6t Obedience to ail the Coifimands of
God, then we are under a NecelTity of breaking fome
Commands, in fome Degree ; having no Power to perform
fo much as is commanded. And if fo, why does he cry out
of the Unreafonablenefs and Folly of commanding beyond
what Men have Power to do ?

And Armimans in general are vtry inconfiftent w^ith them-
ftlves in what they lay of the Inability of fallen Man in this
Refpedl. They ftrenuoufly maintain, that it would be un-
juft in God, to require any thing of us beyond our prefent
*Power and Ability to perform ; and alfo hold, that we are
now undblc to perform perfect Obedience, and that Chrift

died

J 58 Of de Inability (^/^ fallenMan. Part III.

died to fatisfy for the ImperfeSfions of our Obedience^ and has
made Way that our impertecSt Obedience might be accept-
ed inftead of perfect : Wherein they feem infenfibly to run
themfelves into the groiTeft Inconfiftence. For, (as I have
obferved elfewherej *' They hold that God in Mercy to
*' Mankind has aboiiflied that rigorous Conftitution or LaWj
*' that they were under originally ; and inftead of it, has in-
*' troduced a more mild Conftitution, and put us under a
*' new Law, which requires no more than imperfed fmcere
*' Obedience, in Compliance with our poor inlirm impotent
*' Circumftances fmce the Fall."

Now, how can thefe Things be made confiftent ? I would
sfk what Law thefe Imperfedions of our Obedience are a
Breach of ? If they are a Breach of no Law that jwe were
ever under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not
Sins, what Need of Chrift's dying to fatisfy for them ? But
if they are Sins, and the Breach of fome Law, what Law is
it ? They can't be a Breach of their new Law ; for that
requires no other than imperfe(5t Obedience, or Obedience
with Imperfedions : And therefore to have Obedience attend-
ed with Imperfections, is no Breach of it ; for 'tis as much
as it requires. And they can't be a Breach of their old Law ;
for that,they fay, is entirely aboliIhed,and we never were under
it..--- They fay, it would not be juft in God to require
of us pertecSl Obedience, becaufe it would not be juft to re-
quire more than we can perform, or to punifh us for failing
of it. And therefore, by their own Scheme, the Imper-
feflions of our Obedience don't deferve to be puniftied.
What need therefore of Chrift's dying, to fatisfy for them ?
What need of his Sufferings to fatisfy for that which is no
Fault, and in it's own Nature deferves no fuffering ? "What
need of Chnft's dying, to purchafe, that our imperfeSl Obedi-
ence fnould be accepted, when according to their Scheme,^
it would be unjuft in it felf, that any other Obedience than
imperfci^ ihould be required ? What need of Chrift's dying
to make Way for God's accepting fuch an Obedience, as
it would be unjuft in Him not to accept ? Is there any
Need of Chrift's dying, to prevail with God not to do un-

righteoufly ? If it be faid, that Chrift died to fatisfy

tliat old Law for us, that io we might not be under it, but that
there might be Room for our being under a more mild Law ;
ftiil I would inquire, what Need of Chrift's dying that
we might not be under a Law, which (by their Principles).
it would be in it felf unjuft that we ftxouJd be under, whe-
ther

Se£t. IV. Of Inability^ and OhXig^Xiori. 159

ther Ghrift had died or no, becaufe in our prefent State we
are not able to keep it ?

' So the Jrmimans are inconfiftent with thcmfelves, not
op]y- in what they fay of the Need of ChrilVs Satisfac-
tion ;,to attone for thofe ImperfecStions which we cannot
avoid," but alfo in what they fay of the Grace of God,
granted to enable Men to perform the fincere Obedience of
the new Law. " I grant (fays Dr. Stebbing *) indeed, that
.« by Reafon of original Sin, we are utterly difabled for the
*' Performance of the Condition, without new Grace from
' ' God. But I fay then, that He gives fuch Grace to all of
" us, by which the Performance of the Condition is truly
*' poffible : And upon this Ground he may, and doth moil
'" righteoufly require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to fpeak
properly, by Grace he muft mean, that AlTiftance which is of
Grace, or of free Favour and Kindnefs. But yet in the fame
Place he fpeaks of it as very unreafonable^ ^^^j^i/^ and cruel^ for
God to require that, as the Condition of Pardon, that is be-
come impolTible by original Sin. If it be fo, what Grace is
there in giving AiTiftance and Ability to perform the Condi -
% tion of Pardon ? Or why is that called by the Name of
\ Grace, that is an abfolute Debt, which God is bound to be-
ftow, and which it would be unjuft and cruel in Him to
with-hold, feeing he requires that, as the Condition of PariJt9k^
which we cannot perform without it ?

Section IV.

Command, and Obligation to Obedience,

conjiftent with moral Inability to obey.

IT being fo much infifted on by Arminian Writers, that
NecelTity is inconfiftent with Law or Command, and
particularly, that it is abfurd to fuppofe God by his
Command Ihould requrre that of Men which they are una-
ble to do ; not allowmg in this Cafe for any Difference that
there is between natural and moral Inability ; I would there-
fore now particularly confider this Matter.

And

* Treatife of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 Edit. P. 1 1 z, 113.

1 60 Commands conf^Jlent Part IIL

And for the greater Clearnefs, I would diftin(5lly lay down

the following Things.

I. The Will it itXU and not only thofe A6Vions which arc
the Effe6^s of the Will^ is the proper Obje6t of Precept of
Command. That is, fuch or fuch a State or A6ts of Men's
Wills, is in many Cafes, properly required of them /by
Command ; and not only thofe Alterations in the State of
their Bodies or Minds that are the Confequences of Volition»
This is moil manifeft ; for 'tis the Soul only, that is properly
and directly the Subjedl of Precepts or Commands j that /.
only being capable of receiving or perceiving Commands.,'
The Motions or State of the Body are Matter of Command,
only as they are fubjecfl to the Soul, and conneded with
it's A6ts. But now the Soul has no other Faculty whereby
it can, in the moft dire6t and proper Senfe, confent, yield to^
or comply with any Command, but the Faculty of the Will ;
and 'tis by this Faculty only, that the Soul can diredly dif-
obey, or refufe Compliance : For the very Notions of
Confentmgy TieUing^ Accepting^ Complying^ Refuftng^ RejeSimg &c.
are, according to the Meaning of the Terms, Nothing but
certain Ads of the Will. Obedience, in the primary Na-
ture of it, is the fubmitting and yielding of the Will of one
to the Will of another. Difobedience is the not eonfent-
i«g, not complying of the Will of the commanded to the
manifefted Will of the Commander. Other A61s that are
not the Adfs of the Will, as certain Motions of the Body
and Alterations in the Soul, are Obedience or Difobedience
only indiredly, as they are connected with the State or
Adions of the Will, according to an eftablilhed Law of
Nature. So that 'tis manifefl, the Will it {t\i may be re-
quired : And the Being of a good Will is the mort proper,
diredt and immediate Subjedt of Command j and if this
can't be prefcribed or required by Command or Precept, no-
thing can ; For other Things can be required no otherwife
than as they depehd upon, and are the Fruits of a good Will,

Corol. I. If there be feveral Ads of the Will, or a Series
of Ads, one following another, and one the Effed of ano-
ther, the firfi and dettr?n:mng A^ is properly the Subjed of
Command, and not only the confequent Ads, which are de*
pendent upon it. Yea, 'tis this more efpecially which is that
which Command or Precept has a proper Refped to ; be-
caufe 'tis this Ad that determines the whole Affair : In this
Ad rh.cObedience orDifobediencc lies, in a peculiar Manner ;

the

i Sed. IV. with moral Inability. 16c

I the confequent A(5ts being all fubje(5l to it, and governed and
I determined by it. This determining governing A61 mull be
i the proper Subjed of Precept, or none.

Corol, 2. It alfo follows from what has been obferved,
j That if there be any Sort of Ad, or Exertion of the Soul,
\ prior to all free Acts oi theWiil or A6ts of Choice in the Cafe,
direding and determining Vv^hat the A(5ts of the Will (ball be ;
that A(5l or Exertion of the Soul can't properly be fubject
to any Command or Precept, in any Refpe6t whatfoever,
either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such
Acts can't be fubje6t to Commands diredly^ becaufe they are
no A(5ts of the Will ; being by the Suppofition prior to all
A<5ts of the Will, determining and giving Rife to all it's Ads :
They not being Ads of the Will, there can be in them no
Confent to, or Compliance with any Command. Neither can
they be fubjed to Command or Precept tndireSfly or remotely ;
for they are not fo much as the Ejf&5is or Confequences of the
Will, being prior to all its Ads. So that if there be any
Obedience in that original Ad of the Soul, determining all
Volitions, it is an Ad of Obedience wherein the \V\\\ has no
Concern at all ; it preceeding evei-y Ad of Will. And there-
fore, if the Soul either obeys or difobeys in this Ad, it is
wholly involuntarily ; there is no willing Obedience or Rebel-
lion, no Compliance or Oppofition of the Will in the Affair :
and what Sort of Obedience or Rebellion is this !

And thus the Armiman Notion of the Freedom of the Will
confiding m the Soul's determining it's own x\ds of Wlij],
inftead of being efiential to moral Agency, and to Men's
being the Subjeds of moral Government, is utterly incon-
fiftent with it. For- if the Soul determines all it's Ads of
Will, it is therein fubjed to no Command or moral Govern-
ment, as has been now obferved ; becaufe it's original deter-
mining Ad is no Ad of Will or Choice, it being prior,by the
Suppofition, to every Ad oi Will. And the Soul can't be the
Subjed of Command in the Ad of the Will it felf, which
depends on the foregoing determining Ad, and is determined
by it ; in as much as this is neceiTary, being the necelTary
Confequence and Effec^: of that prior determining i\d, which
is not voluntary. Nor can the Man be the Suojed of Com-
mand or Government in his external Adious ; becaufe thek*
are all neceffary, being the neceiTary Effeds of the Ads of the
Will themfelves. So that Mank.ind,according to this Scheme^
sre Subjeds of Command or moral Government in noth ng

X .at

i52 ■ Commands ^^;^^/^^;^/ PartllL

at all ; and all their moral Agency is entirely excluded, and
no Room left for Vertue or Vice in the World.

So that 'tis the Arminian Scheme, and not the Scheme of
the Cahinjjis^ that is utterly inctnfiftent with moral Govern- ,
ment, and with all Ufe of Laws, Precepts, Prohibitions, Pro-
mifes, or Threatnings. Neither is there any Way whatfoever
to make their Principles confift with thefe Things. For if,
it be faid, that there is no prior determining Acl of the Soul,
preceding the A6ls of the Will, but that Volitions are Events
that come to pafs by pure Accident, without any determining
Caufe, this is moft palpably inconfiftent with all Ufe of Laws
and Precepts ; for nothing is more plain than that Laws can
be of no Ufe to direcTt and regulate perfect Accident ; which
by the Suppofition of it's being pure Accident, is in no Cafe
regulated by any Thing preceeding ; but happens this Way
or that perfe6tly by Chance,v/ithout any Caufe or Rule. The
perfedl Ufelefnefs of Laws and Precepts alfo follows from the
Arminian Notion of Indifference, as elTential to that Liberty
which is requifite to Vertue or Vice. For the End of Laws is
to hind to one Side ; and the End of Commands is to turn the
Will one Way : and therefore they are of no Ufe unlefs they
turn or bias the Will that Way. But if Liberty confifts in
Indifference, then their biafTmg the Will one Way only, de- .
llroys Liberty ; as it puts the Will out of 'Equilibrium. So
that the Will, having a Bias, thro' the Influence of binding
Law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to it ^qM^ to determine
it felf which Way it will, Vv'ithout Influence from without.

II. Having fhewn that the Will it kl^^ efpecially in thofe
A6fs wlfich are original, leading and determining in any Cafe, '
is the proper Subjed of Precept and Command, and not only
thofe Alterations m the Body, &c. which are the Effeds of the
Vv'ill J I now proceed in the /^-tw/^/ Place, to obferve that the
very Oppofition or Defed of the Will it k\t^ In that A(5t
which is it's original and detennining Aol in th^ Cafe, I fay the
Will's Oppofition in this Acl to a Thing propofed or com-
manded, or it's failing of Compliance, implies a moral Inabi-
lity to that Thing : Or in other Words, whenever a Com-
mand requires a certain State or A(5t of the Will, and the
Perfon conuTianded, notwithftanding the Command and the
Circumilances under which it is exhibited, ftill finds his Will
oppoute or wanting, in that^ belonging to it's State or Acfts,.
ichich is original and determining in the Affair^ that Man is morally
Unable to obey that Coinmand.

This

Sc6l. IV. with moral Inability. 163

This is manifeft from what was-obferved in the fiift Part,
concerning the Nature of moral Inability, as didinguiOied from
jwtural : where it was obferved, That a Man may then be faid
to be morally unable to do a Thing, when He is under the
Influence or Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, or has a
Want of Inclination, under fuch Circumftances and Views.
'Tis alfo evident from what has been before proved, that the
Will is always, and in every individual A61, necelTarily deter-
mined by the ftrongeft Motive ; and fo is alvv^ays unable to go
againft the Motive, which all Things confidpred, has now
the greateft Strength and Advantr.ge to move the Will.---
But not further to infift on thefe Things, the Truth of
the Pofition now laid down, viz. That when the Will is op-
pofite /(?, or failing of a Compliance with a Thing in it\
§riginal determining Inclination or Acl^ it is not able to comply,
appears by the Conlideration of thefe two Things.

1. The Will in the Time of that diverfe or oppoilte leading
A61 or Inclination, and when adually under the Influence of it,
is not able to exert it felf to the contrary, to make an Alte-
ration, in order to a Compliance. The Inclination is unable
to change it felf ; and that for this plain Reafon, that it is
unable to in.cline to change it felf, Prefent Choice can't at
preient chufe to be othervv^ife ': for that would be at prejc?it
to chufe fomething diverfe from v/hat is at prefent cliofen. If
the Will, all Things now confidered, inclines or chufes to go
that Way, then it can't chufe, all Things now confidered, to
go the other Way, and fo can't chufe to be made to go
the other Way. To fuppofe that the Mind is now fmcerely
inclined to change it felf to a different Inclination, is to fiip-
pofe the Mmd is now truly inclined othtrwife than it is now
inclined. The Will may oj^pofe fome future remote A<5t that
it is expofed to, but not its own prefent A61.

2. As it is impoffible that the Will fhould comply with the
Thing commanded with Refpe6t to it's leading J^, by any Act
of it's own, in the Time of that diverfe or oppofite leading and
original ASi^ or after it is a6kially come under the Influence of
that determining Choice or Inclination ; fo 'tis impolTible it fhould
be determined to a Compliance by any foregomg k.Si ; for by
the very Suppofition, there is no foregoing A<5t ; the oppof.te
or non-complying Aft being that A6t v.'hich is originul and
determining in the Cafe. Therefore it muft be io^ that if this
firjd determining ASi be found non-complying, on the Propcfal
of the Command, the Mind is morally unable to obey. For
to fuppofe it to be able to obey, is to fuppofe it to be able to
determine and caufc it's frjl detcrrnining Aif- to be oriiv;ivvi''"e,

X 2 and

164 Q>omx^2iVidi% confiflent Part III.

and that it has Power better to govern and regulate it's jirjl
governing and regulating Aa^ v/hich is abfurd ; For it is to flip-
pofe a prior Ad of the Wi]l, determining it's firft determining
A6t ; that is,an A6t prior to the firft, and leading and govern- ^
ing the original and governing K6X of all \ which is a .
Contradiction. 1

Here if it fhould be faid, that attho* the Mind has not ;

any Ability to will contrary to what it does will, in the -

original and leading A(5l of the Will, becaufe there is fup- «

pofed to be no prior A61 to determine and order it otherwife, :;j

and the Will can't immediately change it felf, becaufe it »3

can't at prefent incline to a Change ; yet the Mind has an li

Ability for the prefent to forbear to proceed to Adion, and y

take Time for Deliberation ; which may be an Occafion of h

the Chanp;e of the Inclination. |'

I anfwer, (i.) In this Objection that feems to be for- t
gotten which was obferved before, viz. that the determin- |
ing to take the Matter into Confideration, is it felf an
K€t of the Will : And if this be all the Ad wherein
the Mind exercifes Ability and Freedom, then this, by
the Suppofition, muft be all that can be commanded or re»
quired by Precept. And if this Acl be the commanded Ad,
then all that has been obferved concerning the commanded
Acft of the Will remains true, that the very Want of it is a
moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are fpeaking con-
cerning the firft and leading A6t of the Will in the Cafe, or
about the Affair ; And if a Determining to deliberate, or on
the contrary', to proceed immediately without deliberating,
be the nrft and leading A6t ; or whether it be or no,if there
be another A6t before it, which determines that ; or what-
ever be the- original and leading Ad j ftill the foregoing
Proof ftands good, that the Non-compliance of the leading
Ad implies moral Inability to comply.

If it ftiould be objeded, that thefe Things make all moral
Inability equal, and fuppofe Men morally unable to will |
otherwife than they aduaily do will, m all Cafes, and equally '

fo, in every Inftance.

In anfvrer to this Objedion, I defire two Things maybe '
obrervcd. Firji^ That if by being equally unable, be meant "j
5ts really un^blt) then fo far as the Inability is meerly mo-;|
r^ilj 'tis true, th^ Will, in every Inftance, ads by moral Ne- |

cefTity, i

Se6l:. IV. "^tth moral Inability i 165

ceflity, and is morally unable to a6l otherwife, as truly ancjl
properly in one Cafe as another ; as, I humbly conceive,
has been perfedly and abundantly demonftrated by what
has been faid in the preceeding Part of this ElTay. But yet,
in forne Refpe6l, the Inability may be faid to be greater in
fome Inftances than others : Tho' the Man may be truly un^
able, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet

'. he may be further from being able to do fome Things than
others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable
to do. A FV^rfon whofe Strength is no more than fufficient
to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and
really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten
Thoufand Pounds ; but yet he is further from being able to
lift the latter Weight than the former j and fo, according to
common Ufe of Speech, has a greater Inability for it. So
it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to
chufe contrary to a prefent Inclination, which in the leaft

[ Degree prevails ; or contrary to that Motive, which, all

I Things confidered, has Strength and Advantage now to
move the Will, in the leaft. Degree, fuperiour to all other
Motives in View : But yet he is further from Ability to refill
a very ilrong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Incli-
nation, or a Motive vaftly exceeding all others in Strength.
And again, the Inability may in fome Refpe6ts be called
greater, in fome Inilances than others, as it may be more
general and extenpve to all JMs of that Kind. So Men may be
faid to be unable in a different Senfe, and to be further from
moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is gene-

I ral and habitual^ than they who have only that Inability which
is occafional 2n\A particular. \ Thus in Cafes of natural Inability ;
he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a
difterent Manner, and is in fome Refpe6fs further from being

I able to fee, than He whofe Sight is hinder'd by a tranfient

: Cloud or Mift.

And befides, that which was obferved in the firft Part of
this Difcourfe concerning the Inability which attends a ftrong
and fettled Hablt^ fhould be here remember'd ; viz. That fix'd
Habit is attended v»^ith this peculiar moral Inability, by which
it is diflinguiihed from occafional Volition^ namely, that En-
deavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which arc
agreabie to luch a Habit, much more frequently and com-
monly prove vain and infufficient. For tho* it is impofTible

there

•}• See thisDilliD(5lion of moral Inability explain'd in Part I. Secl,lY>

1 66 Covcivci^xi6% confijient Part III. !

there ihould be any true fincere Defires and Endeavours a- !

gainft a prefent Volition or Choice, yet there may be againft ;j

Vohtions of that Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. A Perfon i

may defire and ufe Means to prevent future Exercifes of a :J

certain Inclination ; and in order to it, may wifh the Habit h

might be removed ; but his Defires and Endeavours may be 'i

inefFedual. The Man may be faid in fome Senfe to be ■':

unable ; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Terniy and j:

has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours ; yet not with Regard ^ |
to prefent, but remote Endeavours.

Secondly^ It muft be borne in Mind, according' to what was, '
obferv'd before, that indeed no Inability whatfoever which is
meerly moral, is properly called by the Name of Inability j
and that in the ftrkSteft Propriety of Speech, a Man may be"
faid to have a Thing in his Power,if he has it at his Election ; »;
and He can't be faid to be unable to do a Thing, when He \
can if He now pleafes, or whenever he has a proper, direct, \
and immediate Defire for it. As to thofe Defires and Endea- [«
vours that may be againft the Exercifes of a ftrong Habit, |
with Regard to which Men may be faid to be unable to j
avoid thofe Exercifes, they are remote Defires and Endea- ^
vours in two Refpe6ls. Firji^ as to Ti?ne \ they are never: fi
againft prefent Volitions, but only againft Volitions of fuch a \
Kind, when view'd at a Diftance. Seeondfyy^s to their Nature ; |
thefe oppofite Defires are not directly and properly againft the |
Habit and Inclination itfelf, or the Volitions in which it is J
exercifed ; for thefe, in themfelves conndered, are agreable ;
but againft fomething elfe, that attends them, or is their Con-
fequence ; the Oppofition of the Mind is levelled entirely
againft this ; the Inclination or Volitions themfelves are not
at all oppofed dire6lly, and for their own fake ; but only
indiredly, and remotely on the Account of fomething aliene
and foreign.

III. Tho' the Oppofition of the Will it kl^^ or the very
want of Will to a Thing commanded, implies a moral Ina-
bility to that Thing ; yet, if it be as has been already fhewn,
that the Being of a good State or Ad of Will, is a Thing
moft properly required by Command ; then, in fome Cafes
fuch a State or Ad of Will may properly be required, which
*t prefent is not, and which may alfo be wanting after it is
commanded. And therefore thofe Things may properly be
commanded, which Men have a moral Iiiability for.

Such

Sed. I V. with tioral Inability. 167

Such a State or A(fl of the Wil], may be required by Com-
mand, as does not already exifc. For if that Volition only
may be commanded to be which already is, there could be
no ufe of Precept ; Commands in all Cafes would be per-
fedly vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a Will
be required as is wanting before the Command is given, but
alfo fuch as may poflibly l3e wanting afterwards ; fuch as the
Exhibition of the Command may not be effe<5hial to produce
or excite. Otherwife, no fuch Thing as Difobedience to a
proper and rightful Command is poffible in. any Cafe ; and
there is no Cafe fuppofable or polTible, wherein there can
be an inexcufable or faulty Difobedience. Which Armimam
cannot affirm, confiftcntly with their Principles : for this makes
Obedience to jull and proper Commands always neceffary^ and
Difobedience impoffible. And fo the Arminian would over-
throw Himfelf, yielding the very Point we are upon, which
He fo fti'enuoufly denies, vi%. that Law and Command are
I confident with Neceffity.

If meerly that Inability will excufe Difobedience, which is
implied in the Oppofition or Defe(5t of Inclination, remaining
after the Command is exhibited, then Wickednefs always
carries that in it which excufes it. 'Tis evermore fo, that by
ihow much the more Wickednefs there is in a Man*s Heart,
I by fo much is his Inclination to Evil the Wronger, and by fo
much the more therefore has he of moral Inability to the
iGood required. His moral Inability, confifting in the
IjStrength of his evil Inclination, is the very Thing wherein
jhis Wickednefs conlifts ; and yet according to Annmian Prin-
ciples, it muft be a Thing inconfiflent with Wickednefs ; and
(by how much the more he has of it, by fb much is he the
[further from Wickednefs.

I Therefore, on the whole,it is manifeft, that moral Inability
jalone (which confifts in Difmclination) never renders any
Thing improperly the fubje6t-matter of Precept or Command,
land never can excufe any Perfon in Difobedience, or Want
fjof Conformity to a- Command.

\\ Natural Inability, arifing trom the Want of natural Capa-^

Icity, or external Hindrance (which alone is properly called

Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a Thing

improperly the Matter of Command. If Men are excufed

I trom doing or adting any good Thing, fuppofed to be com-

I Imanded, it mull be through fome Defed or OblUcle that is

y not

1 68 Commands and Invitations Part III. \

not In the Will itfelf, but extrinfic to it ; either in the Capa- ']
city of Underilanding, or Body, or outward Circumftances. |

Here two or three Things may be obferved, y

1. As to fpiritual Duties or Ad^s, or any good Thing in the \
State or immanent A6ts of the Will it felf, or of the Affections i
(which are only certain Modes of the Exercife of the Will ) |
if Perfons are juifly excufed, it muft be thro' want of Capacity j
in the natural Faculty of Underftanding. Thus the fame fpi- \\
ritual Duties, or holy Affedions and Exercifes of Heart, can't \
be required of Men, as may be of Angels ; the Capacity of Un- j
derftanding being fo much inferiour. So Men can't be Id
required to love thofe amiable Perfons w^hom they have '?
had no Opportunity to fee, or hear of, or come to the Know- \\
ledge of, in any Way agreable to the natural State and Capacity 'J
of the human Underftandmg. But the Infufficiency of Mo- j
lives wiii not excufe ; uniefs their being infufficient arifes not -v
from the moral State of the Will or Inclination it feif, but j-
from the State of the natural Underftanding. The great ^,
Kindnefs andGenerofity of another may be a Motive infuf^- 1
cient to excite Gratitude in the Perfon that receives the J
Kindnefs, thro' his vile and ungrateful Temper : In this Cafe, I
the Infufficiency of the Motive arifes from the State of the 'y
Will or Inclination of Heart, and don't at all excufe. But if '.;
this Generofity is not fufficient to excite Gratitude, being un- -A
known, there being no Means of Information adequate to the '..\\
State and Meafure of the Perfon's Faculties, this Infufriciency '{^^
is attended with a natucal Inability, which entirely excufes. !•

2. As to fuch Motions of Body, orExerciles and Alterations ' 1
of Mind, which don't confift in the immanent Acts or State ;• i
of the Vv^iil it felf, but are fuppofed to be required as Effe6ts 'i^
of the W'ill^ I fay, in fuch fuppofed EffecSts of the VyfiW^ in |t
Cafes wherein there is no Want of a Capacity of Underftand- %
ing ; that Inability, and that only excules, which confifts in \
V/ant of Connexion between them and theWill. If the Will %,
fullv complies, and the propofed Effect don't prove, according \
to the Laws of Nature, to be cr>ane6fed with his Volition, ^
the Man is perfectly excufed ; he has a natural Inability to the \
Thing required. 'For the Will Itfelf, as has been obferved, is i
all that can be direcSily and immediately required byCommand; \
and other Tilings only indirectiy, as connected with the Will. i»
If therefore there be a full Compliance of Will, the Perfon \

haf ;i

Sec^^.lV. conjijient with morallnability. 169

has done his Duty ; and if other Things don*t prove to be
connected with his VoUtion,; that is not owing to him.

3. Both thefe Kinds of natural Inability that have been
mentioned, and fo all Inability that excufes, may be refolved.
into one Thing ; namely. Want of natural Capacity or
Strength ; either Capacity of Underflanding, or external
Strength. For when there are external Defeats and Obftacles,
they would be no Obftaeles, were it not for the Imperfedtion
and Limitations of Underftanding and Strength.

Carol. If Things for which Men have a moral Inability,
may properly be the Matter of Precept or Command, then
they may alio of Invitation and Couniel. Commands, and
Invitations come very much to the fame Thing ; the Differ- .
ence is only circumftantial : Commands are as much a Mani-
feilation of the Will of him that Ipeaks, as Invitations, and as .
much Tedimonies of ExpeClation of Compliance. The Dif-
ference between them Hes in nothing that touches the Affair
in Hand. The main Difference betv/een Command and
Invitation confiiis in the Enforcement of the Will of Him
who commands or invites. In the latter it is his Klndncfs^ the
Goodnefs which his Will arifes from t in the former it is
iiis Authority. But whatever be the Ground of the Will of
him that fpeaks, or the Enforcement of what he fays, yet
feeing neither his Will nor Expedation is any more teltifkd
in the one Cafe than the other ; therefore a Perfon's being
known to be morally unable to do the Thing to which he is ■
directed hy Invitation^ is no more an Evidence of InfmcerJty in.
him that directs, in manifeliing either a Will, or Expc6tation:
which he has not, than his bemg known to be morally unable

to do what he is diredted to hy Cotmnand, So that all this

grand Objection of Arniiniam againil the Inability oi fallen
Men to exert Faith in Chrift, or to perform other fpiritual-
Gofpel-Duties, from the Sincerity of God's Counfels and In^
vitations, muft he without Force. #'

i>i ■*

Section

1 70 What Willingnefs and Part IIL

Section V.

H^at Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours,
ivhich is Juppofed to tXQ\x{Q, in the Non-
performance of Things in themf elves goody
particularly conjidered.

^ *^--|-'^IS what is much Infifted on by many, that fome Men,
I thp' they are not able to perform fpiritual Duties,
iuch as Repentance of Sin, Love to God, a cordiaj
/Acceptance of Chrift as exhibited and offer'd in the Gofpe!,&c.
yet they may fmcerely defire and endeavour thefe Things ;
and therefore muft be excufed ; it being unreafonable to
blame 'em for the Omiflion of thofe Things which they fm-
cerely deiire and endeavour to do, but can't do.

Concerning this Matter, the following Things may be
obferved.

I. What is here fuppofed, is a great Miftake, and grofs
Abfurdity ; even that Men may iincerely chufe and deftre
thofe fpiritual Duties of Love, Acceptance, Choice, Rejec^lion
&c. confifting in the Exercife of the Will it felf, or in the Dif-
pofition and Inclination of the Heart ; and yet not be able to
perform or exert them. This is abfurd, becaufe 'tis abfurd tq
fuppofe that a Man fhould directly, properly aod fmcerely in-
cline to have an Inclination, which at the fame Time is con-
trary to his Inclination : for that is to fuppofe him not to be
inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a Man, in the
State and Ads of his Will and Inclination, does properly and
dire6ily fall in with thofe Duties, he therein performs 'em :
For the Duties themfeives conlift in that very Thing ; they
coniift in the State and hdis of the Will being fo formed and
directed. If the Soul properly and fmcerely falls* in with a
certain propofed A61 of Will or Choice, the Soul therein
makes that Choice it's own. Even as when a moving Body
falls in with a propofcd Direction of its MotioHj that is the
fame Thing as to move in that Direflion«

2. That

SeA.V. Sincerity is no Excufe. 17 1

2* That which is called a Deftre and IVUlingnefs for thofe
inward Duties, in fuch as don't perform them, has refpe6t to
thefe Duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly
reprefented as a Willingnefs for them -, not only becaufe (as
was obferved before) it refpeds thole good Volitions only in a
diftant View, and with refped to future Time ; but alfo be-
caufe evermore, not thefe Things themfelves, but fomething
t\k^ that is aliene and foreign, is the Objed that terminates
thefe Volitions and Defires,

A Drunkard, who continues in his Druhkeiinefs, being un-
der the Power of a Love, and violent Appetite to ftrong Drink,
and without any Love to Vertue ; but bemg alfo extreamly
•covetous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grieved at
the Diminution of his Eftate, and Profpe6t of Poverty, may ia
a Sort defij-e the Vertue of Temperance : and tho' his prefent
Will is to gratify his extravagant Appetite, yet he may wifh
he had a Heart to forbear future Ads of Intemperance, and
forfake his Exceffes, thro' an Unwillingnefs to part with his
Money : But ftill he goes on with his Drunkennefs ; his
V/ifhes and Endeavours are infufficient and ineffectual : Such
a Man has no proper, direct, lincere Willingnefs to forfake
this Vice, and the vicious Deeds which belong to it : for He
.adls voluntarily in continuing to drink to excefs : His Defire
is very improperly called a Willingnefs to be temperate ; it is
no true Defire of that Vertue ; for it is not that Vertue that
terminates his Wiihes ; nor have they any dire(5t Refpedt at
all to it. 'Tis only the faving his Adoney^ and avoiding Poverty,
that terminates, and exhaufts the whole Strength of his Defire,
The Vertue of Temperance is regarded only very indire6lly
and improperly, even as a neceffary Means of gratifying th<s
Vice of Covetoufnefs.

So, a Man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked Heart,
who has no Love to God and Jefus Chrift, but on the con-
trary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the
greateft Diftafte of the Things of Religion,and Enmity againft
'em ; yet being of a Family, that from one Generation to
another, have moil: of 'em died IrtYouth of an hereditaryCon-
fumption j*'& fo having littleHope of livmg long ; and having
been inftru6ted in the Necelllty of a fupreara Love to Chrifr,
and Gratitude for his Death and Sufferings, in Order to his
Salvation from eternal Mifery j if under thefe Circumftances
he fliould^tbro' Fear of eternal Toiments, wiOi he had fuch a
- Difpoiltioa : But his profane and carnal Heart remaining, He

Y a Gontiuuss^

I7« What W-^xi^^^ and PartllL

continues ftill in his habitual diftafte of, and Enmity to God
and Religion, and wholly without any Exercife of that Love
and Gratitude, (as doubtlefs the very Devils themfelves, not-
withftanding all the Devilifhnefs of their Temper, would wifh
for a holy Heart, if by that Means they could get out of Hell :)
In this Cafe, there is no lincere Wiliingnefs to love Chrift
and chufe him as his chief Good : Thefe holy Difpofitions
and Exercifes are not at all the dlred Object of the Will :
they truly (hare no Part of the Inclination or Defire of the
Soul ; but all is terminated on Deliverance from Torment :
and thefe Graces and pious Volitions, notvvithtianding this
forced Confent, are looked upon undefirable ; as when a

fick Man defires aDofe he greatly abhors, to fave his Life.

From th^fe Things it appears.

3. That this indire(5l Wiliingnefs which has been fpoken
of, is not that Exercife of the Will which the Command
requires ; but is entirely a different one ; being a Volition of
a di^^erent Nature, and terminated altogether on different
Objtds ; wholly falling fliort of that Vertue of Will, which
the Command has refpedl to.

. 4. This other Volition, which has only fome indirecStCon-
cern with the Duty required, can't excufe for the Want of
that good Will it {t\^^ which is commanded ; being not the
Thing which anfwers and fulfils the Command, and being
wholly deftitute of the Vertue which the Command feeks. ,

Further to illuftrate this Matter. If a Child has a moft

excellent Father, that has ever treated him with fatherly
Kindnefs and Tendernefs, and has eveiy Way in the higheft
Degree merited his Love and dutiful Regard, being withal
very wealthy ; but the Son is of fo vile a Difpofition, that He
jnveterately hates his Father ; and yet, apprehending that his
Hatred of Him is like to prove his Ruin, by bringing Him
iinally to Poverty and abjedt Circumfiances, thro' his Father's
difinheriting Him, or otherwife ; which is exceeding crofs \o
his Avarice and Ambition ; He therefore wifhes it were other-
wife : but yet remaining u^^dcr the invincible Power of his vile
and malignant Di{j>olition, He continues ftill in his fettled
Hatred of his Father. Now if fuch a Son's indirect Wiliing-
nefs to have Love and Honour towards his Father, at all ac-
quits or excufes before God, for his failing of a6luaily exer-
citing thefe Difpofitions tov»'ards Him which God requires,
it muft be ou one of thcf<i two Accounts, (i.) Either that

Se<St.V. Sincerity h no Excufe. 173

I it anfwers and fulfils the Command. But this it does not, by
the Suppofition ; becaufe the Thing commanded is Love and

, Honour to his worthy Parent. If the Command be |)roper
and juft, as is fuppofed, then it obliges to the Thing com-
manded ; and fo nothing elfe but that can anfwer the Ob-
ligation. Or, (2.) It mufl: be at leaft ^becaufe there is that

; yertue or Goodnefs in his indirecft Willingnefs,that is cquiva-

1 lent to the Vertue required ; and fo balances or coun-
tervail^ it, and makes up for the Want of it. But that
alfo is contrary to the Suppofition. The Willingnefs the Son

j has merely from a Regard to Money and Honour, has no
<^oodnefs in it, to countervail the Want of the pious filial
•^efpe(5i: required.

Sincerity and Reality, in that indire(^ W^illingnefs which
has been fpoken of, don't make it the better. That which
is real and hearty is often called fmcere ; whether it be in
Vertue or Vice. Some Perfons are fmcerely /'^^ ; others are
fincerely good ; and others may be fincere and hearty in
Things which are in their ownNaturefW/^7T«f ; asaMan may
-be fincerely defirous of eating when he is hungry. But a
being fincere, hearty and in good Earnefl:, is no Vertue, un-
lefs it be in a Thing that is vertuous. A Man may be fin-
cere and hearty in joining a Crew of Pirates, or a Gang of
Robbers. When the Devils cried out, and befought Chrift
•not to torment them, it was no mere Pretence ; they were
very hearty in their Defires not to be tormented : but this
did not make their Will or Defires vertuous. And if Men
,have fincere Defires, which are in their Kind and Nature no
better, it can be no Excufe for the want of any required
■ Vertue.

And as a Man's being fincere in fuch an indiredt Defire or
Willingnefs to do his Duty, as has been mention'd, can't ex-
cufe for the w^ant of Performance ; fo it \% y^\\\\ Eyideavours
arifing from fuch a Willingnefs. The Endeavours can have
no more Goodnefs in 'em, than the Will which they are the
Effe6l and Exprefiion of. And therefore, however fincere and
^ real, and however great a Perfon's Endeavours are ; yea, tho'
they fhould be to \\\t utmoft of his Ability j unlefs the Will
which they proceed from be truly good and vertuous, they
•can be of no Avail, Influence or Weight to any Purpofe what-
r/oever, in a moral Senfe or Refpedl. That which is not truly
. vertuous in God's Sight, is looked upon by Him as good for
; J^othing : and fo can be of no Value, Weight or Influence

174- T^hat Sincerity of Endeavours, PartllL

in his Account, to recommend, Tatisfy, excufe or make up for

any moral Defe6t. For nothing can counter-balance Evil, but
Good. If Evil be in one Scale^ and we put a great deal into
^\-i^ other, iincere and earneil: Defires, and many and great
Endeavours ; yet if there be no real Goodnefs in all, there ig
no Weight in it ; and fo it does nothing towards balancing
the real Weight which is in the oppofite Scale. Tis only lilcft
the fubftradVing a Thoufand Noughts from before a real Num-
ber, v/hich leaves the Sum julf as it was.

Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a negatively good Influ-
ence, "rhoie Things which have no pofitive Vertue, have no
pofitive mo:al Influence ; yet they may be an Occafion of
Pcrfons avoiding fome pofitive Evils. As if a Man were in
the Water with a Neighbour that he had ill-will to, wha
could not fwim, holding him by his Hand ; which Neigh-
bour was much in Debt to Him ; and (hould be tempted to let
him fmk and drown ; but Ihould rei'ufe to comply with the
Temptation ; not from Love to his Neighbour, but from the
Love of Money, and becaufe by his drowning He fliould lofe
his Debt ; that which he does in preferving his Neighbour
fi-om drowning, is nothing good in the Sight of God : Yet
hereby he avoids the greater Guilt that would have bfeent
contracted, if he had defignedly let his Neighbour fink ^d
periih. But when Armhnans in their Difpiites with CahiA/is
infill: (6 much on Hncere Defires and Endeavours, as wiat
mull: excufe Men, muft be accepted of God he. 'tis manlSneft
they have Refped to fome pofitive moral Weight or Influence
cf thofe Defires and Endeavours. Accepting, juftifying, or
excufing on the Account of iincere honeft Endeavours (as
they are called) and Men's doing what they can, &c. has Re-
lation to fome moral Value, iomething that is accepted as
Good, and as fuch, countervailing fome Defedl.

But there is a great and unknown Deceit, arifing from tlie
Ambiguity of the Phrafe, y/Wr^ Endeavours. Indeed there is a
vaft Ind!uin(5tnefs & Unhxednefs in moft,or at leaft very many
of the Terms ufed to exprefs Things pertaining to nwral and
fpiritual Matters. Whence arife innumerable Miifakes, ftrong
Prejudices, inextricable Confulion, and endiefs Controverfy.

The Word finccre is mofi: commonly ufed to fignify fome-
thing that is good : Men are habituated to underlfand by it
the fame as honejl and vpight \ which Terms excite an Idea
of fomething good iu the flri^^eft aiid highell: Senie i good in

the

I Sect. V. is no Excufe. 175

j the Sight of Him who fees not only the outward Appearance,

I but th"e Heart. And therefore Men think that if a Perfon be

; fuuere^ he will certainly be accepted. If it be faid that any

\ one is fincere in his Endeavours, this fuggeih to Men's Minds

as much, as that his Heart and Will is good, that there is no

Defed of Duty, as to vertuous Inclination ; he honeflly and

uprightly defires and endeavours to do as he is required ; and

this leads 'em to fuppofe that it would be very hard and un-

reafonable to punifh him, only becaufe he is unfuccefstul in

\i\s Endeavours, the Thing endeavoured being beyond his

Power. Whereas it ought to be obferved, that the Word

[ ftncere has thefe different Significations.

1. Sincerity^ as the Word is fometimes ufed, fignifies no
I more then Reality of IP' ill and Endeavour^ with refpect to any

Thing that is profelled or pretended ; without any Confidera-
tion of the Nature of the Principle or Aim, whence this real
I Will and tme Endeavour arifes. If a Man has fome real
Defire to obtain a Thing,either diredl or indired,or does really
endeavour after a Thing,he is laid iincer:ly to deiire or endea-
vour It j without anyConfideration of the Goodnefs or V'ertu-
oufnefs of thePrincipie he acts rrom,or anyExcellency orWor-
thinefs of the End he.acSls for. Thus a Man that is kind
to his Neighbour's Wife, who is f)ck and languifhing, and
very helpful in her Cafe, makes a Shew of defiring and en-
I deavouring her Reftoration to Health and Vigour ; and not
i only makes fuch a Shew, but there is a Reality in his Pretence,
! he does heartily and earneftly defire to have her Health re-
j ftored, and ufes his true and utmoft Endeavours for it 5 He
} is faid fmcerely to deiire and endeavour it, becaufe he does
1 ki truly or really ; tho' perhaps the Principle he ads from,
i$ no other than a vile and fcandalous PalTion ; having lived
in Adultery with her, he earneftly defires to have her Health
and Vigour reftored, that he may return to his criminal Plea-
fures With her. Or,

2. By Sincerity is meant, not meerly a Reality of Will and
'Endeavour of fome Sort or other, and from fome Coniidera-
tion or other, but a vertuous, Sincerity. That is, that in the
Performance of thofe particular Ads that are the Matter of
Vertue or Duty, there be not only the Matter, but the Form

J and EiTence of Vertue, confifting in the Axim that governs the
I Ad, and the Principle exercifed in it. There is not only the
1 Reality of the A.d, that is as it were the Body of the Duty ;
i but ahb the Soul^ v;hich fhould properly belong; to fuch a
1 ^ Body.

17^ 0/ Promises Part IIL

Body. In this Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, when he
2(5ts with a pure Intention ; not from finifter Viev/s, or bye-
Ends : He not only in Reality defires and feeks the Thing to
be done, or Qualitication to be obtained, for fome End or
other ; But he wills the Thing direaiy and properly, as nei-. :§i
ther forced nor bribed ; the Vertue of the Thing is properly, ffj
the Objea of the Will. ^ it

Jn the former Senfe^a Man is faid to be fmcere,in Oppofiti-,; i|
on to a mecr Pretence, and Shezv of the particular Thing to he done \%
or exhibited, without any real Deiire or Endeavour at" all. la-
the latter Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, in Oppofition to/
that Shezu of Vertue there is in meerly doing the Matter of Duty,
without the Reality of the Vertue it felf in the Soul, and the
EiTence of it, which there is a Shew of. A Man may be fin-
cere in the former Senfe, and yet in the latter be in the Sight
of God, who fearches the Heart, a vile Hypocrite.

In the latter Kind of Sincerity, only, is there any Thin^
truly valuable or acceptable in the Sight of God. And this is-
the Thing which in Scripture is called Sincerity, Uprightnefsj
Integrity, Truth in the inward Parts, and a being of a perfe^ Heart,
And if there be fuch a Sincerity, and fuch a Degree of it as
there ought to be, and there be any Thing further that the
Man is not able to perform, or which don't prove to be con^
neded with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the Man is.
wholly excufed and acquitted in the Sight of God ; His Will
jfhall furely be accepted for his Deed : And fuch a fincere.
Will and Endeavour is all that in Stri6tnefs is required of him,
by any Command of God. But as to the other Kind of
Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no Vertue in
it, (as was obferved before) can be of no Avail before Goc'
in any Cafe, to recommend, fatisfy, or excufe, and has no pofi
tive moral Weisht or Influence whatfoever.

Cord' I. Hence it may be infer'd, that Nothing in the Rea-'
fon and Nature of Things appears, from the Confideration of
any moral Weight of that former Kind of Sincerity, whicK
has been fpoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading"
us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofitive Promifes of
Salvation, or Grace, or any faving Afilftance, or any fpiritual
Benefit whatfoever, to any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours,
Striving, or Obedience of thofe, who hitherto have no true
%'ertue or Holinefs in their Hearts ; tho' we fiiculd fuppofe

all

Sed.V. to gracelefs Endeavours. 177

all the Sincerity, and the utmoft Degree of Endeavour, that is
polFible to be in a Perlon without Holinefs*

Some objefl againft God's requiring, as the Condition of

ii Salvation, thole holy Exercifes, which are the Refult of a fu-

pernatural Renovation ; fuch as a fupream Refped to Chrifl,

Love to God, loving Holinels for it's own fake, ^c. that thefe

inward Difpofitions and Exercifes are above Men's Power, as

they are by Nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, that

i when Men are brought to be fmcere in their Endeavours, and

[do as well as they can, they are accepted ; and that this muft

,1 be ail that God requires in order to Men's being received as

'the Objects of his Favour, and muft be what God has ap-

' pointed as the Condition of Salvation. Concerning v/hich I

vsould obferve, that in fuch a Manner of Speaking of Men's

being accepted^ becavfe they are fincere^ and do as well as they can<^

there is evidently a Siippofition of fome V^ertue, fome Degree

of that wdiich is truly Good ; tho' it don't go fo far as were

tobewifh'd. For if Men do what ihey can^ unlefs their fo

doing be from fome good Principle, Difpofition, or Exercife of

Herrt, fome vertuous Inclination or A61 of the Will ; their

fo doing Vv^hat they can, is in fome Refpeds not a Whit better

than if they did Nothing at all. In fuch a Cafe, there is no

more pcfitive m.orai Goodnefs in a Man's doing what he can,

than in a Vv'ind-MiU's doing what it can ; becaufe the A6iioa

does no more proceed from Vertue ; and there is Nothing in

iuch Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that Ihould

render it any mere a proper or fit Recommendation to pofitivc

Favour and Acceptance, or the Condition of any Reward or

ad-uai Benefit, than doing Nothing -, for both the one and the-

other are alike Nothing, as to any true moral Weight or

Value.

Coroh 2. Hence alfo it follov>'s, there is Nothing that appears
in theRealbn and Nature of Things,which can juftly lead us to
determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary Means of
Salvation, or fome Way or other beftow true Holinefs and
tternal Life on thofe Heathen^ who are fincere (in the Senfc
above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the Will of
the Deity, and to pleafc Him, according to their Light, that
they may efcape his future Difpleafure and Wrath, and obtain
Happinefs in their future State, through his Favour,

Z Section

178 IndifFerence inconftjlent Part III.
Section VI.

Liberty of IndifFerence, not only not ne-:
cejfary to Vertue, but utterly mconj7jie?pt{\\
with it ; And ally either vertuous or vi-r
cious Habits or Inclinations, inconjifient
with Arminian Notions of Liberty an
moral Agency.

lO fuppofc fuch a Freedom of Will, as Armin'ians talk of, \
to be requilite to Vertue and Vice, is many Ways con- I
trary to common Senfe. J

If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as Arminlam fup- |i
pofe, and it be effential to a vertuous A6lion that it be perfor- m
med in a State of Liberty, as they alfo fuppofe ; it will follow, fl
that it is ellential to a veituous A6lion that it be performed in |
a State of Indifference : And if it be performed in a State of \
Indifference, then doubtlefs it muft be performed in the 77W ,1
of Indifference. And fo it will follow, that in order to th^ %
Vertuoufnefs of &n A61, the Heart mull be indifferent in the j
Time of the Performance of that Adi, and the more indiffer- \
cnt and cold the Heart is with Relation to the A(5t which is f
p-crformed, fo much the better ; becaufe the A(5l is performecj -i
with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this agreable to the \
Light of Nature ? Is it agreable to the Notions which Man- i
kind, in all Ages, have of Vertue, that it lies in that which \
is contrary to Indifference, even in the Tendency and Inclination i
of theHeart to vertuous Action ; and that the ftronger the In- I
clmation, and fo the further from Indifference, the more ver- '
tucus the Heart, and fo much the more praife-worthy the J^ ]
which proceeds from it r \

If we (hould fuppofe (contrary to what has been before de— j
monftrated) that there may be an A61 of V/iIl in a State of j
indifference ; for Inflance, this A6t, vi-z. The Will's deter-' |
mining to put it felf out of a State of Indifference, and give it 1
iclf a Preponderatiou one Vv^ay, then it would follow, on Jrm^

nian

Sed:. VL wii^/j Ycrtwc. 179

man Principles, that this A61 or Determination of the Will is
that alone wherein Vertue confifts, becaufe this only is per-
formed while the Mind remains in a State of Indifference, and
fo in a State of Liberty : For when once the Mind is put out
of it's Equilibrium, it is no longer in fuch a State ; and there-
fore all the A(5ts which follow afterwards, proceeding from
Bias, can have the Nature neither of Vertue nor Vice. Or if
the Thing which the Will can do, while yet in a State of
Indifference, and fo of Liberty, be only to fufpend ailing, and
determine to take the Matter into Confideration, then this
Determination is that alone wherein Vertue confifts, and not
proceeding to Action after the Scale is turned by Confideration,
So that it will follow from thefe Principles, all that is done
after the Mind, by any Means, is once out of it's Equilibrium
and already pollelfed by an Inclination, and ariling from that
Inclination, has nothing of the Nature of Vertue or Vice, and
is worthy of neither Blame nor Praife. But how plainly con-
trary is tills to the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, and to the No.-
tion they have of fmcerely vertuous A6lions ? Which is, that
they are Actions which proceed from a Heart well difpofed and
ind'med ; and Xh^Jironger^ and the vaox^t fix'd and determined xht
good Difpofition of the Heart, the greater the Sincerity of
Vertue, and fo the more of the Truth and Reality of it. But
if there be any Ads which are done in a State of Equihbrium,
or fpring immediately from perfe61: Indifference and Coldnefs
; of Heart, they cannot .arife from any good Principle or Djf-
J3ofition in theHesrt ; and confequentlyj according to common
Senfe, have no nncere Goodnefs in 'em, having no Vertue of
Heart in 'em. To have a vertuous Heart, is to have a Heart
that favours Vertue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfcd\-
1 ly cold and indifferent about it.

And befides the Anions that are done in a State of Indiffer-
ence, or that arife immediately out of fuch a State, can't be
vertuous, becaufe, by the Suppofition, they are not determined
by any preceeding Choice. For if there be preceedingChoice,
then Choice intervenes between the A61 and the State of In-
difference ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the Ad's
" arifing immediately out of Indifference. But thofe Ads which
are not determined by preceeding Choice, can't be vertuous or
vicious hy Arminian Principles, becaufe they are not determined
^by theWill. So that neither oneWay, nor the other, can any
Adions be vertuous or vicious according toy/rwrn/^wPrinciples.
If theAdion be determined by a preceedingAd oif Choice it can't
be vertuous ; becaufe the Adion is not done in a State of In-
i Z 2 d-ifFerence,^

i8o \nd\Stv. inconft/i^ withV^vtuQ. Part III,

difference, nor does immediately arife from, fuch a State ; and,

fo is not done in a State of Liberty. If the A6tion be not d^-. . \

Urmined by a preceeding Act of Choice, then it can't be ver-^ ^

tuous J becaufe then the Will is not Self-determin'd in it, \

So that 'tis made certain, that neither Vertue nor Vice caa '\

ever find any Place in the Univerfe. ; \

Moreover, that it is neceffary to a vertuous A^ion that \% i

be performed in a State of Indifference, under a Notion of \

that's being a State of Liberty, is contrary to common Senfe ; a

as 'tis a Di6tate of common Senfe, that Indifference it felf, in -

Tnany Cafes, is vicious, and fo to a high Degree. As if when %

I fee my Neighbour or near Friend, and one who has in \

the higheft Degree merited of me, in extreme Diflrefs, and \

ready to penlh, I find an Indifference in my Heart with Re-» l^

fpc6t to any Thing propofed to be done, which I can eafily do, f

for his Relief. S^ if it Ihpuld be propofed to me, to blafpheme ^

God, or kill my Father, or to do numberlefs other Things j

"which might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for a Mo- i

nient, would be highly vicious and vile. j

And it may be further obferved, that to fuppofe this Liberty \

of Indifference is effential to Vertue and Vice, deilroys the .1

great Difference of Degrees of the Guilt of different Crimes, k

and takes away the Heinoufnefs of the moft fiagitious horrid '

Iniquities ; fuch as Adultery Beftiality, Murder, Perjur)', Blaf- \

phe'Tiy, &c. For according to thefe Principles, there is no 1

Harm at all in having the Mind in a State of perfect Indiffer- i

ence withRefpe<fl to thefeCrimes ; nay, 'tis abfolutely neceffary j
in order to aiiy Vertue in avoiding them, or Vice in doing

them. But for the Mind to be in a State of Indifference j

%vith Refpedt to 'em, is to be next Door to doing them : It is i
then inlinitely near to chuling, and fo committing the Fad :

For Equilibrium is the next Step to a Degree of Prepondera^ J

tion ; and one, even the leaft Degree of Preponderation (all 'i

Things confidered) is Choice. And not only fo, but for the \

Will tQ be in a State of perfed Equilibrium with Refped to \

fuch Crimes, 'is for the Mind to be in fuch a State, as to he Jj

full as likely to chufe 'em as to refufe 'em, to do 'em as to !

prnit 'em. And if our Minds muft be in fuch a State \

vvherein it is as neSr to chufmg as refufing, and wherein it \

^nud of Neceffity, according to the Nature of Things, be ^ |;

likely to commit 'em, as to refrain from 'em \ where is the^ \

^xceedin^ Heinoufnefs of chuf^ng and committing them .'' If l|

thefe be no Harm ia often being ia fuch a State, wherein the |j

Probability \

Sed.VI. Ofvertuous &* vicious Habits. i8i

Probability of doing and forbearing are exaflly equal, there
being an Equilibrium, and no more Tendency to one than thq
other ; then according to the Nature and Laws of fuch a Con-
tingence, it may be expeded, as an inevitable Confequence of
fjjch a Difpofition of Things, that we {hould chufe 'em as
often as reject 'em : That it fhould generally fo fall out is ne-
cefTary, as Equality in the EfFed is the natural Confequence
of the equal Tendency of the Caufe, or of the antecedent
State of Things from which the Effed arifes r Why then
Ihould we be fo exceedingly to blame, if it does fo fall out \

'Tis many Ways apparent, that the Jrminian Scheme of Li-
berty is utterly inconiiitent with the being of any fuch Thin2;s
as either vertuous or vicious Habits orDifpoiitions. If Liberty
of Indiffere-nce be efTential to moral Agency, then there can be
no Vertue in any habitual Inclinations of the Heart ; which
are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their Nature the
very Dertrudion and Exclulion of it. They fuppoie nothing
can be vertuous, in which no Liberty is exerciied ; ' but hov/
abiurd is it to talk of exerciling Indiiference under Bias and
Prcponderation !

And if felf- determining Power in the Will be necelTarv to
moral Agency, Praife, Blame, &c. then nothing done by^ the
Will can be any further Praife or Bhme-vvorthy,than fo far a$
the Will is moved, fwayed and determined by it {e\i^ and the
Scales turned by the fovereign Pov/er the Will has over it {e\x»
And therefore the Will muft not be put outof it'sBaiance already,
thePreponderation muft not be determined and effected before-
hand ; and fo the felf-determining A61: anticipated. Thus it
appears another Way, that habitual Bias is inconfiftent with
that Liberty which Annlnlans fuppofe to be necelTary to Vertue
or Vice ; and fo it follows, that habitual Bias it felf cannot be
either vertuous or vicious.

The fame Thing follows from their Dodrine concerning
the Inconfiftence of Necejfity with Liberty, Praife, Difpraife,&e.
None will deny,thatBias and Inclination may be fo ftrong as to
be invincible, and leave no Poilibility of the Will's deterinin-
Jng contrary to it ; and fo be attended with Neceifity. This
^Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Vv'ili of God, Angels and
glorified Saints, with Refped to Good ; and the V/ill of
Devils with Refped to Evil. Therefore if NeceiTity be incon-
Hftent with Liberty ; then when iix'd Inclination is to fuch a
;Pegree of Strength, it utterly exgiudes aii Vertue, Vice^ Praife

1 82 Of vertuous^ PartllL

or Blame. And if fo, then the i\earer Habits ^'are to thisj^

iitrength, the .more do they impede Libetty, and Po diminifti' j
Praife and Blame. If very ftrong Habits deilroy Liberty, the j
leiler Ones proportionably hinder it, a.ccording to their Degree' i
of Strength. And therefore it wilt follow, that then is the ;j
A<51 moft vertuous or vicious, when perfonned without any ^5
Inclination or habitual Bias at all j becaufe it is then perform-' -'^
ed with moft Liberty. -l

Every pre-poffeffing fix'd Bias oti the Miijd brings a Degree i
of moral inability for the contrary ; becaufe fo far as theMind (
is biaffed and pre-poiTeffed, fo much Hindrance is there of the ^
contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconfit^ent with j
moral Agency, or the Nature of Vertue and Vice, then fo far v^
as tiiere is any fuch Thing as evil Diipofition of Heart, or ha- J
bitual Depravity of Inclination ; whether Covetoufnefs, Pride, '^
Malice, Cruelty, or whatever elfe ; fo much the more excuf- •'
able Peribns are j fo much the lefs have their evil Ads of this j
Kind, the Nature of Vice. And on the contrary, v^rhatever "{
excellent Difpolitions and Inclinations they have, fo much are '
they the ieis vertuous. ]

1
'Tis evident, that no habitual Difpofition of Heart, whether \

it be to a greater or lefler Degree, can be in any Decree ver-
tuous or vicious i or the Avftions which proceed from them |
at all Praife or Blame-worthy. Becaufe, tho' we faould fup- '\
pofe the Habit not to be of fuch Strength as wholly to take \
av/ay all moral Ability and felf-determining Power i or hin- '\
der but that, altho' the Acft be partly from Bias, yet it may ^|
be in Part from Self-determination ; yet in this Cafe, all that \
is from antecedent Bias muft be fet afide, as of no Confidera- |
tion 5 and in eftimating the Degree of Vertue or Vice, no >'
more muft be confidered than what arifes from felf-determin-
ing Pov^/er, without any Influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty i
is exercifed in no more : So that all that is the Exercife of |
habitual Inclination, is thrown away, a^ not belonging to thcj '■
Morality of the Adlion. By which it appears, that no Exer- j
cife of t'hefe Habits, let 'em be ftronger or weaker, can ever i'l
have any Thing of the Nature of either Vertue or Vice. I

Here if any one ffeould fay, that notwithftanding all thefd '
Things, there may be the Nature of Vertue and Vice in Habits \
of the Mind j becaufe thefe Habits may be the .Effe6ls of |
thofe h&.i, wherein the Mind exercifed Liberty ; that how- ;|
ever t^ie foremention'd Reafons will prove that no Habits '{

vv]-)ich

Sed. VI. and ^/r/^^j\Habits, ,, ^ 183

which are natural^ or that any are born or created with us, can
be either vertuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of
Habits, which have been acquired ' and eftablifh'd by repeated
free Ads.

To fuch an Objector I would fay, that this Evifion will not
at all help the Matter. For if Freedom of Will be eflential to
the very Nature of Vertue and Vice, then there is no Vertiie
or Vice but only in that very Thing, wherein this Liberty is
exerclfed. If a Man in one or more Thing that he does, ex-
ercifes Liberty, and then by thofe A6ts is brought into fuch'
Circumftances, that his Liberty ceafes, and there follows a
■.long Series of A6ls or Events that come to pafs neceflarily ;
thofe confequent Ads are not vertuous or vicious, rewardable
or punhhable ; but only the free Adts that eftablifli'd this Ne-
cedlty J for in them alone v^as the Man free. The following
Effects that are neceffary, have no more of the Nature of Ver-
tue or Vice, than Health or Sicknefs of Body have properly
the Nature of Vertue or Vice, being the EfFe61:s of a Courfe of
free Acts of Temperance or Intemperance ; or than the good
Qiialities of a Clock are of theNature of Vertue,which are the
Eifiects of free A6ls of theArtificer ; or theGoodnefs and Sweet-
nefs of the Fruits of a Garden are moral Vertues, being the
Efre6ls of the free and faithful Adts of the Gardener. If Li-
berty be abfolutely requifite to the Morality of Actions, and
Neceflity wholly inconfiftent with it, as Annmians greatly infift ;
then no necejfary EffeSls whatfoever, let the Caufe be never fo
good or bad, can be vertuous or vicious ; but the Vertue or
Vice muft be only in \Sx^ free Caufe. Agreably to this, Dr.
Whtihy fuppofes, the Neceffity that attends the good anti
evil Habits of the Saints in Heaven, and Damned in Hell,
which are the Confequence of their free Acts in tlieir State of
Probation, are not rewardable or puniQiable.

On the whole,- it appears, that if the Notions o^ Ar?n'm}nns
concerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, itjv/ill fol]ov»r
that there is no Vertue in any fuch Habits or Qualities as
Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Mercy, Gratitude, Generofity,
Heavenly-mindednefs ; Nothing at ail Praife -worthy in loving
Chrid: above Father and Mother, Wife and Children, or our
own Lives ; or in Delight in Holinefs, hungring and thirfting
after Rightebufnefs, Love to Enemies, univerfal Benevolence
to Mankind : And on the other Hand, there is nothing at all
vicious, or worthy of Difpraife, in the moft fordid, beaflly,
Rlgljg^cant, dcviiiinDifpofition^ ;. in being ungrateful, profane,

habitually

184 Armimamfm intonfiftent Partlll.

habitually hating God, and Thihgs facred and holy ; or in
being mofi: treacherous^ ehvibUs and cruel toVvards Men. For
all thefe Things are Difpojitions i.'ix^ Inclmations of the Heart.
And in fliort, there is no iuch Thing as any vertuous or vici-
ous ^ality of Mind ; no Iuch Thing as inherent Vertue and
Holinels, or Vice and Sin : And the ftronger thofe Habits or
Difpofitions are, which ufed to be called vertuous and vicious,
the further they are from being fo indeed ; the more violent
Men's Lufls are, the more tix'd their Pride, Envy, Ingratitude
and Malicioufnefs, ftill the further are they from being blame-
worthy. If there be a Man that by his own repeated Acts,
or by any other Means, is come to be of the moft hellifh
Diipofition, defperately inclined to treat his Neighbours with
Injurioufnefs, Contempt and Malignity ; the further they
fliould be from any Diipofition to be angry with Him, or in
the leafi to blame Him. So on the other Hand, if there be a
Perfon, who is of a moft excellent Spirit, ftrongly inclining
him to the moft amiable Actions, admirably meek, benevolent
&:c. fo much is he further from anyThing rewardable or com-
mendable. On which Principles, the Man Jefus Chrift was
very far from being Praife-worthy for thofe Acts of Holinefs
and Kindnefs which He performed, thefe Propenfities being fo
ftrong in his Heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and
gracious God, is infinitely remote from any Thing commen-
dable, his good Inclinations being infinitely ftrong, and He
therefore at the utmoft poflible Diftance from being at Liberty.
And in all Cafes, the ftronger the Inclinations of any are to
Vertue, and the more they love it, the lefs vertuous they
are ; and the more they love Wickednefs, the lefs vicious.— ^
Whether' thefe Things are agreable to Scripture, let every
Chriftian, and every Man who has read theBible, judge : and
whether they are agreable to common Senfe, let every one
judge, that have human Underftanding in Exercife.

And if we purfue thefe Principles, we (hall find that Ver-
tue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the World -, and that
there never was, nor ever c^an be any fuch Thing as one or
the other ; either in God, Angels or Men. No Propenfity,
Difpofition or Habit can be vertuous or vicious, as has been
(liewn i becaufe they, ki far as they take Place, deftroy the
Freedom of the Will, the Foundation of all moral Agency,

and exclude all Capacity of either Vertue or Vice.

And if Habits and Difpofitions themfelves be not vertuous
nor vicious, neither can the Exercife of thefe Difpofitions be
ig ; For the Exercife of Bias is not the Exercife of free fTf-

dctermtning

Seel. VII. with moral Habits ^Motives. 185

determining TVtll^ and fo there is no Exercife of Liberty in it.

Confequently noMan is vertuous or vicious, either in being well

or ill difpofed, nor in acting from a good or bid Difpolition.

And whether this Bias or Difpofition be habitual or not, if it

exifts but a Moment before the Act of Will, which is the

Effect of it, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Neceflity of .the

Effect. Or if there be no previous Difpofition at all, either

habitual or occafional, that determines the Act^ then it is not

Choice that determines it : it is therefore a Contingence, that

happens to the Man, arifing from Nothing in him ; and is

neeeffary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his ; and there-

I fore can't make Him either the better or worfe, any more than

a Tree is better than other Trees, becaufe it oftener happens

to be lit upon by a Swan or Nightingal ; or a Rock more

vicious than other Rocks, becaufe Rattle-Snakes have happen'd

I oftner to crawl over it. So that there is no Vertue nor Vice

I in good or bad Difpofitions, either fix'd or tranfient ; nor any

! Vertue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous In-

i clination ; nor yet any Vertue or Vice in acting wholly with-

j out any previous Inclination. Where then fhali we find

1 Room for Vertue or Vice ?

Section VII.

Arminlan Notions of moral Agency incojt-
Jiftent with all Influence of Motive and
Inducement, in either vertuous or vicious
AElions.

As Armtnian Notions of that Liberty, which is efTentlal
to Vertue or Vice, are inconfiftent with common Senfe^
in their being inconfiftent with all vertuous or vicious
Habits and Difpofitions ; fo they are no lefs fo in their Incon-
^{lency with all Influence of Motives in moral Actions.

A a 'Ti3

1 86 Motive &^ Inducem^ incoiifif^ Y'^xX III.

'Tis equally againft thofe Notions of Liberty of Will, whe-
ther there be, previous to the Act of Choice, a Preponde-
rancy of the Inchnation, or a Preponderancy of thofe Circum-
ftances, which have a Tendency to move the Inchnation.
And indeed it comes to juft the fameThing : To fay, the Cir-
cumftances of the Mind are fuch as tend to fway and turn it*s
Incliaation one Way, is th^ faine Thing as to fay, the IntU-
nation of the Mind, as under fuch Circumftances, tends th^t
Way.

Or if any think it moft proper to fay, that Motives do alter
the Inclination, and give a new Bias to the Mind ; it will not
alter the Cafe, as to the prefent Argument. For if Motives
operate by giving the Mind an Inclination, the^ they operate
by deftroying the Mind's Indifference, and laying it under a
Bias. But to do this, is to deftroy the Anninian Freedom : B:
is not to leave the Will to it's own Self-determination, but to
bring it into Subjection to the Power of fomething extrinficfc,
which operates upon it, fways and det-ermines it, previous to
it's own Determination. So that what is done from Motive,

can't be either vertuous or vicious. And befides, if the Acts

of the Will are excited by Motives, thofe Motives are the
Caufes of thofe Acts of the Will : which makes the Acts of
the Will neceffary ; as Effects neceffarily follow the. Efficieticy
of the Caufe. And if the Influence and Power of the Mo-
tive caufes the Volition, then the Influence of the Motive
determines Volition, and Volition don't determine it felf ;
and fo is not free, in the Senfe of Arviinimis (as has been
largely (liewn already) and confequently can be neither ver-
tuous nor vicious.

The Suppofition, v/hich has already been taken Notice of
as an infufficient Evafion in other Cafes, would be in like
Manner impertinently alledged in this Cafe ; namely, the*
huppofition that Liberty coniifl:s in a Power of fuipending
Adlion for the prefent, in order to Deliberation. If it (hould
be faid, Tho' it be true, that the V/Ul is under a Neceffity of
finally following the firongeft Motive, yet it may for the pre-
fent forbear to ad upon the Motive prefented, till there has-
been Opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and compare it's
real Weight with the Merit of other Motives. I anfwef,
as follow^.

Here ?gain it mufl: be remember'd, that if determining thust
to fufpeud and confider,be that A61 of the Will wherein alone
Liberty is exercifed„ then in this all Vertue and Vice muft

conflU i

Sedl.Vll. mthXtmim^nFertue^Fict. 1S7

confift 5 and the A<5ls that follow this Confidcration, and are
#ie Effe6ts of it, being neceflary, are no more vertuous or
vicious than fome good or bad Events which happen when
they are fail alleep, and are the Confequences of what
they did when they were awake. Therefore I would here
obierve two Things.

I. To fuppofe that all Vertue andVice, in every Cafe, con-
fifts in determining whether to take Time for Confideration,
or not, is not agreable to common Senfe. For according to
fuch a Suppofition, the moft horrid Crimes, Adultery, Murder,
Buggery, Blafphemy, &c. do not at all confift in the horrid
Nature of the Things themfelves, but only in the Negle6t of
thorough Confideration before they were perpetrated : which
brings their Vicioufnefs to a fmall Matter, and makes all
Grimes equal. If it be faid, that Negled of Confideration,
when fuch heinous Evils are propofed to Choice, is worfe than
in other Cafes : I anfwer, this is inconfiftent, as it fuppofes
the very Thing to be, which at the fame Time is fuppofed
ftot to be ; it fuppofes all moral Evil, all Vicioufnefs and Hei-
noufnefs, dees not confift meerly in the want of Confideration,
It fuppofes fome Crimes in themfelves^ in their oivn Nature, to be
inore heinous than others, antecedent to Confideration or In-
confideration, which lays the Perlbn under a previous Obliga-
tion to coafider in fome Cafes more than others.

2. If it were fo, that all Vertue and Vice,' in every Cafe,
confifted only in the Ael of the Will, whereby it determines
'ii^hether to coniider or no, it would not alter the Cafe in the
leaft, as to the prefent Argument. For ftill in this A6t of the
Will on this Determination, it is induced by fome Motive, and
neceffarily follows the ftrongeft Motive ; and fo is necelTary,
vcven in that Ad wherein alone it is either vertuous or vicious.

Gne Thing more I would obfefve, concerning the In con -
fiftence of Jrmiman Notions of moral Agency with the Influ-
ence of Motives. I fuppofe none will deny,that 'tis pof^ibie

for Motives to be fet before theMind fo powerful, and exhibit-
<rd in fo ftrong aLight,and under fo advantageousCircumliances,
as to be invmcible ; and fuch as the Mind cannot but yield
to. In this Cafe, ^rwm/^;zi will doubtlefs fay. Liberty is de-
ftroyed. And if fo, then if Motives are ejvhibited with half
fo much Power, they hinder Liberty in Proportion to their
Strength, and go half-way towards deftroying it. If a
Thoufand Degrees of Motive abolith all Liberty, then five

A a 2 Hundrect

1 88 hxmvci. Arg^ from />6^ Sincerity Partlll.

Hundred take it half away. If one Degree of the Influence^
of Motive don't at all infringe or diminifn Liberty, then no
more do two Degrees \ for Nothing doubled, is ftill Nothing.
And if two D'Cgrees don't diminifli the Will's Liberty, no
more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix Thoufand. For Nothing
multiplied never fo much, comes to butNothing. If there be
iicthing in the Nature of Motive or moral Suafion, that is at
all oppolite to Liberty, then the greateft Degree of it can't
hurt Liberty. But if there be any Thing in the Nature of
the Thing, that is againft Liberty, then the leaft Degree of it
hurts it in fome Degree ; and confequently hurts and dimi-
nifhes Vertue. If invincible Motives to that A6tion which is
good, take av/ay all the Freedom of the Ad, and fo all the
v''ertue of it ; then the more forceable the Motives are, fo
much the worfe, fo much the lefs Vertue i and the weaker
the Motives are, the better for the Caufe of Vertue j and
none is befl of all.

Now let it be confidered,v^hether thefe Things are agreable
to common Senfe. If it Ihould be allowed, that there are
fome Infcances wherein the Soul chufes without any Motive,
what Vertue can there be in fach a Choice ? I am fure, there
is no Prudence or Wifdom in it, Such a Choice is made for
no good End ; for it is for no End at all. If it were for any
End, the View of the End would be the Motive exciting to
the Acft ; and if the A61 be for no good End, and fo from no
good Aim, then there is no good Intention in it ; And there-
fore, according to all our natural Notions of Vertue, no more
Vertue in it than in the Motion of the Smoke,which is driven
to arid fro by the V/ind, without any Aim or End in the
Thing moved, and which knows not whither, i)or why and
wherefore, it is moved.

Corol. I. By thefe Things it appears, that the Argument
againft the Cahinijls^ taken from the Ufe of Counfels, Exhor-
tations, Invitations, Expoftulations, &c. fo much infifted on
by Armhnans^ is truly again [t themfeives. For thefe Things
can operate no other Way to any good EfFed, than as in
them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite
p.nd determine the Acls of the V/ill. But it follows on their
Principles, that the A6ts of Will excited by fuch Caufes, can't
t-e vertuous j becaufe fo far as they are from thefe, they
3re not from the Will's felf-determining Power. Hence it
ivill follovv/, th:it it :s not worth the while to offer any Argu-
iy\mp to peruvade I'ltxx to any vertuous Volition or voluntary
'' '" '•■'•••■• Aetion 5

Se.VII. of Invit2LWc. again/! thcmklvcs. 189

I A<5tion ; 'tis in vain to fet before them the Wifdom and
Amiablenefs of Ways of Vertue, or the Odioufnefs and
Folly of Ways of Vice. This Notion of Liberty and moral
Agency fruftrates all Endeavours to draw Men to Yertuc
by Inftrudion, or Perfwafion, Precept, or Example : For tho*

I thefe Things may induce Men to what is materially vertuous,
yet at the fame Time they take away the Form of Vertue,

; becaufe they deftroy Liberty ; as they, by their own Power,
put the Will out of it's Equilibrium, determine and turn the
Scale, and take the Work of felf-dctermining Power out of

\ it's Hands. And the clearer the Inftru(5lions are that are given,

, the more powerful the Arguments that are ufed, and the more
moving the Perfwafions or Examples, the more likely they are
to fruftrate their own Defign ; Becaufe they have fo much the

i greater Tendency to put the Will out of it's Balance, to hinder
it's Freedom of felf-determination •, and fo to exclude the
very Form of Vertue, and the EiTence of whatfoever is Praife-
worthy.

So it clearly follows from thefe Principles, that God has no
Hand in any Man's Vertue, nor does at all promote it, either
by a phyfical or moral Influence ; that none of the moral
Methods He ufes with Men to promote Vertue in the World,
have Tendency to the Attainment of that End ; that all the
Inilrudlions which He has given to Men, from the Beginning
of the World to this Day, by Prophets, or Apoftles, or by his
Son Jefus Chrift ; that all his Counfels, Invitations, Promifes,
Threatnings, Warnings and Expoftulations ; that all Means
He has ufed with Men, in Ordinances, or Providences ; yea,
all Influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have
had no Tendency at all to excite any one vertuous Adl of the
Mind, or to promote any Thing morally good and commen-
dable, in any Refpe6t. For there is no Way that thefe or

any other Means can promote Vertue, but one of thefe three.
Either ( I.) By a phyfical Operation on the Heart. But all
Effe6ls that are wrought in Men in this Way, have no Vertue
in them, by the concurring Voice of all Jr?mmans. Or (2.)
Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the Underftanding,to excite
good Acls in the Will. But it has been demonftrated, that
Volitions which are excited by Motives, are neceflary, and not
excited by a felf-moving Power ; and therefore, by their Prin-
ciples, there is no Vertue in them. Or (3.) By meerly giving
the Will an Opportunity to determine it felf concerning
the Objects propofed, either to chufe or reject, by it's own
Jjncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced felf-determinatiou. And if

this

igo Arminianifhl excludes ^// Vertuey P.llL

this be all, then all thofe Means do ho more to promote Ver-^
ttic, than Vice: For they do Nothing but give the Will
Opportunity to determine it felf either Way\ either to Good
or Bad, without laying it under any Bias to either : And fo
thtrc is really as much of an Opportunity given to determine
in Favour of Evil, as of Gefod.

Thus that horrid blafphemous Confequence will certainly-
follow from the Armiman Dodrine, which .they charge on
Others \ namely, that God a6ls an inconfiftent Part in ufing
fo many Counfels, Warnings, Invitations, Intreaties, &c. with
Sinners, to induce 'em to forfake Sin, and turn to the Ways of
Vertue ; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will fol-
\m^ from their Dodrine, that God does thefe Things whert
He knows at the fame Time, that they have no Manner of
Tendency to promote the Effedt He feems to aim at ; yea^
knows that if they have any Influence, this very Influence
will be inconfiftent with fuch an Eifecl:, and will prevent it.
But what an Imputation of Infincerity would this tix on Him
who is infinitely holy and true !~So that their's is theDo6lrJn5
which if purfued in it's Confequences, does horribly reflect on
the moft High, and fix on Him theCharge of Hypocrify ; arid
not the Dodlrine of the Cahhiijl ; according to their frequentj
and vehement Exclamations and Invedives.

Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this S€<51:ion, ft-
again appears, that Armhuayi Principles and Notions, when
fairly examined, and purfued in their demonftrable Confe-
quences, do evidently Ihut all Vertue out of the World, and
make it impoflible that there fhould ever be any fuch Thing,
in any Cafe \ or that any fuch Thing fhould ever be conceiv'd
of. For by thefe Principles, the very Notion of Vertue oi^
Vice implies Abfurdity and Contradidion. For it is abfurd irt
it felf, and contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe a vertuous
A<51 of Mind without any good Intention or Aim ; and by
their Prin^eiples, it is abfurd to fuppofe a vertuous A(5l with a
good Intention or Aim \ for to att for an End, is to a6t froih-
a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe Principles, there cart
be no vertuous A61 with a good Defign and End ; and 'tiS
felf-evident, there can be none without : confequently there
can be no vertuous A61 at all.

Corol, 3. Tis manifeft, that Armmian Notions of moral
Agency, and the Being of a Faculty of V/ill, cannot confift to-
gether i and that if there be apy fuch Thixig as, either a ver-

tuous>

Sea.VIL and Victy out of the World. 191

tuous, or vicious A<5t, it can't be an A(5l of Will ; no Will can
bye at all concerned in it. For that A6t which is performed
without Inclination, without Motive, without End, muft be
performed without any Concern of the Will. To fuppofe an
A51 of the Will without thefe, implies a Contradiction. If
the Soul in it's Act ha? no Motive or End ; then in that Ad
(as was obferv^d before) it feeks Nothing, goes after Nothing,
exerts no Inclination'to any Thing ; and this implies, that in
that A61 it defires Nothing, and chufesNothing ; fo that there
is noA<5t of Choice in theCafe : And that is as much as to fay,
there: is no Adt of Will in the^ Cafe. Which very effedtualiy
fhuts out all vicious and vertuous A6ts put of the Univerfe ;
in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or
vertvious A(5t wherein the Will is concerned ; arid according
\.o the plaineft Didates of Reafon, and the Li^ht of Nature,
and alfo the Principles of Armin'mm themfelyes, there can be
no vertuous or vicipus K6k wherein the Will is not concerned.
And therefore there is no Room for any vertuous or vicious
A«ts at all.

Corok 4. If none of the moral A(ftions of intelligent Beings^
are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, ano-
ther ftrange Thing will follow ; and this is, that God not
only can't foreknow any of the fijiture moral Acftions of his
Creatures, but He can make no Conjedure, can give no pro-
bable Guefs concerning them. For, all Conjedure in Things
of this Nature, muft depend on fome Difcerning or Apprcr.
li^nfion of thefe two Things, previous Difpcfition^ and Motive ;
which, as has been obferved, Arminian Notions pf moral
' Agency, in their real Confequ.ence, altogether exclude.

PART

{ 192 )

PART IV.

Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafon-
ings o{ Arminians^m Support andDefence
of the foremention'd Notions o{ Liberty^ I
moral Ageitcy^^c. and againft the oppo- I
file Doctrine, are confidered. ■%

Section I.

!r>5^ Eflence of the Vertue and Vice of Dif \

pofttions of the Hearty a?td A8is of the \

JVilly lies not in their Caufe, hut their \

Nature. \

NE main Foundation of the Reafons, which are
brought to eftablifh the foremention'd Notions of
Liberty, Vertue, Vice, &c. is a Suppofition, that the
Vertuoufnefs of the -Difpofitions or A^s of the Will
confifts not in the Nature of thefe Difpofitions or
A6ls, but wholly in the Origin or Caufe of them : fo that if
the Difpofition of the Mind or hdi of the Will be never io
£Ood, yet if the Caufe of the Difpofition or Adt be not our
Vertue, there is nothing vertuous or praife-worthy in it ; and
•a the contraiy, if the Will in it's Inclination or Ads bene-

vei^

Sea.I. OftkeMcnctofFertue &> Fice,i^^

I vcr fo bad, yet unlefs it arifes from fomething that is our
Vice or Fault, there is Nothing vicious or bIame-^\^orthy in

I it. Hence their grand Objedlion and pretended Demonftra-
tion, or Self-Evidence, againft any Vertue and Cofrtmenda-
bJenefs, or Vice and Blame-worthinefs, of thofe Habits or
A(5ls of the Will 3 which are not from fome vertuous or Vici*

I; ous Determination of the Will it felf.
Now, if this Matter be well confidered, it will appear to
be altogether a Miftake, yea, a grofs Abfurdity ; and that it is
r moft certain, that if there be any fuch Things, as a vertuous,
or vicious Difpofition-, or Volition of Mind, the Vertu5ufnefs
or Vicioufnefs of them confifts not in the Origin or Caufe of
thefe Things, but in the Nature of them.

If the EiTence of Vertuoufnefs or Commendablenefs, and
of Vicioufnefs or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Difpo-
fitions Or A6ls of Mind, which are faid to be our Vertue or
our Fault, but in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no
where at all. Thus^ for Inflance, if the Vice of a vicioi^s
Aa of Will, lies not in the Nature of the Aa, but the
Caufe ; fo that it's being of a bad Nature will not
make it at all our Fault, unlefs it afifes from fome faulty
Determination of our's as it*s Caufe, or fomething in us that
is our Fault; then for the fame Reafon, neither can the
Vicioufnefs of that Caufe lie in the Nature of the Things it
felf, but in it^s Caufe : that evil Determination of our's is not
our Fault, meerly becaufe it is of a bad Nature, unlefs it
arifes from fome Caufe in us that is our Fault; And when
v/e are come to this higher Caufe, fl:ill the Reafon of the
Thing holds good ; tho* this Caufe be of a bad Nature, ye^L
V, e are not at all to blame on that Account, unlefs it arifes
from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthinefs
lie in the Nature of ibis Canje^ but in the Caufe of that. And
thus we muft drive Faultinefs back from Step to Step, from
a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum : and that is thoroughly
to banilh it from the World, and to allow it no polfibility of
Exigence any where in the Univerfality of Things. On thefe
Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't confift in any Thing
I that is an EffeSf ; becaufe Fault don't confift in the Nature
; of Things, but in their Caufe ; as well as becaufe Effefls
: are neceiuiry, being unavoidably conne(5led with their Caufe :
' \ therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that
Faultinefs can lie only in that Caufi^ which is a Caufe only^ zn6.
no Effecft of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for then
it muft lie in the Mature of the Thinir it felf ; cct in it's be-
k B b ^ ia^

K^^T^e Effcnct of Fertue & J^ke^ Part IV*

ing from any Determination of o]jr*s, nor any Thing faulty
m us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Caufe at all,
for by the iiuppofition, it is no EfFed, and hai no Caufe.
And thus, He that will maintahi, it is n'ot the Nature of
Habits or Ads of Will that makes them vertuous or faulty,
but the Caufe, muft immediately run Hnnfelf out of his
ovm AfTertion ; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly con-
tradid and deny it.

This is certain, tha.t if EfFe6ls are vicious and faulty, not
from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them,
but bccaufe they are from a bad Caufe, it muft be on Ac-
count of the Badnefs of the Caufe ; and fo on Account
of the Nature of the Caufe : A bad EfFea in the Will muf^
be bad, becaufe the Caufe is bad^ or of an evil Nature^
or has Badnefs as a Quality inherent in it : and tl good Eflfed
in the Will muft be good^ by Reafon of the Goodnefs of the
Caufe, or it's being of a geod Kind and Nature, And if this
be what is meant, the very Suppofition of Fault and Praife
iving not in the«» Nature of the Thing, but the Caufe, con-
tradicts it {€ii^ and does at leaft refolve the Eftence of Vertue
and Vice into theNature of Things, and fuppofes it originally

to confift in that. And if a Caviller has a Mind to run

from the Abfurdity, by faying, '' No, the Fault of the
«"^ Thing which is the Caufe, lies not in this, that the Caufe,
>' it {^ii is of an evil Nature^ but that the Caufe is evil in
*^' that Senfe, that it is from another bad Caufe". Still the
Abfurdity will follow him ; for if fo, then the Caufe before,
ch"arged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame muft be laid,
to the higher Caufe, and muft confift in that's being Evil^ or
of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay theBlamC'
of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and
not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifti as to go higher
ftill, and afcend from Step to Step, till he is come to that
which is the lirftCaufe concerned in the whole Affair, and will
fay, all the Blame lies in that ; then at laft he muft be forced
to ov/n, that the Faultinefs of the Thing which he fuppofes
alone blame-worthy, lies wholly m the Nature of the Thing,
and not in the Original or Caufe of it ; for the Suppofition
is, that it has no Original, it is determined by noAct of our's,
is caufcd by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely w///>tf«f
ans; Qaufl. And fo the Race is at an End, but the Evader is
taken In his Flight.

'Tis agreable to x\\'^ natural Notions of Mankind, that
moral Evil, v.'ith it's Defert of Diilike and Abhorrence, and
ali it's other Jll-defcrvings, confifts in a certain DAtw/Zv in

. the

Se.I. in the^^t^ of Volition ^not in theC^LVik. 1 9 5

the Nature of certain Difpofitions of the Heart, and A€is of
the Will ; and not in the Deformity of fcrmihing elfe^ diverfe.
from the very Thing it felf, which deferves Abhorrence,
fuppofed to be the Catife of it. Which would be abfurd,
becaufe that would be to fuppofe, a Thing that is in-
nocent and not Evil, is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another
Thing is Evil. It implies a Contradidion ; for it would be
to fuppofe, the very Thing which is morally evil and blame-
worthy, is innocent and not blame-worthy j but that fomething
elfe, which is it's Cauie, is pnly to blame. To fay, that Vice
don't confift in the Thing which is vicious, but in it's Caufe,
is the fame as to fay, that Vice don't confiil: in Vice, but in
that which, produces it.

'Tis true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being the Caufe
of Vice : It may be Wicicednefs in the Caufe, that it pro-
duces Wickednefs. But it would imply a Contradidion, to
fuppofe that thefe two are the fame individual Wickednefs.
The wicked A61 of the Caufe in producing Wickednefs, is
one Wickednefs ; and the Vf ickednefs produced, if there be
any produced, is another. And therefore the Wickednefs of
the latter don't lie in the form.er, but is diftind from it ; and
the Wickednefs of both lies in the evil Nature of the Things
which are wicked.

The Thing' which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it
deferves P'uniSiment ; which is but the Expreffion of Hatred.
And that which renders Vertue lovely, is the fame with that,
on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praife and Re-
ward ; which are but the Expreflions of Efteem and Love.
But that which makesVice hateful, is it's hateful Nature ; and
that which rendersVertue lovely, is it's amiable Nature. 'Tis
a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good
'or evil Will, whieh is the Soul of Vertue and Vice (and not
in the Occafion of it) which is their Worthinefs of Eileem or
Difefteem, Praife or Difpraife, according to the common Senfe
of Mankind. If the Caufe or Occaficn of the Rife of an
hateful Difpofition or Ad of Will, be alfo hateful ; ^ fuppofe
another antecedent evil Will 5 that is entirely an^ig. Sin,
and defer\^es Punidiment by it felf, under a diilincrv^onf de-
ration. There is Worthinefs of Difpraife in the Nature of an
evil Volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing A<5t which
is it's Caufe ; otherwife the evil Volition wl»ich is the Eifeit*
is no moral Evil, any more than Sicknefs, or fome other na-
tural Calamity, which arifes from a Caufe moraUy evil.

B b 2 Thus

«96 The Effence ofFerm ^Vice, PartlV.

Thi;s for Inftance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of
Difpraife,ajccording to common Senfe ; not becaufe fomethjng
as bad, or worfe than Ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced
^t ; but becaufe it is hateful in it i€ii^ by it's own inherent
Deformity. So the Love of Vertue is amiable, and worthy of
Praife, not meerly becaufe fomething elfe went before thi^
Love of Vertue in our Minds, which caufed it to take Place
there ; forlnflance our own Choice ; we chofe to love Vertue,
and by fome Method or other wrought our felves into th$
Love of it ; but becaufe of the Amiablenefs and Condecei\cy
of fuch a Difpofition and Inclination of Heart. If that was
the Cafe, that we did chufe to love Vertue, and {o produced
that Love in our \thts^ this Choice it felf could be no other-!
wife amiable or praife- worthy, than as Love to Vertue, or
fom,e other amiable Inclination, was exercifed and impjied in
it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it muft be fo on Act
count of fome amiable Qiiality in the Nature of the Choice,
If we chofe to love Vertue, not in Love to Vertue, or any
Thing that was good, and exercifed no fort of good Difpofi*
tion in the Choice, the Choice it felf was not vertuous, no!"
worthy of any Praife, according to commpn Senfe, becaufe^
the Choice vvas not of a good Nature.

^ It may not be improper here to take Notice of fomething
faid by anAuthor, that has lately made a mighty Noife in Ame-
rica, <« A neceffary Holinefs (fays He *) is no Holinefs.- —
" Adam could not be originally created in Righteoufnefs and
*' true Holinefs, becaufe He muft chufe to be righteous, before
*^ He could be righteous, And therefore He muft exift. He
'* muft be created, yea He muft exercife Thought and Re^^
" fledtion, before he v<ras righteous." There is much more
to the fame Effed: in that Place, and alfo in P. 437, 438, 439,
440. If thefe Things are fo, it will certainly follow, that the
^rft chufmg to be righteous i? no righteous Choice ; there
is no Righteoufnefs or Holinefs in it ; becaufe no chufing to
be righteous goes before it. For He plainly fpeaks of chufmg
to be righteous y as what muji go before Righteoufnefs : And that
which follows the Choice, being the EfFe^ of the Choice,
can't be Righteoufnefs cr Holinefs : For an Eife<5l is a Thing
neceifary, and can't prevent the Influence or Efficacy of it's
Caufe J and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the
Caufe : And He fays, A neceffaryHolinefs is no Holinefs, So that
neither can a Chpice of Righteoufpefs be Righteoufnefs oc

Holinefs,

♦^ ?cnp. Pqc, of Qri^iaal Sin.y, f, 180. 3d ^dit*

ScJ.m theNat^ ofVoUtton^notin /^^Caufe. 197

Holincfs, nor can anyThing that is confequent on that Choice,
and the EfFedl of it, be Righteoufnefs or Holinefs ; nor can
any Thing that is without Choice, be Righteouinefs or Holi-
nefs. So that by his Scheme, all Righteoufnefs and Holinefs
is at once fhut out of the World, and no Door left open, by
which it can ever poflibly enter into the World.

I fuppofe, the Way that Men came to entertain this abfurd
inconfirtent Notion, with Refpe6l to internal Inclinations and
Volitions themfelves, (or Notions that imply it,) vi%. that the
ElTence of their moral Good or Evil lies not in their Nature,
but their Caufe ; was, that it is indeed a very plain Didate
of common Senfe, that it is fo with Refpe(5t to all outward
J^fio-fis, and fenfible Motions of the Body ; that the moral
Good or Evil of 'em don't lie at all in the Motions them-
felves ; which taken by themfelves, are nothing of a moral
Nature ; and the EfTence of all the moral Good or Evil that
concerns them, lies in thofe internal Difpofitions and Volitions
which. are the Caufe of them. Now being always ufed to de-
termine this, without Hedtation or Difpute, concerning external
Atliom \ which are the Things that in the ccmmiOn Ufe of
Language are fignified by fuch Phrafes, as Men's Actions^ or
their Doings ; Hence v^hen they came to fpeak of Volitions,
and internal Exercifes of their Inclinations, under the fame De-
nomination of their Jdlisns, or what they do, they unwarily de-
termined the Cafe muil alfo be the fame with thefe, as with
txterjzal Actions ; not confidering the vaft Difference in th«
Nature of the Cgfe.

If any (hall ftill objed and fay. Why is it not neceffary
tfiat the Caufe ihould be confidered, in order to determine
whether anyThing be worthy of Blame orPraife ? Is if agreable
to Reafon and common Senle, that a Man is to be praifed or
blamed for that which he is not the Caufe or Author of, and
has no Hand in ?

I anfwer, fuch Phrafes as being the Caufe, being the Author,
paving a Hand^ and the like are ambiguous. They are moft
vulgarly underftood for being the defigning voluntary Caufe,
or Caufe by antecedent Choice : And it is moft certain that
Men are not in this Senfe the Caufes or Authors of the firfl
A<5t of their Wills, in any Cafe ; as certain as any Thing is,
or ever can be ; for nothing can be more certain, than that a
Thing is not before it is, nor a Thing of the fame Kind be-
fcre the firft Thing of that Kind -, and To no Choice before

thfc

rgS The Arminian JVo/ion of A&ion, P.IVr

Ac firft Choice.-— As ihtPhrvik, heing the Juthofy may be un-
derftood, not of being the Producer by an antecedent Ad: of'
Will ; but as a Perfon may be faid to be the Author of the
A<5t of Will it felf, by his being the immediate Agent,
^ the Being that is a^'mg^ or in Exercife in that A&. ; If the'
Phrafe of heitig the Author^ is ufed to iignify this, then donbt-\
lefs cwnmon Senfe requires Men's being the Authors of their
own A(5ts of Will, in order to their being efteemed worthy of
Praife or Difpraife on Account of them. And common Senfe' *
teaches, that tHey muft be the Authors of external ASiions^ \vi
the former Senfe, namely, their being the Caiifes of 'em by an"
A6t of Will or Choice, in order to their being juftly blamed
or praifed : But it teaches no ftich I'hing with Refpe6t to the
Ads of the Will thennfelves.— But this may appear more ma-
nifeft by the Things whrch will be obferved in the following
S^dion.

Section II.

lT)e Falfenefs and Incon/tjience of that meta-
phyfcal Notion of Adion, ^W Agency,
which feems to be generally entertained by
the Defenders of the Arminian Do&riner
concerning Liberty ^ moral Agency y &c.

ONE Thing that is made very much a Ground of Argu-
ment and fuppofed Demonftration by Arminians^ in
Defence of the fore-mentioned Principles, concerning
moral Agency, Vertue, Vice 5cc. is their metaphyseal Notion
of Agency and A^ion. They fay, unlefs the Soul has a Self-
determining Power, it has no Power of A5iion ; If it's Vo-
litions be not caufed by it felf, but are excited and determined
by fome ex»rinfic Caufe, they can't be the Soul's own ASls j
and that the Soul can't be a^'ive^. but muft be wholly pajjlvey in
thofe EfFeds which it is the Subject of necefTarily-, and ;iQt
from it's own free Determination,

Mr,

Se£l:. II. falfe and inconjijlent. igg

Mr. Chuhh lays the Foundation of his Scheme of Liberhr,
and of his Arguments to fupport it, very much in this Pofiti-
on. That Man is an Agent^ ancl capable of A6lion. Which
doubtlefs is true : But Bdf- determination belongs to his Notion
pf A6fion^ and is the very Eflence of it. Whence he infers
that it is impoffible for a Man to a6l and be ac^led upon, in
the fame Thing, at the fame Time ; and that nothing that is
an Adion, can be the Effedl of the Adion of another : and he
infifts, that a necejjary Agent ^ or an Agent that is neceffarily
determined to ad:, is a plain Cofitracii^ion,

But thofe are a precariousSort of Demonftrations,whichMen
build on the Meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a Word ;
efpeciaily when that Meaning is abftrufe, inconfiftent, and
entirely diverfe from the original Senfe of the Word in com^
mon Speech.

That the Meaning of the Word Adlion^ as Mr. Chubb apd

many others ufe it, is utterly unintelligible and inconfifl:ent,^is

manifell:, becaule it belongs to their Notion of an Adion, that

'tis fomething wherein is no Pafllon or PalTivcnefs ; that is

(according to their Senfe of Paffivenefs) it is under the

Power, hiiluence or Adion of no Caufe. And this implies,

that A(5tion has no Caufe, and is no Effed : for to be an

Effe6t implies Pajftvenefs^ or the being fubjed to the Power and

! Adion of it's Caufe. And yet they hold, that the Mind's

A^ion is the Effedl of it's own Determination, yea, the Mind's

free and voluntary Determination ; which is the fame with

i free Choice. So that Adion is the EfFed of fomething pre-

ceeding, even a preceeding Ad of Choice : And confequently,

i in this Effed the Mind is paffive, fubjed to the Power and

I Adion of the preceeding Caufe, which is the foregoing Choice,

[and therefore can't be adive. So that here we have this Con-

tradidion, that Adion is always the Effed of foregoingChoice ;

; and therefore can't be Adion ; becaufe it is pajftve to the

I Power of that preceeding caufal Choice ; and the Mind can't

I be adive and paffive in the fame Thing, at the fame Time.

I Again, they fay, Neceffity is utterly inconfiftent with Adion,

iand a neceflary Adion is a Contradidion ; and fo their Notion

of Adion implies Contingence, and excludes all NecefTity.

And therefore their Notion of Adion implies, that it has no

neceflary Dependence or Connedion with any Thing forego-

{ing ; for fuch a Dependence or Connedion excludes Contin-

|gence, and implies Neceflity. And yet their Notion of Adion

^implies NecefTity, and fuppofes that it is neceffary, and can't be

contingent,

200 T^^Arminian Notion of AGtion^ Parti V. \

tontingent. For they fuppofe,that whatever is properly called i

A(5tion, muft be determined by the Will and free Choice ; ]

and this is as much as to fay, that it muft be neceffary, being j

dependent upon, and determined by fomething foregoing ; j

namely, a foregoing A(5t of Choice. Again, it belongs to their 1

Notion of Adtion, of that which is a proper and meer A<51^ f

that it is the Beginning of Motion, or of Exertion o( Power ; ^

but yet it is implied in their Notion of A6lion, that it is not i

the Beginning of Motion or Exertion of Power, but is confe- i

quent and dependent on a preceeding Exertion of Power, viz» i

the Power of Will and Choice : for they fay there is no pro- . i
per Adion but what is freely chofen ; or, which is the fame

Thing, determined by a foregoing A6i of free Choice. But i

if any of them (hall fee Caufe to deny this, and fay they hold \
flo filchThing as that every A6tion is chofen. or determined by

a foregoing Choice ; but that the very firft Exertion of Will j

tonly, undetermined by any preceeding A61:, is properly called \

Adion ; then I fay, fuch a Man's Notion of A6tion implies i

NecelTity ; for what the Mind is the Subjedt of without the 'J

Determination of it's own previous Choice, it is the Subjed of" I

necefiarily, as to any Hand that free Choice has in the Affair ; '

and without any Ability the Mind has to prevent it, by any *

Will or Eledlion of it's own : becaufe by the Suppofition it 1
precludes all previous Ads of the Will or Choice in the Cafe,

which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this 'other i

Way, implied in their Notion of Ad, that it is both neceffary '}

and not necefiary. Again,it belongs to their Notion of an Ji^, i^

that it is no Effed of a pre-determining Bias or Preponderation, 'J

but fprings immediately out of Indifference ; and this implies %

that it can't be from foregoing Choice, which is foregoing Pre- 'j

ponderation : if it be not habitual, but occafional, yet if it 'f

caufes the Ad, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. ' ;

And yet, at the fame Time, 'tis eifential to their Notion of an ' j;1

Ad, that it is what the Agent is the Author of freely and vo- 'i*

luntarily, and that is, by previous Choice and Defign. •]

So that according to their Notion of an Ad, confidered witb^ i1

Reeard to it's Coniequences, thefe following Things are all !

cffential to it j viz. That it fhould be neceffary, and not ne- \ <

cefTary ; that it fhould be from a Caufe, and no Caufe' ; that it. 3

(hould be the Fruit of Choice and Defign, and not the Fruit of '\

Choice and Defign ; that it fhould be the Beginning of Motioi* i

or Exertion, and yet confequent on previous Exertion ; that :«

it fhould be before it is ; that it fliould fpring immediately '^-

out oi Indifference and Eq^iiibrium, aftd yet be the EfFed oP i

PiCeponderation.^ ^

Sed:. II. falfe and inconfifient. 20 1

Preponderation ; that it lliould be felf-orlginated, and alfo
have it's Original from fomething elfe ; that it is what the
Mind caufes it felf, of it's own Will, and can produce or pre-
vent, according to it's Choice or Pleafure, and yet what the
Mind has no Power to prevent, it precluding all previous
Choice in the Affair.

So that an A(5l, according to their metaphyfical Notion of

it, is fomething of which there is no Idea ; 'tis nothing but

a Confufion of the Mind, excited by Words without anv

difi:in6l Meaning, and is an abfolute Non-entity ; and that in

two Refpeds ; (i.) There is nothing in the World that ever

was, is, or can be, to anfwer the Things which mufl belong to

it's Defcription, according to what they fuppofe to be eflential

jto it. And (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be,

any Notion or Idea to anfwer the Word, as they \ife and ex-

i plain it. For if we (hould fuppofe any fuch Notion, it would

many Ways deftroy it felf. But 'tis impolTible, any Idea of

i Notion (liould fubfift in the Mind, v/hofe very Nature and

lEfTence, which conftitutes it, deilroys it.™ If fome learned

i Philofopher, who had been abroad, in giving an Account of

[the curious Obfervations he had made in his Travels, fhould-

|fay, " He had been in Terra del Fuego^ and there had feen an

I " Animal, which he calls by a certain Name, that begat and

I «« brought forth it felf, and yet had a Sire and a Dam di{lin<5l

i " from it felf ; that it had an Appetite, and was hungry before

r' it had a Being ; that his Mafier, v/ho led him, and govern-

*' ed him at his Pleafure, was always governed by him, and

I •* driven by him where he pleafed ; that when he moved, hs

\ ** always" took a Step before the firit Step ; that he went with

i " hisHead firft,and yet always wentTail foremoft ; and this,tho'

J!" he had neitherHead norTail:" It would be no Impudence at

; all, to tell fuch a Traveller, tho' a learned Man, that Ke him-

felf had no Notion or Idea of fuch an Animal as he gave an

i Account of, and never had, nor ever would have.

■ As the fcremention'd Notion of Acftion is very inconfiflent,
fo it is wholly diverfe from the original Meaning of the Word,
The more ufual Signification of it in vulgar Speech, f^ems to
be fome Moticn or Exertion of Power ^ that is voluntary, or that
\% the Effe6l cf the IVill ; and is ufed in the fame Senle as doing :
And moil commonly 'tis ufed to fignify cutzuard Afuom. So
Tinr.kirg is often diftinguilh'd from Atnng ; and Defirhig and
TVilUng^ from Doing.

C c Befide*

4 "

202 7^^ArininIaniV<9//^;^ of Ailion, Part IV.

Befides this more ufual and proper Signification of the Word
A^ion^ there are other Ways in which the Word is ufed that
are lefs proper, which yet have Place in common Speech.
Oftentimes 'tis ufed to fignify fome Motion or Alteration in
inanim.ate Things, with Relation to fome Obje6l and Effect.
So the Spring of a Watch is faid to aot upon the Chain and
Wheels ; the Sun-beams, to a6l upon Plants and Trees ;
and theFire, to ad upon Wood. Sometimes the Word is ufed
to fignify Motions, Alterations, and Exertions of Power, which
are feen in corporeal Things, cor.fidered ahfolutely ; efpecially
when thefe Motions feem to arife from fome internal Caufe
■which is hidden j fo that they have a greater Refemblance of
thofe Motions of our Bodies, which are the Effe6fs of internal
Volition, or invifible Exertions of Will. So the Fermentation
of Liquor, the Operations of the Loadfi:one, and of eledlrical
Bodies, are called the Adiion of thefe Things. And fometimes
the Word Aciion is ufed to fignify the Exercife of Thought,
or of Will and Inclination : fo meditating, loving, hating, in-
clining, difinclining, chufing and refufing, may be fometimes
called acting ; tho' more rarely (unlefs it be by Philofophers
and Metaphyficians) than in any of the other Senfes.

But the Word is never ufed in vulgar Speech in that Senfe
which Anninian Divines ufe it in, namely, for the felf-deter-
minate Exercife of the Will, or an Exertion of the Soul that
arifes without any necefiTary Connexion v^rith any Thing fore-
going. Jf a Man does fomething voluntarily, or as the EfFed
of his Choice, then in the moft proper Senfe, and as the Word
is moil originally and commoaly ufed, he is faid to a^ : But
whether that Choice or Volition be feif-determined, or no,
whether it be conne(5led with foregoing habitual Bias, whether
it be the certain Effed of the ftrongefi; Motive, or fome extrin-
iick Caufe, never comes into Confideration in the Meaning of
the Word.

And if the Word ASfion is arbitrarily ufed by fome Men
othervv'ife, to fuit fome Scheme of Metaphyficks or Morality,
no Argument can reafonably be founded on fuch a Ufe of this
Term, to prove any Thing but their own Pleafure. For Di-
vines and Philofophers ftrenuoufly to urge fuch Arguments, as
tiio' they were fufficient to fupport and demonftrate a whole
Scheme of moral Philofcphy and Divinity, is certainly to eredt"
a mighty Edifice on the Sand, or rather on a Shadow. And
tho' it mav now perhaps, thro' Cufiom, have become natural
for 'em tg ufe the \Vord in this Senfe (if that may be called a

Senfe*

Seel, II. falfe and inconjijlent. 203

Senfe or Meaning, which is fo in confident with it felf ) yet
this don't prove that it is agreable to the natural Notions Men
have of Things, or that there can be anyThing in the Creation
that fhould anfwer fuch a Meaning. And tho' thej^ appeal to
Experience, yet the Truth is, that Men are fo far from expe-
riencing any fuch Thing, that it is impolTible for 'em to have
any Conception of it.

If it fhould be objecfled, that Atihii. and Faffion are doubtlefs
Words of a contrary Signification ; but to fuppofe that the
Agent, in it's Action, Is under the Power and Influence of
fomething extrinlick, is to confound Adion and PafTion, and
make 'em the fame Thing.

I anfwer. That Acflion and Faffion are doubtlefs, as they are
fometimes ufed, Words of oppofite Signification ; but not as
fignifying oppofite Exijiences^ but only oppofite Relations. The
Words Caufe and Ef}£i are Terms of oppofite Signification ;
but neverthelefsjif I afieit that the fameThing may at the fame
Time, in different Refpecls and Relations, be both Caiife and
Effe^^ thi^ will not prove that I confound the Terms. The
Soul may be both aSiive and paffive in the fame Thing „in dif-
ferent Refpeds, aSiive with Relation to one Thing, and pajjlvg
with Relation to another. The Word PaJJion when fet in Op-
pofition to A^mt or rather ASiivenefs^ is meerly a relative Term :
it fignifies noEfled or Caufe, nor any proper Exiftence ; but is
the fame ^'xKwPaJfivencfi.^ or a being paflive,or a being a6led up-
on by fomething. Which is a meerRelatlon ofaThing to fome
Power or Force exerted by fome Caufe, producing fome Effe6t
in it, or upon it. And ASi'ion^ when fct properly m Oppofition
to Pajfion^ or Pajfivenefs., is no real Exifience ; it is not the fam.c
with AN AtYion^ but is a meer Relation : 'Tis the ABvvcnefi of
fomething on another Thing, being the oppofite Relation to
the other, Wz. a Relation of Power, or Force exerted by fome
Caufe, towards another Thing, which is the Subjcn^l of the
Effe6l of that Power. Indeed the Word Att'ion is frequently
ufed to fignify fomething not meerly relative^ but more ahfoluie^
and a real Exifience ; as when we fay An Acfion ; when the
Word is not uled tranfitively, but abfoiutely, for fome Motion
or Exercife of Body or Mind, without any Relation to any
Object or Eff&6t : And as ufed thus, it is not properly. the op-
'Ippfite of Pajfton \ v^hich ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute,
but meerly the Relation of being aiied upon. And therefore if
the Word '/JStion be ufed in the like relative Seiife, then Action
and PalTion are only two contrary Relations. And 'tis no Ab-

Q Q 2, furdity

:204 How _ this Arminian Notion Part IV. ]

furdlty to fuppofe, that contrary Relations may belong to the i

fame Thing, at the fame Time, with refpedt to difFerentThings. \

So to fuppofe, that ther^ are Ads of the Soul by which a Man \

voluntarily moves, and ac^s upon ObjecSts, and producesEfFe6ls> ,

which yet themfelves are Effe6ls of fomething elfe, and wherein \

the Soul it felf is the Object of fomething adting upon, and i

influencing that, don't at all confound Adion and PafTion. i

The Words may neverthelefs be properly of oppoiite Signiti- •

cation : there niay be as true and real a Difference between I

adling and being caufed to a6l^ tho' we fliould fuppofe the Soul "i

to be both in the fame Volition, as there is between livings and \

heing qtiukerid^ or made to live. 'Tis no more a Contradiction, to 'i

luppofe that Adion may be the Effe6t gf fome other Caufe, ,^

hefides the Agent, or Being that aifts, than to fuppofe that Life \

may be the EfFed of fome other Caufe, befides the Liver, or 1

the Being that lives, in whom Life is caufed to be. ■

The Thing v/hich has led Men into this inconfiftent No- j
tion of Action, v/hen applied to Volition, as tho* it were \
eiTential to this internal A6lion, that the Agent (hould be felf- I
determined in it, and that the Will fliould be the Caufe of it, ^
was probably this ; that according to the Senfe of Mankind, \
and the common Ufe of Language it is fo, with refpedl to ;
Men's external Adions ; which are what originally, and ac-
cording to the vulgar Ufe and mofl: proper Senfe of the Word, A
are called A^iions. Men in thefe are felf-dire(5ted, felf-deter- i
mined, and their Wills are the Caufe of the Motions of thei? ij
Bodies, and the external Things that are done ; fo that unlefg ij
Men do 'em voluntarily, and of Choice, and the A6tion be de- ij
termined by their antecedent Volition, it is no A61ion or Doing ||
of theirs. Hence fomeMetaphyficians have been led unwarily, \\
but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerningVolitioi) | ■
it felf, that That alfo mufl: be determined by the Will ; which %
is to be determin'd by antecedent Volition, as the Motion of 1
the Body is 5 not confidering the Contradiction it implies.

But 'tis very evldent,that in the metaphyfical Diftind^ion bev

tween A6lion and PaiT|on, (tho' long fince become common j

and the general Vogue) due Care has not been taken to con- -■

form Language to the Nature of Things, or to any diftind j

clear Ideas. As it is in innumerable other Philofophical, Me* 1
t:aph3^f]cal Terms, ufed in thefe Difputes ; which has occafion'<|[^!.;|
;r,e::fQrcirible Difficiilty, Contention, Errour and Confufion.

An4

Se(^. II. probably arofe. 205

And thus probably it came to be thought,that NecefTity was
inconfifleiit with Adion, as thefe Terms are applied to Vo-
lition. Firft, thefeTerms A^'ion and Necejftty afe changed from
dieir original Meaning, as fignifying external voluntary A6tion,
and Conftraint, (in which Meaning they are evidently incon-
fiftent) to fignify quite other Thinigs, viz. Volition it felf, and
Certainty of Exiftence. And when the Change of Signification
is made, Care is riot taken to make proper Allowances and
Abatements for the Difference of Senfe ; but ftill the fame
Things are unwarily attributed to J^ion and Necejftty^ in the
new Meaning of the Words, which plainly belonged to 'em in
their firft Senfe ; and on this Ground, Maxims are eftablifned
without any real Foundation, as tho' they were the moft cer-
tain Truths, and the moft evident Didates of Reafon.

But however ftrenuoufly it is maintain'd, that what is necef-
fary can't be properly called Adion, and that a necefTary
Adion is a Contradicftion, yet 'tis probable there are few Armt^
man Divines, who if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe
Principles. They will alIow,that God is in the higheft Senfe
an a6tive Being, and the higheft Fountain of Life and A(5tion ;
and they would not probably deny, that thofe that are called
God'^s X<5ts of Righteoufnefs, Holinefs and Faithfulnefs, are
truly and properly God's A6ls^ and God is really a holy Agent
in them : and yet I truft, they will not deny, that God necef-
farily adts juftly and faithfully, and that it is impoflibk for
Him to ad unrighteoufly aad unholily.

Section

2o6 JVhy C^\m\(vn. is fuppofed Part IV.

Section III.

The Reafons why fome think it contrary to
common Scnfe, to fuppofe thofe things
which are neceffary, to be worthy of either
Praife or Blame.

^^~W^<IS abundantly affirmed and urged by Armm'ian Writers,
I that it is contrar}^ to common Senfe^ and the natural No-
tions and Apprehenfions of Mankind, to fuppofe o-
therwife than that Neceffity ('making no Diftindlion between
natural and moral Necefnty) is inconfiftent with Vertue and
Vice, Praife and Blame, Revv^ard and Punilhment. And their
Arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in ;
and have been not a little perplexing to many who have been
friendly to the Truth, as clearly revealed in the holy
Scriptures .* It has fcem'd to them indeed difficult, to recon-
cile Calvinijlk Do6lrines with the Notions Men commonly
hav^e of Juftice and Equity. And the true Reafons of it
feem to be thefe that follow.

L 'Tis Indeed a very plain Dictate of common Senfe, that
natural Neceffity is wholly inconfiftent with juft Praife or
Blame. If Men do Things which in themfelves are very
good, fit to be brought to pafs, and very happy Effeds, pro-
perly againft their Wills, and can't help it ; or do them from
a Neceffity that is without their Wills, or with which
their Wills have no Concern or Connexion ; then 'tis
a plain Didate of common Senfe, that it's none of their
Vertue, nor any moral Good in them ; and that they are
not worthy to be rewarded or praifed ; or at all efteemed,
honoured or loved on that Account. And on the other
Ha^d, that if from like Neceffity they do thofe Things which
in Themfelves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them
becaufe they can't help it ; the Neceffity is fuch, that it is
all one whether they will them, or no j and the Reafon why
they are done, is from Neceffity only, and not from their
Wills ; 'Tis a very plain Dicflate of common Senfe that they
are not at all to blame ; there is no Vice, Fault, or moral
Evil at ail in the E£fe6l ilQii^ j *noi; are they who arc thus

neceff.tate4

Se6l.III. contrary to common Senfe, 207

necelTitated, in any wife worthy to be puniihed, hated, or
in the leall difrefpeded, on that Account.

In like Manner, if Things in themfelves good and defira^
ble are abfolutely impofhbie, with a natural Impoffibility,
the univerfal Reafon of Mankind teaches, that this wholly a)id
perfcSlly excufes Perfons in their not doing them.

And 'tis alfo a plain Didate of common Senfe, that if the
doing Things in themfelves Good, or avoiding Things io
themfelves Evil, is not abfolutely impojfihle^ with fuch a natural
Impoffibility, but very difficulty with a natural Difficulty ; that
is, a Difficulty prior to^ and not at all confifling in Will and
Inclination it felf, and which would remain the fame, let the
Inclination be what it will ; then a Perfon's Negle6t or O-
miffion is excufed in fojne Meafure^ tho' not wholly ; his Sin is
lefs aggravated,than if theThing to be done were eafy. And if
inftead of Difficulty and Hindrance, there be a contrary natural
Propenfity in the State of Things, to the Thing to be done, or
£fte6i: to be brought to pafs, abftra6ted from any Confidera-
tion of the Inclination of the Heart ; tho' the Propenfity be
not fo great as to amount to a natural Neceffity ; yet being
fome Approach to it, fo that the doing the good Thing be
very much from this natural Tendency in the State of Things,
and but little from a good Inclination ; then it is a Dictate
of common Senfe, that there is fo much the lefs Vertue in
what is done ; and fo it is lefs Praife-worthy and rewarda-
ble. TheReafon is eafy, viz, becaufe fuch a natural Propenfity
or Tendency is an Approach to natural Neceffity ; and th®
greater the Propenfity, ftill fo m^uch the nearer is the
Approach to Neceffity. And therefore as natural Neceffity
takes away or fhuts out all Vertue, fo this Propenfity ap-
proaches to an Abolition of Vertue ; that is, it diininijhes it.
And on the other Hand, natural Difficulty in the State "of
Things is an Approach to natural Impoffibility. And as the
latter, when it is compleat and abfolute, whclly takes away
Blame ; fo fuch Difficulty takes away fome Blame, or dimi-
niflies Blame ; and makes the Thing done to be lefs worthy
of Punifhment.

II. Men in their firft Ufe of fuch Phrafes as thefe, Mnjf^

. mritn^ cant help it, can't avoid it^ necejjary^ unable^ impojJible.y uH"

trvoidable^ Irreftflible he. ufe them to fignify a Neceffity of Con-

ftraint or Rertraint, a natural Neceffity or Impoflibility ; or

-fome Neceffity that the Will has nothing to do in- ; which

-may

2 o8 tFhy Galvinlfm is fuppofed Part IV.

may be, whether Men will or no ; and which may be fup-
pofed to be juft the fame, let Men's Inclinations and DefireJ
be what they will. Such Kind of Terms in their original
\Jky I fuppofe among all Nations, are relative ; carrying in
their Signification (as was before obferved) a Reference or Re-'
fpe6l to fome contrary Will, Defire or Endeavour, which, it is^
fuppofed, is, or may be in the Cafe. All Men find, and be-
gin to find in early Childhood, that there are innumerable
Things that can't be dene, which they defire to do ; and in-
numerable Things which they are averfe to, that mull be,
they can't avoid them, they will be, whether they chufe them
or no. 'Tis to exprefs this Neceflity, which Men fo foon
and fo often find, and which fo greatly and fo early afFe6ls
them in innumerable Cafes, that fuch Terms and Phrafes
are firft formed ; and 'tis to fignify fuch a Neceffity, that
they are firft ufed, and that they are moft conftantly ufed, in
the common Affairs of Life ; and not to fignify any fuch me-
taphyfical, fpeculative and abftradt Notion, as that Connexion
m the Nature or Courfe of Things, which is between the
Subje6t and Predicate of a Propofition, and which is the Foun-
dation of the certain Truth of that Propofition ; to fignify
which, they who employ themfelves in Philofophical Inqui-
ries into the firft Origin and Metaphyfical Relations and
Dependences of Things, have borrowed thefe Terms, for
want of others. But we grow up from our Cradles in a Ufa^
of fuch Terms and Phrafes, entirely diff*erent from this, and
carrying a Senfe exceeding diverfe from that in which they are
commonly ufed in the Controverfy between Jr?nmia?is anM
Calvinifts. And it being, as was faid before, a Di6late of ,
the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, evident to us as foon as we
begin to think, that the Neceflity fignified by thefe Terms, in
the Senfe in which we firft learn them, does excufe Perfons,
and free them from all Fault or Blame ; Hence our Idea's of
Excufablenefs or Faultlefnefs is tied to thefe Terms and
Phrafes by a ftrong Habit, which is begun in Childhood as
foon as we begin to fpeak, and grows up with us, and is
ftrengthned by conftant Ufe and Cuftom, the Connedioft
growing ftronger and ftronger.

The habitual Conneaion which is in Men's Minds be-
tween Blamelefnefs and thofe foremention'd Terms, Muji^
cannot^ unable^ mcejfary, impcjfible^ unavoidable &:c. becomes very
ftrong j becaufe as foon as ever Men begin to ufe Reafori
and Speech, they have Occafion to excufe themfelves, from
the nataral Neceflity fignified by thefe Terms*, in numerous i,

Inftancesv |

Sed. III. contrary to common Senfe. 209

Inftances I can't do It— 1 could not help it. And all Man-
kind have conftant and daily Occafion to ufe fuch Phrafes
in this Senfe, to excufe themfelves and others in almoft all
the Concerns of Life, with Refped to Difappointments, and
Things that happen which concern and afFe(5t us and others,
that are hurtful, or difagreable to us or them, or Things de»
firable that we or others fail of.

That a being accuftomed to an Union of different Ideas,
hfem early Childhood, makes the habitual Connexion ex-
ceeding ftrbng, as tho' fuch Connection were owing \.q Nature^
is manifeil in innumerable* Inftances. It is altogether by
fuch an habitual Connexion of Ideas, that Men judge of the
Bignefs or Diftance of the Objects of Sight from their Ap-
pearance. Thus 'tis owing to fuch a Connection early ellab-
i liflied, and growing up with a Perfon, that he judges a Moun-
i tain, which he fees at ten Miles diftance, to be bigger than
I his Nofe, or further off than the End of it. ■ Having been
s uled fo long to join a confiderable Diftance and Magnitude
[with fuch an Appearance, Men imagine it is by a Dictate of
natural Senfe : Whereas it v^rould be quite otherwife with
one that had his Eyes newly ofxened, who had been born blind :
He would have the fame vifible Appearance, but natural
Senfe would dictate no fuch Thing concerning the Magnitude
.or Diftance of what appeared.

III. When Men,after they had been fo habituated to conne(S
Ideas of Innocency or Blamelefnefs with fuch Terms, that the
Union feems to be the Effe6t of meer Nature, come to hear the
fameTerms ufed, & learn to ufe them themfelves in the foremen-

\ tion'd new & metaphyiical Senfe, to fignify quite anotherSort of
Necefllty,which has no fuchKind of Relation to a contrary fup-
pofable Will and Endeavour ; the Notion of plain and mani-
feft Blamelefnefs, by this Means, is by a ftrong Prejudice, in-

ienfibly and unwarily transfer'd to a Cafe to which it by no
Means belongs : The Change of the Ufe of the Terms, to
a Signification which is very diverfe, not being taken Notice

L of, or adverted to. And there are feveral Reafons why it

fis not.

I. The Terms,as ufed by Philofophers, are not very diftlnd
kind clear in their Meaning : few ufe them in a fix'd deter-
mined Senfe. On the contrary, their Meaning is very vagus
;uid confufed. Which is what coininonly happens Xo "the

D d Words

2 lo TVhy Calvinifm isfuppvfed Part IV. i

Words ufed to fignify Things intelle6tual and moral, and to
exprefs what Mr. Locke calls mixt Modes. If Men had a clear J
and diftindl underftanding of what is intended by thefe meta- s|
phyfical Terms, they would be able more eafily to compare i
them with their original and common Senfe ; and fo would i
not be fo eafily cheated by them. The Minds of Men are i
fo eafily led into Delufion by no Sort of Terms in the World, 'i
as by Words of this Sort. j

2. The Change of the Signification of the Terms is the .1
more infenfible, becaufe the Things fignified, tho' indeed very :
different, yet do in fome generals agree. In Necefftty^ that I
which is vulgarly fo called, there is a ftrong Connection be- ' \
tween the Thing faid to be neceflary, and fomething antece- i
dent to it, in the Order of Nature ; {o there is alfo m philo- \
fophical Necejfity, And tho' in both Kinds of Neceflity, the;;
Connexion can't be called by that Name, with Relation to'j
an oppofite Will or Endeavour, to which it \% fuper'iour \-[
which is the Cafe in vulgar Neceflity \ yet in both, the Con- i
ne^ion is prior to Will and Endeavour, and fo in fome Re-,!
fpe(5t fuperiour. In both Kinds of Neceffity there is a Foun-j
dation for fome Certainty of the Propofition that affirms the ;

Event. The Terms ufed being the fame, and the Things 1

lignified agreeing in thefe and fome other general Circumftan- ■'
ces, and the Exprefllons as ufed by Philofophers being not il
well defined, and fo of obfcnre and loofe Signification i hence j
Perfons are not aware ©f the great Difference ; and the No- ^j
tions of Innocence or Faultlefnefs, which were fo ftrongly [j
^bciated with them, and were ftricSlly united in their Mind^,
ever fince they can remember, remain united with them ftill,
as if the Union were altogether natural and neceffary ; and
they that go about to make a Separation, feem to them to do \
great Violence even to Nature it ML \

■ \
IV. Another Reafbn why it appears difficult to reconcile it |
with Reafon, that Men mould be blamed for that which U \
neceffary with a moral Neceffity (which as was obferved before^ |
is a Species of Philofophical Neceffity) is, that for want of I
due Confideration, Men inwardly entertain that Apprehenfion>
that this Neceffity may be agair\il Men's Wills andfincere En-
deavours. They go away with thatNotion,thatMen may truly
will and wilb and firivc that it may be otherwife ; but that
invjncible Neceflity iiands in the Way. And many think, thus
concerning themfelves : fome that are wicked Men think tliey.
AViih that they were jood, that tliey loved God and Holinefs jj

burJ

Seil.III. contrary to common Senfev 211

but yet don't find that their Wifhes produce the EfFe<5V.

The Reafons why Men think thus, are as follows, (i.) They
ifind what may be called an indire£i Willingnefs to have a better
^Will, in the Manner before obferved. For it is impoflible,
J and a Contradiction to fuppofe the Will to be diredly and
• properly againft it felf. And they don't confider, that this in-
direct Willingnefs is entirely a different Thing from properly
willing the Thing that is the Duty and Vertue required ; and
that there is no Vertue in that fort of Willingnefs whicbthey
have. They don't con{ider,that the Volitions which a wicked
M^n may have that he loved God, are no Ads of the Will
at all againft the moral Evil of not loving God ; but only
feme difagreable Confequences. But the making the requifite
Diflindion requires more Care of Reflection and Thought
than moft Men are ufed to. And Men thro' a Prejudice in
their own Favour, are difpofed to think well of their own
Defires and Difpoiitions, and to account 'em good and ver-
tuous, tho' their Rel"pe6l to Vertue be only ipAire£i and remote^
and 'tis noticing at all that is vertuous that truly excites or ter-
minates their Inclinations. (2.) Another Thing that infenfibly
leads and beguiles Men into a Suppofition that this moral
NecelTity or ImpolTibility is, or may be againft Men's Wills,
and true Endeavours, is the Derivation and Formation of the
Terms themfelves, that are often ufed to exprefs it, which
is fuch as feems direClly to point to, and hold this forth. Such
, Words, for Inftance, as unable^ unavoidable^ impojjible^ Irreftjiihle ;
v/hich carry a plain Reference to a fiippofable Power exerted.
Endeavours ufed, Refiftance made, in Oppofition to the Ne-
celfity : And the Perfons that hear them, not confidering nor
fufpeding but that they are ufed in their proper Senfe : That
Senfe being therefore underftood, there does naturally, and as
it were neceffarily arife in their Minds a Suppofition that it
may be fo indeed, that true Defires and Endeavours may take
Place, but that invincible Neceffity ftan4s in the Way, and
renders '.em vain and to no Effed:.

V. Another Thing which makes Perfons more ready to
fuppofe it to be contrary to Reafon, that Men fliould be ex-
pofed to the Punifhments threaten'd to Sin, for doing thofc
Things which are morally neceflary, or not doing thole
Things morally impoffible, is,that Imagination ftrengLhens the
Argument, and adds greatly to the Power and Influence of
the feeming Reafons againft it, from the Greatnefs of that
Puniftiment. To allow that they may be juftly expofed to a
u fmall Puniftiment, would not be fo difficult. Whereas,- if there
I D d 2 • were

212 Neceffary Vertue^ &c. Part IV^ «

were any good Reafon in the Cafe, if it were truly a Didate of
Reafon that fuch Neceffity was inconfiftent with Faultineis, or
jufl Punifhment, the Demonftration would be equally certain
with refpecfl to a fmall Punifhment, or any Punifliment at all,
as a very great one : But it is not equally eafy to the Imagi- ;
nation. They that argue againft the Juftice of daimiing Men '
for thofe Things that are thus neceflary, feem to make their
Argument the llronger, by fetting forth the Greatnefs of the
Punifliment in flrong ExprefTions -.—-'That a Man jhould he cafi
into eternal Burnings,, that he Jhould he rnade to fry in Hell to all
Eternity ,, for thofe Things which He had no Power to avoids and was
under afatal^ unfruftrahle^ invincible Necejfity of doing. ^

Section IV,

// is agreahle to common Senfe, and the na-
tural Notions of Mankind, to fuppofe
moral NeceJJlty to be conjifient with Praife
and Blame ^ Reward and Punijhment.

WHETHER the Reafons that have been given, why it
appears difficult to fome Perfons to reconcile with
common Senfe the praifing or blaming, rewarding gr
piinifhing thofe Things which are morally neceffary, are
thought fatisfadory, or not ; yet it mofl evidently appears by
the following Things, that if this Matter be rightly under-
ilood, fetting afide all Deiufion arifmg from the Impropriety
and Ambiguity of Terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with
the nature Apprehenfions of Mankind, and that Senfe of
Things which is found every where in the common People,
who are furtheft from having their Thoughts perverted from
their natural Channel, by metaphyseal and philofophical Sub-
tilties ; but on the contrary, altogether agreable to^ and the
yery Voi<;:e and DitiUte of this natqral and vulgar Senfe.

L This vnW appear if we confid^r what the vuIgarNotion of %
BJr.tnf-'Worthinefs is. The Idea which the common People i
■ ^ - through i

Sed. IV. agreable to common Senfe. 213

through all Ages and Nations have of Faultinefs, I fuppofe to
be plainly this ; A Perfon's being or doing wrongs with his own
Will and Pleafure ; containing thefe two Things ; i. His doing
ijurong^ when he does as he pleafes, 2. His Pleafure*s being wrong.
Or in other Words, perhaps more intelligibly exprefTing their
' Notion ; A Per/on s having hisHeart wrongs and doing wrong from
his Heart, And this is the Sum total of the Matter.

The common People don't afcend up in their Refledtions and
Abftra6tions, to the metaphyfical Sources, Relations and De*
pendences of Things, in order to form their Notion of Faul-
tinefs or Blame-worthinefs. They don't wait till they have
decided by their Refinings, what firft determines the Will ;
whether it be determined by fomething extrinfiQ, or intrinfic ;
whether Volition deterniines Volition, or whether the Under-
ftanding determines the W~ill ; whether there be any fuch
Thing as Metaphyficians mean by Contingence (if they have
any Meaning;) whether there be a Sort of a ftrange unac-
countable Sovereignty in the Will, ir) the Exercife of which,
by it's own fovereign A6ls, it brings to pafs all it's own fove-
reign Ads. They don't take any Part of their Notion of
Fault or Blame from the Refolution of any fuch Queftions. If
this were the Cafe, there are Multitudes, yea the far greater
Part of Mankind, nine Hundred and ninety-nine out of a
. Thoufand would live and die without having any fucH
Notion as that of Fault ever entring into their Heads, or with-
out fo much as once having any Conception that any Body-
was to be either blamed or commended for any Thing. To
be fure^^it would be a long Time before Men came to have
fuchNotions. Whereas 'tis manifeft,they are fome of the firft
Notions that appear in Children ; who difcover as foon as
they can think, or fpeak, or a(5l at all as rational Creatures,
a Senfe of Defert. And certainly, in forming their Notion of
it, they make no ufe of Metaphyficks. All the Ground they
go upon conlifts in thefe two Things ; Experience^ and 2. natu^
ral Senfation of a certain Fitnefs or Agreablenefs which there is
in uniting fuch moral Evil as is above defcribed, vi%. a being
or doing wrong with the Will^ and Refentment in others, and
Pain inflided on the Perfon in whom this moral Evil is.
Which natural Senfe is what we call by the Name of Confcience,

'Tis true,the common People and Children, in their Notion

of a faulty A 61 or Deed of any Perfon, do fuppofe that it is

' the Perfon's own ASf and Deed. But this is all that belongs to

what they underiland by aThing's being a Perfon's own Deed 9r

A^ion i

214 Necejfary Fertue^ &c. Part IV.

j£fion I even that it is fomething done by him of Choice.
That fome Exercife or Motion fliould begin of it felf, don't
belong to their Notion of an A6lion^ or Doing. If fo, it would
belong to their Notion of it, that it is fomething which is the
Caufe of it*s own Beginning : And that is as much as to fay,
that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of dm
ASiion fome Motion or Exercife that begins accidentally, with-
out any Caufe or Reafon ; for that is contrary to one- of the
prime Dictates of common Senfe, namely, that every Thing
that begins to be, has fome Caufe or Reafon why it is.

The common People, in their Notion of a faulty or
praife-worthy Deed or Work done by any one, dp fup-
pofe that the Man does it in the Exercife of Liberty. But
then their Notion of Liberty is only a Perfon's having Oppor^
tunity of doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of Liber-
ty confiding in the Will's firft ading, and fo caufmg it's own
A<5ls ; and determining, and fo caufing it's own Determinati-
ons ; or chufing, and fo caufing it's own Choice. Such a
Notion of Liberty is what none have, but thofe that have
darken'd their own Minds with confufed metaphyfical Specu-
lation, and abftrufe and ambiguous Terms. If a Man is not
reftrain'd from ading as his Will determines, or conftrain'd to
Z.&. otherwife ; then he has Liberty, according to common No-
tions of Liberty, without taking into the Idea that grand Con-
tradi6tion of all the Determinations of a Man's free Will being

the EfFecfts of the Determinations of his free Will. Nor

have Men commonly any Nol^ion of Freedom confiding in In-
difference. For if fo, then it would be agreable to their No-
tion, that the greater Indifference Pvlen a6t with, tlie more
Freedom they a6t with ; whereas theReverfe is true. He that
in acfling, proceeds with the fulleft Inclination, does what He
does with the greateft Freedom, according to common Senfe.
And fo far is it from being agreable to common Senfe, that
fuch Liberty as confifts in Indifference is requifite to Praife ox
Blame, that on the contrary, the Didate of every Man's natu- '\
ral Senfe thro' the World is, that the further he is from being
indifferent in his ading Good or Evil, and the more he does
either with full and ftrong Inclination, the more is he efteemed
or abhorred, commended or condemned.

II. If It were inconfiftent with the common Senfe of Man-
kind, that Men (hould be either to be blamed or commend-
ed in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Cafe of moral
Neceffity or Impoffibihty ; then it would furely alfo be agrea-
feie to the fame Senfe and Reafon of Mankjind, that the near-
ex

Se£t. IV. agr cable to common Senfc. 215

er the Cafe approaches to fuch a moral Neceffity or Iinpoffi-
bility, either through a flrong antecedent morai Propenfity
on the one Hand, * or a great antecedent Oppofition and
Difficulty on the other, the nearer docs it approach to a being
neither blameable nor commendable ; fo that A<5Vs exerted
with fuch preceeding Propenfity would be worthy of propor-
tionably lefs Praife ; and v/hen omitted, the A61 being attend-
ed with fuch Difficulty, the Omiffion would be worthy of the
lefs Blame. It is fo, as was obferved before, with natural
Neceffity and Impoffibility, Propenfity and Difficulty : As 'tis
a plain Didate of the Senfe of all Mankind, that natural Ne-
ceffity and Impoffibility takes away all Blame and Praife j and
therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to thefe through
previous Propenfity or Difficulty, fo Praife and Blame are
proportionably diniinijhed. And if it were as much a Dictate
of common Senfe, that moral Neceffity of doing, or Impoffi-
bility of avoiding, takes away all Praife and Blame, as that
natural Neceffity or Impoffibility does this ; then, by a psrfe<5l
Parity of Reafon, it would be as much the Dictate of common
Senfe, that an Approach to moral Neceffity of doing, or Im-
poffibility of avoiding, diminijhes Praife and Blame, as that
an Approach to natural Neceffity and Impoffibility does fo.
'Tis equally the Voice of common Senfe, that Perfons are
excufahle in Part^ in negleding Things difficult againft their
Wills, as that they are excufahle wholly in negledling Things
impoffible againft their Wills. And if it made no Difference,
whether the Impoffibility were natural and againft the Will,
or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to Excufablenefs >
fo neither would it make any Difference, whether the Diffi-
culty, or Approach to Neceffity be natural againft theWiH,
or moral, lying in the Propenfity of the Will.

But 'tis apparent, that the Reverfe of thefe Things is true.
\ If there be an Approach to a moral Neceffity in a Man's Ex-
ertion of good A6ls of Will, they being the Exercife of a
Lftrong Propenfity to Good, and a very powerful Love to Ver-
I tue 3 'tis fo far from being the Di<5tate of common Senfe, that
I He is lefs vertuous, and the lefs to be efteem'd, loved and
praifed ; that 'tis agreable to the natural Notions of all Man-
' kind that he is fo much the better Man, worthy of greater
Refped, and higher Commendation. And the ftronger the
Inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to Neceffity in that

Refpect ;

, * 'Tis here argued, on Suppofition that not all Propenfity implies
moral Necefiiiy, but only fom« very high Degrees ; which rione
will deny.

2i6 Neceffary Vertue^ &c. Part IV.

Refpe6t, or to Impoflibility of neglecting the vertuous A(5t,or of
doing a vicious one ; ftiJl the more vertuous, and worthy of
higher Commendation. And on the other Hand, if a Man
exerts evil A6ts of Mind ; as for Inftance, A(5ls of Pride or
Mahce, from a rooted and ftrong Habit orPrinciple of Haugh-
tinefs and Mahcioufnefs, and a violent Propenfity of Heart to
fuch Ads J according to the natural Senfe of all Men, he is
fo far from being the lefs. hateful and blameable on that Ac-
count, that he is fo much the more worthy to be detefted and
condemned by all that obferve Him,

Moreover, 'tis manifeft that it is no Part of the Notion
which Mankind commonly have of a blameable or praife-
lyorthy A6t of the Will, that it is an Adl which is not deter-
mined by an antecedent Bias or Motive, but by the fovereign
Power of the Will it felf j becaufe if fo, the greater Hand
fuchCaufes have in determining any Ads of the Will, fo much
the lefs vertuous or vicious would they be accounted j and
the lefs Hand, the more vertuous or vicious. Whereas the
Keverfe is true : Men don't think a good A<5t to be the lefs
praife-worthy, for the Agent's being much determined in it by
a good Inclination or a good Motive ; but the more. And if
good Inclination or Motive has but little Influence in deter-
mining the Agent, they don't think his A61 fo much the more
vertuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning evil Ads, which
are determined by evil Motives or Inclinations.

Yea, if it be fuppofed that good or evil Difpofitlons are xm-
planted in the Hearts of Men by Nature it felf (which, it \%
certain, is vulgarly fuppofed in irmumerable Cafes) yet it is
not commonly" fuppofed that Men are worthy of no Praife or
Difpraife for fuch Difpofitions ; altho* what is natural is un-
doubtedly neceffary, Nature being prior to all Ads of the Will
whatfoever. Thus for Inftance, if a Man appears to be of a
very haughty or malicious Difpofition, and is fuppofed to be
fo by his natural Temper, 'tis no vulgar Notion, no Didae of
the common Senfe and Apprehenfion of Men, that fuch Dif-
pofitions are no Vices or moral Evils, or that fuch Perfons arc
not worthy of Difefteem, Odium and Difhonour ; or that the
proud or malicious Ads which flow from fuch natural Difpo-
fitions, are worthy of . no Refentment. Yea, fuch vile na-
tural Difpofitions, and the Strength of 'em, will commonly be
mention'd rather as an Aggravation of the wicked Ads that
come from fuch a Fountain, than an Extenuation of 'em.
Jt's being natural for Men to ad thus, i$ gften obferved by
. Mea

Seel. IV. agr cable to common Senfe. 217

Men in theHeight of their Indignation : They will fay, " 'Tis
;" his very Nature : He is of a vile natural Temper -, 'tis as
i 4*<, natural to Him to adt fo, as it is to breathe ; He can't help
I " ferving the Devil, &c." But it is not thus with Regard t(>
hurtful mifchievous Things that any are the Subjecfis or Ccca-
iions of by natural Nectijjity^ zg^iin^ their Inclinations. In fuch
a Cafe, the NecelTity, by the common Voice of Mankind, will

be fpoken of as a full Excufe. Thus 'tis very plain, that

common Senfe makes a vaft Difference between thefe two
Kinds of Neceffity, as to the Judgment it makes of their In-
fluence on the moral Quality and Defert of Men's A<5lions»

AndthefeDi6latesof Men'sMinds are fo natural and neceffar}'',
iihat it may be very much doubted whether the Arminlam
themfelves have ever got rid of 'em ; yea,their greatefbDodors,
t^^at have gone furtheft in Defence or their metaphyseal No-
tions of Liberty, and have brought their Arguments to their
greateu Strength, and as they fuppofe to a Demonftration,
againu theConfiftence of Vertue and Vice with any Neceffity :
'"ris to be queflion'd, whether there is fo much as one of them,
but that if He fuffered very much from the injurious AcSIs of a
Man under the Pov>rerof an invincible Haughtinefs and Malig-
nancy of Temper, would not, from the foremention'd natural
I Senfe of Mind, refent it far otherwife,than if as great Sufferings
came upon Him from the Wind that blows, and Fire that
burns by natural Neceffity ; and otherwife than he would, if
! he fuffered as much from the Condu6l of a Man perfecflly de-
; hrious ; yea, tho' he hrft brought his Diftraction upon Him
t feme Way by his own Fault.

Some feem to difdain the Diflindlon that we make between
i natural and moral Neceffity^ as tho' it were altogether impertinent
in this Controverfy : " That which is neceffary (fay they) is
*' neceffary ; it is that which muft be, and can't be prevented.
" And that which is impoffible,isimpoffible, and can't be done :
*' and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it." And
fuch Comparifons are made ufe of, as the commanding of a
Man to walk who has loft his Legs, and condemning and pu-
nilhing Him for not obeying ; Inviting and calling upon a
Alan,, who is ffiut up in a ftrong Prifon, to come forth, &:c.
But in thefc Things Armmians arc very unreafonable. Let
common Senfe determine whether there be hot a great Differ-
ence between thofe two Cafes ; the one, that of a Man who
has offended his Prince, and is caft into Prifon ; and after he
has lain there a while^ the King ccnies to him, calls him to
... E « corns

2i8 Calyinifm conjijlent Part IV.'

come forth toHim ; and tells him that if he will do fo,and will
fall down before Him, and humbly beg his Pardon, he (hall
be forgiven, and fet at Liberty, and alfo be greatly enrich'd,and
advanced to Honour : The Prifoner heartily repents of the
Folly and Wickednefs of his Offence againft his Prince, is
thoroughly difpofed to abafe Himfelf, and accept of the King's
Offer ; but is confined by flrong Walls, with Gates of Brafs;, ^
and Barrs of Iron. The other Cafe is, that of a Man who 4
is of a very unreafonable Spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, |j
wilful Difpofition ; and moreover, has been brought up in |
traiterious Principles ; and has his Heart poUeffed with an ii^
extream and inveterate Enmity to his lawful Sovereign ; and ij
for his Rebellion is caft into Prifon, and lies long there, loaden |ij
with heavy Chains, and in miferable Circumflances. At length jtj
the compaflionate Prince comes to the Prifon, orders his ps
Chains to be knocked off, and his Prifon-Doors to be fet widp ;|
open ; calls to him, and tells Him, if He will come forth to ,'5
him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has i
treated him unworthily, and afk his Forgivenefs ; He Ihall h&i
forgiven, fet at Liberty, and fet in a Place of great Dignity and p
Profit in his Court. But He is fo flout and flomachful, and ,il
full of haughty'Malignity,that He can't be willing to accept the 1
Offer : his rooted flrong Pride and Malice have perfe61: Power ]»;
over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his Heart : )
The Oppofition of his Heart has the Maflery over Him, hav- i
ing an Influence on his Mind far fuperiour to the King's Grace ]
andCondefcenfion,and to all his kindOffers & Promifes. Now, }
is it agreable to common Senfe, to affert and fland to it, that a
there is no Difference between thefe two Cafes, as to any \
Worthinefs of Blame in thePrifoners ; becaufe, forfooth, there (
is a Neceffrty in both, and the required A(5t in each Cafe is j
iijipoffible ? 'Tis true, a Man's evil Difpofitions may be as, j
llrong and immovable as the Bars of a Caflle. But who
can't fee, that when a Man, in the latter Cafe, is faid to be
unable to obey the Command, the Expreffion is ufed improper-
ly, and not in the Senfe it has originally and in common ;|
Speech ? And that it may properly be faid to be in theRebersfl
Power to come out of Prifon, feeing he can eafily do it if he ;
pleafes ; tho* by Reafon of his vile Temper of Heart which i%;|
hx'd and rooted, 'tis impoffible that it fhould pleafe Him ? J

Upon the whole, I prefume there is no Perfon of good Un- |
derftanding, who impartially confiders the Things which have "^
been obferved, but will allow that 'tis not evident from the '^
Didta^es of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of Man- .;

kind, I

■

'Sed^ VI. with common Senfe. 219

kind, that 'moral Neceffity is inconfiftent with Praife and Blame.
And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any fuch Incon^
ififtency, it muft be by fome philofophical and metaphyfical
Arguments, and not common Senfe.

There is a grand Illufion in the pretended Demonftration
of Armimans from common Senfe. The main Strength of all
ithefeDemonftrations, lies in that Prejudice that arifes thro' the
infenfible Change of the Ufe and Meaning of fuch Terms as
Liberty^ able ^uneble^ necejjary^ impojfible^ unavoidable^ invincible, j£fiony
&c. from their original and vulgarSenfe, to a metaphyfxaiSenfe
entirely diverfe ; and the ftrong Connection of the Ideas of
Blamelefnefs &c. with fome of thefe Terms, by an Habit
contraded and eftablifh'd, while thefe Terms were ufed in
their firft Meaning. This Prejudice and Delufion is the Fouii-
dation of all thofe Portions they lay down as Maxims, by
which moft of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this Con-
troverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous De-
monftrations from Scripture and Reafon depend. From this
fecret Delufion and Prejudice they have almofl all their Ad-
vantages : 'Tis the Strength of their Bulwarks, and the Edge
of their Weapons. And this is the main Ground of all the
Right they have to treat their Neighbours in fo affuming a
Manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as
themfelves, as weak Bigots^ Men thai dwell in the dark Caves of
Superjlition^ perverjly fet^ objfinately /hutting their Eyes againjl the
Noon-day Lights Enemies to common Senfe^ maintaining the firjl -born
of Abfurdities^ &c. hc. But perhaps an impartial Confideration
of the Things which have been obferved in the preceeding
Parts of this Enquiry, may enable the Lovers of Truth better
to judge, whofe Do6lrine is indeed abfurd, abjhufe^ felf-contra-
diotory^ and inconfiftent with common Senfe, and many Ways
repugnant to the univcrfal Dictates of the Reafon of Mankind.

Corol. From Things which have been obferved, it will fol-
low, that it is agreable to common Senfe to fuppofe, that the
glorified Saints have not their Freedom at all diminifti'd, in
any Refpect ; and that God Himfelf has the higheft pofTible
Freedom, according to the true and proper Meaning of the
Term ; and that He is in the higheft poflible refpect an Agent,
and active in the Exercife of his infinite Holinefs ; tho' He
acts therein in the higheft Degree necefiarily : and his Actions
of this Kind are. in the higheft, moft abfolutely perfect Man-
ner vertuous and praife-worthy ; and are fo, for that very
Reafon, becaufe they are moft perfectly necefiary.

E e 2 Section

2 20 Endeavours not rendered vain, Part I V. '
Section V.

Concerning thofe ObjeftionSj that this Scheme \
of Necejftty renders all Means and En- |
deavoursy^r the avoiding of Siny or the i
obtaining Vertue and Holinefs ^ vain, and i
to no Purpofe ; and that it snakes Men \
no more than meer M.?ich\nt^ in Affairs i

of Morality and Religion. |

yfRm'inians fay, if it be fo, that Sin and Vertue come to !
„^:^^ pafs by a Neceffity conliiling in a fure Conne6tion of ■
Caufes and Effects, Antecedents and Confequents, it \
can never be . worth the while to ufe any Means or Endea- '\
vours to obtain the one, and avoid the other ; feeing no En- '■.
deavours can alter the Futurity of the Event, which is become j
neceffary by a Connexion already eftabliftied. j^

But I defire, that this Matter may be fully confidered ; and \\
that it may be examined with a thorough Stridtnefs, whether ij
it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or ;>
obtain any future Thing, muft be more in vain, on the Sup- li
pofition of fuch a Connedtion of Antecedents and Confequents^ \\
than if the contrary be fuppofed, |i

\i
For Endeavours to be In vain, is for 'em not to be fuccefsfui^ fi
that is to fay, for 'em not eventually to be the Means of the p
Thing aimed at, which can't be, but in one of thefe two l|
Ways ; either, Firfi^ That altho' the Means are ufcd, yet the |^
•Event aimed at don't follow : Or, Secondly^ If the Event does i^
follow, it is not becaufe of the Means, or from any Connexion j;
or Dependence of the Event on the Means, the Event would il
have come to pafs, as well without the Means, as with them, i}
If either of thefe two Things are the'Cafe, then the Means jj
are not properly fuccefsful, and are truly in vain. The Sue- |]
cefsfulnefs or Unfuccefsfuinefs of Means, in order to an s
Effe6t, or their being in vain or not in vain, confilfs in thofe \
Means being connected, or not counec^led, with the EfFe<^, in j

iuch \
A

Sect. V. hy Calviniftic Principles. 22 1

fuch a Manner as this, vi%. That the Ef?e6t is with thcMeans,
,and not without them ; or, that the Being of the EfFe6t is, ori
the one Hand, conne6ted with the Means, and the Want of
the Effe(5t, on the other Hand, is conne6ted with the Want o#
the Means. If there be fuch a Connexion as this between
Means and End, the Means are not in vain : The more there
is of fuch a Connedion, the further they are from being in
vain ; and the lefs of fuch a Connedion, the more are they
in vain.

Now therefore the Qiieftion to be anfwered, (in order to
determine, whether it follows from this Dodnne of the ne-
cefiary Connedion between foregomg Things and confequent
ones, that Means ufed in order to any EffciSt^ are more in
vain than they would be otherwife) is. Whether it follows
from it, that there is lefs of the forementioned Connedion
between Means and EfFed ; that is. Whether on the Suppoli-
tion of there being a real and true Connedion between
antecedent Things and confequent ones, there mufi: be lefs of
a Connedion between Means and EfFed, than on the Suppo-
fition of there being no fix'd Connedion between antecedent
Things and confequent ones : And the very ftating of this
Quefi:ion is fufficient to anfwer it. It muil: appear to every
one that w^ill open his Eyes, that this Queftion can't be
affirmed, without the grofseft Abfurdity and Inconfiftence.
Means are foregoing Things, and Effeds are following
Things : And if there were no Connedion between foregoing
Things, and following ones, there could be no Conne6lion
between Means and End 5 and fo all Means would be wholly
vain and fruitlefs. For 'tis by Vertue of fome Connedion
only, that they become fu(±efsful : 'Tis fome Connedion
obferved, or revealed, or otherwife known, between ante-
icedent Things and following on^s, that is what direds in the
Choice of Means. And if there were no fuch Thing as an
eftablifh'd Connedion, there could be no Choice,as to Means ;
one Thing would have no more Tendency to an Effed, than
another ; there would be no fuch Thing as Tendency in the
Cafe. All thofe Things which are fuccefsful Means of other
Things, do therein prove conneded Antecedents of the m :
And therefore to aflert, that a fix'd Connedion between Ai ite-
cedents and Confequents makes Means vain and ufelefs, or
(lands in the Way to hinder the Connedion between Me'ans
and End, is juft fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a Conned :ion
between Antecedents and Confequents ftands in the Wa}/ to
hinder a Connedion between Antecedents and Confequentsj;.

'Hor

222 Means&^ Endeavours made rain, P.IV.

Nor can any fuppofed Connexion of the Succeffion orTrain
©f Antecedents and Confequents, from the very Beginning of
all Things, the Connexion being made already fure and
neceffary, either by efl:abli(h'd Laws of Nature, or by
thefe together with a Decree of fovereign immediate Inter-
pofitions of divine Power, on fuch and fuch Occafions, or any
other Way (if any other there bej) I fay, no fuch neceffary
Connexion of a Series of Antecedents and Confequents can
in the leaft tend to hinder, but that the Means we ufe may
belong to the Series ; and fo may be fome of thofe Antecedents
which are eonneded with the Confequents we aim at, in the
eftablifh'd Courfe of Things. Endeavours which w^e ufe, are
Things that exift ; and therefore they belong to tl;ie general
Chain of Events ; all the Parts of which Chain are fuppofed
to be conne6ted : And fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be con-
nected with fomeEffe6ls, or fome confequent Things, or other.
And certainly this don't hinder but that the Events they are
connected with, may be thofe which we aim at, and which
we chufe, becaufe we judge 'em moft likely to have a Con-
nection with thofe Events, from the eftablifh'd Order and
Courfe of Things which we obferve, or from fomething in
divine Revelation.

Let us fuppofe a real and fure Connexion between a Man's
having his Eyes open in the clear Day-light, with goodOrgans
of Sight, and Seeing ; fo that Seeing is connected with his
opening his Eyes, and not feeing with his not opening his
Eyes 5 and alfo the like Connection between fuch a Man's
attempting to open his Eyes, and his adtually doing it : The
fuppofed eftablifhed Connection between thefe Antecedents and
Confequents, let theConnedion -be never fo fure and neceffary,
certainly don't prove that it is in vain, for a Man in fuch Cir-
cumftances to attempt to open his Eyes, in order to feeing :
His aiming at that Event, and the tJfe of the Means, being
the Effect of his Will, don't break the Conne(5tion, or hinder
the Succefs.

So that the Objecftion we are upon, don't lie againft the
Doctrine of the Neceffity of Events by a Certainty of Connec-
tion and Confequence : On the contrary, it is truly forcible
againft the Armiman DoCtrine of Contingence and Self-deter-
mination ; which is inconfiftent with fuch a Connexion. If
there be no Connection between thofe Events wherein Vertue
and Vice confift, and any Thing antecedent j then there is no
Connection between thefe Evens and any Means orEndeavours

ufed

Sed. V. by the Arminian Scheme. 223

ufed in order to them : And if fo, then thofe Means mud be
in vain. The lefs there is of Conne6lion between foregoing
Things.and following ones, fo much the lefs there is between
Means and End, Endeavours and Succefs ; and in the fame
Proportion are Means and Endeavours inefFedlual and in vain.

It will follow from Arminian Principles, that there is no
Degree of Connection between Vertue or Vice, and any
foregoing Event or Thing : Or in other Words, That the
Determination of the Exiftence of Vertue or Vice don't in the
leaft depend on the Influence of any Thing that comes to
pafs antecedently, from which the Determination of its Ex-
iftence is, as its Caufe, Means, or Ground ; becaufc, fo far as
it is fo, it is not from Self-determination : And therefore,fo far
there is nothing of the Nature of Vertue or Vice. And fo
it follows, that Vertue and Vice are not at all, in any Degree,
dependent upon, or conneded with any foregoing Event or
Exiftence, as its Caufe, Ground, or Means. And if fo, then
all foregoing Means muft be totally in vain.

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any Confiftence with
the Arminian Scheme, be any recifonable Ground of fo much
as a Conje6lure concerning the Confequence of any Means
and Endeavours, in order to efcaping Vice or obtainingVertue,
or any Choice or Preference of Means, as having a greater
Probability of Succefs by fome than others ; either from any
natural Connexion or Dependence of the End on the Means,
or through any divine Conftitution, or revealed Way of God's
beftowing or bringing to pafs thefe Things, in Confequence of
any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjedure in
this latter Cafe depends on a Suppolition that God himfelf is
the Giver, or determining Caufe of the Events fought : But
if they depend on Self-determination, then God is not the
determining or difpofing Author of them : And if thefe
Things are not of his Difpofal, then no Conje(5ture can be
made from any Revelation he has given concerning any Way
or Method of his Difpofal of them.

Yea, on thefe Principles, it will not only follow that Men;
can't have any reafonable Ground of Judgment or Conje^hire,
that their Means and Endeavours to obtain Vertue or avoid
Vice, will be fuccefsful," but they may be fure ,they will not ;
they may be certain, that they will be in vain j and that if
ever the Thing which they feek comes to pafs, it will not be
at ail owing to the Means they ufe. For Means and En-
deavours

2 24 Calvinifm dm t encoiirage Sloth. P. IV;

deavours can have no EfFe6t at all, in Order to obtain the
End, but in one of thefe two Ways j either (i.) Through fi
natural Tendency and Influence, to prepare and difpofe the
Mind more to vertuous Adts, either by cauflng the Difpofition
of the Heart to be more in Favour o^ fuch A6ls, or by
bringing the Mind more into the View of powerful Motives
and Inducements : Or, (2.) By putting Perfons more in the
Way of God's Be''owmept.; of the pjenelit. But neither o£
thefe can be the Cafe. Nbt the, latter ; fof. as has been juft
now obferved, it don't confift with the j^rmiman l^ot'.on of
Self-determination, which they fupppie effential to Vertue,
that God fhould be the Bel'tpwer, or (which is the fame
Thing) the determining, ^ifpoimg Author of Vertue. NoJ:
^he former ; for natural Influence and Tendency fuppofes
Caufality and Connexion > and that fuppoies Necefiity of
Event, which is inconfiftent with Ar?mnian Liberty. A Ten-
dency of Means, by biafling the Heart in Favour of Vertue, or
by bringing the Will under ; the Influence and Power of
motives in its Determinations, are both inconfiftent with
Armin'ian Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference, and
fovereign Seif-determination, as has been largely demonftrated.

But for the more full Rernoval of this Prejudice againft that
Do61:rine of N^icemty which has been maintain'd, as though it
tended to encourage a total Negledt of all Endeavours as vain j j
ihe following Things may be conlidered.

The Queftion is not. Whether Men may not thus improve
this Do6\rine : We know that many true and wholefome
Do6trines are abufed : But, V/hether the Doctrine gives any
juft Occaiion for fuch an Improvement ; or whether, on. the.
Suppofition of tlie Truth of the Do61rine, fuch a Ufe of it
would not be unreafonable ? If any fliall aflirm, that it would
not, but that the very Nature of the Do6lrine is fuch a*'
gives juft Occafion for it, it muft be on this Suppofition ;
iiamely. That fuch an invariableNeceflity of all Things already
fettled, muft render the Interpofition of all Means, Endear
vours, Conclufions or A6lions of ours, in order to the obtaining
any "future End whatfoever, perfectly infignificant ; becaufe
they can't in the leaft alter or vary the Courfe and Series of
Thmgs, in any Event or Circumftance ; all being already fixed
unalterabiy by Neceffity : And that therefore 'tis Folly, for
Men to ufe any Means y^^r cn.'^ End \ but their Wifdom,to fave
themfelves the Trouble of Endeavours, and take their Eafe.
No Perfon can dravf fuch an Inference from this Dodrine,

and

6^(3:. V. Calvlhifm dont encourageSloth, 225

and come to fuch a Conclulion, without contradic^ing^himfclf,
and going counter to the very Principles he pretends to a6l
upon : For he comes to a Conclufion, and takes a Gourfe, hi
order to an &nd, even his Eafe^ or the faving himfelf from
Trouble ; he feeks fomething future, and ufes Means inOrder
to a future Thing, even in his drawing up that Conclufion,
that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any
Thing future ; he feeks his future Eafe, and the Benefit and
"Comfort of Indolence. If prior Neceffity that determines ail
'Things, makes vain all A6tions or Conclufions of ours, in
order to any Thing future ; then it makes vain all Conclufions
and Condu6l of ours, in order to our future Eafe. The Mea-
fure of our Eafe, with the Time, Manner and every Circum-
fiance of it, is already fix'd, by all-determining Neceffity, as
much as any Thing elfe. If he fays within himfclf, " What
♦' future Happinefs'or Mifery I (hall have, is already in Efied:
*' determined by the neceiTary Courfe and Connedtion of
"*' Things ; therefore I will lave myfelf the Trouble of Labour
*'« and Diligence, which can't add to my determined Degree
*' of Happinefs, or diminilh my Mifery i but will take my
*' Eafe, and will enjoy the Comfort of Sloth and Neghgence."
Such a Man contradicts himfelf : He fays, the Meafure of his
future Happinefs and Mifery is already tix'd, and he won't
try to diminilh the one, nor add to the other : But yet in his
very Conclufion, he contradi6ts this ; for he takes up this
Conclufion, to add to his future Happinefs^ by the Eafe and
Comfort of his Negligence ; and to diminidi his future Trou-
ble and Mifery, by faving himfeif the Trouble of ufing Means
and taking Pains.

Therefore Perfons can't reafonably make this Improvement
of the Dodrine of Neceffity, that they will go into a v6iuntary
Kegligence of Means for their own Happinefs. For the
Principles they mufi: go upon, in order to this, are inconfiftent
with their making any Improvement at ail of the Dodrine :
For to make fome Improvement of it, is to be influenced by
it, to come to fome voluntary Conclufion, in Regard to
their own Condu6t, with fome View or Aim : But this, as
has been (hown, is inconfiftent with the Principles they pretend
to a6t upon. In (hort, the Principles are fuch as cannot be
acted upon at all, or in any Refpect, confiftently. And there-
fore in every Pretence of acting upon them, or making ur.y
Improvement at all of them, there is a Seif-con^adicticn.

F f -• A^

2 2 6C^\vim{mdo/2'itmakeMenMachincs.'PAV'

As to that Objection againft the Doctrine which I have
endeavoured to prove, that it makes Men no more than
meer Machines ; I would fay, that notwithftanding this Doc-
trine, Man is entirely, perfedly and unfpeakabiy tlifferent from
a meer Machine, m that he has Reafon and Underftanding^
and has a Faculty ot' Will, and fo is capable of Volition and 'i
Choice ; and in that, his Will is guided by the Di6tates or
Views of his Underftanding ; and in that his external Adions
and Behaviour, and in many Refpe6l alfo his Thoughts, and 'j
the Exercifes of his Mind, are fubje6l to his V^ill ; fo that i
he has Liberty to acft according to his Choice, and do what he (^
pleafes j and by Means of thefe Things, is capable of moral i
Habits and moral A6ls, fuch Inclinations and Actions a^ i;(
according to the common Senfe of Mankind, are worthy of !.|
Praife, Efteem, Love and Reward ; or on the contrary, of
Difefteem, Deteftgtion, Indignation and Punifhment.

In thefe Things is all the Difference from meer Machines, ii

as to Liberty and Agency, that would be any Perfection, Dig- |

nity or Privilege, in any Refpect : Ail the Difference that can a

be defired, and all that can be conceived of j and indeed all j

that the Preteniions of the Jr?nmians themfelves come to, as j

they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Tho' their Expli- I

cations overthrow and abolifh the Things afferted, and pre- '\

tended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a felf- \\

determining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to deter- ii
mine- as it chufes or wills ; v*hich comes to no more than';!

this, that a Man has a Power of chufmg, and in many \\
Inilances,can do as he chufes. Vv'hich is quite a differentThing
fr-om that Contradiction, his having Power of chufmg hi5
flrft Act of Choice in the Cafe.

Or if their Scheme makes any other Difference than this^
between Men and Machines, it is for the worle : It is fo far
from fuppoUng Men to have a Dignity and Privilege above
Machines, that it makes the Manner of their being determined
(lijl more unhappv. Whereas Machines are guided by an un-
derflanding Caule', by the flcihul Hand of the Workman or
Owner ; the V/ill of Man is left to the Guidance of nothing,
but abibiute blind Contingence.

S E c T I on

Sea. VI. Of the Stoical Fate. 227

Section VL

Concerning that Objeflion agai7ijl the Doc-
trine which has been maintain d^ that it
agrees with the Stoical DoEirine of 'Fate,
and the Opinions of Mr, Hobi3es.

WHEN Calv'inij^s oppcfe the Armmlan Notion of the Free-
dom of Will, and Contingence of Volition, and infift
I V that there are no A6ts of the Will, nor any other

Invents whatfoever, but what are attended with fome Kind of
Neceffity ; their Oppofers cry out of thenr, as agreeing with
the antient Stoicks in their Doctrine of Fut^y and with Mr.
Hobbes in his Opmion of Necejftty.

It would not be worth while, to take Notice of fo imperti-
nent an Objection, had it not been i#ged by fome of the chief

'Jrminian Writers. There were many important Truths

\ maintain'd by the antient Greek 2in^ Roman Philofophers, and
I cfpecially the Stoicks^ that are never ther worfe for being held by
[them. The S/^/V Philofophers, by the general Agreement of
\ Chriflian Divines, and even Arminian Divines, were the
\ greateit, wifeft and molt vertuous of all the Heathen Philofo-
\ phers ; and in their Dodrine and PracStice came the neareft
" to Chriftianity of any of their Seels. Flow frequently are the
I Sayings of thefe Philofophers, in many of the Writings and
Sermons, even of Arminian Divines, produced, not as Argu-
ments of the P'alfenefs of the Dodrines which they delivered,
but as a Confirmation of fome of the greateft Truths of the
Chriftian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfedions of the
Godhead, a future State, the Duty and Happinefs of Maiikind,
h<z. as obferving how the Light of Nature and Realbn in the
wifeft and beft of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms
the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift. a

And it is very remarkable concerning Dr. W¥itb)\ that altho'
He alledges the Agreement of the Stoicks with us, wherein He
fuppofes they maintain'd the like Dodrine with us, as an Ar^
gument againft the Truth of our Doctrine \ yet this very Dr.
Whitby alledges the Agreement of the Stoich with the Jrminians^

F f 2 ' wherein

2 28 Of the Stoical Fate. Part IV. '

"vvherein he fuppofes they taught the fame Do6lrine with them,
as an Argument tor the Truth of their Doctrine. * So that
v/hen the ^toicks agree >vith t^em.^ this (it feems) is a Confirma-
tion of their Dodrine, and a Confutation of ours, as fhewing
that our Opinions are contrary to the .natural Senfe h common
Reafoh of Mankind : Neverthelefs, when the Stoicks agree with
7is^ it argues no fuch Thing in our Favour ; but on the con-
trary, is a great Argument agairjft us, and ihews our Doctrine
to be Heathenifh. . «.' :'

It is obfe)*ved by fome Cahinifilc Writers, that the Jrmintam \\\
fymbohze with the Stokksy in fome of thofe Dodrines wherein 4'
they are oppofed by the Cahinijls \ particularly in their denying ' :
an original, innate, total Corruption and Depravity of Heart'; \\
and in what they held- of Man's Ability to make Himfelf i
truly vertuou5 and conformed to God ;— - and in fome other jj
Doctrines. ' |

It may be further obfervcd, 'tis certainly no better Objection j

againft our Doctrine, that it agrees in fome Refpects with the I

Doctrine of the antient Sttoic Philofophers, than it is againft \

theirs, wherein they diffe?^from us, that it agrees in fome Re- i

fpects with the Opinion of the very word of the Heathen Phi- \
lofophers, the Followers of Epicurus^ that Father of Atheifm
and Licentioufnefs, and with the Dodrine of the Sadducees and

jefuits, ;;^

I am not much concerned to know precifely what the antient;.
Stoic Philofophers held concerning Fate^ in order to determine
what is Truth ; as tho' it were a fure Way to be in the right,
to take good Heed to differ from them. It feems that they
differed among themfelves ; and probably the Do61rineofiv7^^, .)
yis maintain'd by moft of 'em, was in fome Refpe6ts erroneous, ^j
But whatever their Dodrine was, if any of 'em held fuch \ ■
Fate, as is repugnant to any Liberty conlifting in our doing ')\
as we pleafe, I utterly deny fuch a Fate. If they held any. v
fuch Fate, as is not confident with the common and univerfal j
Notions thatMankmd have of Liberty, A61:ivity, moral Agency, |
Vertue and Vice ; I difclaim any fuch Thing, and think I j
have demonftrated that the Scheme I maintain is no fuch <]
Scheme. If the Stoicks by Fate meant any Thing of fu^h a^.;'
Nature, as can be fuppofed to ftand in the Way of the Advan-*?|
tage and Benefit of the Ufe of Means and Endeavours, or-j^

niake^;',^

f l-rhithy on the five Points, Edit. 3. P. 325, 326, 327. ' |

f'Sc(a.VI. 0/ Hohhidical JVeceJ^fj. 229

makes it lefs worth the while for Men to defire, and feek after
any Thing wherein their Vertue and Happinefs confifts ; 1
hold no Do6lrin€ that is clog'd with any- fuch Inconvenience,
any more than any other Scheme whatfoever ; and by no
Means fo much as the Jrm'inian Scheme of Contingence ; as
has been Ihewn. If they held any fuch. Dodrine of univerfal
Fatality, as is inconfiftent with^ny Kind of Liberty, that is
or can be any Perfection, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or
any Thing defirable, in any Refpect, for any intelligent Crea-
ture, or indeed with any Liberty that is poiflible or conceivable ;
lembrace no fuch Doctrine; If they held any fuch Doctrine
of Fate as is inconfiftent with the World's being in all Things
fubject to the Difpofal of an intelligent wife Agent, that pre-
lides, not as the Soul of the World, but as the fovereign Lord
of, the Univerfe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choice
.and Defign, in the Exercife of the moft perfect Liberty con-
ceivable, without Subjection to any Conftraint, or being pro-
perly under the Power or Influence of any Thing befote, above
or without himfelf ; I wholly renounce any fuch Doctrine.

' As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the fame Doctrine concern-
ing NeceiTity ;— I confefs, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes,
Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not reject all
Truth which is demonftrated by clear Evidence, meerly be-
caufe it was once held by fome bad Man.- This great Truth,
that Jefus is thj Son of God, was not fpoil'd becaufe it was*
once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil.
If Truth is fo defiled becaufe it is fpoken by the Mouth, or
written by the Pen of fome ill-minded mifchievous Man, that
it muft never be received, we fhall never know when we hold
any of the moft precious and evident Truths by a lure
Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad Ufe of this
Truth, that is to be lamented : bat the Truth is not to be
tho't worthy of Reje6lion on that Account. 'Tis common for
the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abufe the beft
Things to vile Purpofes.

I might alfo take Notice of it's having been obferved, that
the ArminidJis agree with Mr. Hobbes f in many more Things
than the Cahinijh. As, in what he is faid to hold concerning
Original Sin, in denying the Neceffity of fupernatural Illumi-
nation, in denying infufed Grace, in denying the Dodrine of
Juftification by Faith alone , and other Things.

t Dr. Gill, in his Anfwcr to Dr. IVhithy. Vol. 3. P. 1 83, &c.

Section

230 Concerning the Neceffity Part IV.

Section VIL
Concerning the NecefTity of the Divine Will. ,

^OME may pofTibly obje6l againft what has be^n fuppofed
^S of the Abfurdity and Inconfiftence ,of a feif-determining
Power in the Will, and the^ ImpolfibilJty of it's being
otherwife, than that the Will fhould be determined in every^
Cafe by fome Motive, and by a Motive which (as it (lands
in the Viev/ of the UnderRanding) is of fuperiour Strength to
any appearing on the other Side ; That if thefe Thmgs are
true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created A4inds,
but the Will of GqcI Hhnfelf is necefiaryin all it's Determina-
tions. Concerning which fays the Authpr of the EJfay. on the
Freedj?n of IVill hi God and m the Creature' {V^g^ 85, 86.)
What llrange Doctrine is . this,., contrary to ail our Ideas oi
the Dominion of God ? Does it not deftroy the Glory of
his Liberty of Choice, and take away from the Creator and
Governour and Benefactor of the. World, that moft free and
fovereign Agent, all the Glory of this. Sort of Freedom ?
Does it not feem to make Him a Kind of mechanical Me-
dium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hohbcs's Dodrine of Fata.-
li'ty and NecelTity, into all Things that God hath to do
with ? Does it riot feem to reprefent the blelTed Go^, as a
Being of vaft Underftanding, as well as Power and Effi-
ciency, but flill to leave Him without a Will to chufe among
all the Objects within his View^ ? In fliort, it feems to make
the blefTed God a Sort of almighty Minifter of Fate, under
it's univerfal and fupream Influence ; as it was the profefs'd
Sentiment of fome of the Antknts, that Fate was above the
Gods."

This is declaiming, rather than arguing 5 and an Applica-
tion to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to meer

Reafon. But 1 would calmly endeavour to confider whether

there be any Reafon in this frightful Reprefentation. But

before I enter upon a particular Confideration of the Matter, I
would obferve this : That 'tis reafonable to fuppofe, it ftiould
be much more difficult to exprefs or conceive Things accord-
ing to exa<5t metaphyfical Truth, relating to the Nature and
Manner of the Exigence of Things in the divine Underftand-
ing and Will, and the Operaticn of thefe Faculties (if I may

Seel. VII. of the Divine Volume. 231

To call them) of the divine Mind, than in the human Mind ;
which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to a
Propottion to the Meafure of our Comprehenfion, and more
commenfurate to the Ufe and Import of human Speech.
Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms to
exprefs precife Truth concerning our own Minds, and their
Faculties and Operations. Words Vv^ere iirft formed to exprefs

-external Things ; and thofe that are applied to exprefs Things
internal and fpiritual, are almoft all borrowed,and ufed in a Sort
ef figurative Senfe. Whence they are mofl of 'em attended with
a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixednefs in their Signitica^

-tion, occafioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Confu-
fions in Enquiries and Controverfies about Things of this Na-
ture. But Language is much lefs adapted to exprefs Things
in the Mind of the incomprehenfible Deity,precifely as they are.

We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exadly of
the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithftanding all the
Progrefs which has been made in pad and prefent Ages, in
this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphyficks, as it
relates to thefe ' Things, is brought to greater Perfe6tion than
once it Was ; yet here is flill Work enough left for future En-
quiries and Refearches, and Room for Progrefs flill to be made.
Tor many Ages and Generations. But we had need to b^ in-
finitely able Metaphyiicians, to conceive withClearnefs, accord-
ing to ftricl, proper and perfed Truth, concerning the Nature
of the divine EfTence, and the Modes of the Adion and Ope-
ration of the Powers of the divine Mind.

And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged
^to conceive of fome Things in God as confequent and depen-
dent on others, and of fome Things pertaining to the divine
Nature and Will as the Foundation of others, and fo before
others in the Order of Nature : As, we muft conceive of the
Knowledge and Holinefs of God as prior in the Order of Na-
ture to his Happinefs ; the Perfedion of his Underftanding, as
the Foundation of his wife Purpofes and Decrees ; the Ploli-
nefs of his Nature, as the Caufe and Reafon of his holy De-
I terminations. And yet v/hen v/e fpeak of Caufe and Effedf ,
Antecedent and Confequent, fundamental and dependent, de-
termining and determined, in the firfc Being, who is felf-
cxifient, independent, of perfe^ft and abfolute Simplicity and
Imm.utability, and the firft Caufe of all Things ; doubtlefs
there mull: be lefs Propriety in fuchPvepref&utations, than when

232 Necefftty of aSiing mojl wifely. Part IV.

we fpeak of derived dependent Beings, who are compounded,
and liable to perpetual Mutation and Succeflion.

Having premifed this, I proceed to obferve concerning the i

foremention'd Author's Exclamation, •showX.i^ix^ necejjary Deter- .J

mination of God's IVill^ in all Things, by v^at He fees to be \

fitteji and beji. ' \

That all the feeming Force of fuch Obje6lions and Excla-
mations muft arife from an Imagination, that there is fomc i 1
Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without fuch a moral ;
Neceffity, as will make it impoliible to do any other, than ;^
always chufe what is wifeft and beft ; as tho' there were fome ^c
Difadvantage, Meannefs and Subje6tion, in fuch a NecelTity ; "j
a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and \i
held in Servitude by fomething,-which, as it were, maintained >\
a ftrong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds \\
that held him fail:, and that he could by no Means deliver {
himfeif from. Whereas, this muft be all meer Imagination i
and Delufion. 'Tis no Difadvantage or Dilhonour to a Being, \
neceiTariJy to a(5t in the moft excellent and happy Manner, '
from the necelTary Perfedlion of his own Nature. This argues i
no Imperfe6tion, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of \
Dignity, Privilege or Afcendancy. f 'Tis not inconfiflent with j

the \

•)- *' It might have been objefted with much more Plaufiblenefs, that j

" the fupreme Caufe cannot be free, becaufe he mutt needs do |

" always what is beft in the Whole. But this would not at all i^

*' ferve Spinoza s Purpofe : For this is a Necefhty, not of Nature pj

*• and Fate, but of Fitnefs and Wifdom ; a Neceffity confiftent ji

•« with the greateft Freedom, and moft perfeft Choice. For the lii

" only Foundation of this Neceffity is fuch an unalterable Refti- |^

*' tude of Will, and Perfeflion of Wifdom, as makes it impoffible I'

*' for a wife Being to ad foolifhiy." C/arF& Dem. of the Being J

" and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. ^

" Tho' God is a moft perfeftly free Agent, yet he cannot but do. 5

*' always what is beft and wifeft in the Whole. The Reafon i^ ^ !^

" evident ; becaufe perfeft Wifdom and Goodnefs are as fteady*' j.-

" and certain Principles of Adion, as Neceffity itfejf ; and an' fi

** infinitely wife and good Being, indued with the moft perfect ?

*' Liberty, can no more chufe to aft in Contradiftion to Wifdom' f]

•* and Goodnefs, than a neceffary Agent can aft contrary to the ^

*' Neceffity by which it is afted ; it being as great an Abfurdity and >

«* impoffibility in Choice, for infinite Wifdom to chufe to aft un- \\

*' wifely, or infinite Goodnefs to chufe what is not good, asit would i

•• be

; Se.VII. agreahle to mojl perfeBUhzYty. 233

il the abfolute, and moft perfe6l Sovereignty of God. The
I Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do what-
' ever pleafes Him ; v^^hereby He doth accord'mg to his TVill in the
. Armies of Heaven^ and amon^ the Inhabitants of the Earthy and

none canjiay his Hand^ or fay unto hirfi^ What dofi thou ? The

I following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God ; vi-z,
\ (i.) Supreme, univerfal, and infinite Ptjwn*; whereby he is
able to do what he pleafes, without Controul, without any
■ (Confinement of that Power, without any Subje(5\ion in the leaft
Meafure to any other Power ; and fo without any Hindrance
or Refiraint, that it fhould be either impolTible, or at all
difficult, for him to accomplifli his Will 3 and without any

G g Dependance

" be in Nature, for abfolute Neceffity to fail of producing its ne-
*' ceffary EfFeft. There was indeed no Neceffity in Nature, thac
*' (jod Ihould at firll create fuch Beings as he has created, or in-
*' deed any Being at all ; becaufe he is in himftilf infinitely happy
" and Allfaflicient. There was alfo no Neceffity in Nature, that
•' he fhould preferve and continue Things in Being, after they were
*' created; becaufe he would be felffufiicient without their Conti-
" nuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was fit and wife
-<• and good, that infinite Wifdora fhould manifeft, and infinite Good-
*' nefs communicate itfelf ; and therefore it was neceilary, in the
" Senfe of Neceffity I am now fpeaking of, that Things ihould be
^ •' made at fuch a l'i?ne^ and cor^tinued fo long^ and indeed with.
** various Perfedlions in fuch Degrees, as infinite VVifdom and
" Goodnefs faw it wifeft and bell that they fhould." Ibid, P. 1 1 2,1 1 3.
*' 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfedion of our Nature, to defirc, will and

** adl, according to the laft Rcfult of a fair Examination. This

** is fo far from being a Reftraint or Diminution of Freedom, that
*' it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it : 'Tis not an Abridg-
" ment, 'ds the End and Ufe of our Liberty ; and the further we
" are removed from fuch a Determination, the nearer we are ta,
*' Mifery and Slavery. A perfed: JndifTerence in the Mind, noc
*' determinable by its lafl Judgment of the Good or Evil that is
*' thought to attend its Choice, would be fo far from being an Ad-
*' vantage and Excellency of any inteJiedlual Nature, that it would
•* be as great an Imperfedion,as the Want of IndifFerency to a£l, or
** not to ad, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfedtion

** on the other Side." Tis as much a Perfedion, that Defire

** or the Power of preferring fhould be determined by Good, as that

** the Power of ading fliould be determined by the Will : And the

** certainer fuch Determination is, the greater the Perfedion, Nay,

" were we determined by any Thing but the lall Refult of our owa

^** Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Adion, we were

? " not U^Q, The very End of our Freedom being, t!:at we might

M. »» attam

2 3 4 Necejftty of aEiing moji wifely, Part IV.

Dependance of his Power on any other Power, from whence
it fliould be derived, or which it (hould ftand in any Need of:
So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, \
and is abfolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has fu- \
preme Authority ; abfolute and moft perfect Right to do what j
He wills, without Subjedion to any fuperiour Authority, or •
any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by ;
any diftind independent Authority, either fuperiour, equal, or ,
inferiour 5 he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain ;
of all. Authority ; and alfo without Reftraint by any Obliga- \
tion, implying either Subje6tion, Derivation, br Dependance, ;
or proper Limitation. (3.) That his /F/7/ is fupreme, unde- i
rived, and independent on any Thing without Himfelf ; being j

in \ '[
J
*' attain theGood we chufe ; and therefore every Man is bro't under i
** a NeceiTity by his Conftitution, as an intelligent Being, to be "
" determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what i
*' is beft for him to do ; elfe he would be under the Determination j
" of fome other than himfelf, which is Want of Liberty. And to
** deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows hisov^n
** Judgment, is to fay, that a Man wills and afts for an End that ;
** he would not have, at the fame Time that he wills and afts for it, '
<' For if he prefers it in his prefcnt Thoughts, before any other,
" 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any \
*' other ; unlefs he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, 1
<* at the fame Tiroe ; a Contradidtion too manifeft to be admitted.-- i
" If we look upon thofe fuperior Beings above us, who enjoy per- \
«* fe6l Happinefs, we /hall have Reafon to judge/that they are more V
*' Readily determined in their Choice of Good than we j and yet f]
" we have no Reafon to think they are lefs happy, or lefs free, than f^
** we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite Creatures as we ;^
'■ are, to pronounce what infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs could do, ij
** I think we might fay, that God himfelf cannot chufe what is not itj
" Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being deter minei "^

♦* by ivhat is beji. But to give a right View of this miftaken %

*' Part of Liberty, let me a/k, Would any one be a Changeling, |
** becaufe he is lefs determined by v/ife Determinations, than a wife' |
" Man ? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be atLiberty to play ii,
** the Fool, and draw Shame and Mifery upon a Man's felf ? If to >
•* break loofe from the Condudl of Reafon, and to want that fi
*' Reftraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from \\
*' doing or chufing the worfe, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad -men ;j
*' and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would |
*' chufe to be mad, for the fake of fuch Liberty, but he that is '
*♦ mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. j
** This Being having all Things always necelTarily in View, mull al^ j

•• ways,. I

Sed-VII. ;7(? Meannefs (?r Difadvantage* 235

in every Thing det'ermin'd by his own Counfel, having no
other Rule but his own Wifdom ; his Will not being fubjedl
to, or reftrain'd by the Will of any other, and others Wills
being perfectly fubje6t to his. (4.) That his Wifdom^ which
determines his Will, is fupreme, perfe6t, tinderived, felf-
fufficient, and independent ; io that it may be faid as in Ifai.
■xl. 14. With whom took He Counfel ? And who wjiru5ted Him and
taught Him in the Path of Judgment^ and taught Him Knowlege^ and

\Jhewed Him the Way of Vndcrjianding f There is no other

(divine Sovereignty but this : and this is properly ahfolute Sove-
reignty : No other is defirable ; nor would any other be ho-
liourable, or happy : and indeed there is no other conceivable
or poffible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatnefs of the divine
Sovereignty, that God's Will is determin'd by his own infinite
all-fufficient Wifdom in every Thing ; and in nothing at all
is either direded by any infenour Wifdom, or by no Wifdom ;
whereby it would become fenfelefs Ai-bitrarmels, determining
and adlmg without Reafon, Defign or End.

' G g 2 If

ways, and eternally will, according to his 'infinite Comprehenfion
of Things; thac is, mull will all Things that arewifeil and bell to
be done. There is no getting free of this Confequence. If it
can will at all, it mufl will this Way . To be capable of know-
ing, and not capable of u'il'ing, is not to be underftood. And
to be capable of willing otherwife than what is wifeft and beft,
contradids that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge
mufl diredl the Will without Error Here then is ths Origin of

moral NeceJJity ; and that is really^ of Freedom. ■ Perhaps it

may be faid, when the divine Will is determined, from the Con-
fideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necelTarily
determined, as if it were phyfically impel'd, if that were poiTible.
But it is Unfkilfulnefs, to fuppofe this an Objection. The great
Principle is once eftablifhed, <viz. That, the divine Will is deter-
mined by the eternal Reafon and Aptitudes of Things, inllead of
being phyfically impelled; and after that, the more (Ircng and
neceflary this Determination is, the more pcrfeft the Deity muil
be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and
adorable Being, whofe Will and Power are condantly, immutably
determined, by the Confideration of what is wifeft and beft ; in-
ftead of a furd Being, with Power, bnt without Difcerning and
Reafon. // is the Beauiy of this Necefity, thnt it is fro?2g as Fate
itfelf nvith all the Ad'vantnge of Ren fan and Goodnefs. It is

■ ftrange, to fee Men contend, that the Deity is notFree, becaufe he

■ is neceflarily rational, immutably good and wife ; when a Man
is allowed ftiil the perfecler Being, the more fixedly and conllantly
his Will is de ermined by Reafon and Truth." Enquiry into the
Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. P. 403, 404.

236 Necejfity of aEiing mo ft wifely, Parti V. \

If God's Will is fteadily and furely determined in every J
Thing by/z//'r^?//^Wifdora, then it is in every Thing neceiTarily :i
determined to that which is moji wife. And certainly it would „f
be a Djfadvantage and Indignity, to be othervv^ife. P or if the J
divine Will was not necefiarily determined to that which in ' (
every Cafe is wifeft and beft, it muft be fubjec5t to fome Degree (
of undefigning Contingence ; and fo in the fame Degree i
liable to Evil. To fuppofe the divine Will liable to be carried j
hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind I
Contingence, which is guided by no Wifdom, no Motive, no :;
intelligent Didate whatfoever, (if any fuchThing were pbfTible) i
would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and \

Meannefs, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a Dif- J

advantage, for the divine Will to be attended v/ith this moral (j
NecefTity, then the more free from it, and the more left at j
Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And confe- \
quently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Underftand- \
ing, and univerfally and entirely left to fenfelefs unmeaning!
Contingence, to act abfolutely at Random, would be the \
fupreme Glory. "^ ,,

It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his \
fupremely wife Volition is ncceffary, than it argues a Depcn- -J
dence of his Being, that his Exiftence is necellary. If it be i
fomething too low, for the fupreme Being to have his Will de- i^
termined by moral Ne^ceffity, fo as neceiTarily, in every Caf^ 1!
to will in the higheil: Degree holily and happily ; then why
is it not alfo fom.ething/too low, for him to have hisExiftence,
and the infinite Perf^edion of his Nature, and his infinite
Happinefs determined by NecefTity ? It is no more to God's
Diilionour, to be necefTarily wife, than to be necefTarily holy.>
And if neither of them be to his Dilhonour, then it i^
not to his Difhonour necefTarily to ad holily and wifely. An<t
if it be not diihonourable, to be necefTarily holy and wife, iii
the highefi pofTible Degree, no more is it mean or diflionour- ,
able, necefTarily to act holily and wifely in the higheil pofTible
Degree ; or (vv'hich is the fame Thing) to do that, in every
Cafe, which above all other Things is wifefl andbefl. •

The R.eafon why it is not difhonourable, to be necefTarily
7n'iji holy, is, becaufe Holinefs in itfelf is an excellent and
honourable Thing. Eor the fame Reafon, it is no Difhonour
to be necefTarily rr.cj} wife, and in every Cafe to a(5t moft wifely,
or do the Thing which is the wifefl of all ; for Wifdom is
alfo i» it felf excellent and honourable.

TheJ

Sed.VII. /^^ Meannefs (^r Difad vantage. 237

The forementioned Author of the EJpiy on the Freedom of IVtll
Sec. as has been obferved, reprefents that Do6lrine of the
divine Will's being in every Thing neceflarily determined by
fuperior Fitnefs, as making the blefled God a Kind of al-
mighty Minifter and mechanical Medium of Fate : And he
infifts, P. 93, 94. that this moral NeceiTity and ImpolTibility is
in Effea the fame Thing with phyfical and natural NecelTity
and Impoffibility : And in P. 54, 55. he fays, " The Scheme
" which determines the Will always and certainly by the
" Underflanding, and the Underftanding by the Appearance
" of Things, feems to take away the true Nature of Vice
" and Vert^ue. For the fublimefi: of Vertues, and the vileil
" of Vices, feem rather to be Matters of Fate and Neceffity,
" flowing naturally and neceflarily from the Exiftence, the
" Circumliances, and prefent Situation of Perfons andThings :
" For this Exiilence and Situation neceflTarily makes fuch an
" Appearance to the Mind ; from this Appearance flows a
" neceflary Perception and Judgment, concerning thefeThings;
" this Judgment neceflTarily determines the Will : And thus
" by this Chain of necefl'ary Caufes, Vertue and Vice would
" iofe their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and neceflary
" Things, infl:ead of moral and free Adions."

And yet this fame Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a per-
fe6i:ly wife Being will confl;antly and certainly chufe VN^hat is
?nofl: fit ; and fays, P. 102, 103. " I grant, and ahvays have
" granted, that wherefoever there is fuch an antecedent fupe-
" nor Fitnefs of Things, God acts according to it, fo as never
" to contradi<St it ; and particularly, in all his judicial Pro-
" ceedings, as a Governor, and Diftributer of Rewards and
" Puniflimcnts." Yea, he fays exprefly, P. 42. " That it is
*'_ not poflible for God to act otherwife, than according to
" this Fitnefs and Goodnefs in Things."

So that according to this Author,putting thefe feveralPafiages
of his EflPay together, there is fio Vertue^ nor any Thing of a moral
Nature, in the moft fublime and glorious A6ts and Exercifes of
God's Holinefs, Juftice, and Faithfulnefs ; and He never does
any Thing which is in it felf fupreamly worthy, and above dl
other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mecha-
nical Medium of Fate ; and in iJuhat he does as the Judge^ and
moral Governor of the IVorld, He exercifes no moral Excellency ;
exercifing no Freedom in thefe Things, becaufe He a6ts by
moral Neccflity, \Yhich is in Effect the fame with phyfical or

natural

2Z^]Veceffity of Govs a^ wifely,^c. P.IV.

natural Neceffity ; and therefore he only a6ts by an Hohhiftical
Fatality \ as a Being indeed ofvaji Vnderjianding>, as ivcll as Poiuer
and Efficiency (as He iaid before) but wiihout a Will to chufe^ being
a Kind cf almighty Adinifier of Fate^ acting under ifsfupreafu In-
fiuenee. For He allows, that in all thefe Things God's Will
is determined conftantly and certainly by a fuperiour Fitnefs,
and that it is not poffible for Him to acft otherwife. And if
thefe Things are fo, what Glory or Praife belongs to God
for doing holily and judly, or taking the moft fit, holy, wife
and excellent Courfe, in any one Inftance ? Whereas, accord-
ing to the Scriptures, and alio the common Senfe of Mankind,
it don't in the leaft derogate from the Honour of any Being,
that through the moral Perfedlion of his Nature, he necelTarily
sets with fupream Wifdom and Holinefs : But on the con-
trary, his Praife is the greater : Herein confifts the Height of
his Glory.

The fame Author, P. 56. fuppofes, that herein appears the

excellent Character of a zvife and good lidan^ that tho' he can chuje
contrary to the Fitnefs of Things^ yet he does not ; hut fuff'ers himfef
U be dire^ed by Fitnefs ; and that in this Condu<^ He imitates
the bleffed God. And yet He fuppofes 'tis contrariwife with the
blefled God ; not that he fufrers Himfelf to be direded by
Fitnefs, when He can clmfe contrary totheFitnefs of Things^ but that
he cannot chufe contrary to the Fitnefs of Things -, as he fays, P. 42.
— Tl:at it is not poffible for God to a^ otherwife^ than^ accorditig to
this Fitnefs^ where there is any Fitnefs or Goodn^s in Things : Ye a, he
fuppofes, P. 31. That if a Man were fetfe^ily wife and good^ he
could not do otherwife than be conflantly and certainly determined by the
Fitnefs of Things.

One Thing more I would obferve, before I conclude this
Section ; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the
Glory of God, to be necelTarily determined by fuperior Fitnefs
in fome Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in
all Things ; from any Thing in the Nature of fuch Neceffity,
as at all detrading from God's Freedom, Independence, abfo-
lute Supremacy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State,
or Manner of ading ; or as implying any Infirmity, Reftraint,
or Subjection. And if the Thing be fuch as well confifts with
God's Glory, and hasnothing tending at all to detracSl from
it ; then we need not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too
many Things, left thereby we fhould detra6t from God's
Glory too much.

Section

( 239 )
Section VIII.

Some further ObjeEiions againji the moral
Neceffity of God's Volitions conjidered.

THE Author laft cited, as has been obferved, owns that
God, being perfedly wife, will conftantly and certainly
chufe what appears moft fit, where there is a fuperior
Fitnefs and Goodnefs in Things j and that it is not pomble
for him to do otherwife. So that it is in Effed confefs'd, that
in thole Things where there is any real Preferablenefs,
'tis no Diflionour, nothing in any Refpec^ unworthy of God,
for him to a6l from Neceffity ; notwithftanding all that can
be obje6tcd from the Agreement of fuch a Neceflity, . with the
Fate oit\\Q-Stoicks^ and the Neceflity maintain'd hylAx. Hobbes,
From which it will follow, that if it were fo, that in all the
different Things, among which God chufes, there were ever-
more a fuperior Fitnefs or Preferablencfs on one Side, then it
would be no Dilhonour, or any Thing, in any Refpe6f, un-
worthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be neceffarily
determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a
giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unfuitablenefs of
fuch a Neceifity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and
Glory of the divine Being ; and a refting the wholeWeight of
-the Affair on the Decifion of anotherPoint wholly diverfe ; viz.
Whether it be fo indeed^ that in all the various poifibie Things
which are in God's View, and may be confidered as capable
ObjecSls of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferabienefs
in one Thing above another. This is denied by thisAuthor ;
w{io fuppofes, that in many Inftances, between two or more
poiTible Things, which come v/ithin the View of the divine
Mind, there is a perfe6t Indifference and Equality as to Fitnefs,
or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in
View, or to anfwer any of his Deiigns. Now therefore I
would coniider whether this be evident.

r The Arguments brought to prove this, are of two Kinds,
(i.) It is urged, that in many Inllances w^e mufl fuppofe

.there is abfolutely no Difference between various poffible Ob-
jeds of Choice, which God has in View : And (2,). that the

•^ . Difference

240 0/* God's creating the World^ Part IV.

Difference between many Things is fo inconfiderable, or of
fuch a Nature, that it would be unreafonable to fuppofe it to
be of any Confequence ; or to fuppofe that any of God's wife
Defigns would not be anfwered in oneWay as well as the other.

Therefore, ,)

I. The firft Thing to be confidered is, "Whether there are \

any Inftances wherein there is a perfe(5l Likenefs, and ab- -

folutely no Difference,between different Objeds of Choice, that i:

are propofed to the divine Underffanding ? ' ^

And here in the firjl Place, it may be worthy to be confi- "

dered, whether the Contradiction there is in the Ti?r;?2^ of the 1

Queftidn propofed, don't give Reafon to fufpedl that tliere is 'i

an Inconfirtence in the Thhig fuppofed. 'Tis inquired, whe- ;j

ther different Objects of Choice mayn't be ab folutely withcut \

Difference P If they .are abfolutely zvithout Difference^ then how i

are they different Objeds of Choice ? If there be abfolutely no j

Difference in any Refpe6t, then there is no Variety or DiJiinSiion : '

For DiftinCtion is only by fome Difference. And if there be ]

no Variety among propofed OhjeSfs of Choice^ then there is no j

Opportunity for Variety of Choice^ orDifference of Determination. 1

For that Determination of a Thing w^hich is not different in j

any Refpedt, is not a different Determination, . but the fame. \

That this is no Quibble, inay appear more fully anon. I

The Arguments, to prove that the moft High, in fome In- '

ftances, chufes to do one Thing rather than another, where |

the Things themfelves are perfe6tly without Difference, are 1

two. - j

I. That the various Parts of infinite Time and Space, ab- |

folutely confidered, are perfedtly alike, and don't differ at all |

one from another : And that therefore, when God determined |

to create the World in fuch a Part of infinite Duration and !

Space, rather than others, he determin'd and prefer'd among '.
various Objects, between which there w^as no Preferablenefs, ,
and abfolutely no Difference.

Jnfiv. This Objection fuppofes an infinite Length of Time
before theVv^orld was created, diftinguifhed by fucceffive Parts,
properly and truly fo ; or a Succeffion of limited and unmea-
furable Periods of Time, following one another, in an infi-
nitely long Series : which muff needs be a groundlefs Imagi-
nation. The eternal Duration which was before the Worlds
Veing only the I'2ternity of God's Exiflence ; which is nothing

elle

Sed.VlIL atfuch a Time ^W Place. 1\X

clfe but his immediate, perfetfl and invariable Poffeffion of the
whole of his unlimited Life, together and at once 5 Vita inter-
fninabtlis^' tota^ ftmtil ^ perfeSfa Pojfeffio. Which is fo generally
allowed, that I need not ftand to demonftrate it* *

So this Obje6lion fuppofes an Extent of Space beyond the
Limits of the Creation, of an infinite* Length, Breadth and
Depth, truly and properly diftinguilhed inta different meafur-
able Parts, limited at certain Stages, one beyond another, in
an infinite Series. Which Notion of abfolute and infinite Space
is doubtlefs as unreafonable, as that now mention'd, of abfo-

H h lute

* " if all created Beings were taken away, all t^oflibility of any Mu-
" tation or Succeffion of one Thing to another would appear to
*' be alfo removed. Abftraft Succeffion in Eternity is fcarce to be
** underftood. What is it that fiicceeds ? One Minute to another
*' perhaps, ^velut unda Jupewenit undam. But when we -imagine
** this, we fancy that the Minutes are Things feparately exifting.
•* This is the common Notion ; and yet it is a manifeft Prejudice.
*• Time is nothing but the Exiftence of created fucceffive Beings,
*' and Eternity the necelTary Exiftence of the Deity. Therefore^i^
'* this necefTary Being hath no Change or Succeffion in his Nature,
«* his Exiftence muft of Courfe be unfucceffive. We feem to com-
•♦ mit a double Overfight in this Cafe ; firji, we find Succeffion in
«* the neceftary Nature and Exiftence of the Deity himfelf : V7hich
« is wrong, if the Reafoning above be conclufive. And then
«* we afcribe this Succeffion to Eternity, coniidered abftraftedl/
" from the eternal Being j and fuppofe it, one knows not what, a
•* Thing fubfifting by it {t\iy and flowing, one Minute after another,
" This is the Work of pure Imagination, and contrary to the
«* Reality of Things, Hence the common metaphoricalExpreffions ;
•* ^ime runs a-pace» let us lay hold on the frefent Minute, and the like.
« The Philofophers themfelves mifiead us by their Jlluftrations :
" They compare Eternity to the Motion of a Point running on
« forever, and making a tracelefs infinite Line. Here the Point u
** fuppofed a Thing adually fubfifting, reprefenting the prefent Mi-
** nute ; and then they afcribe Modon or Succeffion to it ; that is,
" they afcribe Motion to a meer Non-entity, Co illuftrate to us a

" fucceffive Eternity made up of finite fucceffive Parts. li once

** we allow an all-perfe6lMind, which hath an eternal,immutable and
" infiniteComprehenfion of allThings, always (and allow it we muft)
«* the Diftindlion of paft and future vaniflies with Refpedl to fuch a

** Mind. In a Word, if we proceed Step by Step, as above,

" the Eternity or Exiftence of the Deity will appear to be Vit^
•* interminahilisy tot a, fimul tf perfe^a PoJfeJJjo ; how much fosver
" this may have been a Paradox hitherto." Enquiry ivVo the Nature
tf thi Human Soul, Vol. t, P. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3,

242 Of Go^'s placing 6\SQVtvi\\y Part IV. |

lute and infinite Duration. 'Tis as improper, to imagine that .
the Immenfity and Omniprefence of God is diftinguilhed by a
Series of Miles and Leagues, one beyond another ; as that I
the infinite Duration of God is diftinguilhed by Months andij
Years, one after another. A Diverfity and Order of diftind t
Parts, Hmited by certain Periods, is as conceivable, and does iJ|
as naturally obtrude itfelf on our Imagination, in one Cafe as |:;
the other ; and there is equal Reafon in each Cafe, to fuppofe <
that our Imagination deceives us. 'Tis equally improper, to k
talk of Months and Years of the divine Exiftence, and Mile- \
fquares cf Deity : And we equally deceive our felves, when )
we talk of the World's being differently fix'd with Refpec5t to ^i
either of thefe Sorts of Meafures. I' think, we know not what \
we mean, if we fay, the World might have been differently J
placed from what it is, in the broad Expanfe.of Infinity ; or, ?Jt
that it might have been differently fix'd in the long Line of I
Eternity : And all Arguments and Objections which are i
built on the Imaginations we are apt to have of infinite Exten- 1
fion or Duration, are Buildings founded on Shadows, or J
Caftles in the Air.

2. The fecond Argument, to prove that the moft High wills 1
one Thing rather than another, without any fuperior Fitnefs or ;1i
Preferablenefs in the Thing prefer'd, is God's adually placing ,1
in different Parts of the World, Particles or Atoms of Matter \
that are perfe6tly equal and alike. The forementioned Author ii
jfays, P. 78, b'V. " If one would defcend to the minute fpecific j
" Particles, of which different Bodices are compofed, we fhould j
*' fee abundant Reafon to believe that there are Thoufands of \\
" fuch little Particles or Atoms of Matter, which are perfectly 1
" equal and alike, and could give no diftind Determination to il
*' the Will of God, where to place them." He there inftances )i
in Particles of Water, of which there are fuch immenfe Num- l
bers, which compofe the Rivers and Oceans of this World j ;j
and the infinite Myriads of the luminous and fiery Particles, |
which compofe the Body of the Sun ; fo many,that it would be ''S
>ery unreafonable to fuppofe no two of'them fhould be exadly j
equal and alike. |

Jnfw, (i.) To this I anfwer : That as we mufl fuppofe 'i
Matter to.be infinitely divifible, 'tis very unlikely that any two \
of all thefe Particles are exadtly equal and alike ; fo unlikely, |
that it is a Thoufand to one, yea, an infinite Number to one, i
but it is lotkerwife : And that altho' we fhould allow a great I

Similarity 1

Se6l. Vlli, fimilar Particles. 243

Similarity between the different Particles of Water and Fire,
as to their general Kature and Figure ; and however fmall we
fuppofe thofeParticles to be, 'tis infinitely unlikely, that any two
of them (hould be exa6lly equal in Dimenlions and Quantity

of Matter. If we (liould fuppofe a great many Globes of

the fame Nature with the Glpbe of the Earth, it would be very
ftrange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the
fame Number of Particles of Dull and Water in them. But
infinitely lefs ftrange, than that tvvo Particles of Light fhould
have juft the fame Quantity of Matter. For a Partici" of
Light (according to the Dodrine of the infinite Diviiibuity of
Matter) is compofed of infinitely more affignable Parts, than
there are Particles of Duft and Water in UiQ Globe of the
Earth. And as it is infinitely urJ;kely, that any two of thefe
Particles (hould be equal ; fo it is, that they (hiouid be alike m
other Refpe6ls : To inriance ia the Configuration of their
Surfaces. If there were very many Globes, of the Nature of
the Earth, it would be very unlikely that any two Ihould have
exactly the fame Number of Particles of Dafi, Water andStone,
in their Surfaces, and all pofited exacStly alike, one with Ref-
pe6l to another, without any Difference, in any Part difcernable
either by the naked Eye or Microfcope ; but infinitely lefs
ftrange, than that two Particles of Light ftiouid be periediy
of the fame Figure. For there are infinitely more alfignable
real Parts on the Surface of a Particle of Light, than there are
Particles of Duft, Water and Stone, on the Surface of the
terreftrial Globe.

Anf, (2.) But then, fuppofmg that there are two Particles
fer Atoms of Matter perfe6tly equal and alike, which God has
placed in different Parts of the Creation ; as I will not deny it
to be poffible for God to make two Bodies perfedly alike, aad
put them in different Places ; yet it will not follow, that two
different or diltind A6ls or Eft"e6ls of the divine Power have
^ exadly the fame Fitnefs for the fame Ends. For thefe two
different Bodies are not different or diftmd, in any other
Refpeds than thofe wherein they differ r They are two in no
other Refpe<5ls than thofe wherein there is a Difference. If
they are perfectly equal and alike in thernfehes^ then they csnbe
diftinguifhed, or be diftind, only in thofe Things "Which are
called Circumjiances j as. Place, Time, Reft, Motion, or fome
other prefent or paft Circumftar^ces or Relations. For 'tis
Difference only, that conftitutes Diftindion. If God makes
two Bodies ifi tJ3£mfelv€S everyWay equal and alike, and agreeing

H h 2 perfeaiy

244 0/* God's /'/<?a«^ differently Part

IV. 1i

perfedly in all other Circumftances and Relations, but only i|
their Place ; then in this only is there any Diftin6lion or Du-
plicity. The Figure is the fame, the Meafure is the fame,
the Solidity and Refiftance are the fame, and every Thing the ,
fame, but only the Place. Therefore what the Will of God
determines, is this, namely, that there (hould be the fame \
Figure, the fame Extenfion, the fame Refiftance, ^c. in two
different Places. And for this Determination he has fome
Reafon. There is forne End, for which fuch a Determination
and A6t has a peculiar Fitnefs, above all other A(5ls. Here is
no one Thing determined without an End, and no one Thing
without a Fitnefs for that End, fuperior to any Thing elfe. If
it be the Pleafure of God to caufe the fame Refiftance, and the
fame Figure, to be in two different Places and Situations, we
can no more juftly argue from it, that here muft be fomq
Determination or A(5t of God's Will, that is wholly without
Motive or End, then we can argue that whenever, in any
Cafe, it is a Man's Will to fpeak the fame Words, or make,
the fame Sounds at two different Times ; there muft be fome
Determination or A61 of his Will, without any Motive orEnd,
The Difference of Place, in the former Cafe, proves ne more
than the Difference of Time does in the other. If any one
fhould fay with Regard to the former Cafe, that there muft be
fomething determined withor.t anEnd ; viz. That of thofetwo
fimilarBodieSjthis in particular Ihould be made in thisPlace,and
the other in the other, and fhould enquire why the Creator did
not make them in a Tranfpofition, when both are alike, and
each would equally have fuited either Pla^e ? The Enquiry
fuppofes fomething that is not true j namely, that the two
Bodies differ and are diftin6t in other Refpedts befides theift
Place, So that with this DiftincSlion, inherent in them, they
might in their firft Creation have been tranfpofed, and each
inight have begun it's Exiftence in the Place of the other.

Let us for Clearnefs fake fuppofe, that God had at the
Beginning made two Globes, each of an Inch Diameter, both
perfe<5|: Spheres, and perfedly folid without Pores, and per-
'fedlly alike in every Refpe(5t, and placed them near one to
another, one tow^ards the right Hand, and the other toward*
the left, without any Difference as to Time, Motion or Reft,
paft or prefent, or any Circumftance, but only their Place ;
and the Qijeftion fliould be afk'd. Why God in their Creation
placed 'em fo ? Why that which is made on the right Hapd,
was not made on the left, and vice verfa f Let it be well con-

fidered*

Sed.VIIL fimilar Particles. 245

iidered, whether there be any Senfe in fuch a Queftion ; and
•whether the Enquiry don*t fuppofe fomething falfe and abfurd.
Let it be confidered, what the Creator muft have done other-
wife than he did, what different Acl of Will or Power he muft
have exerted, in order to the Thing propofed. All that could
have been done, would have been to have made two Spheres,
perfectly alike, m the fame Places where he has made them,
without any Difference of the Things made, either in them-
felvcs, or in any Circumftance ; fo that the whole Effect would
have been without any Difference, ^nd therefore jufi: the fame*
By the Suppofition, the two Spheres are different in no other
Refpe6t but their Place ; and therefore in other Refpeds they
are the fame. Each has the fame Roundnefs : it is not a
diflind Rotundity, in any other Refpecft but it's Situation.
There are alfo the fame Dimenfions, differing in nothing but
their Place. And fo of their Refiftance, and every Thing elf®
that belongs to them.

Here if any chufes to fay, " that there is a Difference in
another Refped, viz. That they are not NUMERICALLY
the fame : That it is thus with all the Qualities that belong
to them : That it is confeffed they are in fome Refpe6ts
the fame ; that is, they are both exadly alike ; but yet nume^
rically they differ. Thus the Roundnefs of one is not the
fame numerical., individual Roundnefs with that of the other."
Let this be fuppoied ; then the Queftion about the Determi-
nation of the divine Will in the Affair, is. Why did God will,
that this individual Roundnefs fliould be at the right Hand, and
the other individual Roundnefs at the left ? Why did not he
make them in a contrary Pofition ? Let any rational Perfoi>
confider, whether fuchQueftions be notWords without aMean-
ing ; as much as it" God Ihould fee fit for fome Ends to caufe
the fame Sounds to be repeated, or made at two different
TJiries ; the Sounds being perfe6lly the fame in every other
Jvefpedl, but only one was a Minute after the other ; and it
fhould be afk'd upon it, why God caufed thefe Sounds, nume-
rically different, to fucceed one the other in fuch a Manner ?
why he did not make that individual Sound which was in the
(irft Minute, to be in the fecond ? and the individual Sound of
the laft Minute to be in the firft ? Which Enquiries would be
even ridiculous ; as I think every Perfon muft fee at once, in
the Cafe propofed of two Sounds, being only the fame repeat-
ed, abfolutely without any Difference, but that one Circum-
ftance of Time. If the moft High fees it will anfwer fom^

good

24^6 Of God's chuf among likeZ^/;^^j,P.IV.

good End, that the fame Sound (hould be made by Lightning
at two diftincft Times, and therefore wills that it fhould be fo,
piuft it needs therefore be, that herein there is fome Ad of
God's Will witho|it anyMotive or End ? God faw fit often, at
diftin<5l Times, and on different Occafions, to fay the very
fame Words to Mofes ; namely thofe, / am Jehovah. And
would it not be unreafonable, to infer as a certainConfequence
from this, that here muft be fome A61 or Adls of the divine
Will, in determining and difpofing thefe Words exa6lly alike
at different Times, wholly without Aim or Inducement ? But
it would be no more unreafonable than to fay, that there muft
be an AS. of God's without any Inducement, if he fees it beft,
and for fome Reafons, determines that there fhall be the fame
Refiftence, the fame Dimenfions, and the fame Figure, in
feveral diftindt Places.

If in the Inftance of the two Spheres, perfe(5lly alike, it be
fuppofed pofTible that God might have made them in a contrary
Pofition J that which is made at the rightHand, being made at
the Left ; then I afk, Whether it is not evidently equally poffi-
ble, if God had made but one of them, and that in the Place
of the right-hand Globe, that he might have made that nume-
rically different from what it is, and numerically different from
what he did make it ; tho' perfedlly alike, and in the fame
Place ; and at the fame Time, and in every RefpecSV, in the
fame Circumftances and Relations ?, Namely, Whether he
might not have made it numerically the fame with that which
he has now made at the left Hand ; and fo have left th^at
which is now created at the right Hand, in a State of Non-
Exiftence ? And if fo, whether it would not have been poffible
to have made one in that Place, perfectly like thefe, and yet
numerically differing from both ? And let it be confidered,
whether from this Notion of a numerical Difference inBodies,
perfedly equal and alike, which numerical Difference is fome-
thing inherent in the Bodies themfelves, and diverfe from the
Difference of Place or Time, or any Circumftance whatfoever j
it will not follow, that there is an infinite Number of numeri -
Gaily different poffible Bodies, perfedlly alike, among which
God chufes, by a felf-determining Power, when be goes about
to create Bodies.

Therefore let us put the Cafe thus : Suppofing that God in
the Beginning had created but one perfedly folid Sphere, in a
certain Place 3 and it (hould be ^nquired,Why God created that

indivi'dual

Se.VIII. andThings of XxivbXDifference. 247

individual Sphere, in that Place, at that Time ? And why he
did not create another Sphere perfecSVly hke it, but numerically
different, in the fame Place, at the fame Time ? Or why he
chofe to bring into Being there, that very Body, rather thaa
any of the infinite Number of other Bodies, perfe(5i:Iy like it 5
either of which he could have made there as well, and would
have anfwered his End as well ? Why he caufed to exift,, at
that Place and Time, that individual Roundnefs, rather thaa
any other of the infinite Number of individual Rotundities, juft
like it ? Why that individual Refifiance, rather than any other
of the infinite Number of poflible Refiftances juft like it ? And
it might as reafonably be afked. Why, when God firft caufed
it toThunder,he caufed that individualSound then to be made,
and not another juft like it ? Why did he make Choice of this
very Sound, and reje6l all the infinite Number of other poflible
Sounds juft like it, but numerically differing from it, and all
differing one from another ? I think, every Body muft be fen-
fible of the Abfurdity and Nonfenfe of what is fuppofed in fuch
Inquiries. And if we calmly attend to the Matter, we (hall be
convinced, that all fuch Kind of Obje<5lions as I am anfwer-
ing, are founded on nothing but the Imperfe(5tion of our Man-
ner of conceiving of Things, and theObfcurenefs of Language,
and great Want of Clearnefs and Precifion in the Signification
of Terms.

If any fhall find Fault with this Reafoning, that it is going
a great Length into metaphyfical Niceties and Subtilties ; I
anfwer, The Obje6tion which they are in Reply to, is a me-
taphyfical Subtilty, and muft be treated according to the Na-
ture of it. *

II. Another Thing alledged is. That innumerable Things
which are determined by the divine Will, and chofen and done
by God rather than others, differ from thofe that are not
chofen in fo inconfiderable a Manner, that it would be unrea-
fonable to fuppofe the Difference to be of any Confequence,
or that there is any fuperiour Fitnefs or Goodnefs, that God
can have Refpe<5t to in the Determination.

* " For Men to have Recourfe to Subtilties, in raifing Difficulties,
" and then complain, that they fhould be taken off by minutely
" examining thefe Subtilties, is a ftrange Kind o( Procedure.'''
Nature 0/ the Hum. Soul, V. 2. P. 331.

248 0/God's chufi am^ (vnzWMattersV.lV.

To which I anfwer ; it is impoflible for us to determine
with any Certainty or Evidence, that becaufe the Difference is
very fmali, and appears to us of no Confideration, there-
fore there is abfolutely no fuperiour Goodnefs, and no valuable
End which can be propofed by the Creator and Governor of
the World, in ordering fuch a Difference. The foremention'd
Author mentions many Inftances. One is, there being one
Atom in the wholeUniverfe more,or lefs. But I think it would
be unreafonable to fuppofe, that God made one Atom in vain,
or without any End or Motive. He made not one Atom but
what was a Work of his almighty Pov/er, as much as the
whole Globe of the Earth, and requires as much of a conftant
Exertion of almighty Power to uphold it ; and was made and
is upheld underftandingly, and on Defign, as much as if no
<3ther had^-been made but that. And it would be as unreafo-
nable to fuppofe, that he made it without any Thing really
aimed at in fo doing, as mucii as to fuppofe that he made the
Planet Jupiter without Aim or Defign.

'Tis pofFible, that the moft minute Efre6ts of the Creator's
Power, the fmaileft affignable Differences between the Things
which God has made, may be attended, in the whole Series
of Events, and the whole Compafs and Extent of their Influ-
ence, with very great and important Confequences. If the
Laws of Motion & Gravitation, laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton^
.hold univerfally, there is not one Atom, nor thjs leaft affignable
Part of an Atom, but what has Influence, every Moment,
throughout the whoie material Univerfe, to caufe every Part
to be'otherwife than it would be,'if it were not for that parti-
cular corporeal Exiftence. And however the Effed is infenfl-
ble for the prefent, yet it may m Length of Time become
great and important.

To illuflrate this. Let us fuppofe two Bodies moving the
fame Way, in flrait Lines, perfectly parallel one to another j
but to be diverted from this Parallel Courfe, and drawn one
from another, as much as might be by the Attra6tion of an
Atom, at the Diilance of one of the furtheft of the fix'd Stars
from the Earth ; thefe Bodies being turned out of the Lines
of their parallel Motion, will, by Degrees, get further and
further diflant, one from the other ; and tho' the Diftance may
be imperceptible for a longTime, yet at Length it may become
very great. So the Revolution of a Planet round the Sun be-
i^ttg retarded or accelerated, and the Orbit of it's Revolution

Wiade

Se^VIII.Neceflity conftpwi^^ itttGrace. 249

made greater or lefs, and more or lefs elliptical, and (o it's
Periodical Time longer or lliorter, no more than may be by
the Influence of the lead Atom, might in Length of Time per-
form a whole Revolution fooner or later than otherwife it
would have done ; which might make a vaft Alteration
with Regard to Millions of important Events. So the Influence
of the leaft Particle may, for ought we know, have fuch EfFecSt
on fomething in the Conftitution of fome human Body, as to
caufe another Thought to arife in the Mind at a certain Time,
than otherwife would have been ; which in Length of Time
(yea, and that not very great) might occafion a vaft Alteration
thro' the whole World of Mankind. And fo innumera-
ble other Ways might be mention'd, wherein the leaft afllgn-
able Alteration may poflibly be attended with great Confc-
quences.

Another Argument^ which the foremention'd Author brings
sgainft a neceflary Determination of the divine Will by a fupe-
hour Fitnefs, is, that fuch Do6trine derogates from the Freenefl
of God's Grace and Goodnefs^ in chufing the Objedls of his
Favour and Bounty, and from the Obligation upon Men to
Thankfulnefs for fpecial Benefits. P» 89, ^c*

In anfwer to this Objedion, I would obfefve,

1. That it derogates no more from the Goodnefs of God,
to fuppofe the Exercife of the Benevolence of his Nature to
be determined by Wifdom, than to fuppofe it determined by
Chance, and that his Favours ate beftowed altogether at Ran-
dom, his Will being determin'd by nothing but perfed: Acci-
dent, without iany End or Defign whatfoever ; which muft be
the Cafe, as has been demonftrated, if Volition be not deter-
mined by a prevailing Motive. That which is owing to per-
it^ Contingence, wherein neither previous Inducement, nor
antecedent Choice has any Hand, is not owing more to Good- •
nefs or Benevolence, than that which is owing to the Influence
of a wife End.

2. 'Tis acknowleged,that if the Motive that determines the
Will of God, in the Choice of the Objeds of his Favours, be
any moral Quality in the Objecfl, recommending that Obje(5t
to his Benevolence above others, his chufing that Objedt is
not fo great a Manifeftation of the Freenefs and Sovereignty of
his Grace, as if it were otherwife. But there is no NecelFity
of fuppoiing this, in ©rder to our fuppoiing that ha has fome

I i wii'tj

2^0 Neceffity confifl^ wi^^ free Cr^c^. Parti V.

wife End in View, in determining to beftow his Favours on
one Perfon rather than another. We are to diftinguilh be-
tween the Merit of the Objcdf of God's Favour^. ox a moral Qua-
lification of th ObjeSi ?.ttracling that Favour and recommend-
ing to it, "kn^ xhz nahird Fkntfs of fuch- a Determination of
the ASi of God's Goodnefs^ to anfwer fome wife Defign of his

own, fome End in the View of God's Oranifcience. 'Tis

God's own A61, that is the proper and immediate Objedt of
his Vohtion.

3. I fuppofe that none will deny, but that in fome Inftances,
God a6ts from wife Deiign in determinmg the particular Sub-
jeds of his Favours : None will fay, I prefume, that when
God diftinguifhes by his Bounty particular Societies or Perfons,
He never, in any Inftance, exercifes any Wifdom in fo doing,
aiming at fome happy Confequence. And if it be not denied
to be fo in fome Inftances, then I would enquire, whether in
thefe Inftances God's Goodnefs is lefs manifeiled, than in
thofe wherem God has no Aim or End at all ? And whether
the Subjeds have lefs Caufe of Thankfulnefs ? And if fo, who
Ihall be thankful for the Beftowment of diftinguiihing Mercy,
with that enhancing Circumftance of the Diftin6Vion's being
made without an End ? How fhall it be known when God is
influenced by fome wife Aim, and when not ? It is very mani-
fefl with Refpe6l to the Apoftle Paul, that God had wife Ends
in chuiing Him to be aChriftian and an Apoll:le,who had been
a Perfecutor, &c. The Apoftle himfelf mentions one End.
I Tifn. i. 15, 16. Chrtft J ejus came into the World to fave Sinners y
of whom I am chief. Hovjbeit, for this Caufe I obtained Mercy , that
in ??ie fi'J}^ J^fr^ Chrijl might fhew forth all Long-fuffering^ for a
Pattern to the?n who Jhoidd hereafter believe on Hi?n 10 Life ever-
hfAng. But yet theApoftle never look'd on it as a Diminution
"of the Freedom and Riches of divine Grace in his Election,

which Ke fo often and fo greatly magnifies. This brings me
to obferve,

4. Our fuppcfrng fuch a moral Neceifit)' in the Acfls of God's
XViil as has been fpoken of, is fo" far from neceflariiy derogat-
ing from the Riches of God's Grace to fuch as are the chofen
ObjecSts of his Favour, that in many Inftances, this moral Ne-
cellity may arife from Goodnefs, and from the great Degree of
it. God may chufe this Objei5l rather than another, as having
a fuperiour Fitnefs to anfwer the Ends, Defigns and Inclina-
tions of his Goodnefs ; being m*ore finful, and fo more mife-

rkble

Secl.VIIL Oi Arminian Fatality. 251

rable and neceflitous than others ; the Inclinations of infinite
Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gra-
cious Defign of God's fending his Son into the World may be
more abundantly anfwered, in the Exercifes of Mercy towards
fuch an Object, rather than another.

One Thing more I would obferve, before I finifli what I
have to fay on the Head of the Neceflity of the A6ts of God's
Will ; and that is, that fomething much more like a fervile
Subjedion of the divineBeing to fatalNeceirity,will follow from
Arminian Principles, than trom the Doctrines which they cp-
pofe. . P^or they (at leall moft of them) fuppofe, with Refpedt
to all Events that happen in the moral World depending on
the Volitions of moral Agents, which are the moft important
Events of the Univerfe, to which all others are fubordinate ;
I fay, they fuppofe witli refpe6t to thefe,that God has a certain
Foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any Purpofes or De-
crees of his about them. And if fo, they have a fix'd certain
Futurity, prior to any Pefigns or Volitions of his, and inde-
pendent on them, and to which his Volitions muft be fubjed,
as He would wifely accommodate his Affairs to this fix'd
Futurity of the State of Things in the moral World. So that
here, inftead of a moral Necelfity of God's Wil], arifing from
or confiding in the infinite Perfedtion and Blefiednefs of the
divine Being, we have a fix'd unalterable State of Things,
properly difiincf from the perfect Nature of the divine Mind,
and the State of the divine Will and Defign, and entirely in-
dependent on thefe Things, and which they have no Hand in,
becaufe they are prior to them ; and which God's Will is truly
fubjedl to, being obliged to conform or- accom.modate himfelf
to it, in all his Purpofes and Decrees, and in every Thing He
does in his Difpofals and Government of the V/orld ; the
moral World being the End of the natural ; fo that all is in
vain, that is not accommiodated to that State of the moral
World, v/hich confifts in, or depends upon the A6ls and State
of the Wills of moral Agents, which had a fix'd Futurition
from Eternity. Such a Subjedion to Necefiity as this, would
truly argue an Inferiority and Servitude,that would be unworthy
of the fupreme Being ; and is much more agreable to the No-
tion which many of the Heathen had of Fate, as above the
Gods, than that moral Necefiity of Fitnefs and Wifdom which
has been fpoken of ; and is truly repugnant to the abfolute
Sovereignty of God, and inconfiftent with the Supremacy of his
Will ; and really fu"bjeas the Will of the moft High to the Will
qI his Creatures, and brings him into Dependence upon them.

I i 2 Section

252 Of the 0\y^Qdi\QXi about Part IV. i'

Section IX.

Concerning that ObjeEiion againft the Doc- '
trme which has been maintain d^ that it
makes Goo the Author of Sin.

TTTIIS urged by Arminians^ that the Dodrine of theNecelTity
j[. of Men's Volitions, or their neceffary Connection with
antecedetit Events and Circumftances, makes the firft
Caufe, and fupreme Orderer of all Things, the Author of Sin;
in that he has fo conftituted the State and Coyrfe of Things,
that finful Volitions become neceflary, in Confequence of his
pifpofal. Dr. Whitby^ in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the
Will, * cites one of the Antients,as on his Side,declaring that
this Opinion of the NecefTity of the Will "abfolves Sinners, as
^' doing nothing of their own Accord which wasEvil,and would
** caft all the Blame of all the Wickednefs committed in the
•' World, upon God, and upon his Providence, if that were
*' admitted by the Afl'ertors of this Fate ; whether he himfelf
♦* did neceflitate them to do thefe Things, or ordered Matters
"*' fo that they fhould be conftrain'd to do them by fome other
<' Caufe." And the Dodor iays in another Place, % " In the |
** Nature of the Thing, and in the Opinion of Philofophers,
*' Caufa deficiens^in rebus necejfarils^ad Caufafii per fe efficient em redu-
^' cenda eft. In Things neceflary, the deficient Caufe muft be
*' reduced to the efficient. And in this Cafe the Reafon is
*' evident ; bfecaufe the not doing what is required, or not
avoiding vyhat is forbidden, being aDefe6t,muft follow fron^
the Pofition of the neceflary Caufe of that Deficiency.'*

Concerning this, I would obferve the following Things. \

I. If there be any Difficulty in this Matter, 'tis nothing pe- \

?!uliar to this Scheme ; 'tis no Difficulty or Difadvantage |i

wherein it is diftinguirtied from the Scheme of Ar?mmans j and \

therefore not realbnabiy obje(5led by them. ' \

Dr. Whitby fuppofes, that if Sin necefTarily follows from j

pod's withholdingAffiftance, or if that Affiftance be not given ^

which I

J Pn the five Points. P. 361. % Ihid P. 4S6. \

Seft.lX. makingGod the Author^ Sin. 253

which is abfolutely neceflary to the avoiding of Evil ; then in
the Nature of the Thing, God mull be as properly the Author
of that Evil, as if he were the efficient Caufe of it, P^otn
whence, according to what he himfeif fays of the Devils and
damned Spirits, God muft be the proper Author of their perfect
unreftrained Wickednefs : He muft be the efficient Caufe of
the great Pride of the Devils, and of their perfect Malignity
againft God, Chrift, his Saints, and all that is Good, and of
the infatiable Cruelty of their Difpofition. Yox he ailowsjthat
God has fo forfaken them, and does fo withhold his Affiilance
from them, that they are incapacitated from doing Good, and
determined only to Evil, f Our Dodrine, in its Confequence,
makes God the Author of Men's Sin in this World, no more,
and in no other Senfe, than his Do6trine, in its Confequence,
makes God the Author of the hellilli Pride and Malice of the
Devils. And doubtlefs the latter is as odious an Effe6l as
the former.

Again, if it ^\\\ follow at all^ that God is the Author of Sin,
from «-aat has been fuppofed of a fure and infallibleConneclion
between Antecedents and Confequents, it Vvill follow hecaufe
of this^ 1J12., That for God to be the Author, or Orderer of
thofe Things which he knows before-hand, will infallibly be
attended with fuch a Confequence, is the fame Thing inEftcct,
as for him to be the Author of that Confequence. But if this
be fo, this is a Difficulty which equally attends the Dodrine
of Ar?mnians themfelves ; at leait, of thofe of them wlio allow
God's certain Fore-knowledge of all Events. For on the
Suppofition of fuch a Fore-knowledge, this is the. Cafe with
Refpedl to every Sin that is committed : God knew, that if he
ordered and brought to pafs fuch and fuch Events, fuch Sins
would infallibly follow. As for Inftance, God certainly fore-
knew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered Thing;s
fo, that there (hould be fuch a Man born, at fuch a Time,
and at fuch a Place, and that his Life fhould be preferved,an(l
that he fhould, in divine Providence, be led into Acquaintance
withjefus; and that his Heart fhould be fo influenced by
God's Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a Follov/er
of Chriil: ; and that he fliould be One of thofe Twelve, .which
fhould be chofen conftantly to attend him as his Family ; and
that his Health fhould be preferved fo that he fhould go up to
Jerufaleniy at the laftPaffover in Chrift's Life ; and it fhould be
io ordered that Judas Ihould fee Chrift's kind Treatment of

5 54 How GOD is concern d Part IV.

the Woman which anointed him at Bethany^ and have that
Reproof from Chrift, which he had at that Time, and fee and
hear other Things, which excited his Enmity againft his
Mafter, and other Circwmftances Ihould be ordered, as they
■were ordered ; it would be what would moil certainly and in-
fallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would
■foon after hang himfelf, and die impenitent, and be fent to
HeiJ, for his horrid Wickednefs.

Therefore this fuppofed Difficulty ought not to be brought
3san Objection againft theScheme which has been maintain'd,
as difagreelng v/ith the Arminian Scheme, feeing 'tis no Diffi-
culty owing to fuch TiDifagreement ; but aDiffi.culty wherein the
Armmians ihare with us. That muft be unreafonably made
an ObjecStion againft our differing from them, which we fhouid
nQt\efcape or avoid at all by agreeing with them.

And therefore I would obferve,
II. 'Fhey who object, that this Doc5trine makes God the
Author of Sin, ought diftin6tly to explain what they mean by
that Phrafe, The Author of Sin. I know, the Phrafe, as it is
commonly ufed, fignihes fomethins; very 111, If by ihe Author
cf Sin^ be meant the Sinner^ the Agent^ or ASior of Shi, or ihe
Doer of a wicked Thing ; fo it would be a Reproach and Blaf-
phemy, to fuppofe God to be the Author of Sin. In this
Senfe, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin ; rejecting
fuch an Imputation on the moft High, as what is infinitely to
be abhor'd ; and deny any fuch Thing to be the Confequence,
of what I have laid down, fut if by the Author of Sin, is meant
the Permitter, or not a Hinderer of Sin ; and at the fame
Time, a Difpofer of the State of Evente, in fuch a Manner,
for v>/ife, holy and moft excellent Ends and Purpofes, that Sin,
if it be permitted or not hindered, will moft certainly and in-
fallibly follow : I fay, if this be all that is meant, by being the
Author of Sin, I don't deny that God is the Autlior of Sin,
(tho' I dilhke and reject the Phrafe, as that which by Ufe and
Cuftom is apt to carry another Senfe) it is no Reproach for the
moft High to be thus the Author of Sin. This is not to be
the AtUr of Sin, but on the contrary, of Holwefs. What God
doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious Exercife of the infinite
Excellency of his Nature. And I don't deny, that God's being
thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down ;
and I affert, that it equally follows from the Doctrine which is
maintained bv moft of the Armman Divines.

That

Sed:. XL in the Exiftence of Sin. 255

That it is moft certainly fo, that God is In fuch a Manner
the Difpofer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any Credit is to
be given to the Scripture ; as well as becaufe it is impoffible in
the Nature of Things to be otherwife. In fuch a Manner God
ordered the Obftinacy of Pharaoh^ in his refufing to obey God's
Commands, to let the People go. Exod. iv. 21. 1 will harden

his Hearty and he Jhall not let the People go. Chap. vii. 2 5.

Aaron tl^ Brother fiall /peak unto Pharaoh, that he fend the Chil-
dren cf Ifrael out of his Land. And I will harden Pharaoh'j Hearty
and midtiply jny Signs and my Wonders in the Land of Egypt. But
Pharaoh jhall not hearken unto you \ that I may lay mine Hand upon
Egypt, by great Judgments., kc. Chap. ix. 12. Jnd the Lord
\ harden d the Heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto the?n^ as
\ the Lord had fpoken unto Mofes. Chap. x. 1,2. And the Lord
I faid unto Mofes, Go in ««^(7 Pharaoh ; for I have harden d hisHearU
\ and the Heart of his Servants^ that I . might Jhew thefe ?ny Signs
I before Him., and that thou may ft tell it in the Ears of thy Son^ and
I thy Son's Son^ what Things I have wrought in Egypt, and my Signs
which I have done anwngfi them., that ye may knoiv that I am the Lord.
•Chap. xiv. 4. And I will harden Pharaoh's Heart, that he Jhall
follow after them : and I will be hanoured upon Pharaoh, and upon
all his Hoji. V. 8. And the Lord hardened the Heart i?/' Pharaoh
King of Egypt, and he purfued after the Children (j/'IfraeL And it
is certain that in fuch a Manner, God for wife and good Ends,
ordered that Event, Jofeph's being fold into Egypt by his Bre-
thren. Gen. xlv. 5. Now therefore he 7iot grieved., nor angry
: with your/elves, that ye fold ?ne hither ; for God did fend me before you
\ to preferve Life. Ver. 7, 8. God did fend me before you to preferve a
I Pofierity in the Earth., and to fave your Lives by a great Deliverance :
]^^fo that now it was not you, that fent me hither^ but God. Pfal. evil.
j 17. He fent a Man before them., even Jofeph, vjho zvas fold for &
! Servant. 'Tis certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and Folly
jj of Sihon King of the Amarites., in refufmg to let the People of
j Ifrael pafs by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30. But Sihon King of
Hefhbon would not let us pafs by him ; for theLord thy God harden d
his Spirit., and made his Heart objlinate., that He might deliver Him
into thine Hand, 'Tis certain, that God thus ordered the Sin
and Folly of the Kings of Canaan., that they attempted not to
make Peace with Ifrael., but with a ftupid Boldnefs and Oblli-
nacy, fet themfeives violently to oppofe them and their God.
Jofh. xi. 20. For it was of the Lord., to harden their Hearts ^ that
'they fljould come againji Ifrael in Battle., that he mght
dejhoy them utterly^ and that they might have no Favour j but
that he might deftroy thcm^ as the Lord co?nmanded Mofes^ 'TiS

evident^

256 How GOD is concern d Part IV.

e^wdent, that thus God ordered the treacherous Rebellion of
Zedekiah^ againft the King of Babylon. Jer. iii. 3. For thro' the
Anger of the Lord it came to pafs in Jerufalem, ajid Judah, '//// He
had caji them out fro?n his Prejhice^ that Zedekiah rebelled againfl
the Kinz of Babylon. So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And 'tis exceeding
manifell, that ^God thus ordered the Rapine and unrighteous
Ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in fpoiling and ruining the Nations
round about. Jer. xxv. 9. Behold^ I will fend and take all the
Fsmil'ies of the Norths faith the Lord, «,W Nebuchadnezzar my Ser-
^jant>and^will bring them againfl this Land^and againfl all theNations
round about; and will utterly dejlroy thern^andmake them anAfioiiiJhment^
nnd an hiijfmg, a7id perpetual Deflations. Ch. xliii. 10. Ii. I will
fend and take Nebuchadnezzer the King of Babylon, my Servant ;
and I ivill ft his Throne upon thefe Stones that I have hid, and he"
fhall jpread his royal Pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he
fhall finite the Land of Egypt, and deliver juch as are for Death to
Death, and fuch as are for Captivity to Captivity, and fiich as are
for the Sword to the Sword. Thus God reprefents himfelf as
^ fending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking of him and his Armies,
and bringing him agaiiUt the Nations which were to be deftroy-
ed by him," to that very End, that he might utterly deftroy
them, and make them defolate ; and as appointing the Work
that he fhould do, fo particularly, that the very Pcrfons were
defigned, that he fhould kill with the Sword ; and thofe that
fliould be kiird wnth Famine and Peftilence, and thofe that
Ihouid be earned into Captivity ; and that in domg all thefe
Things, he fnould aa as his Servant : By which, lefs can't be
intended, than that he Ihould ferve his Purpofes and Defigns.
And in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6. God declares how he would caufe
him thus to ferve his Deligns, viz. by bringing this to pafs in
his fovereign Difpofals, as" the great PofTeflbr and Governor of
the Univerfe, that difpofes all Things juft as pleafes him.
Thus faith the Lord of Hojls, the God ^/Ifrael ; / have made the
Earth, the Man and the Beaft that are upon the Ground, by my greaf/
Power, and my fr etched out Arm, and have given it unto whom^ it
feemed meet unto ?ne : And now I have given all thefe Lands into'
the Hands ^/Nebuchadnezzar MY SERVANT, 'and the Beafls '
cf the Field have I given alfo to ferve him. And Nebuchadnezzar is
fpoken of as doing thefe Things, by having his Arms firengthned
by God, and \\^v\u2, God's Sword put into his Hands, for this-
End. Ezek. xxx. 24,^25, 26. Yea, God fpeaks of his terribly
ravac;ino; and waftino; the Nations, and cruelly deftroying all
Sorts, Without Diftiriaion of Sex or Age, as the Weapon in
God's Hand, and the Inftrument of his Indignation, which

God

Sed:. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 257

God makes ufe of to fulfil his ownPurpores,and execute his bwn
Vengeance. Jer. li. 20, &c. Thou art my Battle- Axe^ and Wea-
pons of JVar. For with thee will I break in Pieces the Nations^ and
with thee I will dejlroy Kingdoms^ and with thee I will break in
Pieces the Horfe and his Rider^ and with thee I tvill break in
Pieces the Chariot an J his Rider ; with thee alfo tvill I break in
Pieces Man and Woman ; and tvith thee will I break in Pieces Old
and Young \ and with thee will I break in Pieces the young Man and
the Adaid., &c. 'Tis reprefented,that the Defigns ot Nekichadnez-
i&cr, and thofe that dertroyed Jerufalem, never could have been
accompliflied, had notGod determined them, as well as they j
Lam. iii. 37. Who is he that faith ^ and it cometh to pafs^ and ths
Lord conmiandeth it not P And yet the King of Babylon's thus
deftroying the Nations, and efpecially the Jews, is fpoken of
as his great Wickednefs, for which God finally dertroyed him,
Jfai. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5,-12. and Jer. Chap. 1. & h.
'Tis mofi manifeft, that God, to ferve his own Defigns, provi-
dentially ordered Shimei's curi\ng David, 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11,

Trje Lord hath faid unto him-, Curfe David. Let him curfe^ for

the Lord hath bidden him.

'Tis certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious
and glorious Ends, ordered the Fa6l which they committed,
who were concerned in Chrift's Death ; and that therein they
did but fulfil God's Defigns. As, I truft, no Chriflian will deny
it was the Defign of God, that Chrift {hould he crucified^ and
that for this End, he came into the World, 'Tis very manifeft
by many Scriptures, that the whole Affair of ChrilVs Cruci-
fixion, with it's Circumftances, and the Treachery of Judas^
that^ made Way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in
Purfuance of his Purpofe 5 notwithftanding the Violence that
is ufed with thofe plain Scriptures, to obfcure and pervert the
Senfe of 'em. A6t. ii. 23. Him being delivered^ by the detcrininatc
Cownfel and Foreknowledge of Gody f ye have taken., and vjith wicked
Hands^ have crucified and fiain. Luk. xxii. 21,22. \\ But behold the
Hand of him that bctrayeth me^ is with me on the Table: And truly

K k the

f " Grotiusy as well as 'Beza,oh(erve%, that isroiywi'Tj? mud herefig-
" nifie Decree ; and Elfner has fhewn that it has that Significa-
" tion, in approved Gr^^i^ Writers. And it is certain irJor'^
*' fjgniiies one given up into the Hands of an Enemy." Doddridge
in hoc.

II " As this PaiTage is not liable to the Ambiguities, which Tome
" have apprehended in ^J?. ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which yet feera
** on the whole %q be parallel to it, in their moll natural Conflruc-

*' thn)

258 How Gob is concerned Part IV.

the Son of Man goeth, as it tCas determined. A6t. iv. 27, 281
For of aTruthy agamji thy holy Child Jefus^ whom thou haft anointed^
both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles^ and the People |
^Ifrael, were gathered together ^ for to do whhtfoever thy Hand and (i
thy Counfel determined before to be done. A<5t. iii. 17, 18. jind now |
Brethren^ I wot that through Igyiorance ye did it, as did alfo your t
Rulers : Bat thefe Things ^ which God before had /hewed by the Mouth |
9f all his Prophets y that Chriji Jhould fuffer^ he hath fo fulfilled. So \
that what thefe Murderers of Chrift did, is fpoken of as what 1i
God brought to pafs or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled |
his own Word. |

In Rev. xvii. 17. The agreeing of the Kings of the Earth to give I
their Kingdom to the Beafl, tho' it was a very wicked Thing in
them, is fpoken of as a fulfilling God's PFill, and what God
had put it into their Hearts to do. 'Tis manifeft, that God fome-
times perinitsSin to be committed.and at the fameTime orders I
Things fo, that if he permits the Fad, it will come to pafs, I
becaufe on fome Accounts he fees it needful and of Importance !
that it (hould come to pafs. Matt, xviii. 7. It muft needs be^ \
that Offences come ; hut Wo to that Man by whom the Offence cometh, \
With I Cor. xi. 19. For there rriuji alfo be Hereftes among you^ \
that they which are approved^may be made manifefl among you. \

Thus it is certain and demonftrable, from the holy Scrip- \
tures, as well as the Nature of Things^ and the Principles of |
ArminianSy that God permits Sin j and at the fame Time, fo ij]
orders Things, in his Providence, that it certainly and mfalli- ■(
bly will come to pafs, in Confequcnce of his Permiflion. \

I proceed to obferve in the next Place, :

III. That there is a great Difference between God*s
being concerned thus, by his Permiffton^ in an Event and Adt,
•which in the inherent Subject and Agent of it, is Sin, (tho' the
Event will certainly follow on his PermilTion,) and his being
concerned in it by />;Wm«^ it and exerting the- Acfl of Sin j
or between his being the Orderer of it's certain Exiftence, by
7tot hindering it, under certain Circumftances, and his being the

proper

*' tion) I look upon it as an evident Proof, that thefe Things are/
** in the Language of Scripture,faid to be determined or decreed
** (or exadly bounded and mark'd out by God, as the Word
•* Qi^\?^oi moll naturally Signifies) which he fees in Fa6l will hap-
<* pen, in Confequence of his Volitions, without any necefEtating
" Agency ; as well as thofe Events^ of which he \& properly
*• the Author." DQdd. in hoc.

Seft. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 259

proper j£lor or Author of it, by a pofitive Agency or Efficiency,
I And this, notwithftanding ^ix'sxDx .Whithy offers about a Saying
of Philofophers, thatC^/^y^ defic'iens^ in Rebus necejfariis^ ad Caufam
\perfe efficientem rediicenda eji. As there is a valt Difference be-
tween the Sun's being the Caufe of the Lightfomenefs and
Warmth oi the Atmofphere, and Brightnefs of Gold and
Diamonds, by its Prefence and pofitive Influence ; and its be-
ing the Occafion of Darknefs and Froft, in the Night, by its
Motion, whereby it defcends below the Horizon. The Motion
of the Sun is the Occafion of the latter Kind of Events ; but
it is not the proper Caufe, Efficient or Producer of them j. tho*
they are neceffarily confequent on that Motion, under fuch
Circumftances : No more is any A6tion of the divine Being
the Caufe of the Evil of Men's Wills. If the Sun were the
i proper Caufe of Cold and Darknefs, it would be the Fountain
[of thefe Things, as it is the Fountain of Light and Heat : And
! then fomething might be argued from the Nature of Cold and
I Darknefs, to a Likenefs of Nature in the Sun ; and it might
be juifly infer'd, that the Sun itfelf is dark and cold, and that
his Beams are black and frofty. But from its being the Caufe
no otherwife than by its Departure, no fuch Thing can be
infer'd, but the contrary j it may juftly be argued, that the
Sun is a bright and hot Body, if Cold and Darknefs are found
j to be the Confequence of its Withdrawment ; and the more
conftantly and necefTarily thefe Effeds are connected with, and
confined to its Abfence, the more fl:rongly does it argue the
Sun to be the Fountain of Light and Heat. So, inafmuch as
Sin is not the Fruit of any pofitive Agency or Influence of the
moft High, but on the contrary, arifes from the withholding of
IJiis A(5lion and Energy, and under certain Circumftances, ne-
ceffarily follows on the Want of his Influence; this is no Ar-
gument that he is finful, or his Operation Evil, or has any
I Thing of the Nature of Evil ; but on the contra^ry, that He,
I and his Agency, are altogether good and hjoly, and that he js
the Fountain of all Holinefs. It would be flraiige arguing in-
I deed, becaufe Men never commit Sin, but o;iiy when God
leaves 'em to themfelves^ and necefTarily fin, when he does
fo, that therefore their Sin is not from thefnfelves^ but fromGod ;
and fo, thatGod muft be a finful Being : As flrange as it would
be to argue, becaufe it is always dark when, the Sun is
gone, and never dark when the Sun is prefent, that therefore
I all Darknefs is from the Sun, and that his Difk and Beams
mufl, needs be black, ^

K k 2 IV. It

26o How GOD is concerned Part IV.

IV. It properly belongs to the fupreme and abfblute Gover^Sll
nor of the Univerfe, to order all important Events within his
Dominion, by his Wifdom : But the Events in the moral
World are of the moft important Kind ; fuch as the moral
A<5tions of intelligent Creatures, and their Confequences.

Thefe Events will be ordered by fomething. They will
either be difpofed by Wifdom, or they wnll be difpol'ed by ,
Chance ; that is, they will be difpofed by blind ?.nd undefign-j ,
ing Caufes, if that were poffible, and could be called a Dilpo^'^i I
fal. Is it not better, that the Good and Evil which happensfe'^
in God's World, (hould be ordered, regulated, bounded and ^
determin'd by the good Pleafure of an infinitely Vv^ife Being,|
who perfe^ly comprehends within his Underftanding and con-j
ftant View, the Univerfality of Things, in all tlieir Extent an4 1
Duration, and fees all the Influence of every Event, with ;
Refpedt to every individual Thing and Circumftance, through-^ ;
out the grand Syftem, and the whole of the eternal Series of '
Confequences ; than to leave thefe Things to fall out by ■
Chance, and to be determined by thofe Caufes which have no'j
Underftanding or Aim ? Doubtlefs, in thefe important Events^ '
there is a better and a worfe, as to the Time, Subje6t, Place,
Manner and Circumftances of their coming to pafs, wnth Re-
gard to their Influence on the State and Courfe of Things,
And if there be, 'tis certainly bel^ that they fhould be deter-,
inine4 to tha^ Time^ Place, 5cc, which is beft. And therefore :
'tis in its own Nature fit, that Wifdom, and not Chance, fliould
order thefe Things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is.
the PofTeflbr of infinite Wifdom, and is the Creator andOwner J
of the w^hole Syftem of created Exiftences,and has the Care oF *
all ; I fay, it belongs to him,to take Care of this Matter ; ard ;
he would iiot do what is proper for him, if he fliould negiecl it.
And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to undertake this
Affair, that it would rather have been unholy to negled it ; aj^
it would have been a negle61ing what fitly appertains to him y
pnd fo it would have been a very unfit and unfuitable Negle6^.

Therefore the Sovereignty of God doubtlefs extends to thisj^^
Matter : efpecially confidering, that if it fhould be fuppofed*'
to be other wife, and God ihould leave Men's Volitions, and *
'sxW moral Events, to the Determination and Difpofition of j
blind and unmeaning Caufes, or they fhould be left to happen
perfectly without a Qaufe ; this would be no more confiflerit
Wh Li|:)crty, in any Notion of it, and particularly not in the

Arminlan i

' i3

Sed. IX. in //6^ Exiftence of Sin. 261

Armmtan Notion of it, than if thefe Events were fubje(5l to the
Difpofal of divine Providence, and the Will of Man were de-
termined by Circumftances which are ordered and difpofed
by divine Wifdom ; as appears by what has been already
oblerved. But 'tis evident, that fuch a providential difpofing
and determining Men's moral Adions, tho' it infers a moral
NecelTity of thofe Adions, yet it does not in the leaft infringe
the real Liberty of Manicind, ; the only Liberty that common
Senfe teaches to be necefiary to moral Agency, whifh, as has
been demonftrated, is not inconfiflent whith fuch Neceffity,

On the whole, it is manifeftjthat God may be, in theManner
which has been defcribed, the Orderer and Difpoler of that
Event, which in the inherent Subjed and Agent is moral Evil;
and yet His fo doing may be no moral Evil. He may will the
Difpofal of fuch an Event, and it's coming to pafs for good
Ends, and hisWill not be an immoral or fmful Will, but a per-
fe6tly holy Will. And he may actually in his Providence fo
difpofe and permitThings, that the Event may be certainly and
infallibly, conneded with fuchDifpofal h. Permiffion, and hisA(5l
therein net be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holyAct.
Sin may be an evil Thing, and yet that there fnould be fuch a
Difpofal and Permiffion, as that it (hould come to pafs, may be
a good Thing. This is no Contradi6tion, or Inconfifterjce.
Jofeph's Brethren's felling him into Egypt ^ confider it only as it
was a6ted by them, and with RefpeCt to their Views and Aims
which were evil, was a very bad Thing ; but it was a good
Thing, as it was an Event of God's ordering, and confider'd
with Refped to his Views and Aims which were good. Gen.
1. 20. Js for yoii^ ye thought Evil againft me \ hut God ?neant it unt§^
Good. So the Crucifixion of Chrift, if we coniider only thofe
Things which belong to the Event as it proceeded from his
^urde,rers, and are comprehended within the Compafs of the
Affair confidered as their A61, their Principles, Difpofitions,
Views and Aims ; fo it was one of the moft heinous Things
that ever wa:s done ; in many Refpeds the moft horrid of all
Aels : But confider it, as it was v/ill'd and ordered of God,
in the Extent of his Defigns and Views, it was the moft ad-
mirable and glorious of all Events ; and God's willing the
Event was the moft holy Volition of God, that ever was made
known to Men ; and (jod's Ad in ordering it, was a divine
Ad, which above all others, manifefts the moral Excellency
©f the divine Being.

The

262 OfGOUs fecret Part IV.

TheConfideration of thefeThings may help us to a fufficient
Anfwer to the Cavils of Arminians concerning what has been
fuppofed by many Calvinifts^ of a Diftindion between a fecret
and revealed Will of God, and their Diverfity one from the
other s fuppofing, that the Calvimfts herein afcribe inconfiftent
Wills to the mod High : Which is without any Foundation.
God*s fecret and revealed Will, or in other Words, his difpofing
and preceptive Will may be diverfe, and exercifed in diffimilar
A<5ts, theu one in difapproving and oppoling, the other in
willing and determining, without any Inconfiftence. Becaufe,
altho* thefe diffimilar Exercifes of the divine Will may in
fome Refpe6ls relate to the fame Things, yet in Stridnefs they
have different and contrary Objeds, the one Evil and the
other Good. Thus for Inftance, the Crucifixion of Chrift
was a Thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of
God ; becaufe, as it was viewed and done by his malignant
Murderers, it was a Thing infinitely contrary to the holy Na-
ture of God, and fo necefiarily contrary to the holy Inclina-
tion of his Heart revealed in his Law. Yet this don't at
all hinder but that the Crucifixion of Chrift, confidered with
all thofe glorious Confequences, which were within the View
of the divine Omnifcience, might be indeed, and therefore
might appear to God to be, a glorious Event ; and confe^
quently be agreable to his Will, tho' this Will may be fecret,
i. e, not revealed in God's Law. And thus confidered, the
Crucifixion of Chrift was not evil, but good. If the fecret
Exercifes of God's Will were of a Kind that is diflimilar and
contrary to his revealed Will, refpecSting the fame, or like
Obje(fts ; if the Objedts of both were good, or both evil j
*hen indeed to afcribe contrary Kinds of Volition or Inclina-
tion to God, refpeding thefe Objeds, would be to afcribe an
inconfiftent Will to God : but to afcribe to Him different and
oppofite Exercifes of Heart, refpeding different Obje6ls, and
Obje(5ls contrary one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's
Will to be inconfiftent with it felf, that it can't be fuppofed
confiftent with it felf any other Way. For any Being to have
a Will of Choice refpe(5ling Good, and at the fame Time a
Will of Rejection and Refufal refpeding Evil, is to be very
confiftent : But the contrary, vi%, to have the fame Will to-
wards thefe contrary Obje6ts, and to chufe and love both
Good and Evil at the fame Time, is te be very inconfiftent.

There is no Inconfiftence in fuppofing, that God may hate
a Thing as it is in it felf, and confidei-ed fimply as Evil, and

yet

Sect. IX. and revealed TVilL 263

yet that it may be his Will it ihould come to pafs, con-
fidering all Confequences. I believe, there is no Perfon of
good Underftanding, who will venture to fay, he is certain
that it is impolTible it fhouid be beft, taking in the whole
Compafs and Extent of Exiftence, and all Confequences in
the endlefs Series of Events, that there fhouid be fuch a Thing
as moral Evil in the World. * And if fo, it will certainly fol-
low,

* Here are worthy to be obferved feme Paffages of a late noted
Writer, of our Nation, that no Body who is acquainted with Him
will fufpedl to be very favourable to Cahinifm. ** Jt is difficult
" (fays he) to handle the NeceJJjty of E'vH in fuch a Manner, as
** not to Humble fuch as are not above being alarmed at Propo-
" fitions which have an uncommon Sound. But if Philofophers
" will but refleft calmly on the Matter, they will find, that con-
** fiftently with the unlimited Power of the fupreme Caufe, it
" may be faid, that in the beft ordered Syftem, En)ils muft have

** Place." TurnbuiPs Principles of moral Philofophy. Pag.

327, 328. He is there fpeaking of w^r^/ Evils, as may be feen.

Again the fame Author, in his fecond Vol. entitled, Chrijiian Philofophy^
Pag 35. has thefe Words : ** If the Author and Governor of
*' all Things be infinitely perfeSi^ then whatever is, is right ; of all
** poffible Syllems he hath chofen the hejl : and confequently there

" is no abfolute Enjil in the Univerfe. ~ This being the Cafe,

" all the feeming Imperfedions or E'vH! in it are fuch only in a
" partial View i and with Refpefl to the wohok Syftem, they arc

. " Goods.
Ibid. Pag. 37. " Whence then comes E'vH, is the Queftion that hath in

< " all Ages been reckon'd the Gordian Knot in Philofophy. And
** indeed, if we own the Exiftence of Evil in the World in an
" abfolute Senfe, we diametrically contradidl what hath been juft
*' now prov'd of God. For if there be any En;il in the Syftem,
** that is not good with Refpeft to the ivhole, then is the ivhole not
" good, but evil : or at beft, very imperfeft : And an Author mufl
** be as his Workmanfhip is ; as is the EfFedl, fuch is the Caufe.

' *' Bttt the Solution of this Difficulty is at Hand ; That there is »»
" E'vH in the Vni'verfe. What ! Are there no Pains, no Imper-
" feftions ? Is there no Mifery, no Vice in the World ? Or are
** not thefe £ij//f ? Evils indeed they are ; that is, thofe of one
*' fort are hurtful, and thofe of the other fort are equally hurtful
•* and abominable : But they are not evil or mifchievous with Re-

•^ « fpea to the 'w/?.^^^."

Ibid. Pag. 42. <* But He is at the fame Time faid to create Evil,
" Darknefs, Confufion ; and yet to do no Evil, but to be the Au-
** thor of Good only. He is called the Father of Lights, the Author
" oi e'very perfcSl and good Gift , ivith fwhom there is no Variahlenefs
r nor Shadow of Turning, who tempt fth w Man, but gi<veth to all Men

V iib^rallft

264 Of GO Us fecret Part IV.

low, that an infinitely wife Being, who always chufes what is
beft, muft chufe that there fhouid be fuch a Thing. And if
fo, then fuch a Choice is not an Evil, but a wife and holy
Choice. And if fo, then that Providence which is agreable
to fuch a Choice, is a wife and holy Providence. Men do will
Sin as Sin, and fo are the Authors and Adors of it : They
love it as Sin, and for evil Ends and Purpofes. God don't
v^ill Sin as Sin, or for the fake of any Thing evil ; tho' it be
bis Pleafure fo to order Things, that He permitting. Sin will
come to pafs ; for the fake of the great Good that by his
Difpofar (hall be the Confequence. His willing to order
Things fo that Evil (hould come to pafs, for the fake of the
contrary Good, is no Argument that He don't hate Evil,aiJ
Evil : And if fo, then it is no Reafon why he mayn't reafona-
bly forbid Evil as Evil, and punifh it as fuch.

The Armimans themfelves muft be obliged, whether they
will or no, to allow a Diftin61ion of God's Will, amounting
to juft the fame Thing that Calvimfis intend by their Diftinc-
tion of -^ fecret and revealed TVill. They muft allow a Diftindion
of thofe Things which God thinks beft fhouid be, confidering
all Circumftances and Confeqiiences, and fo are agreable to
his difpofing Will, and thofe Things which he loves, and are
agreable to his Nature, in themfelves confidered^ Who is
there that v*ill dare to fay, that the hellifti Pride, Malice and
Cruelty of Devils, are agreable to God, and what He likes
and approves ? And yet, I truft, there is no Chriftian Divine ,
but what will allow, that 'tis agreable to God's Will fo to
©rder and difpofe Things concerning them, fo to leave them
to themfelves, and give them up to their own Wickednefs,
that this perfect Wickednefs fhouid be a neceflary Confe-
quence. Befure Dr. Whitby's Words do plainly fuppofe and
allow it. t

Thefc^jj

** liberally^ and uphraideth not. And yet by the Prophet l/aias He;
** is introduced faying of Himfelf, 1 form Light, and create Dark'
•* nefs ; / make Peace, and create E'vil : I the Lord do all theft
*' Things. What is the Meaning, the plain Language of all this,.
•* but that the Lord delighteth in Goodnefs, and (as the Scripture
** fpeaks) Evil is his firange H'ork f He intends ^ndpurfues the
** univerfal Good of his Creadon : and the En;il which happens,
" is not permitted for it's own fake, or tr^ro' any Pleafure in Evil,,
•* but becaufe it is requifite to the greater Good purfued^'*

t Whith^ on the five Points. Edit. ^. P. 300, 305,, 309.

Sea.IX. and revealed Will 265 %

',(fl

Thefe following Things may be laid down as' Majiims of %

plain Truth, and indifputable Evidence. *!l

1. That God is a perfeSfly happy Being, in the mofl: abfo- ■■
lute and higheil Senfe poffible. i

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from J
every Thing that is contrary to Happinefs ; and fo, that in ftridt ^
Propriety of Speech, there is no fuch Thing as any Pain, j;
Gn(if or Trouble in God. ;f|

3. When any intelligent Being is really crofs'd and difap- %
pointed, and Things are contrary to what He truly defires, ^
He is the lefs pkafed^ or has lefs Pleafure^ his Pleafure and Happi- **
nefs is dimimjhed^ and he fufFers what is difagreable to him, or v.^
is the Subje6l of fomething that is of a Nature contrary to J,
Joy and Happinefs, even Pain and Grief, ** %

From this lafl: Axiom it follows, that If no Di0:in6lion is |

to be admitted between God's Hatred of Sin, and his Will • ■

with Refpect to the Event and the Exigence of Sin, as the |

alwife Determiner of all Events, under the View of all Con- J

fcquences through the whole Compafs and Series of Things ; f

I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pafs of '%

every individual Kdi of Sin is truly, all Things confidered, h

contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crofs'd in it ; \

and this in Proportion as He hates it. And as God's Hatred ^^

of Sin is infinite, by Reafon of the infinite Contrariety of his j;
holy Nature to Sin ; fo his Will is infinitely crofs'd, in every

Act of Sin that happens. Which is as much as to fay. He '

ejidures that which is infinitely difagreable to Him, by Means I

oF every A6t of Sin that He fees committed. And therefore, ')

as appears by the preceeding Pofitions, He endures truly and [

really, infinite Grief or Pain from every Sin. And fo He muft '^

be infinitely crofs'd, and fufi:''er infinite Pain, every Day, in n

Millions of Millions of Infiances : He muft continually be fj

the Subje6t of an immenfe Number of ;W, and truly infinite- \

\\ great CrofTes and Vexations. ' Which would be to make \

him infinitely the moll miferable of all Beings. 1

LI If I

**Certain]y 'tis not lefs abfuH & unreafonable, to talk of God's Wil! |

andDefire's being truly and properly crofs'd, withoiit his fufferirg j

any Uneafinefs, or any Thing grievous, or difagreable, rhan it is -j

to talk of fomething that may be called a re^uealed Will, whicM \\

may in fome Refped be different from a fecret Purpofe ; wl^ \

Purpofe may be fulfilled, v/hen the other is oppofed* I

266 Of GOD's fecret Part IV.

If any Objedor (hould fay ; All that thefe Things
s mount to, is, that God may do Evil that Good may come ; which
is juilly efteem'd immoral and fmful in Men ; and therefore
may be juftly efteem'd inconfiftent with the moral Perfedions
of God. I anfwer. That for God to difpofe and permit Evil,
in the Manner that has been fpoken of, is not to do Evil that
Good may come ; for it is not to do Evil at all.— In Order
to a Thing*s being morally Evil^ there muft be one of thefe
Things belonging to it : Either it mud be a Thing unfjt and
iinfuitahle in it's own Nature -, or it muft have a had Tendency ;
or it muft proceed from an evil Difpofttion^ and be done for an
evil End. But neither of thefe Things can be attributed to
God's ordering and permitting fuch Events, as the immoral
Ads of Creatures, for good Ends, (i.) It is not unfit in it's
own Nature^ thatHe fhould do fo. For it is in it's own Nature
fit, that infinite IVifidom, and not blind Chance, fhould difpofe
moral Good and Evil in the World. And 't'lsfit, that the
Being who has infinite JFifichn, and is the Maker, Owner, and
fupreme Governor of the World, fhould take Care of that
Matter. And therefore there is no Unfitnefis, or Unfuitablenefs
in his doing it. It may be unfit, and fo immoral, for any
other Beings to go about to order this Affair ; becaufe they
are not poiTefs'd of a Wifdom, that in any Manner fits them
for it ; and in other Refpe6ls they are not fit to be trufted
with this Affair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being
the Owners and Lords of the Univerfe.

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wife and good
Man knew v,-ith abfolute Certainty, it would be beft, all
Things confidered, that there fliould be fuch a Thing as moral
Evil in the World, it would not be contrary to his Wifdom
ajid Goodncfs, for him to chufe that it fliould be fo. 'Tis no
evil Defire,to defire Good, and to defire that which, all Things-
confidered, is beft. And it is no unwife Choice, to cliufe that
That fnould be, which it is beft fhould be ; and to chufe the
Exiftence of that Thing concerning which this is known, viz,
that it is beft it ftiould be, and fo is known in the whole
to be moft worthy to be chofen. On the contrary, it would
be a plain Defedt in Wifdom and Goodnefs, for him not to
chufe it. And the Reafon why he might not order it, if he
were able,would not be becaufe he might not defire it,but only
the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it
*s no Flarm for Him Vvho is by Right, and in the greateft Pro-
' ^:ty, the fupreme Orderer of all Things, to order every

■^^11

Sed.lX. and xtv^AzdiTVilL 267

Thing in fuch a Mann€r,as It would be a Point of Wifdom in
Him to chufe that the.y IhoUld bt; ordered. If it would be a
plainDefe6t of Wifdom and Goodfiefs in a Being, not to chufe ^
that That Ihould be, which He certainly knows it would, all .
Things confidered, be beft fliould be (as^ was but now ob-
ferved ) then it muft be impoliibie for a Being who has no
Defe6l of Wifdom and Goodnefs, to do otherwife than chufe
it fhould be ; and that, for this very Reafon, becaufe He
is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreable to perfe61:
Wifdom and Goodnefs for him to chufe that it fliouid be,
and the ordermg of all Things fupremely and pcrfedly belongs
to him, it muft be agreable to infinite Wifdom and Gccdnels,
to order that it iliould be. If the Choice is good, the order-
ing and difpofmg Things according to that Choice muft alfo
be good. It can be no Harm in one to whom it belongs to
do his Will in the Annus of Heaven^ and amon^d the Inhabitants of
the Earthy to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good,
and the Objedl of his Will be, all Things confidered, good
and beft, then the chufing or willing it is not willing Evil that
Good may come. And if fo', th-en his ordering according to
that Will is not doing Evily that' Good may come.

2. 'Tis not of a bad Tendency, (cr the fupreme Being thus to
order and perm.it that moral Evil to be, which it is beft ftiould
come to pafs. For that it is of good Tendency, is the very

Thing fuppofed in the Point now in Queilion. Chrift's

Crucifixion, tho' a moft horrid Fa6l in them that perpetrated
it, was of moft glorious Tendency as permitted and ordered
of God.

3. Nor is there any Need of fuppofing, it proceeds from any
'■'tvil Difpofition or Jim : for by the Suppofition, what is aim'd

at is Go^d, and Good is the adual Iifue, in the final Refult of
Things.

L I 2 Sectioji

268 Of Sins firft Entrance Part IV.

Section X.

Concerning Sin's firft Entrance into the'
World,

THE Things which have already been offered, may
ferve to obviate or clear many of theObjedions v^iich
might be raifed concerning Sm's tirft coming into the
World ; as tho' it would follow from theDo61rine maintain'd,
that God muft be the Author of -the firft Sin, thro' his fo dif-
pofmg Things, that it fhould r.eceiTarily follov/ from his Per-
mifTion, that the finfui A6t fliould be committed, &c. I need
not therefore ftand to repeat what has been faid already, about"
fuch a Neceflity's not proying God to be the Author of Sin,
in any ill Senfe, or in any fuch Senfe as to infringe any
Liberty of Man, concerned in his moral Agency, or Capacity
of Blame, Guilt and Punifhment.

But if it fhould neverthelefs be faid, Suppofmg the Cafe fo,
that God, when he had made Man, might fo order his Cir-

cumftances, that from thefe Circumftances, together with his \

withholding further Aififtance and divine Influence, his Sin I

would infallibly follow, Why might not God as well have iirll 'I

made Man with a fixed prevailing Principle of Sin in hisHeart? ;'

I anfwer, i. It was meet, if Sin did come into Exigence, |

and appear in the World, it fhould arife from the Imperfecflion f

which properly belongs to a Creature, as fuch, and fl^ould ap- j

pear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as \

the Efficient or Fountain. But this could not have been, if ''\

Man had been made at firft with Sin in his Heart \ nor unlefs '■\

the abiding Principle and Habit of Sin were firft introduced j

by an evil A6f of the Creature. If Sin had not arofe from the |

Imperfection of the Creature, it would not have been fo vifible, i

that it did not a ifc from God, as the pofitive Caufe, and real ,

Source of it. But it would require Room that can't be here j

allowed, fully to confider all the Difficulties which have \

|?een fta^-ted. concerning the firft Entrance of Sin into the |

World, . '■ ;

Ani \

Sed. X. into the World. 269

And therefore,
2. I would obrerve, that Objecflions againft the Dodrine
that has been laid down, in Oppolition to the Arminian Notion
of Liberty, from thefe Difficulties, are altogether impertinent ;
becaufe no additional Difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a
Scheme in this Manner differing from theirs, and none would
be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining
theirs. Nothing that the Armimans fay, about the Contingence,
or felf-determining Power of Man's Will, can ferve to explain
■with lefsDifficuIty,how the hrft finfulVolition ofMankind could
take Place, and IVlan be juftiy charged with the Blame of it.
To fay, the Will was ielf-determined, or determined by free
Choice, in that finful Volition ; which is to fay, that the firft
iinfulVolition was determined by a foregoing finfulVolition ; is
no .olution of the Difficulty. It is an odd Way of folving
Difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay. Two
and Two makes Nine ; or, that a Child begat his Father,
folves no Difficulty : No more does it,, to fay. The firft finful
A6t of Choice was before the firit finful A61 of Choice, and
chofe and determined it, and brought it to pafs. Nor is it any
better Solution, to fiy,The iirfc fmiul Volition chofe, determined
and produced itfeif ; which is to fay. It was before it was.
Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the Diffi-
culty, to fay. The firft finful Volition arofe accidentally,.
wiviicut any Caufe at all ; any more than it will folve that
dirlicuit Quellion, Hgvj the World cciild be made out of Nothim f
to fay, It came into Being out of Nothing, without any
Cauie ; as has been already obferved. And if we fhould allow
that That could be, that the firft evil Volition fhould arife by
perfect Accident, without any Caufe, it would relieve no Diffi-
culty, about God's laying the Blame of it to Man. For how
was Man to Blame for perfe6t Accident, which had no Caufe,
and which therefore, he (to be fure) was not the Caufe of, any
more than if it came by feme external Caufe ?— Such Kind of
Solutions are no better, than if fome Perfon, going about to
folve fome of the ftrange mtithematical Paradoxes, about infi-
nitely great and fmall Quantities ; as, that fome infinitely great
Quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely
great Quantities ; and alfo that fome infinitely fhiall Qiiantlties
are infinitely lefs than others, which yet arc infinitely little ;
in order to a Solution, fho ild fay. That Mankind have been
under a Miflake, in fuppofing a greater Quantity to exceed a
fmaller ; and that a Hundred multiplied by Ten, makes but
SI f^igle Unit.

SiCTlOSf

270 Of the Objeaion Part IV.

Section XL

Of a fuppofed Inconfijlence of thefe Pri7t-
ciplesy wiih GOD's moral Charader.

THE Things which have been already obferved, may be
fufficient to anfwer moil of the Objedlions, and filence
the great Exclamations of Armitiians againft XhtCahiniJisy
from the fvippofed Inconfiftence of CcihimJIk Principles with
the moral Perfedions of God, as exercifed in his Government
of Mankind. The Confiftence of fuch a Do61rine of Neceffity
as has been maintained, with the Fitnefs and Reafonableneis
of God's Com.mands, Promifes and Threatnings, Reward-s
and Eunifhments, has been particularly confidered : TheCavils
of our Opponents, as tho' our Doarine of Neceffity made
God the Author of Sin, have been anlwered ; and alfo their
Objedion-againft thefe Principles, as inconiiftent with God's
Sincerity, in his Counfels, Invitations and Perfwafions, has
been already obviated, in what has been cbferved, refpeding
the Ccnfiftence of what Cahini/h fuppofe concerning the fecret
and revealed Will of God : By that it appears, there is no
Repugnance in 'fuppofmg it may be the fecret Will of God,
that his Ordination and Permiffion of Events Ihould be fuch
that it fhall be a certain Ccniequence, that a Thing never will
com.e to pafs ; which yet it isMan's Duty to do, and fo God's
preceptive Will, that he fhould do ; and this is the fame
Thing as to fay, God m.ay iincerely command and require him
to do it. And if he m.ay be fmcere in commanding him, he
may for the fam.e Reafon be fmcere in counfelling, inviting
and ufing Perfuafions with him to do it. Counfels and Invi-
tations are Manife Rations of God's preceptive Will, or of what
God loves, and v/hat is in it Mf, and as Man's Acl:,agreable to
his Heart ; and not of his difpofmg Will, and what Tie chufes
as a Part of his own infinite Scheme of Things. It has been
particularly (hewn. Part III. Sedion IV. that fuch a Neceffity
as has been maintained, is not inconfiftent with the Propriety
and Fitnefs of divine Commands ; and for the fame Reafon,
not incoafiftent vyith the Sincerity of Invitations and Counfels,
in the Corollary at the End of that Sedion. Yea, it hath been
Ihewn, Part III. Sed. 7. Coral, j. that this Objeaion of Jr-

. tninianSf

Sed. XL from Gois moral Charader. 271

mlnihus^ concerning the Sincerity and Ufe of divine Exhortati-*
ons, Invitations and Counfels, '\% demonftrably againil them-

felves.

Notwithftanding, 1 vc^ould further obferve, that the Diffi-»
culty of reconciling the Sincerity of Counfels, Invitations and
Perluafions, with fuch an antecedent known Fixednefs of
all Events, as has been fuppofed, is not peculiar to thisScheme,
as diftinguiflied from that of the General ;ty of Jrmmians, which
acknowledge the abfolute Foreknowledge of God : And there-
fore, it would be unreafonably brought as an Objection againft"
my differing from them. The mam feeming Difficulty in the
Cafe is this : That God in counfelling, inviting and perfuad^
ing, makes a Shew of aiming at, feeking and uiing Endeavours
for the Thing exhorted and perfuaded to ; whereas, 'tis im-
pofTible for any intelligent Being truly to feek, or ufe Endea-
vours for a Thing, which he at the fame Time knows mod
perfedly will not" come to pafs ; and tliat it is abfurd to fup-
^ofe, he makes the obtaining of a Thing his End, in his
.Calls and Counfels, which he at the fame Time infallibly
knows will not be obtain'd by thefe Means. Novv^, if God
knows this, in the utmoft Certainty and Perfedion, the Way
by which he comes by this Knowledge makes no Difference,
If he knows it by the Neceffity which he fees in Things, or
by fome other Means ; it alters not the Cafe. ' But it is in
Effed: allowed by Jrminians themfelves, that God's inviting^
and perfuading Men to do Things, w^hich he at the fameTime
certainly knows will not be done, is noEvidence of Infmcerity;
Isecaufe they allow, that Gcd has a certain Foreknowledge of
all Aden's fmful Adions and Omiffions. And as.this is thus
implicitly allowed by mod Jrmmia??s^ (o all that pretend to
own the Scriptures to be the Word of God,mufl: be conftrained
.to allow it.— God commanded and counfei'd Pharaoh to let
his People go, and ufed Arguments and Perfuafions to induce
him to it ; he laid before him Arguments taken from his infi-
nite Greatnefs and almighty Power (Exod. vii. i6.) and fore-
warned him of the fatal Confequences of his Refufal, from

Time to Time ; (Chap. viii. i, 2, 20, 21. Chap. ix. 1 5.

X3— 17. and X. 3, 6.) He commanded Mofes^ and the Elders
a^ Ifraely to go and befeech Pharaoh to let the People go ; and
at the fame Time told 'em, he knew furely that he would not
comply to it. Exod. iii. 18, 19. And thou /halt come., thou and the
Elders of Ifrael, unto the King of Egypt, and you fnall fay unto him ;
^iTeLordQod of /Mlebjews hath met with us j .and new let us go^we-

• _ " befeech

fj 20f Ohf fromGod' $ mor.Characler.P.IV.

hefeech thee^ three Days journey into the Wildernefs^ that we may
Sacrifice unto the Lord cur God : And, I am fare that the King of
Egypt will not let you go. So our bleffed Saviour, the Evening
wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would (hametuliy
deny him, before the Morning ; fc3r he declares it to him w th
AlTeverations, to fliew the Certainty of it ; and tells the Difci-'
pies, that all of them fhould be ohended becaufe of him that
Night; Matt. xxvi. 31,-— 35- Joh. xiii. 38. Luk. xxii. 31,-34.
^oh. xvi. 32. And yet it was their Duty to avoid thefeThings ;
they were very fmful Things, which God had forbidden, and
which it was their Duty to watch and pray againil: ; and they
were obliged to do fo from the Counfels and Perjuafions Chrift
ufed with them, at that very Time, lo to do ; Matt. xxvi. 41.
Watch and pray,, that ye enter not intoTemptation. So that whatever
Difficulty there can be in this Matter, it can be no Objection-
againft any Principles which have been maintain'd in Oppoii-
tion to the Principles of Arminians ; nor does it any more con-
cern me tc remove the Difficulty, than it does ihem, or indeed
all that call themfelves Chriftians, and acknowledge the divine

Authority of the Scriptures. Neverthelefs, this Matter may

poffibly (God allowing) be m.ore particularly and largely con-
fideredj in fome future Difcourfe, on the Dodrine of FredejH-
tion.

But I would, here obferve, that however the Defenders of
that Notion of Liberty of Will, which I have oppofed, exclaim
againftthe Dodrine 01 Caknni/Is^ as teiiding to bring Men into
Doubts, concerning the moral P^irfedions of God ; it is their ^
Scheme, and not the Scheme of Cahini/ls, that indeed is jufily
chargeable with this. For 'tis one of the m.oft fundamental
Points of their Scheme of Things, that a Freedom of Will,
confiding in felf-determination, without all Neceffity, is effen-
tial to Moral Agency. This is the fame Thing as to fay, that
fuch a Determination of the V/iU without all Neceffity, muft
be in all intelligent Beings, in thofe Things, wherein they are
tnoral Agents^ or in their moral A^s : And from this it will fol-
low, that God's Will is not neceffiarily determined, in any
Thing he does, as a moral Agent ^ or in any of his AS^s that are
of a moral Nature. So that in all Things, wherein he a6ls
holily^ jufily and truly^ he don't act neceffiarily ; or his Will is
not neceiTarily determined to adl: holily and juftly ; becaufe if
it were necellarily determined, he would not be a moral Agent
in thus aaing : His Will would be attended with Neceffity ;
Hfhich they fay is inconfiftent with maral Agencf : *' He can a(5t

Se.XL 0/" Arm"^ u^r^'^yr^;^ Scripture. 273

" no otherwife ; He is at no Liberty in the Affair ; He id
♦' determined by unavoidable invincible Neceflity : Therefore
*' ruch Agency is no moral Agency ; yea, no Agency at all,
" properly fpeaking : A neceiTary Agent is no Agent : He
" being pallive, and fubjed to Neceffity, what He does is no
*' A61 of his, but an Effe6l of a Neceflity prior to any Act of
*^ his." This is agreable to their Manner of arguing. Now
then what is become of all our Proof of the moral PerfecSlions
of God ? How can we provcj that God certainly will in .any
one Inftance do- that which is juft and holy ; feeing hisWill is
determin'd in the Matter by no Neceflity ? We have no other
Way of proving that any Thing certainly will be, but only by
the Neceflity of the Event. Where we can fee no Neceflity,
but that the Thing may be, or may not be, there we are un-
avoidably left at a Lofs. We have no other Way properly
and truly to demonfl:rate the moral Perfections of God, but
the Way that Mr. Chubb proves them, in P. 252, 261, 262,
263. of his Tracts ; viz. That God mufl: neceflJarily perfedly
know what is mofl v/orthy and valuable in it felf,which in the
Nature of Things is beft and fitteft: to be done. And as this
is moft eligible in it felf, He being omnifcient, mufl: fee it to

. be fo ; and being both omnifcient and felf-fuflicient, cannot
have any Temptation to rejedt it ; and fo mufl neceflarily will

*that which is beft. And thus, by this Neceflity of the De-
termination of God's Will to what is good and beft^ we de-
monftrably eftablifli God's moral Character.

Corol. From Things which have been obferved, it appears,
that mofl: of the Arguments from Scripture, which Ar?mmcms
make ufe of to fupport their Scheme, are no other than begging
the ^ejlion. For in thefe their Arguments they determine in
the tirfl: Place, that without fuch a Freedom of Will as
they hold. Men can't be proper moral Agents, nor the Sub-
lets of Command, Counfel, Perfuafion, Invitation, Promifes,
Threatnings, Expoftulations, Rewards and Punifhments ; and
that without fuch a Freedom 'tis to no Purpofe for Men to
take any Care, or ufe any Diligence, Endeavours or Means, in
order to their avoiding Sm, or becoming holy, efcaping Punifli-
liient or obtaining Happinefs : and having fuppofed thefe
'Things, which are grand Things in Queftion in the Debate,
then they heap up Scriptures containingCommands, Counfeis,
Calls, Warnings, Perfuaflons, Expoftulations, Promifes and
Threatnings ; (as doubtlefs they may find enough fuch ; the
Bible is confeflT^diy full of them, from the Be^inniti;; to tha

M m £nii )

2 74 Whether thefe Principles Part IV.

End ) arid then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their
Side, how many more Texts there are that evidently favour
theirScheme,than fuch as feem to favour the contrary. But let
them firft make manifeft the Things in -Queftion, which they
fuppofe and take for granted, ^nd (hew them to be confident
with themfelves, and produce clear Evidence of their Truth j
and they have gain'd their Point, as all will confefs, without
bringing one Scripture. For none denies,that there are Com-
mands, Counfels, Promifes, Threatnings, &c. in the Bible.
But unlefs they do thefe Things, their multiplying fuch Texts
of Scripture is infignificant and vain.

It may further be obferved, that fuch Scriptures as they
bnng,are really againft them, and not for them. As it has been
demonftrated, that 'tis their Scheme, and not ours, that is in-
confiftent with the Ufe of Motives and Perfuafives, or any
moral Means whatfoever, to induce Men to the Pra6lice of
Vertue, or abftaining fromWickednefs : Their Principles, and
not ours, are repugnant to moral Agency, and inconfiftent with
moral Government, with Law or Precept, with the Nature of
Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punifliment, and with every
Thing whatfoever of a moral Nature, either on the Part of
the moral Governor, or in the State, Adions or Condudt of
the Subject *

Section XII.

Of a fupfofed Tendeitcy of thefe Principles
to Atheifm and Licentioufnefs^

IF any objed againft what has been maintained, that it
tends to Atheifm ; I know not on what Grounds fuch an
Objection can be raifed, unlefs it be that fome Atheifts
have held a Dodrine of Necelhty which they fuppofe to be like
this. But if it be fo, I am perfuaded the Jrminians would not
look upon it juft, that their Notion of Freedom and Contin-
gence ihould be charged with a Tendency to all the Errors
that ever any embraced, who have held fuch Opinions, Thc>

Stoic

Sedl. XII. tend to Atheifm. 275

,5/<?;VPhilorophers,whom the Cahinlfls are charged with agreeing
with, were no Atheiils, but the greateft Theifts, and neareft
a-kin to Chriftians in their Opinions concerning the Unity
and the Perfedions of the (jodhead, of all the Heathen Philo-
fophers. And jS'/>/V«rtti, that chief Father of Atheifm, main-
tain'd no fuch Dodtrine of Neceffity, but was the greateft
Maintainer of Contingence.

The Doctrine of NecefTity, which fuppofes a neceflary Con-
;ne6tion of all Events, on fome antecedent Ground and Reafon
of their Exigence, is the only Medium we have to prove the
Being of God. And the contrary Do6lrine of Contingence,
even as maintain'd by Annmans (which certainly implies or
infers, that Events may come into Exiftence, or begin to be,
without Dependence on any Thing foregoing, as their Caufe,
Ground or Reafon) takes away all Proof of the Being of God;
which Proof is fum manly exprefs'd by theApoIlle, in Rom. i. 20.
And this is a Tendency toy/r/6^//;/i with aWitnefs. Sothat indeed
it is tht:Do6irine of Arminians^ and not of the Calvlnijis^ that is
juftly charged with a Tendency to Atheifm ; it being built on
a Foundation that is the utter Subverfion of every demonltra- .
tive Argument for the Proof of a Deity ; as has been (hown,
Part II. Sea. 3d.

And whereas it has often been faid, that the Cahintjlic Doc-
trine of Ncceffity, faps the Foundations of all Religion and
Vertue, and tends to the greateft Licentioufnefs of Pra(5lice :
This Objedion is built on the Pretence, that ourDo6lrine ren-
ders vain all Means and Endeavours, in order to be vertuous
and religious. Which Pretence has been already particularly
confidered in the 5th SeSiion of this Part ; where it has been
demonftrated, that this Dodrine has no fuch Tendency ; but
that fuch a Tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary
Dodrine : inafmuch as the Notion of Contingence, . which.
, their Do6trine implies, in its certain Confequences, overthrows
all Connexion, in every Degree, between Endeavour and
Event, Means and End.

And befides, if many other Things which have been ob-
ferved to belong to the Arminian Doctrine, or to be plain Con-
fequences of it, be confidered, there will appear juft Reafon
to fuppofe that it is that^ which muft rather tend to Licenti-
' oiifnefs. Their Docflrine excufes all evil Inclinations, which
. Men find to be natural ; becaufe in fuch Inclinations., they
" : M m 2 arc

276 Whether thefe Principles Part IV.

are not felf-dctermined, as fuch Inclinations are not owing \jo^
anyChoice orDetermination of their ownWills. . Which lead? .
Men wholly tojuftify themfelves in all their witked Aaions,fQ ']
far as natural Inclination has had a Hand in determining their 4
Wills, to the Commiirion of 'em. Yea, thefe Notions which /
fuppofe moral Neceffity and Inability to be inconfiftent with /.
Blame or moral Obligation, will direcE^ly lead Men to juftify
the vileft Adts and Pradtices, from the Strength ofjheir wicked
Inclinations of all Sorts ; ftrong Inclinations inducing a moral
Neceffity ; yea, to excufe every Degree of evil Inclination, fo
far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the Thing which
has determined their Wills : Becaufe, £b far as antecedent;
inclination deterrhined the Will, fo far the Will was without
Liberty of Indifference and Self-determination. Which at laft ■
will come to this, that Men will juftify themfelyes in all the
Wickednefs they commit. It has been obferved already, that
this Scheme of Things does exceedingly diminifh the Guilt of .
Sin, and the Difference between the greateft and fmalleft Of-
fences : * And if it be purfued in its real Confequences, it
leaves Room for no fuch Thing, as either Vertue or Vice,
Blame or Praife in the World, f And then again, how natur
rally does this Notion of the fovereign felf-determining Power
of the Will, in all Things, vertuous or vicious, and whatfoever
deferves either Reward or Punifhment, tend to encourage Merj
to put off the Work of Religion and Vertue, and turning from'
Sin to God J it being that which they have a fovereign Power
to determine themfelves to, juft when they pleafe ; or if not,
they are wholly excufeablc in goir^g on in Sm, becaufe of their
Inability to do any other.

If it fhonld be faid, that the Tendency of this Do6lrine of
Neceffity, to Licentioufnefs, appears by the Improvement many
at this Day a6tually make of it, to juftify themfelves in their
diffolute Courfes j I will not deny that fome Men do unrea-
fonably abufe this Dodrine, as they do many other Things
which are true and excellent in their own Nature : But I deny
that this proves, the Do6trine itfelf has any Tendency to
Licentioufnefs. I think, the Tendency of Dodrines, by what
now appears in the World, and in our Nation in particular,
may much more juftly be argued from the general Effed which

has

* Part IIT. Sta. 6.

i Part in. Sea. 6. Ib'd. Sert. 7. Part IV. Se^. ?. Part Il{.
S«a. 3. Cor.<*l. I. afi^r ih^ firilHead,

Se(9:. XII. fend to hiccntioufncfs. 277

has been feen to attend the prevailing o^ t^ne Principles of Jr^
tniniam^ and the contrary Principles ; as both have had their
Turn of general Prevalence in our Nation. If it be indeed,
as is pretended, that Calvimftic Dodrines undermine the very
Foundation of all Religion and Morality, and enervate and
difannul all rational Motives, to holy and vertuous, Pradlice ;
and that the contrary Do6trines give the Inducements to Ver-
tue and Goodnefs their proper Force, and exhibit Religion in
a rational Light, tending to recommend it to the Reafon of
Mankind, and enforce it in a Manner that is agreable to their
natural Notions of Things : I fay,if it be thus, 'tis remarkable,
that Vertue and religious Practice fnould prevail moft, when
the former Dodrines, fo inconfiftent with it, prevailed almoft
univerfally : And that ever lince the latter Doctrines, fo hap-
pily agreeing with it, and of fo proper & excellent a Tendency
to promote it, have been gradually prevailing,Vice, Prophane-
nefs. Luxury and Wickednefs of all Sorts, and Contempt of
all Religion, and of every Kind of Serioufnefs and Stridnefs
of Converfation, rfiotild proportionabiy prevail ; and that thefe
Things (hould thus accompany one another, and rife and pre-
vail one with another, now for a whole Age together. 'Tis
remarkable, that this happy Remedy (difcover'd by the free
Enquiries,and fuperior Senfe and Wiidom of this Age) againft
the perniciousEffeds of Cahiriifm-, fo inconiiftent withReligion,
and tending fo much to banifli all Vertue from the Earth, (hould
on fo long a Trial, be attended with no good EfFed ; but that
the Confequence (l^iould be tiie Reverfe of Amendment ; that
in Proportion, as the Remedy takes Place, and is thoroughly
applied, fo the Difeafe fb.ould prevail ; and the very fame dif-
jnal Eifed take Place, to the higheft Degree, which Calvinijiic
Dodrines are fuppofed to have io great a Tendency to ; even
the banifhing of Religion and Vertue, and the prevailing of
unbounded Licentioufnefs of Manners. If thefe Things are
truly fo, they are very remarkable, and Matter of very curious
Speculation I

Section

278 Of Metaphyfical Part IV,

, Section XIIL

Cmcermng that ObjeSlion again/l the Rea-
ibning, by which the Calviniftic DoEirine
is fupportedy that it is Metaphyfical
and Abftrufe,

IT has often been objected againfl the Defenders of Calvin
nijlic Princples, that in their Reafonings, they run into
nice Schalaftic Diftin6tions, and abi'trufe metaphyfical
Subtihies, and fet thefe in Oppofition to common Senfe. And
,'tis poflible, that after the former Manner it may be alledged
againft the Reafoning by which I have endeavoured to contute
the Arminian Scheme of Liberty and moral Agency, that it is
very abftra^led and metaphyficaL — Concerning this, I would
obferve the following Things.

L If that be made an Obje6lion againft the foregoing Rea-
foning, that it is metaphyfical^ or may properly be reduced to the
Science of Metaphyficks, it is a very impertinent Objection ;
whether it be fo or no, is not worthy of any Difpute or Con-
troverfy. If the Reaibning be good, 'tis as frivolous to en-
quire what Science it is properly reduc'd to, as what Language
it is delivered in : And for a Man to go about to confute the
Arguments of his Opponent, by telling him, his Arguments
are Metaphyfical^ would be as weak as to tell him, his Arguments
could not be fubftantiai, becaufe they were written in French or
Latin. The Queftion is not. Whether what is faid be Meta-
phyficks, Phyficks, Lugick, or Mathematicks, Latin, French,
Englilh, or Mohawk ? But, Whether the ReaConing be good,
and theArguments truly conclufive ? The foregoingArguments
are no more metaphyfical, than thofe which vv^e ufe againll the
Papifts, to difprove their DocStrine of Tranfubftantiation ; al-
jedging, it is inconfiftent with the Notion of corporeal
Identity, that it fliould be in ten Thoufand Places at the fame
Time. 'Tis by metaphyfical Arguments only we are
able to provQ,that the rational Soul is not corporeal ; thatLead
or Sand can't think ; that Thoughts are not fquare or round,
©r doh*t weigh a Pound* The Arguments by whi<;h we prove

the

Sed* XIII. and abftrufe Reafotiing- 279

the Being of God, if handled clofely and diftincftly, fo as to
{hew their dear and demonftrative Evidence, muft be meta-
phyikally treated. 'Tis by Metaphyficks only, that we
can demonftrate, that God is not limited to a Place, or is not
mutable ; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful ; that it is im-
pofTible for him to lie,or be unjuft j and that there is one God
only, and not Hundreds or Thoufands. And indeed we have
no ftria Demonftration of any Thing, excepting mathematical
Truths, but by Metaphyficks. We can have no Proof, that is
properly demonftrative, of any one Proportion, relating to the
Being and Nature of God, his Creation of the World, the
Dependence of all Things on him, the Nature of Bodies or
SpiritSjthe Nature of our own Souls, or any of the greatTruths
of Morality and natural Religion, but what is metaphyfical.
I am willing, my Arguments (hould be brought to the Teft of
the ft:ri6teft and jufteft Reafon, and that a clear, diftin^t and
determinate Meaning of the Terms I ufe, ihould be infifted
on ; but let not the Whole be rejected, as if all were confuted,
by fixing on it the Epithet MetaphyficaL

II. If the Reafoning v\ihich has been made ufe of, be ill
fome Senfe Metaphyfical, it will not follow, that therefore it
muft needs be abftrufe, unintelligible,and a-kin to the Jargon
of the Schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing Reafoning,
at leaft as to thofe Things which are moft material belonging
to it, depends on no abftrufe Definitions or Diftindlions, or
Terms without a Meaning, or of very ambiguous and unde-
termined Signification, or any Points of fuch Abftra<5tion and
Subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive Underftanding in
Clouds and Darknefs. There is no high Degree of Refine-
ment and abftrufe Speculation, in determining, that a Thing is
not before it is, and fo can't be the Caufe of itfelf ; or that the
firft A61 of free Choice, has not another A&i of free Choice
going before that,to excite or dire<5l it 5 or in determining, that
no Choice is made, while the Mind remains in a State of
abfolute Indifference ; that Preference and Equilibrium never
co-exift ; and that therefore no Choice is made in a State of
Liberty, confifting in Indifference : And that fo far as theWill
is determined by Motives, exhibited and operating previous to
i the A6t of the Will, fo far it is not determined by the Ad of
I the Will itfelf ; that nothing can begin to be, which before
was not, without a Caufe, or fome antecedent Ground or Rea-
ibn, why it then begins to be ; that Effeds depend on their
Caufes, and are connected with them i that Vertue is not the

worfe,

2 8o Of Metaphyfical Part IV.

worfe, nor Sin the better, for the Strength of Inclination, with
which it is praclifed, and the Difficulty which thence arifes of
doing otherwife ; that when it is already infallibly known,that |
aThing will be, it is not aThing contingent whether it will ever \
be or no j or that it can be truly faid, notwithftanding, that \
it is not neceiTary it (hould be, but it either may be, or may |
not be. And the like might be obferved of many otherThing* *
which belong to the foregoing Reafoning.^

If any (hall ftill ftand fo ,it, that the foregoing Reafoning i» |
nothing but metaphyfical Sophiftry ; and that it myft be fo, %
that the feeming Force of the Arguments all depends on fomef >
Fallacy and Wile that is hid in the Obfcurity, which always
attends a great Degree of metaphyfical Abrtra^tion and Re-
finement ; and fliall be ready to fay, " Here is indeed fome-
*' thing that tends to confound the Mind, but not to fatisfy it :
•' For who can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that Men are iitly
*' blamed or commended, punifhed or rewarded, for thofe
" Volitions which are not from themfel,es, and of whofe Ex-
*' iftence they are not the Caufes. Men may refine, as much
*' as they pleafe, and advance their abftrac^ Notions, and make
•« out a Thoufand feeming Contradidions, to puzzle our Un-
*' derftandings ; yet there can be noSatisfadion in fuchDodrine
«' as this : The natural Senfeof the Mind of Man will always
'«* refill it." * I humbly conceive, that fuch an Objedtor, if he

has'

* A certain noted Author, of the prefent Age, fays, The Argument*
for NeceJ/ity are nodiing but Quibbling, cr Logomachy, ujing Wordi ;
nvithout a Meanings or Begging the ^ef ion. — 1 don't know what'
K-ind of Necefiiiy any Authors He may have Reference to, arc
Advocates for ; or whether they have managed their Arguments
well, or ill. As to the Arguments I have made ufe of, if tney are '
Nibbles, they may be (hewn to be fo ; fuch Knots are capable of '
being untied, and the Trick and Cheat may be detefled and plainly
laid open. If this be fairly done, with Refpeft to the Grounds and
Reafons I have relied upon, I lliall have juft Occafion for the
future to be filent, if not to be alhamed of my Argumentations. ,
I am willing, my Proofs fhould be thoro'ly examined ; and if there
be nothing but Begging the ^uejiiorty or m^tx Logomachy, or Difpute of
Words, let it be madij manifcft,and ftiewn how the feeming Strength
of the Argument depends on my vftng Words ^without a Meanings or
sirifes from the Ambiguity of Terms, or my making ufe of Words ii
an indeterminate and unfteady Manner ; and that the Weight of
my Reafons relt mainly oa fuch a Foundation : And then, I fhall
either be readv to r^usa what X have urged, and thank the Mait
' that,

Sea. XHI. ^«a^ abftrufe Reafohing. 2 Sir

has Capacity and Humility and Calmnefs of Spirit, Efficient
impartially and thoroughly to examine himfelf, will find that
he knows not really what he would be at j and that indeed
his Difficulty is nothing but a meer Prejudice, from an inad-
vertent cuftomary Ufe of Words, in a Meaning that is not

clearly underftood, nor carefully refleded upon. Let the

Objector refled again, if he has Candor and Patience enough,
and don't fcorn to be at the Trouble of clofe Attention in the

Affair. He would have a Man's Volition ht from himfclf.

Let it hQfrom himfelf moft primarily and originally of any Way

N n conceivable ;

that has done the kind Part, or fhall be juftly expofed for my
Obftinacy.
,The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this Affair, from what
he calls Logomachy and Sophijiry^ to Experience.'^' ' A Perfon can

experience only what palfes in his own Mind. But yet, as we
may well fuppofe, that all Men have the fame human Faculties ;
fo a Man may well argue from his own Experience to that of
Others, in Things that fhew the Nature of thofe Faculties, and the
^^"" Manner of their Operation. But then one has as good Right to
alledge his Experience, as another. As to my own Experience, I
find, that ia innumerable Things I can do as I will ; that the Mo-
tions of my Body, in many Refpeds, inftantaneoufly follow the
A6ts of my Will concerning thofe Motions ; and that my Will has
fome Command of my Thoughts i and that the A6ls of my Will
are my own, /. e. that they are Ads of my Will, the Volitions of
my own Mind ; or in other Words, that what I will, I will.
Which, I prefame, is the Sum of what others experience in this
Affair. But as to finding by Experience, that my Will is originally
determined by it felf ; or that my Will firfl chufing what Volitioa
there fhall be, the ehofen Volition accordingly follows ; and thac
this is the firft Rife of the Determination of my Will in any
Affair; or that any Volinon arifes in my Mind contingently; I
declare, I know nothing in my felf, by Experience, of this Nature ^
and nothing that ever 1 experienced, carries the leafl Appearance
;. or Shadow of any fuch Thing, or gives me any more Reafon to
, fuppofe or fufpedt any fuch Thing, t'.an to fuppofe that my Volj-
» tions exiiled twenty Years before they exifled. 'Tis true, I find
my felf poffefs'd of my Volitions before I can fee the efFeftuSl
Power of any Caufe to produce them (for the Power and Efficacy
of theCaufe is not feen but by the Effedjand this, for ought I know,
may make fome imagine, that Volition has no Caufe, or that it
produces itfelf But 1 have no moreReafon from hence to determine
any fuchThing.than I have to determine that I gave my felf myowix
Being, or that I came into Being accidentally without a <-^aic,
becaufe 1 firfl found my felf pofTsfled ©f Being, befQre I had K-a.ov^?-
.. $&dge of a Caufe of my Bsing.

« 8 2 Of Mdtaphyfical Reafoning.. Part IV. ^

conceivable ; tMt is, from his' own Choice : How will that
help the Matter, as to his being juftly blamed or praifed, un- |
lefs that Choice itfelf be blame or praife-worthy ? And how is
the Choice itfelf (an ill Choice,^ for Inftance) blame-worthy, j
according to thefe Principles, urdefs that be from himfelf too, \
in the fame Manner ; that is, from his own Choice ? But the \
original and firft determining Choice in the Affair is not \
from his Choice : His Choice is not the Caufe of it.— And if \
it be from hirrifelf fome other Way, and not from his Choice,
furely that will not help the Matter : If it ben't from himfelf
of Choice, then it is not from himfelf voluntarily ; and if fo,
he is furely no more to Blame, than if it were not from him-
felf at all. It is a Vanity, to pretend it is a fufficient An-
fvver to this," to fay, that it is nothing but metaphyseal Refine-
ment and Subtilty, and fo attended with Obfcurity and Uncer-
tainty.

If it be the natural Senfe of bur Minds, that what is blartie-
worthy in aMan muft be from himfelf,then it doubtlefs is alfo,
that it muft be from fomething bad in himfelf, a bad Choice^ or
bad Difpofition. But then our natural Senfe is, that this bad
Choice or Difpofition is evil in it felf^ and the Man blame-
worthy for it, on ifs own Account^ without taking into our Notion
of it's Blame-worthinefs, another bad Choice, or Difpofition
going before this, from whence this arifes : for that is a ridi-
culous Abfurdity, running us into an immediate Contradidlion,
which our natural Senfe of Blame-worthinefs has nothing to
do with,and never comes into theMind, nor is fuppofed in the
Judgment we naturally^ make of the Affair. As was demon-
ftrated before, natural Senfe don't place the moral Evil of j^
Volitions and Difpofitions in the Caufe of them, but the Na-
ture of them. An evil Thing's being FROM a Man, or
from fomething antecedent in him, is not eflential to the
original Notion we have of Blame-worthinefs : But 'tis it's
being the Choice of the Heart ; as appears by this, that if a
Thing be/r^/Arus, and not from our Choice, it has not th»-
Nature of Blame-worthinefs or Ill-defert, according to our
natural Senfe. When a Thing is from a Man, in that Senfe,
that it is from his Will or Choice, he is to Blame for it, be- ,
caufe his Will is IN IT : So far as the Will is in it^ Blame is
%n it^ and no further. Neither do we go any further in our
Notion of Blame, to enquire whether the bad Will be FROM
a bad Will : There is no Confideration of the Original of
that bad Willi, becaufe according to our natural Apprehenfion, ^ ,

•a

Sea.XIII. ^F««/if o/ Armin" Writers. 283

Blame originally conftjh in it. Therefore a Thing's being /r^m a
Man, is a fecondary Coniideration, in the Notion of Blame or
lU-defert. Becaufe thofe Things in our external Actions, arc
«ioft properly faid to beyr(?/?2 us, which are from our Choice 5
and no other external kdi\ow% but thofe that are from us in this
Senfe, have the Nature of Blame ; and they indeed,, not lb-
properly becaufe they "sxzfrom us, as becaufe we are in the?n^
i, e. our Wills are in them ; not fo much becaufe they are
from fome Property of ours, as becaufe they are our Properties,
However, all thefe external Adions being truly from us^ as
their Caufe j and we being fo ufed, in ordinary Speech, and
in the common Affairs of Life, to fpeak of Men's Actions and
Conduit that we fee, and that affed human Society, as delerv-
ing 111 or Well, as worthy of Blame orPraife ; hence it is come
to pafs, that Philofophers have incautioufly taken all their
Meafures of Good and Evil, Praife and Blame, from the
' Dictates of common Senfe, about thefe overt A£ts of Men ; to
the running qf every Thing into the moft lamentable and
dreadful Confufion. And therefore I obferve,

III. ^Tis fo far from being true (whatever may be pretended)
that the Proof of the Do6trine which has been maintain'd,
depends on certain abftrufe, unintelligible, metaphyiical Terms
and Notions ; and that the Arrninian Scheme, without needing
" fuch Clouds and Darknefs, for it's Defence, is fupported by
the plain Dictates of common Senfe ; that the very Ps.everfe is
moft certainly true, and that to a greatDegree. 'Tis Fact, that
they, and not we, have confounded Things with metaphyiical,
unintelligible Notions and Phrafes, and have 4rawn them from
the Light of plain Truth, into the grofs Darknefs of abftrufe
metaphyfical Propofitions, and Words without a Meaning.
Their pretended Demonftrations depend very much on fuch
unintelligible, metaphyfical Phrafes, as Self-determination and
Sovereignty of the JVill ; and the metaphyfical Senfe they put oil
fuch Terms, as Necejjity^ Contingency^ J^ion^ Agency^ &c. quite
diverfe from their Meaning as ufed in common Speech ; and
which, as they ufe them, are without any consent Meaning,
or any Manner of diftin6t confident Ideas ; as far from it as
any of the abftrufe Terms and perplexed Phrafes of the Peri-
patetick Philofophers, or the moft unintelligible Jargon of thd
Schools, or the Cant of the wiideft Fanaticks. Yea, we may
be bold to fay, thefe metaphyfical Terms, on which they build
fo much, are what they uie without knov^ing what they mean
t^ieaiielvcs i they ai'e pure metaphyfical Sounds, without any

N n 2 Wcas

284 Armlnians too metaphyftcaL Part IV.

Ideas whatfoever in their Minds to anfwer them ; in-as-much
as it has been demonftrated, that there cannot be any Notion 1
in the Mind confiftent with thefe Expreflions, as they pretend
to explain them ; becaufe their Explanations deftroy them-
felves. No fuch Notions as imply Self-contradidion, and
^elf-abolition, and this a great many Ways, can fubfift in the
Mind J as there can be no Idea of a Whole which is lefs than
any of it's Parts, or of folid Extenfion without Dimenfions, or

of an EfFe6t which is before it's Caufe. Arminians improve

thefe Terms, as Terms of Art, and in their metaphyseal ,
Meaning, to advance and eftablifh thofe Things which are
contrary to common Senfe, in a high Degree, Thus, inftead
of the plain vulgar Notion of Liberty, which all Mankind, in
every Part of the Face of the Earth, and in all Ages, have ;
confifting in Opportunity to do as one pleafes ; they have in-
troduced a new ftrange Liberty, confifting in Indifference,
Contingence, and Self-determination ; by which they involve
themfelves and others in great Obfcurity, and manifold grofs j
Jnconfiftence. So, inftead of placing Vertue and Vice, as";
common Senfe places them very much, in fix'd Bias and In- j
clination, and greater Vertue and Vice in ftronger and more
eftablilh'd Inclination ; thefe,thro' their Refinings and abftrufe
Notions, fuppofe a Liberty confifting in Indifference, to be
eftential to all Vertue and Vice. So they have reafoned them*
felves, not by metaphyfical Diftindtions, but metaphyseal
Confufion, into many Principles about moral Agency, Blame,
Praife, Reward and Punifliment, which are, as has been (hewn,
exceeding contrary to the common Senfe of Mankind ; and .
perhaps to their own Senfe, which gover^is them in common
Lit>o' ^ ■

TH£

( 285 )

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THE

CONCLUSIOK

WHETHER the Things which have been alledged, ar6
liable to any tolerable Anfwer in the Ways of calm,
intelligible and fi:ri(5l Reafoning, I muft leave others to
judge : But I am fenfible they are liable to one Sort of Anfwer.
* Tis not unlikely, that fome wiio value themfelves on the
fuppofed rational and generous Principles of the modern
fafhionable Divinity, will have their Indignation and Difdain
raifed at the Sight of this Difcourfe, and on perceiving what
Things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think
it worthy of being read, or of fo much Notice as to fay much
about it, they may probably renew the ufual Exclamations,
with additional Vehemence and Contempt, about the Fate of
the Heathen^ Hobbes's ISlecefftty^ and making Men meer Machines ;
accumulating the ternble Epithets oi fatal ^ unfrujirable, inevita^
hle^ irrefijlible^ &c. and it may be, with the Addition of horrid
and blajphemous ; and perhaps much Skill may be ufed to fet
forth Things which have been faid, in Colours which fhall be
fhocking to the Imaginations, and moving to the Paflions of
thofe who have either too little Capacity, or too much Con-
fidence of the Opinions they have imbibed, and Contempt of
the contrary, to try the Matter by any ferious and circumfpedt
Examination, f Or Difficulties may be ftarted and infilled oa

which.

f A Writer, of the prefent Age, whom I have feveral Times had
Occafion to mention, fpeaks once and ag^iin of thofe who hold the
Doftrine of Neceffitx^ as fcarcely worthy of the Name of Philofo^

phers. 1 don'c know, whether he has refpetfl to any particulaf

Notion of Neceifity, that fome may have maintain'd ; and if (o,

what Doftrine of NeceiTity it is that He means. Whether I am

worthy of the Name of a Philofopher, or nor, would be a Quellion
litde to the prelent Purpofe. Jf any, and ever fo many, fhould
deny it., I fhould not think it worth the while to enter into a Dif-
Jpute oa \^ Quofticn ; tho' at the fame Time 1 might exped,

fome

286 r^ CONCLUSION.

which don't belong to the Controverfy ; becaufe, let them be
more or lefs real, and hard to be refolved, they are not what
are owing to any Thing diftinguifhing of this Scheme froni
that of the Ay-minians^ and would not be removed nor dimi-
nifhed by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter.
Or fome particular Things may be pick'd out, which they
may think will found harfhcft in the Ears of the Generality ;
and thefe may be glofs'd and defcanted on, with tart and con-
temptuous Words ; and from thence^ the whole treated with
Triumph and Infult.

"'TIS eafy to fee how the Decifion * of moH: of the Points in
Controverfy, between Calvimjh and Arminians^ depends on the
Determination of this grand Article concerning the Freedom of
the Will reqmfite to moral Agency ; and that by clearing and eftab'
lifhing the Cahinijlic Dodrine in this Point, the chief Argu-
ments are obviated, by which Armlman Dodlrines in general
are fupported, and the contrary Docflrines demonftratively
confirmed, Hereby it becomes manifeft, that God's moral
Government over Mankind, his treating them as moralAgents,
making them the Objeds of his Commands, Counfels, Calls,
Warnings, Expoftulations, Promifes, Threatnings, Rewards
and Punifhments, is not inconfiftent with a determining Dijpofal
of all Events, of every Kind, throughout the Univerfe,^ in his.
Providence , either by poiitive Efficiency,or Permiffion. Indeed
fuch an univerfal^ determining Providence^ infers fome Kind of
Neceflity of all Events ; fuch aNecelTity as implies an infallible
previous Fixednefs of the Futurity of the Event : But no other
Neceffiiy of moral Events, or Volitions of intelligent Agents,
is needful in order to this, than moral Neceffity \ which does as
much afcertain the Futurity of the Event, as any othef
Neceffity. But, as has been demonftratcd, fuch a Neceffity is
not at all repugnant to moral Agency, and the reafonable Ufe
of Commands, Calls, Rewards, Punifhments, &c: Yea, not
only are Objedions of this Kind againfl the Do(5lrine of an
univerfal determining Providence^ removed by what has been
iaid s but the Truth of fuch a Dodrine is demonflrated. A^

fome better Anfwer fliould be given to the Arguments brought for
the Truth of the Do<arine I maintain ; and I might further reafo-
rably defire, that it might be confidered, whether it don't become
thofe who are truly ^worthy of the Name of Philofophers, to be
(enfible, that there is a Difference between Argument and Contempt ;.
yea, and a Difference between the Con tern ptiblenefs of the Perfom
that argues, and the Inconcl^AY€jJefs of th« Ar^umenti he oSer^

The CONCLUSION. 287

it has been demonftrated, that the Futurity of all futureEventS
is eftablifhed by previous Neceffity, either natural or moral ;
fo 'tis manifeft, that the fovereign Creator and Difpofer of the
World has ordered this NecelTity, by ordering his own Con-
dud:, either in defignedly acting, or forbearing to ad. For, as
the Being of the World is from God, fo the Circumftances in
which it had it's Being at firft, both negative and pofitive, muft
be ordered by him, in one of thefe Ways ; and all the necef-
fary Confequences of thefe Circumftances, muft be ordered by
him. And God's a<5live and pofitive Interpofitions, after the
World was created, and the Confequences of thefe Interpofiti-
ons ; alfo every Inftance of his forbearing to interpofe, and the
Aire Confequences of this Forbearance, muft all be determined
according to his Pleafure. And therefore every Event which
is the Confeguence of any Thing whatfoever, or that is con-
neded with any foregoing Thing or Circumftance, either po-
fitive or negative, as the Ground or Reafon of its Exiftence,
muft be ordered of God ; either by a defigned Efficiency and
Interpofition, or a defigned forbearing to operate or interpofe.
But, as has been proved, all Events whatfoever are neceffarily
conne6ted with fomething foregoing,either pofitive or negative,
w hich is the Ground of its Exiftence. It follows therefore, that
the whole Series of Events is thus connecSted with fomething
in the State of Things, either pofitive or negative, which is
criginal in the Series ; /'. e. fomething which is connected with
nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate Condud,
either his ading or forbearing to ad. From whence it follows,
that as God designedly orders his own Condud, and its con-
neded Confequences, it muft neceflarily be, that he defignedly
orders all Things.

The Things which have been faid, obviate fome of the chief
Objedions of Anninians againft the Calv'inijiic Do6h'ine of the
total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature, whereby his
Heart is wholly under the Power of Sin, and he is utterly un-
able, without the Interpofition of fovereign Grace, favingly to
love God, believe in Chrift, or do any Thing that is truly-
good and acceptable in God's Sight. For the main Objedion
againft this Dodrine is, that it is inconfiftent with theFreedom
of Man's Will, confifting in Indifference and felf-determining
Power ; becaufe it fuppofes Man to be under a Neceffity of
Sinning, and that God requires Things of him, in order to
his avoiding eternal Damnation, which he is unable to do ;
and tliat this Dodrine is wholly inconfiftent with the Sincerity

288 The CONCLUSION.

©f Counfels, Invitations, &:c. Now this Do(5lrine fuppofes nt
sther NeceJJity of Sinning, than a moral Neceffity ; which, as
has been fhewn, don't at all excufe Sin j and fuppofes no other
Jnability to obey any Command, or perform any Dut\\ even the
moft fpiritual and exalted, but a moral Inabiiiry, which, as has
been proved, don't excufe Perfons in the Non-ptrformance of
any good Thing, or make 'em not to be the proper ObjecSts of
Commands, Counfels and Invitations. And moreover, it
has been fhewn, that there is not, and never can be, either in
Exiflence, or fo much as in Idea, any fuch Freedom of Will,
confiftingin Indifference and Self-determination, for the Sake
of which, this Do6trine of priginal Sin is caft out ; and that no
fuch Freedom is neceffary, in order to the Nature of Sin, and
a jufl Defert of Punifhment.

The Things which have been obferved, ^o alfo take off
the main Objedions of Arminians againfl the Doctrine oi effca-
iious Grace ; and at the fame Time, prove the Grace of God
in a Sinner's Converfion (if there be any Grace or divine In-
fluence in the Affair) to be efficacious^ yea, and irrejifiihle too,
if by irrefiflible is meant, that which is attended with a moral
Isfeceflity, which it is impofUble Ihould ever be violated by any
Refiftence. The main Obje(5tion of Arminians agamft this
Do(5lrine is, that it is inconfifient with their felf-determining
Freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the Nature of
Vertue, that it fliould be wrought in the Heart by the deter-
mining Efhcacy and Power of another, infiead of its being
owing to a felf-moving Povv^er ; that in that Cafe, the Good
which is wrought, would not be our V ertue, but rather God\
Vertue ; becaufe it is not the Perfon in whom it is wrought,
that is the determining Author of it, but God that wrought it
in him.— But the Things which are the Foundatfon of thefe
Obje(5tions, have been coniidered ; and it has been demons
ftrated, that the Liberty of moral Agents does not confifl in
felf-determining Power j and that there is noNeed of any fuch
Liberty, in order to the Nature of Vertue ; nor does it at all
hinder, but that the State or A(5l of the Will may be the
Vertue of the Subject, though it be not from Self-determina-
tion, but the Determination of an extrinfic Caufe ; even fo as
to caufe the Event to be morally necefTary to the Subje(5t of it,
Arwi as it has been proved, that nothing in the State or A(Sts
of the Will of Man is contingent ; but that on the contrary,
every Event of this Kind is necefTary, by a moral NecefTity ;
and has a]|9 been now demonflrated^ that the Dodrine of am

uxiiyerl^l

The CONCLUSION. 289

tiiiiverfal determining Providence, follows from that Do<5lrine
of NecefTity, which was proved before : And To, that God does
decifively, in his Providence, order all the Volitions of moral
Agents, either by poiitive Influence or Permiflion : And it
being allowed o\\ all Flands, that what God does in theAffair of
Man's vertuous Volitions, whether it be more or lefs, is by Ibmo
pofitive Influence, and not by meer PermifTion, as in the Affair
of a fmful Volition : If we put thefe Things together, it will
follow, that God's Aflift:ance or Influence, muft be determin-
ing and decifive, or muft be attended with a moral Neceflity
of the Event ; and fo, that God gives Vertue, Holinefs and
Converfion to Sinners, by an Influence which determines the
Efteift, in fuch a Manner, that the Effe6t will itifallibly follow
by a moral Necefllty ; which is what Calvinifls mean by effi-
cacious and irrefiftible Grace.

The Things which have been faid, Ao likewifc anfwer the
chief Obje6tions againft the Do^lrine of God's unlverfal and
abfolute Decree^ and aff'ord infallible Proof of that Dodrine %
and of the Do6trine of ahfolute^ eteynal^ perfonal Ele^iion in parti-
cular. The main Obje6tions againft thefe Do6trincs are, that
they infer a Necefllty of the Volitions of moral Agents, and of
the future moral State and A6ts of Men ; and fo are not con-
fiftent with thofe eternal Rewards and Punifhments, which arc
conneded with Converfion and Impenitence 5 nor can be made
jto agree w^ith the Reafonablenefs and Sincerity of thePrecepts,
Calls, Counfels, Warnings and Expoftulations of the Word of
God -J or with the variousMethods andMeans of Grace,which
God ufes with Sinners, td bring 'em to Repentance ; and the
whole of that moral Government, which God exercifes towards
Mankind : And that they infer an Inconfiftence between the
Jecret and revealed Will of God ; and make God the Author of
Sin. But all thefe Things have been obviated in the preceed-
ing Difcourfe. And the certain Truth of thefe Do6lrines,
concerning God's eternal Purpofes, will follow from what wa§
jufl: nowobferved concerning God's univerfal Providence j how
it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God,
orders all Events, and the Volitions of moral Agents amongft
others, by fuch a decifive Difpofal, that the Events are infaj-
Jibly connected with his Difpofal. For if God difpofes all
Events, fo that the infallible Exiftence of the Events is decided
,by his Providence, then he doubtlefs thus orders and decides
Things knowingly^ and on Defign. God don't do what he does^
. »cr order what h« orders, accidentally and unawares j either
t O o mthout

290 t:^^ CONCLUSION.

without^ or hefide his Intention. And if there be a foregoing
Defign of _doing and ordering as he does, this is the fame with
a Pitrpofe or Decree. And as it has been fliewn, that nothing
is new to God, in any Refpedl, but all Things are perfe6lly
and equally in his View from Eternity ; hence it will follow,
that his Defigns or Purpofes are not Things formed anew,
founded on any new Views or Appearances, but are all eternal
Purpofes. And as it has been now Ihewn, how the Do6!rine
of determining efficacious Grace certainly follows from"
Things proved in the foregoing Difcourfe ; hence will necef-
farily follow the DocStrine of particular^ eternal^ abfolute Eleffion, '\
For if Men are made true Saints, no otherwife than as God
makes 'em fo, and diftinguidies 'em from others, by an effica-
cious Power and Influence of his, that decides and fixes the
Event J and God thus makes fome Saints, and not others, oa
Defign or Purpofe, and (as has been now obferved) no Defigns
of God are new ; it follows, that God thus diftinguifhed from
others, all that ever become true Saints, by his eternal Defign
or Decree.-— I might alfo fliew, how God's certain Foreknow-
ledge muft fuppofe an abfolute Decree, and how fuch a Decree
can be proved to a Demonftration from it : But that this Dif-
courfe mayn't be lengthen'd out too much, that muft be omit-
ted for the prefcnt.

From thefe Things it will inevitably follow, that however
Chrift in fome Senfe may be faid to die for all^ and to redeem
all vifible Chriftians, yea the whole World by his Death ; yet
there muft be fomething particular in the Defign of his Death,
with Refpe6l to fuch as He intended Ihould adually be faved
thereby. As appears by what has-been now ftiewn, God has
the adual Salvation or Redemption of a certain Number in J
his proper abfolute Defign, and of a certain Number only y
and therefore fuch a Defign only can be profecuted in any.;
Thing God does, in order to the Salvation of Men. God.
purfues a proper Defign of the Salvation of the Ele6t in giving
Chrift to die, and profecutes fuch a Defign with Refped to no
other, moft ftricftly Ipeaking j for 'tis impoffible, that God
fliould profecute any other Defign than only fuch as He has :
Ke certainly don't, in the higheft Propriety and Stridnefs of

•Speech, purfue a Defign that He has not. And indeed fuch

a Particularity and Limitation of Redemption will as infallibly

follow from the Do6^rine of God's Foreknowledge, as from

that of the Decree. For 'tis as impoffible, in StricStnefs of

• Speech, > that Gcd ftiould profecute a Defign or Aim at a

Thins*;

TU CONCLUSION. 291

Thing, which He at the fame Time moft perfectly knows will
not be accomplifhed, as that he (hould uie Endeavours for
that which is befide his Decree.

By the Things which have been proved, are obviated fomc
of the mainObjeaions againft theDo6trine of the infallible and
neceiTary Perfeverance of Saints, and fome of the main lounda-
tions of this Do(5trine are eftabiilhed. The main Prejudices
of Arminians againft this Dodrine feem to be thefe j they lup-
pofe fuch a neceffary, infallible Perfeverance to be repugnant
to the Freedom of the Will ; that it mull be owing tc Man's
own felf-determining Power, that he /r// beco??ies vertuous and
holy ; and (o in like Manner, it muft be left a Thing contin-
gent, to be determin'd by the fame Freedom of \^ ill, whether
he vv^ill perfevere in Vertue and Holinefs ; and that otherwife
his continuing ftedfaft in Faith and Obedience would not be
his Vertue, or at ail Praife-worthy and Rewardable ; nor cculd
his Perfeverance be properly the Matter of divine Commands,
Counfels & Promifes, nor his Apoftacy be properly threaten'd,
and Men warned againil it. Whereas we find all thefe Thmgs
in Scripture : There we find Stedfaftnefs and Perfeverance in
trus Chriftianity, reprefented as the Vertue of the Saints,
fpoken of as Praife-v/orthy in them, and glorious Rewards
: promifed to it ; and alfo find,that God makes it the Subjed of
his Commands, Counfels and Promifes ; and the contrary, of
Threatnings and Warnings. But the Foundation of thefe
..Objections has been removed, in it's being (hewn that moral
Neceility and infallible Certainty of Events is not inconfiftent
with thefe Things ; and that, as to Freedom of Will lying in
the Power of the Will tp determine it felf, there neither is any
fuch Thing, nor any Need of it, in order to Vertue, Reward,
Commands, Counfels, &c.

And as the Doctrines of efficacious Grace and abfolute
Ele6lion do certainly follow from Things which have been
proved in the preceeding Difcourfe ; fo fome of the main
. Foundations of the Do6lrine of Perfeverance are thereby efta-
biilhed. If the Beginning of true Faith and Holine's, and a
Man's becoming a true Saint at firft, don't depend on the
felf-determining Power of the Will, but on the deter-
mining efficacious Grace of God ; it may well be argued,
that it is fo alfo with Refpec^ to Men's being continued Saints,
or perfevering in Faith and Holinefs. The ConverfiOn of a
Sinner being not owing to a Man's Self-determination, but
' to God's DeterminatioHj and eternal EleiVioa, which in abfo-

O o 2 Ivitv,

292 The CONCLUSION,

lute, and depending on the fovereign Will of God, and not
on the free Will of Man ; as is evident from what has been
faid : And it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the
eternal Eledlion which there is of Saints to Faith and Holinefs,
is alfo an Eledion of them to- eternal Salvation ; hence their
Appointment to S,alvation muft alfo be abfolute, and not de-
pending on their contingent, felf-determining Will. From
all which it follows, that it is abfolutely fix'd in God's Decree,
that all true Saints (hail perfevere to adual eternal Salvation.

But I muO: leave all thefe Things to the Confiderafion of
the fair and impartial Reader ; and vv'hen he has maturely
weighed them, I would propofe it to his Conlideration, whe-
ther many of the tiril Reformers, and others that fucceeded
them, whom God in their Day made the chief Pillars of his
Church, and greateft Inftruments of their Deliverance from
Error and Darknefs, and of the Support of the Caufe of
Piety among them, have not been injured, in the Contempt
with which they have been treated by many late Writers, for
their teaching and maintaining fuch Dcdtrines as are com-
monly called Cahinijuc. Indeed fome of thefe new Writers,
at the fame Time that they have reprefented the Do6trines of
thefe antient and eminent Divines, as in the higheft Degree
ridiculous, and contrary to common Senfe, in an Oftentation
of a very generoqs Charity, have allowed that they were honeil:
well-meaning Men : Yea, it may be fome of them, as tho' it
were in great Condefcenfion and Compaflion to them, have
allowed that they did pretty well for the Day which they lived
3n, and confidering the great Difadvantages they laboured un-
der : When at the fame Time, their Manner of Specking has
naturally and plainly faggefted to the Mipds of their Readers,
that they were Perfons, who through the Lownefs of their
Genius, and Greatnefs of the Bigotry, with which their Minds
Vv'ere Ihackled, and Thoughts coniined, living in the gloomy
Caves of Superftition, fondly embraced, and demurely and zea-^
loufly taught the moft abiurd, filly and monilrous Opinions,
worthy of the greateil: Contempt of Gentlemen poffefied of
that noble and generous Freedom of Thought, which happily
prevails in this Age of Light and Enquiry. When indeed fuch
is the Cafe, that we might, if fo difpofed, fpeak as big Words,
as they, and on far better Grounds. And really all the Ar^
•miniam on Earth might be challenged without Arrogance or
Vanity, tc make thefe Principles of theirs wherein they mainly
4iftr froci their fathiys, whom tl>ey fo Xiiuch defpife? con*

^ fiftent

r/^^ CONCLUSION. 29s

fiftent with common Seiife j yea, and perhaps to produce any
Dodrine ever embraced by the bhndeft Bigot of theChurch of
Rome^ov the moft ignorant M.ujfulman^ or extravagant Enthufiaft,
that might be reduced to more, and more demonllrable Incon-
fiftencics, & Repugnancies to c*mmonSenre,and to themfelves ;
tho' their Inconfiftencies mdeed may not he fo deep, or be {6
artfully vail'd by a deceitful Ambiguity of Words, and an in-
determinate Signification of Phrafes. I will not deny, that

thefe Gentlemen, many of them, are Men of great Abilities,
and have been, helped to higher Attainments in Philofophy,
than thofe antient Divines^ and have done great Service to the
Church of God in fome Refpeds : But I humbly conceive,
that their differing from their Fathers with fuch magifterial
AlTurance, in thefe Points in Divinity, muil be owing to fome
other Caufe than fuperiour Wifdom.

It may alfo be worthy of Confideration, whether the great
^Iteration which has been made in the State of Things in our
Nation, and fome other Parts of the Proteftant World, in
this and the pad Age, by the exploding fo generally CahinijVic
Dodrines, that is fo often fpoken of as worthy to be greatly
Tejoyced in by the Friends of Truth, Learning and Vertue, as
an Inftance of the great Increafe of Light in the Chriftian
Church ; 1 fay, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether
this be indeed a happy Change, owing to any fuch Caufe as
an Increafe of true Knov^lege and Underftanding in Things
of Religion ; or whether there is not Reafbn to fear, that it
may be owing to fome worfe Caufe.

And I deiire it may be confidered, whether the Boldnefs
of fome Writers may not be worthy to be refle6led on, who
have not fcrupled to fay, That if thefe and thofe Things are
true (which yet appear to be the demonftrable* Dilates of
Reafon, as well as the certain Dictates of the Mouth of the
moft High) then God is unjull: and cruel, and guilty of manifeft
Deceit and double-dealing, and the like. Yea, fome have
gone fo far,as confidently to afrert,That if anyBook which pre-
tends to be Scripture, teaches fuch Dodrines, that alone is fuf-
ficient Warrant for Mankind to reject it, as what cannot be
the Word of God. Some who have not gone fo far, have
faid, That if the Scripture feems to teach any fuch Do6trines,fa
contrary to Reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other In-
^pretation of thofe Texts, where fuch DocSlrines feem to be
exhibited. Others exprefs themfelves yet more modefily : They
exprefs a Tendernefs and religious Fear, left they Paould re-*
•civp zuid teach any Thing that ihould feem to refle<5l oaGod's

moral

294 ^^^ CONCLUSION.

inoral CharacfVer, or be a Difparagement to his Methods of
Adminiftration, in his moral Government ; and therefore ex-
prefs themfelves as not daring to embrace fome Do6lrines,
though they feem to be deHvered in Scripture, according to
the more obvious and natural Conftru(ftion of the Words*
But indeed it would (hew a truer Modefty and Humility,
if they would more entirely rely on God's Wifdom and Dif-
cerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreable
to his own Perfecflions, and never intended to leave thefe Mat-
ters to the Decifion of the Wifdom and Difcerning of Men ;
but by his own unerring Inftruclion, to determine for us what
the Truth is ; knowing how little our Judgment is to be de-
pended on, and how extremely prone, vain and blind Men are,
to err in fuch Matters.

The Truth of the Cafe is, that if the Scripture plainly
taught the oppofite Dodrines, to thofe that are fo much ftum-
bled at, viz, the Jrminian Do61rine of Free-Will, and others
depending thereon, it would be the greateft of all Difficulties
that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its con-
taining any, even the moft myfterious of thofe Dodrines of the
firft Reformers, which our late Free-thinkers have fo fuperci-
lioufly exploded.— Indeed it is a glorious Argument of the
Pivinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach fuchDo6trines,
which in one Age and another, thro' the Blindnefs of Men's
Minds, and ftrong Prejudices of their Hearts, are rejeded, as
moft abfurd and unreafonable, by the wife and great Men of
the World ; which yet, when they are moft carefully and
ftridly examined, appear to be exactly agreable to the moft
demonftrable, certain, and natural Dictates of Reafon. By
fuch Things it appears, that the Foolijhnefs of God is wifir than
Meriy and God does as is faid in i Cor. i. 19, 20. For it is
written^ I will deftroy the Wifdoin of the Wife ; / will bring to no^
thing the Und^rjianding of the Prudent. Where is the Wife I Where
is the Scribe f Where is the Difputer of this World ! Hath not God
piadefoolijh the Wifdom of this World ? And as it ufed to be in
Time paft, fo it is probable it will be in Time to come, as it
is there written, in ver. 27,28,29. But God hath chofen the foolijh
Things of the Worlds to confound the Wife : And God hath chofen the
weak Things of the World, to confound the Things thai are mighty :
And bafe Tlnngs of the World, and Things which are defpifed, hath
God chofen : Tea, and Things which are not, to bring to noughtThingf
that are ; thai no Flejh Jhould glory in hisPrefence, Amen.

F I N I S,

INDEX

{N. B. The Capital P. fignifies the Part\ this Mark, §, the
Section ; ConcL the Conclufton ; and the fmall p. the P^^^ ;
where the Things here rpeciiied, are to be found.]

yfBftranidox Ahjirufe Rea-

\j^ foning, whether juftly

objeded againft Calvi-

■nijis, P. 4. § 13. p. 278.

\ ASiion^ Inconfiftence of the

dency to fuperfede all Ufe of
Means, and make Endeavours
vain, P. 4. § 5. p. 222. and in
EfFed, to exclude all Vertuc
and Vice out of the World,

■:<^r;w/m'^«Notionofit, P.4. §2. P. 3. §4. p. 161, 167. Ibid.

199. and whence this arofe,

204. what it is in the com-
"mon Notion of it, Ibid. p. 201.
—and how diftinguifh'd from
^Pajfion^ Ibid. p. 203.
• ASiivity of the Nature of the
Soul, whether thro' this. Voli-
tion can arife without aCaufe,
t. 2. § 4. p. 47.

Apparent Good, the greateft,
'in what Senfe it determines
•the Will, P. I. § 2. p. 7.

Arminians, obliged to talk
inconfiftently, P. 2. § 5. p. 53.
^Ibid. § 7. p. 70. §. 9. p. 77.
where the main Strength of
their pretendedDemonftrations
^lies, P. 4. § 4. p. 219. Their
Obje6tion from God's moral
'■Chara6ler, confider'd and re-
torted. Ibid. § II. p. 271,2.

Armhmn Do^rine^ its Tcn-

§ 6. p. 184. and § 7. p. 190.
p. 276.

4. § I. p. 196,7. Ibid. § 12

,7. It

Atheifm, the fuppofed Ten-
dency of C^/ww/Z^/VPrinciples to
it, P. 4. § 12. p. 274. How
Arnilnian Principles tend to it.
Ibid. p. 275,

Attending to Motives, of Li-
berty's being fuppofed to con-
fift in an Ability for it, P. 2.
§ 9. p. 80.

Atonement, See Christ.

Author of Sin, whether it
would follow from the Doc-
trine here maintain'd, that
God is fo, P. 4. § 9. p. 252.

jnLam.e-worthinefs, wherein it
•^ confifts, according to com-
mon Senfe, P. 4. § 4. p. 212.

Cahimjm^

I N D E X

f^Alifhiifm^ confiftent with
^ common Senfe, P. 4. § 3.
p. 2g6.

Cauje^ how the Word is
tifed in this Difcourfe, P. 2.
§ 3. p. 41. No Event without
one, P. 2. § 3. p. 42.— and
Effe^y a neceiTary Conneoflon
between them,P.2. § 8. p. 73.-
This refpedts morale as well as
naturalCaufes, P. 2. § 3. p. 41.

Chrtji^ his Obedience necel-
fary, yet vertuous and praife-
tvorthy, P. 3. § i. p. 139. His
Atonement excluded in Con-
fequence of Arminian Princi-
ples, P. 3. § 3- P- 158.

Chubb (Mr.) the Inconfift-
rnce of his Scheme of Liberty^
&c. P. 2. § 9. p. 85,-98.

Commands^ confiftent with
moral Neceftity and Inability,

P.3-§4-P-i59-'P-.4-§^i-P-

270. Inconfiftent vj'nhArminian

Principles,. P. 3. § 4- P- i^i-

Common SenJ^, why the Prin-
ciples maintain'd in this Dif-
courfe,appear to fome contrary
to it, P. 4. § 3. p. 206. Ne-
ceiTary Vertue &Vice agreable
to it, P. 4. § 4. p. 212. — Jr~
minlan Tenets oppofite to it,
P. 3. § 6. p. 178. Ibid. § 7.
p. 187.

Co7itingcnce^ P. I. § 3. p. 20.
thelnconfiftence of theNotion,
P. 2. § 3. p. 45. Whether ne-
ceflary in order to Liberty, P.

2. § 8. p. 73. implied in

Jrtninian Liberty, and yet in-
confiftent with It, P. 2. § 13.
p. 132. Epicurus the greateit
Maintainer of it, P. 4. § 6. p.
aa8. Ibid. § 12. p. 275.

Corruption of Man^t Nature,

CONCL. p. 287.

Creation of the Worlds at fuch
a particular Time and Flace^ P.
4. § 8. p. 240*

T\Ecree abfolute^notitikrnng
-*-^ Neceffity, any more than
certain Fore-knowledge does,
P. 2. § 12. p. 122. How it fol-
lows from Things proved in
thisDifcour.e. Concl. p. 289.

Dcfsrminatior,. See IVill.

Dictates. See Vnderftanding,

'T'FfeSf, See Caufe.

■^ Ej/icaciousGrace,Qot^.^.2^^*,
EleSiion pcrfonaL See Decree,
Endeavours^ what it is for

them to be in vain^ P. 4. § 5.

p. 220. Render'd vain by,

Anninian Principles, Ibid. p.

222. But not fo by Calvinifmy

Ibid. p. 224. — See Sincerity,
Entrance of Sin into the

World, P. 4. § 10. p. 268.
Equilibrium. See Indifference,
Exhortation. See Invitation,

T^AIIen Man, See Inability.
-^ Fatefioical, P. 4. § 6. p.228.!^

Fatality., the Principles of
Arminians inferring that which ';
is mofl: {hocking, P. 4.. § 8-. p.
251.

Foreknowledge of God, of Vo*
litions of moral Agents,proved
P, 2. § 1 1, p. 98.— Inconfift-
ent with Contingence, P. 2.
§ 12. p, I ij7\ Proves Neceffity,
as much as a Decree, Ibid, p.
122. The feeming Difficulty
of reconciling it with the Sin-
cerity of hisPrtcepts^Counfelsp

&c.

I N D EX.

&c. not peculiar to thtCalvlnifik
Scheme, P. 4. 5 ii. p. 271.

f^OD^ his Being how known,
^ P.2. §3,p.43. P.4.§i2.
p. 275. His moral Excellencies
neceffary, yet vertuous and
praife-worthy,P. 3. M- P-^SS-
P. 4. § 4. p. 219. The Ne-
ceffity of his Volitions, P. 4. §
7. p. 230. Whether the Prin-
ciples maintain'd in this Dif-
courfe are inconfiftent with his
moral Character, P. 4. § 11.
p. 270. How Armmiamjm de-
stroys the Evidence of his mo-
ral rerfe(5tions. Ibid p. 272.

Grace of the Spirit^ excluded
by Jrmiman Principles, P. 3. §

3. p. 159.

Grace^ii^s Freenefs confident
with the moral NecefRty of
God's Will, P. 4. § 8. p. 249.

TTJhitSy vertuous & vicious,
"^-^ inconfiftent withv^rw/«/^«
Principles, P. 3. § 6. p. 181.

Heathen, of their Salvation,
P. 3. § 5. p. 177.

Hobbes^ his Doctrine of Ne-
cefTity, P. 4. S 6. p. 229.

jMpofibility, the fame as ne-
■* gativeNeceffity,P.i.53.p.i9.
Inability^ how the Word is
iifed in common Speech, and
how by Metaphyficians and Jr~
miniansy P. i. § 4. p. 14, 17.
P. 4. § 3. p. 207. Natural and
moral, P. i. § 4. p. 20. Moral,
the feveral Kinds of it, P. i. §

4. p. 25. P. 3. § 4. p. 165.
— of fallen Man to perform
perfcv^ Obedience, P. 3- § 3

p. 157, What does, and what
does not excufeMenj P. 3. § 3,
p. 155. Ibid. §4. p. 167. P. 4.
$ 3. p. 206.

Inclinatlom ; fee Habits,

Indifference, whether Liberty

confifts in it, P. 2. § 7. p. 63.

-—Not necefTary to Vertue,but

inconfiftent with it, P. 3. § 6,

p. 178.

IndifferentThings, thoio. which
appear fo, never the Objecfts of
Volition, P. I. & 2. p. 7. P. 2.
§ 6. p. 56. Whether the Will
can determine it {qM in chufing
among fuch Things, P. 2. § 6»

p. SI',

Invitations, confif^ent with
moral Neceffity and Inability.
P. 3. §4. p. 169. P. 4. § II.
p. 270. But not connftent with
Arminian Principles, P. 2. § 9.
p. 8r. P. 3. § 7. p. 188. P4.
S II. p. 272.

T Aws, the End whereof is to
-^ bind to one Side, render'd
ufelefs by Arminian Principles,
P. 3. § 4. p. 162.

Liberty, tht Natur^of it,P. i.
h 5. p. 27, ■ The Arminian No^
tion of it, . Ibid. p. 28. This
inconfiftent with other Armz
iiian Notions, P. 2. § 9. p, 77,
t^c,

Licentiotijhefs, whether the
Calvinifiic Dodtrine tends to it,
P. 4. § 12. p. 275. — See£«-
deavours,

l\jrAchineSy whether Cahinifm
•^'^ makes Men fuch. P. 4.
§ 5. p. 226.

Meansy fee Endeavours,
P p Mita^hyfi^i

I N D E X.

Metaphyseal Reafoning ; fee
Ahfiraaed.-'-To be juftly ob-
jected againft the Armmian
Scheme, P. 4. S 13. p. 283.

Moral Agency^ it*s Nature,

P. I. s 5. p, 29.

Motives^ what they are, P. i,
§ 2. p. 5, 6, The ftrongeft
determining the Will, Ibid,
p. 6. P. 2. S 10. p. 88» A-
mtnian Principles inconliftent
with their Influence and Ufe
in moral A6tions, P. 3. § 7. p.
185. P. 4. § II. p. 273.

Atural Notions ', fee common
Se7ife,

Necejftty^ how the Term is
ufed in common Speech, and
how by Philofophers, P. 1.
§3. p. 13. P. 4. ! 3. p. 207.

Philofophical, of various

Kinds, Ibid. p. 210. Natural
and moral, P. i. § 4. p. 20.
P. 4. §4. p. 217.— No Liberty
without moral Necefiity, P. 2.
§ 8. p. 73. Neccflity andGon-
tingence,both inconfiftentwith
Ahmman Liberty, P. 2. § 13.
p. 131.— Neceflity of God's
Volition, P. 3. § I. p. 135.
P. 4. § 7. p. 230. This con-
iiftent v/ith the Freenefs of his
Grace, Ibid. § 8. p. 249.— Ne-
ccfTity, of Chrift's Obedience,
^^•' ^' 3* § 2.' p. 140. — of fhe
Sin of fuch as are given up to
jSin, P. 3: § 3. p. 153.—— of
fallen Man, in general, P.3. §
3. p. 157. What Neceffity
•wholly excufes Men, P. 3 § 4.
jp. 168, P. 4. §. 3. p. 206. and
§4. p. 215.

/\Bedience ; fe? Chrift^ Com^
^-^. mandsy Neceffity,

"p Articles perfe^ly alike , of the
^ Creator's placing fuch dif-i
ferently, P. 4. § 8. p. 242.
Perfeverance of Saints ^ CoNr

CLUS. p, 291.

Promifes^ \vh ether any are.
made to the Endeavours of
iinregenerate Sinners, P. 3.-
§ 5. p. 176..

Providenecy univerfal and de-
cifive. CoNCL. p. 286.
T^Edemption partiaular. CoN-
•^ CLUS. p. 290.

Refor7ners ^/>^/r/?,how treated
by many late Writers. Con-
CLus. p. 292. '

Qjints in Heaven^ their Li-
"^ berty, P. 4. § 4. p. 219.

Scripture^ of, the Ar?ninians
Arguments from thence, P. 4.
§ II. p. 273.

Self- deter ?nming Power of the
Willy it's Inconliftence, P. 2.
§ I. p.31. Evafwns of the Ar-
guments againft it confidered,
P. 2. § 2. p. 35. fliewn to be
impertinent. Ibid. § 5. p. 51.

Sin ; fee Author y Entrance',

Sincerity of Defires and En-
deavours y-v^hit is no juft Excufe,
P. 3. § 5. p. 170. The different
Sorts ot Sincerityy lb. p. 175.

Shthy not encouraged by
Calvinifm^ P. 4. $ 5. p. 224.

Stoic Phikfophersy great The-
ifls,P. 4. § 12. p. 2y4..~SeeFate.

Stfpending Vclitiony of the
Liberty of the Will fuppofed
to coniift in an Ability for it,

P. 2. S 7- P- 70. P. 3- § 4-
p. 164. Ibid. § 7. p. 186.

Tendency

I N D E X.

CJ^Endency of the Principles
-^ here maintairi'djtoAtheifm
and Licentioufneii^, the Ob-
jcition confider'd and retorted^
P. 4. § 12. p. 274.

T/'Ertue and pke, the Being
^ of neither of 'em confid-
ent with Jrm'mia?i Principles ;
•See Arminian Doctrine, Their
Eflence, not lying in their
Caufe, but their Nature, P. 4.

I. p. 192.

Underjianding, how it deter-
mines the Wilj, P. I. § 2. p.
12. P. 2. § 9. p. 76. Dictates
©f thellnderftanding asidW^ili,.
as luppofed by fome, the fame,
P. 2. §Q. p. 81.

Uneajinefsy as fuppoffed to

determine the Will, P. i. § 2.

VoUfion^ not wiDhout aCaufe,
P.2.§3.p.46. P.2.§4. p.50.

•rrrlLLy it's. Nature, P. r.
§ I. Pj, i,^r. Its Deterr
mination, rT i. § 2. p. 5, is^c.
The very Being of fuch a Fa-
culty inconfifteiU with Armi-
nian Principles, P. 3. § 7. p.
190.— Of God, Jecrct and
revealed^ P. 4. § 9. p. 262. Ar-
minians themfclves oblig'd to
allow fuch a Diftlndion, Ibid,
p. 264.

WUlingnefs to Duty, what is
no Excufe for the Negle6t of
it. See Binarity,

Advertifement.

E R R A T A. ^^ ;

pAge 26. line 22.read,c:^;^^^r/wzg'.-— p.34l.i.r.6't'/7'*-^'^— p.37,
■* 1. 27. r. eicciie that— p. 65. 1. 2. from Bot.r.and (2^7 the-—
p. 82. 1. laft, r. Notion of Liberty he jujl^ then all Liberty —
p. 91. L 12. r. Thus^ if— Ibid. 1. 37. for (7r,r. <?«— p. 115.L
3C.r. their wziT^?/— p. 132.1. 3.dele «^/— -p.183. 1. i. dele //;.—=
ibid, 1, 3a, x.Jh^withey are not—-p. 2^0,1. 37,8. x.meafurallcc

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Mr. Eldad King, TVoodburyy Conm^hut,
Mr. Thomas Kimberly, ditto,
Mr. Nathanael Kneeland, Bojion^ Majfachufem
Hugh Knox, A. M.

MR. Benjamin Lawrence, Newton^ New-York.
Mr. John Leavitt, MaJJachufetts,
Rev. Mr. Dudley Leavitt, Salem, ditto,
Mr. Afaph Leavitt, Northampton, ditto.

Rev. Mr. Mark Leavenworth, IVaterhury, Conne^licitt, 6 Books,
Mr. Garrit Ledikker, Student at New-Jerfey College.
Rev. Mr. Jonathan Lee, Salijhury, ConneSlicut,
Rev. Mr. Daniel Little, Wells, Majfachufetts,
Mr. Peter Vanburgh Livingilon, Ne%V'Tork,
Mr. John Lloyd, Stamford, ConneSiicut.
Rev. Mr. James Lockwood, TFeathersfield, ditto.
Rev. Mr. Elijah Lothrop, Hebron, ditto,
Mr, Samuel Lowdon, New-Tork,
Mr. John Lyon, Newark, New-Jerfey,
Mr. Phineas Lyman, Northampton, Maffachufetts,
Mr. John Lapiley, Ruling Jilaer at Kylf^th, Scotlaud.
Rev. Mr, Lawrence Hill, of the Barony Parifh, in Glafgow.
Mr. Logan, Preacher at Edinhurg, Scotland, 24 Books.

M. j

Ev, Mr, David Marlnus, Achquechenonk, IVefl-New-Jerfey, , j

Mr. EUenezer Martin, Student at Yale-College, \

Mr. Henry Martin, New-York. 6 Books, 1

Mr, James Martin, ditto, 6'*ooks, '

Mr. Robert McAlpine, ditto, 12 Books^ ,

Samuel McClintock, A. B. j

Mr. John McKeffon, Student at New-Jerfey College. j
Mr. Edward Marrow, Reading, Majfachujetts,
Capt, Richard Meux, Ntv-' -Kent-County, f^irginia, 12 Books.
Rev. Mr. Jadidiah M^Ils, Riptgn^ QiiwOiinU '^ Books-

Jcdidial*

SUBSCRIBERS.

Mr. Jofeph Miller, Majfachufetts,

Mr. Ebenezer Mills, ditto.

Jedidiah Mills, Jun. A. M. Derby ^ ConneSiiciit^ 6 Book^,

Mr. Ephraim Minor, Woodbury^ Conne£lu-v.t,

Deacon Samuel Minor, Woodbury^ ditts.

Mr. John Minor, Jun. Bethlem^ ditto,

Timothy Mix, A. M. 6 Books.

Mr. John Moffat, New-York,

Rev. Mr. John Moorhead, Bojon^ Majfachufetts.

Mr. Jofeph Montgomery, Student at New-Jerfey College.

Mr. James Morris, Bethlnn^ ConneSiicut.

Mr. Samuel Mofeley, -— - Majfachufetts. 6 Bopks.

Rev. Mr. John McLaurin, Glafgow^ Scotland.

Rev. Mr. William McCullock, Cambkflang., Scotland,

Mr. John Munn, Deerfield., Majfachufetts.

Mr. John Murdock, late Baily of Glafgow., Scotland.

Mx, Peter Murdock, Student at TaU-CoUege.

V/l R, Thomas Naprefs, late Bailie of Glafgotv., Scotland.
^^ Rev. Mr. Samuel Newell, New-Cambridge., Farmijigtdfi^
Conneaicut. 6 Books.

Ebenezer Nichols,Efq; Reading., Majfachufetts.
ReVi Mr. Samuel Niles, Braintrce^ ditto ^ 2 Books.

Mr. • Nimmo, Receiver-General of the Excife, Scotland,

Mr. Gideon Noble, Student at Tale- College.

Mr. Garrat Noel, Bookfeller, New-Torky 2^ Books.

MR. Thomas Ogden, New-York.
Mr. John Old, Majfachufetts,

"D Ev. Mr. Jonathan V^ccionsyNewhuryyMaJfachufdts. 6 Books,

-■^ Rev. Mr. Mofes Parfons, ditto.

Mr. Nathaniel Parker, Readings ditto.

Mr. Samuel Parkhurft, Newark., Ncw-Jerfey.

Rev. Mr. Ebenezer Pemberton, Bojhn^ Majfachufetts,.

Mr. Nathaniel Phelps, , ditto.

Rev. Mr. James Pike, Somerswcrth, New-Hji-mpfjirc.

Rev. Mr. Timothy Pitkin, Farmington^ Conned icut, 6 Book*.

SUBSCRIBERS.

Mr. Afhbell Pitkin, Student at rde'Cellege,
Rev. Mr. Thomas YxincQ^ Bojion^ MaJj'achufetU,
ilev. Mr. Ebenezer Prime, Long-Ifiand,

Mr. John Prout, , CmneSiicnt.

Mr. Abraham Purdy, Hanover^ Nevj-Torky
Hon. Jofeph Pynchon, Efq; Bofton^ Majfachufetts,

6 Books.
6 Books*

MR. Wilham Rainfey, Student ^.tNew-Jerfey College.
Rev. Mr. Randal, Inckture^\Scotland.

Mr. James Reeves, Student at New-Jerfey College.

Rev. Mr. Aaron Richards, Raivay^ New^JerJey.

Mr. Jofeph Riggs, Newark^ ditto,

Mr. Arthur Robertfon, Merchant, Glafgow^ Scotland,

Rev. Mr. Philemon Robins, Branfardy Conne^icut^ 2 Bjoks,

Mr. Chandler Robins, Student at Tale-College,

Mr. Philemon Robins, Jun. Student at ditio.

Rev. Mr. Nathaniel Rogers, Ipfwich, Maffacbujdts,

Mr. JefTe Roots, Woodbury^ Conne^kut,

Ecnajah Roots, A. B,

Mr. Robert Rofs, Strr.tfald,, Connefflcut, 2 Books.

Mr. Timothy Rofe, Bcthlem^ Conne^ffcut,

MR. David Sanford, Student at Tale-College,
^Mr. Edmund Sawyer, Newbury , MaJJhchufctts.
Mr. Samuel Sawyer, ditto.
Mr. Robert Scot, Jun. Merchant in Glafgciu,

Mr. John Se^rle, MaJJachufetts.

Rev. Jofeph Sewall, D. D. Bojion^ Mcjadmfeits,

Mr. Jofeph '^^^{^xons^—MaJfachufetts.

Mr. Thomas Seymour,— -^/V/^,

Mr. Thomas Seymour, Student at Tale-College,

Mr. Thorqas Shelden, Suffieldy ditto.

Mr. Reuben Sherman, JVoodlniry^ Conne£lici'i »

Mr. David Shipman, Neivark^ Nevj^Jerfey.

Mr. Jofeph Shippen, Jun. A. B.

Rtv, Mr. Robert Siiliman, Norwalk^ Conne£licut,

Mr. Ebenezer Smeads, Deerfeld., Majfaclmfeits.

P'Tr. Smibcrt, at Kihncnie., Scotland.

f/lr. The Hon. WiDiam Sm.ith, Efqj Nciv-Tork.

Mr. WiJliarn Smith, Jun. ditto.

}Ax. Jpnathnn Smith, Bethlem^ Cor.nepicni,

6 Books.

SUBSCRIBERS.

Ivcv. Mr. Smith, Newhurn^ Scotland. 2 Books^

Mr. Daniel Smith, Woodbury ^ Connecticut. 12 Books.

'Mr. Ephraim Starkweather, ^tudent at Tale-College.
,!Rev. Mr. James Stirling, Glafgow^ Scotland.
Mr. Simeon Stoddard, Student at Tale College.
Mr. Smith Stratten, Student at New-Jerfey College,
Mr. John Strong, Student at Tale College. 2 Books.

Rev. Mr. Strong, New- Marlborough ., MaJJhchufetts

Mr. Nehemiah Strong, Student at 1[ ale-College.

Mr. Nicholas Street, Majfachujetts.

.Mr. James Stuart,- Receiver-General of the Widow's Annuity
Scotland.

in Ev. Mr. Nathan Tayler, New-MUford., Conneaictet.
''"^ Mr. John Temple, Readings Majfachufetts.

Mr. Thomas Tiffany, ditto.

Mr, Gerfhom Tinney, Bofton., Majfachufetts,

Lieut. Richard Thayer, Braintree., ditto. 2 Books.

William Thompfon, A. B.

Rev. Mr. Samuel Todd, Northbinjy ConneSlicut.

Mr. John Tompfon, New-Tork.

Mr, Jeremiah Townfend, New-Haven., ConneBicut.

Mr. Ifaac Townfend, Student at N^w-y^r/^_y College.

Mr. Traill, Bookfeller, Edinburgh Scotland. 6 "Books.,

Rev. Mr. Henry True, Hamp/lead, New-Hat?ipfjir^.
Rev. Mr. John Trumhle ,. IFaterbury, ConneSlicut,
Rev. Mr. Turnbell, Denny, Scotland.

U.
I^Aptain James Utley, Majfachufetts.

MR. Noah Waddam, A. B.
Rev. Mr. Walker, South-Lleth, Scotland.
Rev. Mr. Thomas Walker, at Dundonnald, Scotland.
R.ev. Mr. Robert Wallis, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Mr. John Walton, Jun. Reading, Maj/aclmfetts.
Mr. Jofiah Walton, ditto.
Rev. Mr. Wandrope, Bathgate, Scotland.
Rev. Mr. Alexander Webiter, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Robert Wei wood, Elq; Gelloi, Scotland.
Mr. Samuel Wellea, Deerficld, MaJJachufetts.
Mr. Stephen Weil:, Student at Tale-College.

SUBSCRIBERS.

Mr. Nath. Whittaker, Bafking-Ridge^ New-Jeifey, 2 Books,

Deacon Jabe^^Whittlefey, Bethlem^ ConneSiicut.

Rev. Mr. Stephen Williams, Springfield^ Majfachufctts, 6Book^,

Mr. Samuel Williams, Ipfwichy MaJJachufetts.

Rev. Mr. George W\ih.2.n^ Edinburgh Scotland.

Rev. Mr. Jeremiah Wife, Berwick^ Maffachufetts,

Rev. Mr. John Witherfpoon, Beath^ Scotland.

Timothy Woodbridge, Efq; Maffachufetts.

John Wright, A. M. Hanover ^ Virginia^ 12 Books.

Mr. Philip Freeman, Bofton^ Majfachufetts,

Mr. William Hyflup Bojign, Merchant, MaJJachufetts.

Mr. Ebenezer Little, Neivbury^ Majfachufetts.

N. B. 7/* there Jhould be any of the Names in the foregoing Lift
without their proper Titles ., wrong^pelt^ or Places of Abode
not right inferted^ wi deftre the fame ma-^ he excufedy as done
thro' Mijlake,

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